Pradeep Kant, J.;- Heard learned counsel for the parties. These are two writ petitions, filed by Sri Anand Swarup Chaudhry and others, praying for quashing of all the proceedings in Original Suits No. 65/2007 and 267/2007, pending in the court of Judge, Small Causes Court/Civil Judge, Faizabad. Since both the petitions relate to the common property and the issues of facts and law are common, we have heard them together and they are being disposed of by a common order. 2. Briefly, the facts relate to a house (no. 3/15/29) constructed by late Sri Laxmi Narayan Chaudhary situate at Dhara Road, Faizabad, by purchasing a land out of his own earnings in the year 1952. He died on 29.11.1982 leaving behind three sons, namely, Sri Gyan Swarup Chaudhary, Sri Anand Swarup Chaudhary (petitioner) and Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary (opposite party), two daughters, Smt. Kamla Devi and Smt. Krishna Devi and five grandchildren, namely, Sri Pankaj Chaudhary son of Sri Gyan Swarup Chaudhary born on 23.06.1976, Sri Raj Vardhan born on 25.03.1965 and Sri Prabhakar Vardhan born on 26.01.1968 sons of Sri Anand Swarup Chaudhary and Sri Prashant Chaudhary born in 1977 and Sri Vivek Chaudhary born on 08.09.1982 both sons of Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary. 3. Original suit bearing no. 231 of 1986 was preferred on 23.08.1986 by Sri Anand Swarup Chaudhary in the court of Civil Judge, Faizabad, for partition of the said house in three equal shares. Both sons of late Sri Laxmi Narayan Chaudhary, namely, Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary and Sri Gyan Swarup Chaudhary, and his daughters, namely, Smt. Kamla Devi and Smt. Krishna Devi, were impleaded as opposite parties in the said suit. Smt. Kamla Devi and Smt. Krishna Devi did not contest the suit and abandoned their shares, to be divided amongst their three brothers. The aforesaid suit was hotly contested by Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary, which was decreed on 31.08.1995. 4. Learned Civil Judge vide his order dated 30.5.1998 allotted shares to the parties after disposing of the objections raised by them against the partition scheme prepared by the Court Amin. However, in the First Appeal preferred by Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary, this Court made slight modifications in the final decree vide its order dated 17.1.2003, which in effect allowed Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary to select one share out the three shares. However, in the First Appeal preferred by Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary, this Court made slight modifications in the final decree vide its order dated 17.1.2003, which in effect allowed Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary to select one share out the three shares. Against the aforesaid order passed by the this Court, Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary preferred a special leave petition bearing no. 6538 of 2003 before the Apex Court, which was dismissed on 28.11.2003. The Supreme Court gave time to Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary to select any one of the three shares as permitted by this Court. On 12.12.2004, Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary opted for the middle portion of the house in which he was already living; but at the same time he did not vacate the other portion of the house which was in his occupation since before. 5. Meanwhile, execution proceedings for the decree were initiated and the executing court vide its order dated 15.1.2007 ordered for delivery of possession to the petitioner of his share. Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary preferred a revision against the aforesaid order, but the same was dismissed by the learned District Judge on 17.3.2007. Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary then challenged the aforesaid orders dated 15.1.2007 and 17.3.2007 by filing a writ petition bearing no. 2228 of 2007 (M/S) before this Court which was subsequently dismissed on 30.4.2007. 6. It is pertinent to mention that on that very date i.e. 17.3.2007, when the revision preferred by Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Sri Vivek Chaudhary, younger son of Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary filed a suit through his mother Dr. Maya Chaudhary as his power of attorney holder, seeking a declaration of 1/8th share in the property (house in question) claiming himself to be a coparcener under the Mitakshara Law. The suit was numbered as Original Suit No. 65 of 2007. He also prayed for stay of the execution of decree, passed against his father Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary, which was rejected and an application for transfer of the execution case was also rejected by the court on 8.1.2008. Meanwhile, a writ petition bearing no. 2863 of 2007 (M/B) for quashing the proceedings of aforesaid suit was filed before this Court by the petitioner. This Court granted interim relief and stayed the proceedings of the said suit by order dated 15.05.2007. 7. Meanwhile, a writ petition bearing no. 2863 of 2007 (M/B) for quashing the proceedings of aforesaid suit was filed before this Court by the petitioner. This Court granted interim relief and stayed the proceedings of the said suit by order dated 15.05.2007. 