Judgment :- 1. Petitioner has contested the Election from Ward No.6 of Thanisandra, Bangalore East Taluk and she was declared duly elected on 05.04.2010. The result of the election was published in Karnataka Gazette on 16.04.2010. Respondent Nos.2 to 5 also contested the said election, but have lost. The second respondent herein filed Election Petition on 24.05.2010 in E.P.No.22/2010 under Section 33 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act 1976, before the City Civil Court, Bangalore, (CCH-11). On 13.08.2010, the petitioner filed detailed written statement to the Election Petition. She has also filed I.A.No.IV under Order VII Rule-11 (d) of CPC read with Section 33(1) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act 1976, to reject the Election Petition, as the same was time barred. Section 33 (1) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 mandates that the Election petition shall be presented within 30 days from the date of publication of the result of the election. According to the petitioner, since the election was published in Karnataka Gazette on 16.04.2010, the Election petition ought to have been filed within 30 days from 16.04.2010; since the election petition was filed on 24.05.2010, the same is time barred. The second respondent filed objections to IA No.IV. After hearing, I.A. No.IV was rejected by the Court below, by the impugned order. 2. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that the Limitation Act is not applicable to the Election petitions filed under Section 33 (1) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 and therefore the second respondent herein ought to have filed Election petition within 30 days from the date of publication of the results of election. It is further argued that the Court below is not justified in taking into account Section 10 of General Clauses Act to conclude that the Election petition cannot be filed during summer vacation before the Court below and therefore the Election petition filed on the reopening day after summer vacation is within the period of limitation. 3. It is no doubt true that sub-section (1) of section 33 mandates that the Election petition shall be presented within 30 days from the date of publication of the result of election under Section 32. Section 32 clarifies that all elections of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and the Counsellors, shall be notified by the Government in the Official Gazette. The matter on hand pertains to the election of the Counsellor. Section 32 clarifies that all elections of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and the Counsellors, shall be notified by the Government in the Official Gazette. The matter on hand pertains to the election of the Counsellor. The combined reading of Sections 32 and 33 of the Act makes it clear that the Election petition ought to be filed within 30 days from the date of publication of the result in the Official Gazette. Thus, the second respondent being the election petitioner should have filed Election petition within 30 days from 16.04.2010 (from the date of publication of the result in the Official Gazette). But the Civil Courts were closed during Summer vacation from 26.04.2010 till 23.05.2010. The notification issued by High Court of Karnataka dated 21.04.2010, reveals that the High Court of Karnataka has designated certain of the judges of the Bangalore City Civil Court mentioned therein as Vacation City Civil Judges for hearing the matters which are required to be immediately and promptly dealt with during summer vacation. It is also mentioned in the notification that Vacation City Civil Judges were directed to dispose of urgent civil matters in which injunction, stay of proceedings and attachment orders etc., sought for during the summer vacation. Thus it is clear that except for the urgent civil matters wherein the order of injunction, stay of proceedings and attachment orders, etc. are required, the City Civil Court, Bangalore, which was closed during summer vacation was not required to entertain the matters. The notification issued by the High Court does not empower the City Civil Court or the vacation judges to receive the Election petitions for consideration. As the last date prescribed for filing of the election petition fell during summer vacation, election petitioner filed Election petition on the re-opening day after summer vacation i.e., on 24.05.2010. 4. The notification issued by the High Court does not empower the City Civil Court or the vacation judges to receive the Election petitions for consideration. As the last date prescribed for filing of the election petition fell during summer vacation, election petitioner filed Election petition on the re-opening day after summer vacation i.e., on 24.05.2010. 