Judgment :- This civil miscellaneous appeal is directed against the Order dated 05.10.2010 and made E.A.No.171 of 2010 in E.P.No.2 of 2004 in O.S.No. 49 of 1997, on the file of the learned District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil. 2. The facts, which giving rise to the memorandum of civil miscellaneous appeal may be summarized as under: The appellants 1 and 2 are the defendants, whereas the respondent herein is the plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No. 49 of 1997 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Kuzhithurai. 3. Both the appellants and respondent had entered into an agreement of sale on 18.01.1996 and thereby the appellants had agreed to sell their properties more fully described in the schedule in favour of the respondent for a total consideration of Rs. 54,00,000/-. Totally, the first appellant had received a amount of Rs. 4,45,000/- from the respondent towards advance. Even inspite of several demands, the appellants had not come forward to execute and register the sale deed. Hence, the respondent was constrained to file a suit in O.S.No. 49 of 1997, on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, at Kuzhithurai to realize the sum of Rs. 7,23,920/-with interest at the rate of 12% per annum on Rs. 4,45,000/-. The suit was decreed as prayed for. 4. On the strength of the decree, the respondent had initiated execution proceedings in E.P.No.2 of 2004 before the executing Court viz., the Subordinate Court, Kuzhithurai, seeking the sale of schedule mentioned properties, which were attached even prior to the passing of Judgment, in pursuant to the order made in I.A. No. 257 of 1997, dated 18.08.1997. 5. During the pendency of execution proceedings, the appellants were trying to trammel the execution proceedings by filing various revision petitions before the High Court. After breaking all the hurdles, the respondent had sought permission of the executing Court to bid in the auction as there were no bidders. Accordingly, the respondent was permitted to bid the Court auction on 24.04.2009, in pursuant to the order passed in E.A.No.58 of 2007 under Order 21 Rule 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. Again, the appellants had filed a revision petition in C.R.P. No. 1252 of 2009 seeking the relief of setting aside the order of the executing Court dated 24.04.2009 and made in E.A. No. 58 of 2007 permitting the respondent to bid the auction. 6. Again, the appellants had filed a revision petition in C.R.P. No. 1252 of 2009 seeking the relief of setting aside the order of the executing Court dated 24.04.2009 and made in E.A. No. 58 of 2007 permitting the respondent to bid the auction. When this revision came up for hearing, the appellants had given an undertaking that they would pay the decree amount within a month time. After recording their undertaking, this Court had also directed the appellants to pay a sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- directly to the respondent / decree holder on or before 31.12.2009 and the balance amount as per the decree and as per the calculation given by the respondent / decree holder must be paid to him on or before 31.01.2010. 7. While passing the Order, this Court has specifically made clear that if the appellants/ judgment debtors had committed any default in making the payment of the first installment, as stated supra, the order passed by the lower Court in E.A.No. 58 of 2007 on 24.04.2009 would stand confirmed and the civil revision petition (C.R.P. No. 1252 of 2009) shall stand automatically dismissed. Since the appellants/ judgment debtors had failed to comply with the directions of this Court, the order passed by the executing Court in E.A.No.58 of 2007 on 24.04.2009 was confirmed. Consequently, the civil revision petition in C.R.P. No.1252 of 2009 was also dismissed automatically. 8. In pursuant to the order passed in E.A.No.58 of 2007, the respondent/decree holder had participated in the Court auction held on 11.03.2010 in respect of B Schedule property and the sale was also confirmed in favour of the respondent/decree holder as he was the highest bidder. The respondent/decree holder had also participated in the Court auction held on 25.03.2010 in respect of A schedule property and the sale was also confirmed in his favour as he being the highest bidder. 9. When the matter stood thus, the appellants had filed an application in E.A. No,. 171 of 2010 on the file of the learned District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagarkoil to set aside the sale in respect of A and B schedule properties held on 11.03.2010 and 25.03.2010 respectively. That petition was strongly resisted by the respondent. 10. 9. When the matter stood thus, the appellants had filed an application in E.A. No,. 171 of 2010 on the file of the learned District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagarkoil to set aside the sale in respect of A and B schedule properties held on 11.03.2010 and 25.03.2010 respectively. That petition was strongly resisted by the respondent. 10. On hearing both sides, the learned District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagarkoil had dismissed the application in E.A.No. 171 of 2010 on 5.10.2010 on the ground that the application was filed and the deposit was made beyond the period of sixty days. The learned District Judge had also observed in the impugned order that the appellants/ Judgment debtors had not explained in their affidavit, which was filed in support of the application as to why they could not have moved the vacation court for filing such application and for making deposit of the amount. 