7. On 26.9.2007, another suit numbered as Original Suit No. 262 of 2007, was also filed by Sri Prashant Chaudhary, elder son of Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary through Sri Vishnu Prakash Singh as his power of attorney holder, praying for a declaration that the decree passed in Original Suit No. 231 of 1986 is not binding on him and his 1/8th share in the property. The petitioners challenged the proceedings of the said suit, by filing writ petition no. 715 of 2008 (M/B), and this Court, vide its order dated 25.1.2008, stayed the proceedings of the said suit. 8. Thus, the petitioners, namely, Sri Anand Swarup Chaudhary alongwith his two sons Sri Raj Vardhan Chaudhary and Sri Prabhakar Vardhan Chaudhary, and Sri Gyan Swarup Chaudhary alongwith his son Sri Pankaj Chaudhary, aggrieved by the fresh round of litigation started by the sons of Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary, have preferred these petitions praying for quashing the entire proceedings of the aforesaid suits pending before the court below. 9. The main plea of the petitioners is that once the suit for partition was decreed wherein Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary was also impleaded as defendant, and the decree after a long drawn litigation was confirmed even by the Supreme Court rejecting specific objections of Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary; there was no occasion nor any ground for his sons to file the aforesaid suits seeking declaration of their rights in their individual capacity. The argument in nutshell is that a bare perusal of the plaint would reveal that neither any cause of action has accrued in favour of the grandsons of late Sri Laxmi Narayan Chaudhary, nor can they claim any right, title or interest in the property in question as coparceners, as the property (house) was the self-acquired property of late Sri Laxmi Narayan Chaudhary, their grandfather. So his argument is that the grandson would have right, title or interest in the respective share of their father and not against the whole property. 10. So his argument is that the grandson would have right, title or interest in the respective share of their father and not against the whole property. 10. Sri Anand Swarup Chaudhary, who argued the matter in person, submitted that the two suits, one filed by Sri Vivek Chaudhary and the other by Sri Prashant Chaudhary, are absolutely frivolous and vexatious; they are abuse of the process of the court. The learned Civil Judge ought to have rejected the plaint exercising powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, but instead of doing so, he has entertained the two suits. 11. The submission is that since the plaints in the two suits does not disclose any cause of action nor prima facie establish any right, title or interest in favour of Sri Vivek Chaudhary and Sri Prashant Chaudhary over the property in question, the proceedings before the small causes court cannot continue and the petitioners cannot be dragged into frivolous litigation, denying the fruits of the decree passed after a long contest. 12. His further submission is that it being not disputed by the plaintiffs of the two suits, namely, Sri Vivek Chaudhary and Sri Prashant Chaudhary in their respective plaints that the property in question belonged to late Sri Laxmi Narayan Chaudhary, their grandfather, which was his own property, acquired out of his own earnings and was not the property of Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), their claim of independent shares as legal heirs of their grandfather as against the share of their father, on the face of it, is not legally maintainable and, therefore, no fruitful purpose would be served even if the suits are directed to be proceeded with and decided on merits. 13. The argument, in nutshell, is that on the own pleadings of the two sons of Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary, they would not be entitled to any share in the property of their grandfather, which was his self-acquired property and the only share they derive would be from the share of their father, namely, Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents, in response, submitted that since Sri Vivek Chaudhary and Sri Prashant Chaudhary, the plaintiffs in the said two suits were born during the life time of their grandfather, therefore, they became entitled to equal share in the property of their grandfather, being coparceners and the property being a coparcenary property. 15. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents, in response, submitted that since Sri Vivek Chaudhary and Sri Prashant Chaudhary, the plaintiffs in the said two suits were born during the life time of their grandfather, therefore, they became entitled to equal share in the property of their grandfather, being coparceners and the property being a coparcenary property. 15. A preliminary objection was also raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that the proceedings in a suit cannot be quashed by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and if the petitioners are aggrieved, they ought to have moved a proper application before the learned trial court in the two suits for rejecting the plaint, but having not done so, the pleadings so raised cannot be entertained in the writ petition. 16. In response, the petitioners have submitted that it is a clear abuse of the process of the Court and the two suits being absolutely frivolous, the High Court will have jurisdiction to quash the proceedings. 17. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, whether or not the two suits of Sri Vivek Chaudhary and Sri Prashant Chaudhary, sons of Hari Swarup Chaudhary pending in the Small Causes Court, Faizabad make out any cause of action for filing their respective suits; and whether or not the two plaintiffs can get any declaration of their right, title or interest over the property in question on the very pleas raised in their plaints or on the face of their own pleadings, and whether this Court should exercise its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution to quash the proceedings of the two suits pending before the small causes court would essentially depend on the main plea regarding the right of a grandson as coparcener in the self-acquired property of his grandfather. The ancillary question that arises for consideration is whether the devolution of intestate property would be governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law or the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 ("the Act"). 