4. It is relevant to note the provisions of Sections 10 of General Clauses Act, 1897 at this stage:- “Computation of time:- (Where, by any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceedings shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceedings to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, applies. (2) This section applies also to all (Central Acts) and Regulation made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.” By reading the above provision, it is evident that if the last date of limitation happens to be holiday, the petition if filed on the working day immediately succeeding the holiday i.e., when the Court reopens, the same would be taken to be have been filed within the period of limitation. Since the City Civil Court was closed during summer vacation, except for urgent matters, the Election petition, if filed on the re-opening day would be deemed to have been filed within the period of limitation, in view of Section 10 of General Clauses Act, 1897. 5. In this context, it is also relevant to note the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of HARI SHANKER TRIPATHI Vs SHIV HARSH AND OTHERS reported in (1976) 1 SCC 897 , in the case of MANOHAR JOSHI Vs NITIN BHAURAO PATIL AND ANOTHER reported in AIR 1996 SC 796 , in the case of SIMHADRI SATYA NARAYANA RAO Vs. BUDDA PRASAD AND OTHERS reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 449. BUDDA PRASAD AND OTHERS reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 449. In the aforementioned judgments, the Apex Court was dealing with Election petitions, which were filed on the re-opening day after the vacation. The Apex Court in paragraph 12 of its judgment in the case of HARI SHANKER TRIPATHI Vs. SHIV HARSH AND OTHERS reported in (1976) 1 SCC 897 has observed thus:- “For the reasons given above we are satisfied that as the period of limitation expired during the summer vacation which was a closed holiday by virtue of the notification issued by the High Court, the Registrar was not competent to entertain the election petition nor could the appellant have presented the election petition legally to the Registrar during such period. We are further satisfied that this is a case in which Section 10 of the General Clauses Act applies in terms and the appellant was fully justified in filing the election petition on the reopening day of the High Court, namely, July 8, 1974. In these circumstances the view taken by the High Court that the election petition was barred by time is wrong on a point of law, and the finding of the learned Judge on issue No.8 cannot, therefore, be sustained. In paragraph 15 in the case of MANOHAR JOHSI Vs NITIN BHAURAO PATIL AND ANOTHER reported in AIR 1996 SC 796 , the Supreme Court has observed thus:- “In view of the basic premise that the election petitioner is entitled to avail the entire limitation of 45 days for presentation of the election petition as indicated by Ramlal, ( AIR 1962 SC 361 ) (supra), if the contrary view is taken, it would require that election petitioner to perform an impossible task in a case like the present, to present the election petition on the last day of limitation on which date the High Court as well as its office is closed. It is the underlying principle of this legal maxim which suggests the informed decision on this point, leading to only conclusion that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act applies in the computation of the limitation prescribed the Sub-section (1) of Section 81 of the R.P. Act for presentation of an election petition. It is the underlying principle of this legal maxim which suggests the informed decision on this point, leading to only conclusion that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act applies in the computation of the limitation prescribed the Sub-section (1) of Section 81 of the R.P. Act for presentation of an election petition. So computed, there is no dispute that the election petition presented in the presence case on 16.4.1990 was within limitation and there was no non-compliance of sub-section (1) of Section 81 of the R.P.Act”. In the case of SIMHADRI SATYA NARAYANA RAO Vs M. BUDDA PRASAD AND OTHERS reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 449, the Apex Court relying upon the earlier judgment of HARI SHANKER TRIPATHI Vs SHIV HARSH AND OTHERS reported in (1976) 1 SCC 897 has concurred with the same. From the aforesaid judgments, it is more than clear that, if the period of limitation expires during the summer vacation or any other vacation during which the Court is closed by virtue of notification issued by the High Court, the Registrar of Civil Court shall not be competent to entertain the election petition. Hence the election petitioner could not have presented the election petition legally before the court during such period. The apex court has further held that the provisions of Section 10 of General Clauses Act, 1987 applies to such matters and the election petitioner is fully justified in filing the election petition on the re-opening day of the Court. In view of the above, the Court below is justified in holding that the election petition filed on the re-opening day after summer vacation is well within the period of limitation. Hence, no interference is called for in this writ petition. Accordingly, writ petition fails and the same stands dismissed.