11. Impugning the Order date 5.10.2010, the present civil miscellaneous appeal has been preferred by the appellants/ judgment debtors. It is pertinent to note here that this appeal is filed under Order 43 Rule 1 (j) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. When the appeal came up for hearing Mrs. Hema Sampath, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. R. Subramanian, learned counsel who is on record for the respondent/decree holder has submitted that this civil miscellaneous appeal is not maintainable under Order 43 Rule 1 (j) of the Code of Civil Procedure as the impugned order has been passed under Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. The learned senior counsel, while advancing her arguments, has made reference to Order 43 Rule 1 (j) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 43 Rule 1 (j) reads as follows: R.1 Appeals from orders.- An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of section 104, namely:- ………….. (j) an order under rule 72 or rule 92 of order XXI setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale; It may also be relevant to refer the proviso to Sections 104 and 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sections 104 and 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sections 104(1), 105 and Order 43 Rule 1 shall be conjointly read together. Section 104 contemplates: Orders from which appeal lie. Sections 104 and 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sections 104(1), 105 and Order 43 Rule 1 shall be conjointly read together. Section 104 contemplates: Orders from which appeal lie. – (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders:- ………….. Section 105 contemplates: Other orders.- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any order made by a Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction; but where a decree is appealed from any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. 14. In Ganga v. vijay, AIR 1974 SC 1126 , it is held that Section 104 should be read with Order 43 Rule 1. The provisions of Sections 96, 100, 104 (1), 105 read with Order 43, rule 1 would show that an appeal lies only as against a decree or an order passed under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by Order 43 Rule 1. 15. The first part of Sub-section 1 of Section 105 reiterates that no appeal shall lie from any order unless such right is expressly given by the Code (eg. S. 104 and Order 43 rule 1) : but even if an interlocutory order be appealable, a party is not bound to prefer an appeal at once. In Muthayyan V. Narayanaswami, AIR 1936 M 936, it is observed that though the section says: “ where a decree is appealed from ”, the principle may be extended to interlocutory orders passed in execution proceedings. 16. In this connection, Mrs. Hema Sampath, learned senior counsel has contended that the appellants / judgment debtors had preferred the application in E.A. No. 171 of 2010 only under Order 21 Rule 89 C.P.C. for setting aside the sale of the properties held on 11.03.2010 and 25.03.2010 respectively. The prayer of the appellants/judgment debtors was turned down and that they are not expressly provided with the right of appeal under Section 104 and Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C. 17. The prayer of the appellants/judgment debtors was turned down and that they are not expressly provided with the right of appeal under Section 104 and Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C. 17. The learned Senior Counsel has also submitted that even in Order 43 Rule 1 (j) also the appellants /judgment debtors are not expressly provided with right of appeal as the sub-clause j to Rule 1 of Order 43 contemplates that an appeal shall lie from an order under Rule 72 or Rule 92 of Order 21. Hence, the learned senior counsel has urged that this civil miscellaneous appeal be dismissed in lemine on the ground of maintainability. 18. On the other hand, Mr. M. Kalyanasundaram, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. P. Prabhakaran. Learned counsel who is on record for the appellants would submit that though the impugned order is passed under Order 21 Rule 89 since the order is integrally connected with Rule 92 Sub-rule 2 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure the appeal is very well maintainable. 19. The learned Senior Counsel has also contended that under Order 43 Rule 1 (j) a civil miscellaneous appeal would definitely lie as the impugned order is to be considered as an order having been passed under Order 21 Rule 89 read with Order 21 Rule 92 (2) in accordance with decision in Challamane Huchha Gowda vs. M.R. Tirumala and another, reported in 2004-2-L.W. 350. In this case, a Division Bench of Honorable Supreme Court of India had an occasion to deal with the scope and amplitude of Order 21 Rule 89 and Rule 92 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In paragraph No.10 it is held as follows: “10. Execution is the enforcement, by the process of the Court of its orders and decrees. This is in furtherance of the inherent power of the Court to carry out its orders or decrees. Order 21 of CPC deals with the elaborate procedure pertaining to the execution of orders and decrees. Sale is one of the methods employed for execution. Rule 89 of Order 21 is the only means by with a Judgment Debtor can escape from a sale that has been validly carried out. Order 21 of CPC deals with the elaborate procedure pertaining to the execution of orders and decrees. Sale is one of the methods employed for execution. Rule 89 of Order 21 is the only means by with a Judgment Debtor can escape from a sale that has been validly carried out. Object of the rule is to provide a last opportunity to put an end to the dispute at the instance of Judgment Debtor before the sale is confirmed by the Court and also to save his property from dispossession. Rule 89 postulates two conditions: they are: Depositing – 1) of sum equal to five percent of the purchase