18. On the ancillary question, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the property in question would be governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law and not the Act. 19. The applicable law governing the succession of property is dependent on the question of succession, i.e. the law in force governing the succession. 18. On the ancillary question, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the property in question would be governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law and not the Act. 19. The applicable law governing the succession of property is dependent on the question of succession, i.e. the law in force governing the succession. Reference may be made to Fateh Bibi v. Charan Dass, (1970) 1 SCC 658 wherein the Supreme Court stated that the point of time for the applicability of the Act is when the succession opens. In the context of the applicability of Section 8 of the Act, 1956, reference may be made to two decisions of the Supreme Court in Eramma v. Veerupana & Ors., (1966) 2 SCR 626 and Sheela Devi v. Lal Chand, (2006) 8 SCC 581 . The Supreme Court in Eramma (supra) held that Section 8 of the Act applies only to property of the male Hindu holder dying after the commencement of the Act. Manifestly, the Supreme Court observed, that the provisions of Section 8 are not retrospective in operation and, therefore, where succession is opened after the commencement of the Act, Section 8 of the Act would be operative. This principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Sheela Devi (supra) wherein the Court dealing the question of applicability of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 to a succession that opened in the year 1989 held that the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act would have no application. 20. Indisputably, the property in question is the self-acquired property of late Sri Laxmi Nath Chaudhary which was opened for succession on his death on 29.11.1982. Clearly, therefore, the question of succession would be determined according to Section 8 of the Act, 1956 which was the law in force at the time succession stood open. 21. Before proceeding further to determine if Sri Vivek Chaudhary or Sri Prashant Chaudhary got any right, title or interest in the property in question at the time succession was opened, a distinction needs to be drawn between coparcenary property and self-acquired property. 22. 21. Before proceeding further to determine if Sri Vivek Chaudhary or Sri Prashant Chaudhary got any right, title or interest in the property in question at the time succession was opened, a distinction needs to be drawn between coparcenary property and self-acquired property. 22. It is well-settled that Hindu coparcenary is much narrower body and includes only those persons who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property, these being the sons, grandsons and great grandsons of the holder of the joint property for the time-being [Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore, AIR 1966 SC 1523 ]. Reference may also be made to N.V. Narendra Nath v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, AIR 1970 SC 14 . A property purchased by father from his salary income and inherited by his sons by succession is not a joint-hindu family property [Makkhan Singh (D) by LRs v. Kulwant Singh, 2007 AIR SCW 3018]. There cannot be a presumption that a property would be joint-hindu family property merely because of the existence of the joint hindu family [D.S. Lakshmaiah and Anr. v. L. Balasubramanyam & Anr., (2003) 10 SCC 310 ]. The Supreme Court in D. S. Lakshmaiah (supra) drew an ancillary question in the following terms: "The question to be determined in the present case is as to who is required to prove the nature of property whether it is joint-Hindu family property or self-acquired property of the first appellant." 23. The query was answered in paragraph 18 in the following terms: "The legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint-family property only on account of existence of a joint-Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint-Hindu family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint-family property could be acquired, there would be presumption of the property being joined and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint-family nucleus that was available." 24. Reference may be made to the judgement of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur & Ors. Reference may be made to the judgement of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur & Ors. v. Chander Sen & Ors., (1986) 3 SCC 567 , wherein it was held that a son who inherits his father's assets under section 8 of the Act does so in his individual capacity and not as a 'Karta' of the Hindu undivided family. 