Shishir Kumar, J.;- This is plaintiff's second appeal arising out of Suit No. 257 of 1989, filed by the plaintiff/appellant, which was decreed. The defendants/respondents filed an appeal, which was allowed by order dated 18.03.2008, by dismissing Suit No.257 of 1989. 2. The facts, arising out of the present appeal, are that the appellant is a registered society under the Societies Registration Act and runs a Junior High School in the name and style of Dr. Ambedker Junior High School and Inter College as well as Degree College. A piece of land shown by letters A, B, C, D, E, F was alloted to the plaintiff-appellant for running the Junior High School. The plaintiff was in possession of the land on the basis of patta granted by Gaon Sabha. The total area was 11 Bigha, 4 Biswa, 5 Biswansi. The said land was lying within different housing scheme of Avas Evam Vikas Parishad. The possession of this land was taken by the defendant without any acquisition and requisition on the basis of assurance to allot other land in Scheme No. 3 & 7 and subsequently allowed the plaintiff to take possession over the land in dispute in exchange of land, which was in possession of the plaintiff on the basis of patta. The land shown by red colour in the said map marked by letters M, N, O, P, Q, S, T, D', C' and XYZ were also in possession of the Society from the year 1984. In the letter dated 20.03.1974, addressed to the defendant no3, accepted the transfer of the institution form the land of scheme no.1 to 3 with certain conditions. One Sri Jagdish Saran Agarwal, the then Adhyaksh of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad sent a letter to the plaintiff society intimating him regarding passing of resolution of 12 acres land to be handed over to the institution adjoining to the land which has already been leased out to the plaintiff society within scheme no.3. The above condition was accepted by the defendant and in pursuance thereof, the land, which was shown by letter A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1 and E-1 in the attached site plan was allotted to the plaintiff society. The adjoining land shown in red colour in the site plan was in possession of the land holder at the time when the plaintiff society took the possession of 2 acres land of the School. The adjoining land shown in red colour in the site plan was in possession of the land holder at the time when the plaintiff society took the possession of 2 acres land of the School. The land holders left possession in the year 1984 and on the land holders leaving the possession of the land in dispute, the plaintiff society took the possession thereof in pursuance of the promise of defendant nos.1 & 3 for allotment of 10 to 15 acres of land from scheme no.7 of the land in suit shown in the plaint. By letter dated 15.10.1974, the Basic Shiksha Adhikari also recommended the claim to the defendant for allotting the adjoining land in dispute measuring 10 acres. The Commissioner vide its letter dated 14.09.1988 also intimated defendant Nos. 1 & 2 to allot the requisite land to the plaintiff. The defendant no.1 also given their report on 03.11.1988 for allotment of land to the plaintiff. The above officers have also admitted that the formal allotment of the aforesaid land of the plaintiff was under process and the same was likely to be allotted for running the school. 3. The defendants are bound by the principle of promissory estoppel, as the plaintiff is in possession of the land in question on account of the reason that the land which was given by the Gaon Sabha to the plaintiff was retained by Avas Evam Vikas Parishad without any acquisition for their other housing scheme and allowed the plaintiff to occupy the land in dispute. It is also relevant to mention that no compensation in respect of patta land was given by the defendant to the plaintiff. In this view of the matter, the possession of the plaintiff is legal over the land in dispute on account of exchange of land done by Avas Evam Vikas Parishad. 4. The plaintiff filed a suit that Inter College, Degree College are being run over the property and they are imparting education to about 2000 students and there is a building of the institution and respondents are threatening to evict and to take possession of the property otherwise due process of law, therefore, they may be restrained from taking possession over the property mentioned in the map of the plaint. The suit was contested by the defendants and defendants have filed their written statement. The suit was contested by the defendants and defendants have filed their written statement. With respect to the property shown in red colour, which is subject matter of the suit, the case as stated was that the said land was given to the appellant in exchange of patta and various letters (i.e. paper no.55C, 83C, 84C, 105Ka and photocopy of paper no.106Ka, which were the documents of patta granted to the proposed Samiti and approved by S.D.M. concerned. The trial court decreed the suit. In the meantime, respondents threatened to take the possession with respect to the land marked with letter XYZ, as such, another Suit No. 1107 of 1989, under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act was filed for possession. Both the suits were consolidated together and Suit No. 257 of 1989 was made leading case and the trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 23.03.1998 decreed the suit and recorded a finding that with respect to land mentioned in the plaint appellants are occupying legally and provisions of promissory estoppel are applicable and Board has approved the transfer and patta land has been taken possession of by Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, therefore, the appellants are legally entitled to the land in dispute in exchange. 