money to be paid to the purchaser, 2) of the amount specified in the proclamation of sales less any amount received by the decree holder since the date of such proclamation, in the Court. If these two conditions are satisfied the Court shall make an order of setting aside the sale under Rule 92(2) of Order 21 of CPC on an application made to it. In other words then there will be compliance of Court’s order or decree that is sought to be executed. Because the purpose of the Rule 21 is to ensure the carrying out of the orders and decrees of the Court. Once the Judgment Debtor carried out the order or decree of the Court, the execution proceedings will correspondingly come to an end. It is to be noted that the Rule does not provide that the application in a000000 particular form shall be filed to set aside the sale. Even a memo with prayer for setting aside sale is sufficient compliance with the said Rule. Therefore, upon the satisfaction of the compliance of conditions as provided under Rule 89, it is mandatory upon Court to set aside the sale under Rule 92 and the Court shall set aside the sale after giving notice under Rule 92 (2) to all affected persons. In paragraph No.4 it is held as follows: “4. The only question that requires our consideration in this case is whether the setting aside of sale by the executing Court is correct or not. Under Order 21 Rule 89 (1) of CPC an application to set aside sale can be filed. In paragraph No.4 it is held as follows: “4. The only question that requires our consideration in this case is whether the setting aside of sale by the executing Court is correct or not. Under Order 21 Rule 89 (1) of CPC an application to set aside sale can be filed. The said provision reads as under: R.89,Or.21: Application to set aside sale on deposit:- (1) Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, any person claiming an interest in the property sold at the time of the sale or at the time of making the application, or acting for or in the interest if such person, may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court,- (a) for payment to the purchaser, a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase money, and (b) for payment to the decree holder, the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery which the sale ordered, less any amount which may, since the date of such proclamation of sale, have been received by the decree holder. In paragraph No.5 it is held as follows: “5. The follow up action to Rule 89 (1) is provided under Rule 92 (2) of Order 21, which reads as follows: (1) – (2) Where such an application is made and allowed, and where, in the case of an application under rule 89, the deposit required by that rule is made within thirty days from date of sale, or in case where the amount deposited under rule 89 is found to be deficient owing to any clerical or arithmetical mistake on the part of the deposit and such deficiency has been made good within such time as may be fixed by the Court, the Court shall make an order setting aside the sale: ………” 20. From the above cited decision, it is thus made clear that though an application along with the required deposit has been filed under Order 21 Rule 89 (1) C.P.C. the follow up action to Rule 89 (1) C.P.C. is provided under Rule 92 (2) of Order 21. Hence, Mr. From the above cited decision, it is thus made clear that though an application along with the required deposit has been filed under Order 21 Rule 89 (1) C.P.C. the follow up action to Rule 89 (1) C.P.C. is provided under Rule 92 (2) of Order 21. Hence, Mr. M. Kalyanasundaram, learned senior counsel would submit that as the rule 89 (1) of Order 21 is integrally connected with Rule 92 (2) as the same is construed with Rule 92 (2) as the same is construed to be a follow up action to Rule 89 (1) the appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (j) is very well maintainable. 21. The same ratio is laid down in Sorimuthu v. Muthu, 56 M 808 : AIR 1933 M 598, in which it is held that an order setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale on an application under this rule is appealable as an order under Order 43 Rule 1 (j) and under this rule an auction purchaser can also prefer an appeal. 22. On coming to the issue of limitation, it is to be decided as to whether the application in E.A.No. 171 of 2010 has been filed and the deposit is made well within time as envisaged under Order 21 Rule 89 and 92 (2) of C.P.C. As revealed from the decree of the suit in O.S.No. 49 of 1997 two properties more fully described under A and B schedules were attached in pursuant to the order dated 28.08.1997 and made in I.A. No. 257 of 1997 prior to the passing of judgment and decree in O.S.No. 49 of 1997. Soon after the passing of decree, the respondent herein had initiated execution proceedings in E.P.No. 2 of 2004 before the executing Court (Subordinate Court at Kuzhithurai) seeking the relief of sale of the schedule mentioned properties. 23. It is also revealed from the records that since no bidders were available, the respondent being the decree holder had filed an application in E.A./No.58 of 2007 seeking permission to bid the auction by setting off the decree amount. Accordingly, the respondent/ decree holder was permitted to bid Court auction on 24.04.2009. 24. 23. It is also revealed from the records that since no bidders were available, the respondent being the decree holder had filed an application in E.A./No.58 of 2007 seeking permission to bid the auction by setting off the decree amount. Accordingly, the respondent/ decree holder was permitted to bid Court auction on 24.04.2009. 