25. Even if it is accepted for argument sake that the Sri Prashant Chaudhary and Sri Vivek Chaudhary's right as coparcener crystallised by the fact that they were born before Sri Laxmi Narayan Chaudhary died, in view of the well-settled principles of Hindu Law, and that the property being a coparcenary property in terms of Mitakshara School of Hindu Law revived would not put him in any advantage as the property has been partitioned and original suit to that effect has been decreed. The law in this behalf has succinctly been stated in Mayne's Hindu Law & Usage, 14th edition, at pages 627 and 641, in the following terms: "Where ancestral property has been divided between several joint owners, there can be no doubt that if any of them have male issue living at the time of the partition, the share which falls to him will continue to be the ancestral property in his hands, as regards his male issue, for their rights had already attached upon it, and the partition only cuts off the claims of the dividing members. The father and his male issue still remain joint." 26. However it may be conceived that this position stood settled by the enactment of the Act which in its preamble lays down the purpose of its enactment which is to amend and to codify the law relating to intestate succession among Hindus. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Chander Sen (supra) so far as succession and operation of Section 8 after considering the judgments of Allahabad High Court in CIT v. Ram Rakshpal, (1968) 67 ITR 164 (All.), Andhra Pradesh High Court in CWT v. Mukundgirji, (1983) 144 ITR 18 (AP), Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Addl. CIT v. Karuppan Chettiar, (1978) 114 ITR 523 (Mad), Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shrivallabhdas Modani v. CIT, (1982) 138 ITR 673 (MP) and the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Babubhai Mansukhbhai, (1977) 108 ITR 417 (Guj.) on which Counsel for the Respondents Sri R.B. Yadav placed reliance, leads the way. The extracts of the judgment would be useful: "It is necessary to bear in mind the preamble to the Act, 1956. The preamble states that it was an Act to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession among Hindus. In view of the preamble to the Act i.e. that to modify where necessary and to codify the law, in our opinion it is not possible when Schedule indicates heirs in Class I and only includes son and does not include son's son but does include son of a predeceased son, to say that when son inherits the property in the situation contemplated by Section 8 he takes it as karta of his own undivided family. The Gujarat High Court's view noted above, if accepted, would mean that though the son of a predeceased son and not the son of a son who is intended to be excluded under Section 8 to inherit, the latter would by applying the old Hindu law get a right by birth of the said property contrary to the scheme outlined in Section 8. Furthermore as noted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the Act makes it clear by Section 4 that one should look to the Act in case of doubt and not to the pre-existing Hindu law. It would be difficult to hold today the property which devolved on a Hindu under Section 8 of the Act would be HUF in his hand visa-vis his own son; that would amount to creating two classes among the heirs mentioned in Class I, the male heirs in whose hands it will be joint Hindu family property and vis-a-vis son and female heirs with respect to whom no such concept could be applied or contemplated. It may be mentioned that heirs in Class I of Schedule under Section 8 of the Act included widow, mother, daughter of predeceased son etc." 27. It may be mentioned that heirs in Class I of Schedule under Section 8 of the Act included widow, mother, daughter of predeceased son etc." 27. In paragraph 15, however, the law was stated as under: "It is clear that under the Hindu law, the moment a son is born, he gets a share in the father's property and becomes part of the coparcenary. His right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth. Normally, therefore whenever the father gets a property from whatever source from the grandfather or from any other source, be it separated property or not, his son should have a share in that and it will become part of the joint Hindu family of his son and grandson and other members who form joint Hindu family with him. But the question is: is the position affected by Section 8 of the Act, 1956 and if so, how? The basic argument is that Section 8 indicates the heirs in respect of certain property and Class I of the heirs includes the son but not the grandson. It includes, however, the son of the predeceased son. It is this position which has mainly induced the Allahabad High Court in the two judgments, we have noticed, to take the view that the income from the assets inherited by son from his father from whom he has separated by partition can be assessed as income of the son individually. Under Section 8 of the Act, 1956 the property of the father who dies intestate devolves on his son in his individual capacity and not as karta of his own family." 28. The decision of the Gujarat High Court in Babubhai Mansukhbhai was not accepted by the Supreme Court. This position regarding the interpretation of Section 8 of the Act observed in Chander Sen (supra) was followed in Bhanwar Singh v. Puran, (2008) 3 SCC 87 . The owner of the property died intestate leaving behind one son and three daughters wherein partition of the property took place and one-fourth share of each heir was entered in the revenue records. Thereafter, son's son was born. Subsequently, the son alienated the properties in question first by way of mortgage and then by sale in favour of the respondents therein. Thereafter, son's son was born. Subsequently, the son alienated the properties in question first by way of mortgage and then by sale in favour of the respondents therein. Suit for setting aside the said alienation was preferred by the son's son on the premise that the property in question was the joint family property and the son being the "karta", could not have transferred the same, save and except by way of legal necessity. Suit was decreed by the trial court. The