5. The defendants-respondents filed two appeals being Appeal No. 202 of 1998 and 203 of 1998. The Appeal No. 202 of 1998 was with respect to the land marked with letters M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, D', C' whereas the Appeal No. 203 of 1998 was filed with respect to the land marked as letter X, Y, Z. Both the appeals were consolidated together and illegally the court below has allowed both the appeals and recorded a finding against appellant and also held that principle of promissory estoppel are not applicable and further wrongly held that the patta executed and given to the appellant was not in accordance with law and it has no approval, therefore, there is no question of exchange. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised various issues and has submitted that the finding recorded by the lower appellate court is vitiated on the ground that patta was not approved by SDM concerned is wrong inasmuch as it is clear that the patta was on record and SDM concerned has put the signature and approved the patta. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised various issues and has submitted that the finding recorded by the lower appellate court is vitiated on the ground that patta was not approved by SDM concerned is wrong inasmuch as it is clear that the patta was on record and SDM concerned has put the signature and approved the patta. Further, the amendment was allowed filed on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant and additional written statement was not filed, therefore, it is presumed that the defendants- respondents have admitted the plaint under Order 8 C.P.C., therefore, the suit was liable to be decreed. The letter (paper no. 105Ka) was on record which was issued by the Housing Commissioner after approval of the Board thus resolution of transfer would be treated to have been passed by the Board and the only intimation was to be given by Adyaksh was sufficient evidence to constitute principle of promissory estoppel because promissory estoppel would apply in the present case, as the appellant had given possession of the property to defendants of the land, which was given to appellant on patta and took possession of the property in dispute on the promise of the defendants-respondents to allot land, had started institution thus the finding of the lower appellate court suffers from manifest error of law. 7. Further, it has been submitted that in view of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, the State is bound and principle of promissory estoppel is applicable in view of the document (paper no.105Ka), therefore, the finding recorded by the court below is vitiated. The court below was not justified in reversing the finding of the trial court by misreading the documents, namely, the patta and the letters. The appeal filed by the respondents against Suit No. 1107 of 1989 itself was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The second suit was filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act by the plaintiff-appellant. The suit was decreed and order was passed for redelivery of possession, therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 6(3), no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor any review of any such order or decree be allowed. The suit was decreed and order was passed for redelivery of possession, therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 6(3), no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor any review of any such order or decree be allowed. In such circumstances, learned counsel for the appellant submits that one of the appeal filed by the defendants-respondents itself was not maintainable. Admittedly, the injunction order was granted by the trial court as well as by the appellate court and no appeal was preferred. The second suit was under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, which was dismissed by the lower appellate court on the ground of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. (under Section 88 of the Avas Vikas Act). Admittedly, the defendants have not initiated any proceeding against the plaintiff from 1976 challenging the possession of the land. The possession of the land was given by the defendants themselves. The possession of 2 acres of land under scheme 3 has been admitted by the defendant. 8. The trial court has recorded a finding on the basis of documents 83Ka, 84Ka, 105Ka, 55Ka in which the defendant-respondents themselves have admitted and permitted the acceptance of patta and possession of the plaintiff. Admittedly, the amended paras of the plaint has not been denied by filing an additional written statement, though, the amendment was contested up to the High Court by the respondents. Further submission has been made that trial court has recorded a specific finding on issue No.5 which was relating to the notice under Section 88 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Act. As regards notice, a finding of fact has been recorded that correspondence was going on between the parties, which is proved by the lease deed (paper no.53Ga) as well as letters dated 19.01.1976, 04.05.1989 and 06.06.1974. The trial court taking into consideration the judgments of the apex court has recorded a finding that purpose of notice is only to get the knowledge of the dispute, but it cannot be said that the respondents were not aware regarding the correspondence and the dispute between the parties after recording such finding the trial court recorded a finding that the suit cannot be dismissed on the ground of want of notice. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon a judgment reported in AIR 1969 Supreme Court 674; Raghunath Das v. Union of India and another. Relevant is para 8, which is being quoted below:- "8. The object of the notice contemplated by that section is to give to the concerned Governments and public officers opportunity' to reconsider the legal position and to make amends or settle the claim, if so advised without litigation. The legislative intention behind that section in our opinion is that public money and time should not be wasted on unnecessary litigation and the Government and the public officers should be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the claim made against them lest they should be drawn into avoidable litigations. The purpose of law is advancement of justice. The provisions in s. 80, Civil Procedure Code are not intended to. be used as booby traps against ignorant and illiterate persons. In this case we are concerned with a narrow question. Has the person mentioned in the notice as plainsong brought the present suit or is he someone else ? This question has to be decided by reading the notice as a whole in a reasonable manner." 9. Further reliance has been placed upon a judgment reported in AIR 1960 Supreme Court 1309; The State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies and another. Relevant is para 1 to 6 which is being quoted below:- "1. The only controversy arising in this appeal by special leave relates to the validity of a notice of suit given under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the plaintiff, which is the first respondent before us, to the first defendant, which is the appellant herein. The very language of Section 80 makes it clear,--and it has been so held by the Judicial Committee in Bhagchand Dagdusa v. Secy. of State, which decision has been adopted by the same tribunal in many later cases--that Section 80 is express, explicit and mandatory and admits of no implications or exceptions. The very language of Section 80 makes it clear,--and it has been so held by the Judicial Committee in Bhagchand Dagdusa v. Secy. of State, which decision has been adopted by the same tribunal in many later cases--that Section 80 is express, explicit and mandatory and admits of no implications or exceptions. Section 80 peremptorily requires that no suit shall be filed against the Government or a public officer in respect of anything done in his official capacity until after the expiry of two months from the service of a notice in the manner therein prescribed stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the reliefs which he claims. There is no dispute that the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the reliefs claimed have been sufficiently stated in the notice. The only question is whether the cause of action has been so stated therein. Both the Courts below have held that it has been done. 2. The object of Section 80 is manifestly to give the Government or the public officer sufficient notice of the case which is proposed to be brought against it or him so that it or he may consider the position and decide for itself or himself whether the claim of the plaintiff should be accepted or resisted. In order to enable the Government or the public officer to arrive at a decision it is necessary that it or he should be informed of the nature of the suit proposed to be filed against it or him and the facts on which the claim is founded and the precise reliefs asked for. As already stated, the reliefs claimed have been quite clearly formulated. The only question is whether the cause of action has been stated in the notice. The answer to the question depends on the interpretation of the notice given under Section 80. This being the true position, it is not necessary for us to refer to the decisions requiring the identity of the person who issues the notice and the person who brings the suit as in Vellayan Chettiar v. Govt. The answer to the question depends on the interpretation of the notice given under Section 80. This being the true position, it is not necessary for us to refer to the decisions requiring the identity of the person who issues the notice and the person who brings the suit as in Vellayan Chettiar v. Govt. of Madras, 74 Ind App 223 : (AIR 1947 PC 197) and in Government of the Province of Bombay v. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia, or those requiring the identity of the cause of action in two suits brought by the same plaintiff against the same defendant as a condition for the applicability of Order II, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, as in Mohammad Khalil, Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian, . 3. We have been referred to the well-known observations of Brett J. in Cooke v. Gill, (1873) 8 CP 107 and to the definition of "cause of action" given in Read v. Brown, (1888) 22 QBD 128 which are all referred to in 75 Ind App 121 : Lord Esher M. R., defined "cause of action" to mean "Every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved." Fry L. J. agreed and said: "Everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, must be part of the cause of action." To the same effect are the observations of Lopes L. J. in Mst. Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, 15 Ind App 156. Lord Watson observed : "Now the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers, entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour." The meaning of "cause of action" being thus well understood, we now proceed to consider whether the cause of action with which the plaintiff has come to court has been stated sufficiently in the notice given under Section 80. For this purpose we must first see what is the cause of action set forth in the plaint. 4. Turning to the plaint, we find it stated that the second defendant was the Assistant Marketing Officer of the first defendant, the Madras Government, at Madras; that he had full authority to make purchases on behalf of that Government; that in 1945 the first defendant purchased black gram through the second defendant from the plaintiff at rates settled and fixed between the plaintiff and the first defendant represented by the second defendant; that deliveries would be made ex-godown; that godown rent would be paid according to the rates settled between the plaintiff and the first defendant at Nagpur and mentioned in the bills submitted on April 15, 1946; that interest would be paid on godown rent at six per cent. per annum; that godown rent would not be paid for two months; that annas eight per maund would be charged as overall charges for handling the goods including commission etc.; that the first defendant had paid the prices of the goods and the overall charges but had failed to pay the godown rent amounting to Rs. 28,444-6-6 and the plaintiff claimed Rs. 27,000 in round figures besides interest and lawyer's fees. The plaint makes it clear that the only claim was for godown rent and interest at six per cent. per annum thereon and lawyer's fees for drafting and sending the notice. The averments relating to the contract for the sale of black gram and the terms thereof are only matters of history set out as matters of inducement and are not, strictly speaking, parts of the cause of action on which this suit has been filed. The gist of the plaintiff's cause of action, as disclosed in the plaint, is for the recovery of godown rent for storing the goods agreed to be paid by the first defendant through the second defendant at rates mentioned in the bill submitted by the plaintiff. The question is whether this real cause of action has been sufficiently stated in the notice under Section 80. 5. Turning now to the notice, which is Ex. The question is whether this real cause of action has been sufficiently stated in the notice under Section 80. 5. Turning now to the notice, which is Ex. P-6, we find an averment in paragraph 3 that the plaintiff had supplied about 11,000 tons of black gram to the first defendant, the Madras Government, in or about the year 1945 through the Assistant Marketing Officer of the Madras Government stationed at Nagpur, who is none other than the second defendant. This paragraph quite clearly indicates that in the matter of the sale of black gram the second defendant, the Assistant Marketing, Officer, acted for the 1st defendant the Madras Government. Then in paragraph 4 it is averred that the black gram remained undespatched for more than two months because transport facilities were not arranged by the Madras Government. The implication of the allegation that the goods remained undespatched for more than two months is that something was to happen after the expiry of two months. Reference is made to the correspondence on this subject including a letter of the Assistant Marketing Officer, the second defendant, which, as said in paragraph 1 of the notice, was attached for ready reference and necessary action. Paragraph 5 refers to the bill of the plaintiff which the first defendant wanted to verify from the account books. In the penultimate paragraph of the notice a claim is made for interest at the rate of nine per cent. per annum. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant points out that it is not clear at all from the notice whether the plaintiff's claim is based on a contract for the payment of godown rent or on the footing of damages for use and occupation of the plaintiff's godown or through whom the first defendant is alleged to have entered into the alleged agreement for the payment of godown rent or interest thereon and he submits that in the premises the notice does not fulfil the requirements of Section 80. In considering the question so posed before us we, must bear in mind the following observations made by this Court in Dhian Singh Sobha Singh v. Union of India, : "We are constrained to observe that the approach of the High Court to this question was not well-founded. The Privy Council no doubt laid down in that the terms of this section should be strictly complied with. The Privy Council no doubt laid down in that the terms of this section should be strictly complied with. That does not however, mean that the terms of the notice should be scrutinized in a pedantic manner or in a manner completely divorced from common sense. As was stated by Pollock C.B. in Jones v. Nicholls, (1844) 153 ER 149 at p. 150, 'we must import a little common sense into notices of this kind'. Beaumont C. J. also observed in Chandu Lal Vadilal v. Govt. of Bombay, ILR (1943) Bom 128: (AIR 1943 Bom 138), 'One must construe Section 80 with some regard to common sense and to the object with which it appears to have been passed..'". It should be remembered that Ex. P-6 is a legal notice of a suit sent through a lawyer. It is well known that a claim for "rent", in legal parlance, can only be founded on a contract. Throughout this notice the claim is described as "godown rent" and not damages for use and occupation of the godown. Therefore, the claim, prima facie, appears to be founded on a contract. Paragraph 3 is quite explicit