first appellate court however, reversed the decree of the trial court, holding, inter alia, that upon the death of the owner, the son became a co-sharer of the property and having regard to the entries of the revenue records, it was established that he, along with his sisters, having inherited the same in equal shares, the property lost the character of ancestral property in terms of Section 8 of the Act. Appreciating the decision of the first appellate court, the Supreme Court opined with regard to Section 8 as also Section 19 of the Act, the properties ceased to be joint family property and all the hiers and legal representatives of the owner would succeed as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the property devolved per capita and not per stirpes and that in case of such a nature, the joint coparcenary did not continue. Further, the Supreme Court opined that Section 6 of the Act is not applicable in the matter where the property has already been partitioned. 29. Therefore, it may be pertinent to state that the argument of Sri R.B. Yadav that the property was Mitakshara coparcenary property and therefore devolution of interest of coparcenary property is governed by Section 6 of the Act is not sustainable in light of the fact that the property was not a coparcenary property but self-acquired property of Sri Laxmi Narayan Chaudhary and that such property had been partitioned which was confirmed even by the Supreme Court and therefore, the scheme provided for devolution of interest under Section 6 of the Act is not applicable in the instant matter. 30. 30. Section 8 of the Act excludes the right, title and interest of grandson in intestate succession and therefore, Sri Vivek Chaudhary and Sri Prashant Chaudhary, both sons of Hari Swarup Chaudhary cannot claim any right, title or interest over the property in question, which was the self-acquired property of their grandfather. 31. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, we take notice of the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents that such a plea could have been taken by the respondents before the court below where the matter would have been dealt with at the initial stage and not before this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. 32. Normally a plea of like nature can be raised before the trial court where the suit has been filed, but there is no legal embargo for the High Court to entertain a petition, if it is satisfied that it would be relegating the petitioners to the trial court for raising such an issue, which (i) legally stands concluded; (ii) if no evidence is required to be taken for deciding such a question; (iii) if it is a vexatious litigation; and (iv) if it is a clear abuse of the process of the Court. 33. It also cannot be overlooked that if the petitioners are required to get an answer from the trial court to such an issue about maintainability of the suit, where the trial court would either reject the plaint or otherwise would proceed to hear the matter not being satisfied with the aforesaid plea raised, but in either case, the orders passed are bound to be challenged in superior forums by the aggrieved person, where again it is not known as to how much time it will take in getting the issue finally decided. Litigation has to be expedited and there has to be an end to all such proceedings. The High Court would not desist itself in interfering in a matter like the present one, nor for the sake of arguments that the matter should have been dealt with before the learned trial court first. Litigation has to be expedited and there has to be an end to all such proceedings. The High Court would not desist itself in interfering in a matter like the present one, nor for the sake of arguments that the matter should have been dealt with before the learned trial court first. If the High Court is satisfied that the plaintiffs do not disclose any cause of action and there cannot be any other finding with respect to the claim of the plaintiffs, namely, the present opposite parties in the suits filed by them and that legally they cannot get any share by any stretch of imagination on their own pleading in their suits, it has the power to quash all proceedings in the pending suits in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 34. The stretch of litigation in the instant cases, exposes the litigating tendency of one of the sons of late Sri Laxmi Narayan Chaudhary, namely, Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary, who has not hesitated in lingering the matter for several decades. The suit for partition was filed by the petitioners impleading the heirs of Sri Laxmi Narain Chaudhary including Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary, the father of Sri Vivek Chaudhary and Sri Prashant Chaudhary in the year 1986. This suit for partition was decreed on 31.08.1995. First Appeal and then Second Appeal were filed by Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary, which ultimately were decided upholding the decree in the year 2003. The execution proceedings were initiated but they were also obstructed by Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary and ultimately they came to an end in the year 2007; but on the very date when the revision preferred before the learned District Judge was decided i.e. on 17.03.2007, he got a suit filed by Sri Vivek Chaudhary, his younger son. Thereafter, another suit was also got filed by him through his elder son Sri Prashant Chaudhary, in the year 2007. 