that the supply of black gram by the plaintiff to the first defendant was arranged by and through the Assistant Marketing Officer, the second defendant. The arrangement for payment of godown rent was only incidental to the contract of supply of the goods and it is not unreasonable to infer that this arrangement was also made by and through the second defendant acting for the first defendant. The relief claimed in paragraph 2 of the notice is that the Madras Government should pay up the amount claimed and if it does not pay or the failure is found to be due to the officer of the Madras Government, then the officer concerned should be held responsible, which indicates that the transaction was through some officer and the officer concerned in this case can be no other than the Assistant Marketing Officer through whom the goods were supplied, as stated in paragraph 3 of the notice. In the next place, paragraph 3 indicates that the godown rent is claimed for having stored 11,000 tons of black gram. In the next place, paragraph 3 indicates that the godown rent is claimed for having stored 11,000 tons of black gram. Paragraphs 1 and 4 indicate that the godown rent became payable as the goods remained undespatched for more than two months on account of no arrangement for transport facilities having been made by the first defendant, the Madras Government. The bill mentioned in paragraph 5 would show the rate at which the godown rent was calculated and the period for which it was claimed. Therefore, on a fair reading of the notice it may be said that the fact of the contract for the payment of the godown rent, the quantity of goods stored, the rate at which and the period for which the claim was made and the failure of the first defendant to pay the same are sufficiently stated so as to enable the first defendant, which is the appellant before us, to know what the plaintiffs claim was about and whether the claim should be conceded or resisted. On a careful consideration of the terms of the notice we are not of opinion that the contention of learned counsel for the appellant is well founded. This is sufficient to dispose of this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs." 10. Another judgment of Punjab High Court has been relied i.e. AIR 1962 PUNJAB 262. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the appellant submits that purpose of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. or 88 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Act is not to defeat the justice. The purpose of law is advancement of justice. The provisions in Section 80 of Civil Procedure Code are not intended to be used as booby traps against ignorant and illiterate persons. Admittedly, the subsequent suit was filed after giving notice and it was held that notice was properly given, therefore, the appellate court could not have dismissed the suit by holding that suits were not maintainable for want of notice, as provided under the Act. A finding has been recorded by the trial court that the appellant was allotted patta of the land from Gram Sabha, which was approved by order dated 25.06.1972 by the SDM concerned. A finding has been recorded by the trial court that the appellant was allotted patta of the land from Gram Sabha, which was approved by order dated 25.06.1972 by the SDM concerned. Due to the fact that in lieu of land taken by the defendants-respondents, which was granted in favour of the appellant on patta, the total area could not be allotted, the defendants-respondents allotted only two acres of land in Scheme-3 and promised to allot rest of the land in Scheme-7. In 1984 on the basis of promise, possession of the land was handed over to the appellant. There was an oral contract between the parties, therefore, as regards the allegation made in para 35 of the written statement that the possession of the plaintiff-appellant is unauthorized cannot be accepted. According to the plaintiff, a finding of fact has been recorded that from the evidence on record it clearly appears that the land on which the school was running has been taken over by the defendants, which is apparent from the letter of the Basic Shiksha Adhikari. A finding has been recorded that the burden was upon the defendants to prove that no land has been taken over by the defendants. 11. Further, the appellate court has recorded a finding that a notice in subsequent suit has been given, therefore, the appellate court was having no jurisdiction to dismiss the suit only on this technical ground. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the trial court has committed an error apparent on the face of the record by treating letter dated 20.03.1974 as notice under Section 88 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Act. There was no written contract between the parties. It may be oral, but no permission in writing was ever given to the plaintiff-appellant. Further, an argument has been raised that suit for injunction without possession itself was not maintainable. As regards promissory estoppel this will not apply in the present case being the fact that there cannot be any promissory estoppel against the statute. According to the respondents, no substantial question of law is involved, therefore, in view of the settled principle of law there is no necessity for interference as the finding recorded by the court below is finding of fact based on evidence. According to the respondents, no substantial question of law is involved, therefore, in view of the settled principle of law there is no necessity for interference as the finding recorded by the court below is finding of fact based on evidence. He has placed reliance upon a judgment as regards the notice is concerned i.e. 1998 (1) JCLR 861 (All); Jagdish Prasad Sharma vs. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Etah & Ors. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the respondents submits that suit for specific performance of contract, if filed after expiry of two months from the date of service such provision is mandatory in nature and no relaxation can be given. Therefore, no suit can be instituted against the defendants until expiry of two months from the date of service of notice. He has placed reliance upon para 6 of the aforesaid judgment, which is being quoted below:- "6. After having herd learned Counsel for the parties it appears that by reason of Section 88 of the said Act no suit can be instituted against defendant No.2 until expiry of two months from the date of service of notice on the defendant No.2 The said provision does not contemplate any relaxation, and, as such, the same appears to be mandatory. Therefore, admittedly, no suit is maintainable without such notice. In that view of the matter the findings of the lower appellate court appears to be correct in respect of setting aside of order for injunction. Inasmuch as if the suit appears to be barred by law, in that event no injunction can be granted in such a suit, since jurisdiction of the appellate court was confined only to injunction it cannot take itself a decision in respect of the whole suit. Now it is for the trial Court to decide as to whether on the basis of finding that the suit is not maintainable by the lower appellate court whether plaint is to be returned or not after arriving at appropriate finding as to whether the suit is maintainable on the basis of statement made in the Plaint." 13. Now it is for the trial Court to decide as to whether on the basis of finding that the suit is not maintainable by the lower appellate court whether plaint is to be returned or not after arriving at appropriate finding as to whether the suit is maintainable on the basis of statement made in the Plaint." 13. Further, he has placed reliance upon a judgment reported in AIR 1959 Supreme Court 57; Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya and others and has submitted that the finding recorded by the first appellate court is based upon some documentary evidence, therefore, there should not be any interference in the second appeal with the finding of fact given by the first appellate court based on appreciation of relevant evidence. 14. I have considered the submission of the parties and perused the record. From the record it appears that a patta was granted in favour of the appellant, which was approved by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on 25.06.1972. In 1974, a letter was issued by the defendants regarding exchange of the land from Scheme-1 to Scheme-3 & 7. Admittedly, in the year 1976, some land was allotted in Scheme-3 and possession of the land was handed over. A letter was issued by the defendants to the appellant intimating and accepting the proposal of allotment of 12 acres of land. On 07.06.1976 another resolution was passed by the defendants to give 12 acres of land in lieu of the land taken by them, which was in Scheme-1. A letter was issued to the appellant for exchanging the land on 01.07.1976. The Basic Shiksha Adhikari has also recommended for allotment of 10 acres of land to the appellant in Scheme-7. A letter (paper no.84-Ka) was issued by the Joint Secretary, Avas Evam Vikas Parishad for allotment of land in Scheme-3 to the appellant and the appellant was permitted to complete the formalities. The report of the Executive Engineer shows that the appellant was in possession of the land in dispute. In the year 1989, the defendants wanted to take possession of the land from the appellant, as such Suit No. 257 of 1989 was filed. During pendency of the aforesaid suit, the defendants took forceful possession of the part of the land. The report of the Executive Engineer shows that the appellant was in possession of the land in dispute. In the year 1989, the defendants wanted to take possession of the land from the appellant, as such Suit No. 257 of 1989 was filed. During pendency of the aforesaid suit, the defendants took forceful possession of the part of the land. Then, Suit No. 1107 of 1989 was filed by the appellant for redelivery of possession of the land taken by the defendants under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Both the suits were decreed on 28.03.1998 after recording a finding that various letters show that permission was granted for exchange of the possession of land taken from the appellant and some of the land was given and a promise was made for allotting the land in Scheme-7. It has also come from the record that the possession was given, but no formal allotment order was issued in favour of the appellant. When in the year 1989, the defendants-respondents wanted to take possession of the land from the appellant, then a suit was filed. 15. The trial court has recorded a finding that Section 80 C.P.C. which is analogous to the provisions of Section 88 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Act. The suit was filed on 24.02.1989 and paper no.52Ka1 has been given by the plaintiff-appellant on 20.03.1974 and on 02.01.1976 two acres of land was given to the plaintiff-appellant. After recording such finding, a finding of fact has been recorded that suddenly the suit has not been filed, but from 1974 the parties were corresponding, which is clear from the lease deed (paper no.53Ga), letter dated 19.01.1976 as well as paper no.55Ka dated 04.05.1989 and paper no.105Ka dated 06.06.1974. In paragraph 8 of the plaint it has been stated that up to 1984, possession was of the land holders and as soon as the possession was left the correspondence was going on and possession was taken and as soon as the defendants taken the steps for dispossessing the appellant the suit has been filed, therefore, it can be treated to be a notice and suit should not be dismissed only on this technical ground. After recording such finding, the trial court has held that notice under Section 88 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Act be treated to be sufficient. 16. After recording such finding, the trial court has held that notice under Section 88 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Act be treated to be sufficient. 16. As regards the subsequent suit, a finding has been recorded that notice was given, as required, and after that the suit has been filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. But, the appellate court has not considered the same and has not reversed the finding recorded to that effect. If according to the appellate court itself subsequent suit was maintainable, then how both the suits can be dismissed only on the ground of lack of notice. The purpose of notice under Section 80 of Civil Procedure Code (similar to Section 88 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Act, 1965) is to avoid unnecessary litigation, waste of time and public money. In Raghunath Das's case (supra), the Court while interpreting the similar provision i.e. Section 80 C.P.C. has held that it is only to give an opportunity to the concerned government and public Officers an opportunity to reconsider the legal position and to make amendment or to settle the claim. The purpose of law is advancement of justice. The provision of Section 80 Civil Procedure Code are not intended to be used as booby traps against ignorant and illiterate persons. Admittedly, correspondence were going on and record shows that various letters issued corresponding that Parishad had decided to allot 12 acres of land to the institution and a proposal to that effect was accepted on 06.06.1976. Therefore, it appears that on the basis of acceptance of the proposal though no written contract or written allotment was made, but it was implied consent between the parties regarding allotment of 12 acres of land in Scheme-7, which was adjacent to Scheme-3 and with the consent of the officers of the Parishad, possession was given. It is an admitted case of the parties that possession has been given and certain constructions have also been made. As regards the finding recorded by the lower appellate court that 56Ga was given by one Devendra Kumar Kashyap on behalf of Dr. Ambedker Bal Sudhar Shiksha Samiti, but after amendment, the suit has been filed by one Sri Shyam Singh, alleging himself to be Manager of the Institution. As regards the finding recorded by the lower appellate court that 56Ga was given by one Devendra Kumar Kashyap on behalf of Dr. Ambedker Bal Sudhar Shiksha Samiti, but after amendment, the suit has been filed by one Sri Shyam Singh, alleging himself to be Manager of the Institution. On that basis a finding has been recorded that as provisions of Section 88 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Act and Section 80 C.P.C. are equal, therefore, in view of the supreme court judgments, as the suit has not been filed by the person who has given notice, therefore, the suit is not maintainable. 17. The apex court in various cases has considered the issue and has held that purpose of notice is not to defeat the justice on a technical ground. If it was in the knowledge of the authority concerned or the defendants that some dispute is going on and accordingly some notice has been given, then legally it can be treated to be a notice if in one of the letters it is mentioned that if certain act is not done then matter can go to the Court for decision. From letter dated 06.06.1976 (paper no.105-Ka), it appears that regarding allotment of 12 acres of land a proposal has been accepted. The lower appellate court has recorded such finding that on that basis possession has been given and the appellant has raised certain construction like cycle stand and has installed a statue of Dr. Ambedkar and has made a playground. There is no dispute from the record that by letter dated 20.03.1974, the Parishad has given consent to allot land in Scheme-3 and Scheme-7. The finding to this effect recorded by the lower court is that admittedly the possession has been given. The lower appellate court has reversed the said finding and has held that appellant was in illegal possession of the land in dispute. As regards the contention raised by the respondents that there cannot be any estoppel against the statute taking support of the judgment reported in 2006 All. CJ 568; M/s Bhadauria Gram Sewa Sansthan, Fatehpur vs. Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, Allahabad Division and others, the said judgment has held that in view of Section 115 of the Evidence Act there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. CJ 568; M/s Bhadauria Gram Sewa Sansthan, Fatehpur vs. Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, Allahabad Division and others, the said judgment has held that in view of Section 115 of the Evidence Act there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. It is settled in law that if the statute provides a particular thing to be done there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. In (2004) 1 Supreme Court Cases 139; State of Orissa and others vs. Mangalam Timber Products Ltd., the apex court while considering the question of promissory estoppel held that it is applicable even in case of unwritten contract. Relevant is para 4, which is being quoted below:- "4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that no case is made out for interference with the judgment of the High Court. Before the High Court, the principal plea of the respondent was that there was no contract in writing and therefore the applicability of the principle of promissory estoppel was not established. The High Court has rightly discarded this plea. To attract the applicability of the principle of estoppel it is not necessary that there must be a contract in writing entered into between the parties. We are not satisfied even prima facie that it was a case of an error committed by the State Government of which it was not aware. The State of Orissa should have, while holding out the representation, taken into consideration the fact-who will have to do re-plantation and that the permission of the Government of India would be needed for the purpose. The State cannot take advantage of its own omission. The State Government having persuaded the respondent to establish an industry and respondent having acted on the solemn promise of the state Government, purchased the raw material at a fixed price and also sold its products by pricing the same taking into consideration the price of raw material fixed by the State Government and supplied, the State Government cannot be permitted to revise the terms for supply of raw material adversely to the interest of the respondent and effective from a back date and place the respondent in a situation which it will not be able to resolve. The respondent could not have revised their price from a back date and recovered it from innumerable consumers to whom their finished products were supplied at a fixed price." 18. Further, similar question was taken attention of the apex court in AIR 2007 Supreme Court 1984; Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector and E.T.I.O. & Ors. The apex court has taken a view "We, therefore, are of the opinion that doctrine of promissory estoppel also preserves a right. A right would be preserved when it is not expressly taken away but in fact has expressly been preserved." Therefore, it can easily be interpreted that conduct of the defendants-respondents shows that there was a permission to allot the land and possession according to that was given. In case some assurance has been extended, but if subsequently that is withdrawn, it can easily be held that doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable. In the present case various letters and acceptance regarding allotment and issuance of possession can be said implied consent. It is not disputed that there is no allotment in writing, but conduct of the respondents on the basis of various correspondence and acceptance of proposal of allotment shows that it was an implied consent and contract between the parties. Therefore, the lower appellate court, in my opinion, has not properly appreciated the documents and has not recorded the finding and without reversing the finding recorded by the trial court has dismissed the suit. 19. Once, the notice in the subsequent suit has been held to be valid, then the suit cannot be dismissed for want of notice. Further, the appellate court has also not recorded a finding that the appellant cannot be dispossessed from the property shown as M, N, O, P, Q, S, T, D', C' without adopting proper procedure of law. Meaning thereby, the appellate court was of the opinion that the appellant was in possession of the property in dispute with the consent of the respondents. 20. Meaning thereby, the appellate court was of the opinion that the appellant was in possession of the property in dispute with the consent of the respondents. 20. In such circumstances, though there is very limited scope in interfering with the appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, but if the evidence on record has not been properly considered in a prospective manner and without reversing the finding recorded by the trial court, the lower appellate court has dismissed the suit, then this Court while exercising the powers under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code can interfere. Substantial question for consideration by the lower appellate court is that once the notice has been accepted, then whether, in such circumstances, appeal can be allowed by the lower appellate court for want of notice. Further question for consideration by the lower appellate court is that the record shows that there was an implied consent and permission for allotment of land for the purpose of institution, then how a finding can be recorded that the appellant was an unauthorized occupant of the land in dispute. So far as the notice is concerned, if conduct of the party shows that the notice was given, then the suit should not be dismissed on the ground of want of notice because purpose of the provision is to do the justice. 21. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that these questions, which appear to be substantial in nature, have not been considered by the lower appellate court, therefore, the present appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court is hereby quashed and the matter is remanded back to the lower appellate court to decide the same in view of the findings recorded as well as considering the issues involved in the present appeal after due consideration of relevant records. 22. No order as to costs.