35. Litigation which started in the year 1986 after the death of late Sri Laxmi Narayan Chaudhary and where before that, arbitration proceedings were also undertaken, could not be finalised till date because of the litigation which have been continued by Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary and his two sons. 35. Litigation which started in the year 1986 after the death of late Sri Laxmi Narayan Chaudhary and where before that, arbitration proceedings were also undertaken, could not be finalised till date because of the litigation which have been continued by Sri Hari Swarup Chaudhary and his two sons. More than 25 years have passed from the date of filing of the suit for partition and more than 8 years have passed from the date of final order of the Supreme Court and 4 years after the execution proceedings were initiated, but the petitioners are still litigating. 25 years' time is a long period and one cannot be allowed to drag the litigation just for the reason that one of the parties to the suit did not feel satisfied or for whatever reason, he does not want to honour the decree passed by the competent court which has been upheld by this Court and the Supreme Court. 36. In a situation like this, the trial court itself ought to have rejected the plaint which does not disclose any cause of action instead of entertaining the suit. In the case of T.Arivandandam v. T.V.Satyapal and another, AIR 1977 SC 2421 , the Apex Court, while considering the case of vexatious litigation, observed that the long arm of the law must throttle such litigative caricatures if the confidence and credibility of the community in the judicature is to survive. The contempt power of the Court is meant for such persons as the present petitioner. The Court further observed: "We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentently resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the First Munsif's Court Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal- reading of the plaint, it is manifestly vexatious and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under O. VIII R. 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal- reading of the plaint, it is manifestly vexatious and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under O. VIII R. 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clear drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under O. X, C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits." 37. In (2002) 10 SCC 501 , Raj Narain Sarin v. Laxmi Devi and others also, the Supreme Court observed that rejection of plaint would be justified where the litigation was utterly vexatious and an abuse of process of Court. 38. In the case of Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir and others, AIR 1982 SC 686 , the Supreme Court issued notice of contempt of Court against one Sri Krishna Singh, who not being content with his acrimonious defeat right up to the highest Court of the land, in order to nullify the decision of the High Court and the Supreme Court, filed a civil suit in which he raised almost the same pleas which he had taken in defence of the previous suit. The Supreme Court made the following observation: "22. So far as the suit filed by Sri Krishna Singh is concerned, we are extremely doubtful if Sri Krishna Singh having been found to be a rank trespasser has any locus to bring and maintain the present suit. However, we leave this question open to be decided by the Court concerned which shall frame a preliminary issue on this point and decide it after hearing the parties and after recording such evidence as may be adduced." 39. Smt. Tajwar Jahan and another v. Munsif North, Lucknow and another, 1994 (12) LCD 795 was a case where a decree for eviction was put into execution and a suit was filed by third person claiming his right. Smt. Tajwar Jahan and another v. Munsif North, Lucknow and another, 1994 (12) LCD 795 was a case where a decree for eviction was put into execution and a suit was filed by third person claiming his right. On a challenge being made before the High Court on the ground that it was an abuse of the process of the Court, the High Court held that the execution of the decree for eviction sought to be thwarted by filing suit for injunction amounted to abuse of the process of the court and quashed the proceedings pending in suit. Compensatory costs were also awarded. The High Court also considered the plea of alternative remedy and held that this principle could not be applied in the present case as it was a case of abuse of the process of court. 40. In the case of Mohd. Qadeer v. Munsif North, Lucknow and others, 1992 LCD 90, the High Court found that proceeding in suit holding up the execution of decree for eviction validly passed was abuse of process of the Court and quashed the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 41. In the case of Biswanath Malik v. Munsif Magistrate West, Allahabad and others, 1996 A.L.R 475, the matter related to U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, wherein after the order for delivery of possession and release of accommodation was finalised in favour of the landlord upto the stage of High Court, a civil suit for inunction was filed before the delivery of possession could be made. The Court held that this was nothing but sheer abuse of process of Court and proceedings in the pending suit were quashed by the High Court. 42. We, thus find that the two suits filed by Sri Vivek Chaudhary and Sri Prashant Chauthary are absolutely frivolous and meritless inasmuch as they do not give any cause of action nor substantiate any claim of right, title or ownership as independent heirs of late Sri Laxmi Narayan Chaudhary on their own pleadings. They are nothing but a clear abuse of the process of the Court and thus they cannot be allowed to proceed. 43. For the reasons aforesaid, we allow the writ petitions and quash the proceedings in the suits, pending before the Civil Judge, Faizabad.