24. In the interregnum, the appellants/judgment debtors had filed a civil revision petition in C.R.P.No. 1252 of 2009 under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure before this Court to set aside the order dated 24.04.2009 and made in E.A.No.58 of 2007, permitting the respondent/decree holder to bid Court auction. It is also pertinent to note here that in the above said revision, the appellants/Judgment debtors had given an undertaking that they would pay a sum of Rs. 6,00,000/-on or before 31.12.2009. But, they had not keep up their undertaking and therefore the revision petition in C.R.P. No. 1252 of 2009 was dismissed and the Order dated 24.04.2009 made in E.A. No.58 of 2007 permitting the respondent/decree holder to bid auction was confirmed. 25. It is also important to note here that the respondent/decree holder had participated in the Court auction held on 11.03.2010 and the sale in respect of B-Schedule property was confirmed in favour of the respondent/decree holder. Similarly, on 25.03.2010 the sale in respect of A-Schedule property was confirmed in favour of the respondent/decree holder, as he being the highest bidder in respect of both the properties mentioned in B and A respectively. Therefore, it is made clear that the sale in respect of B-schedule property was effected on 11.03.2010, whereas the sale in respect of A-Schedule property was effected on 25.03.2010. 26. Now, it is very essential to refer the proviso to Rule 89 (1) to Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it is made clear that the sale in respect of B-schedule property was effected on 11.03.2010, whereas the sale in respect of A-Schedule property was effected on 25.03.2010. 26. Now, it is very essential to refer the proviso to Rule 89 (1) to Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. R.89.Application to set aside sale on deposit.-(1) Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree [any person claiming an interest in the property sold at the time of sale or at the time of making the application, or acting for or in the interest of such person,] may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court,- (a) for payment to the purchaser, a sum equal to five percent of the purchase-money, and (b) for payment to the decree-holder, the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale ordered, less any amount which may, since the date of such proclamation of sale, have been received by the decree-holder. 27. From the proviso to Sub-rule 1 to Rule 89 of Order 21, it is that by virtue of Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an application for setting aside a sale and the deposit can be made. It is also very clear that Order 21 Rule 89 does not prescribe any period within which the application is to be made or deposit is to be made. All that Order 21 Rule 92(2) provides is that if the deposit is made within 60 days from the date of sale and an application is filed then the court would have no discretion but to set aside the sale. 28. Rule 92(2) of Order 21 reads as follows: Where such application is made and allowed, and where, in the case of an application under Rule 89, the deposit required by that rule is made with sixty days from the date of sale or in case where the amount deposited under rule 89 is found to be deficient owing to any clerical or arithmetical mistake on the part of the deposit and such deficiency has been made good within such time as may be fixed by the Court, the Court shall make an order setting aside the sale. 29. 29. As rightly held in Challamane Huchha Gowda vs. M.R. Tirumala and another, reported in 2004-2-L.W. 350, the follow-up action to Rule 89 (1) is provided under Rule 92(2) of Order 21. 30. On coming to the instant case on hand, the application in E.A. No. 171 of 2010 under Order 21 Rule 89, was filed along with the payment of the amount specified in the proclamation along with 5% as provided under Order 21 Rule 89 on 31.05.2010. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellants has drawn the attention of this Court to the Court to Order of the learned District Judge, Kanykumari at Nagarkoil, dated 05.10.2010 and made in E.A.No. 171 of 1010. The learned counsel has also maintained that the following two decisions were relied upon during the course of his arguments advanced before the learned District Judge: 1. Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu, AIR 2001 SC 2699 , 2. Challamane Huchha Gowda vs. M.R. Tirumala and another, 2004-2-L.W.350, The learned counsel has also added that in spite of the reference of these two decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court, the learned District Judge while passing the order had observed that in the above cited judgments, the petitioner/judgment debtors had paid the decree amount to the decree holder within the stipulated period and that the sales of the subject properly therein were made prior to amendment of the provision under Act 22 of 2002, which came into effect from 01.07.2002 in the Code of Civil Procedure and as Such Order 21 Rule 92 (2), in case of an application under Order 21 Rule 92(2), in case of an application under Order 21 Rule 89, the deposit is required to be made within sixty days from the date of the sale. The learned District Judge had also observed that in so far as this case is concerned (present case on hand), admittedly the B-Schedule property was sold on 11.03.2010 and the A-Schedule property was sold on 25.03.2010 and the present application was filed and the deposit of the amount under the sale proclamation was deposited on 31.05.2010. Therefore, it is clear that the present petition is filed and deposit is made beyond the period of sixty days. 31. Therefore, it is clear that the present petition is filed and deposit is made beyond the period of sixty days. 31. The learned senior counsel has also adverted to that the delay for making the payment was duly explained to the learned District Judge stating that since the Court vacation was intervening the petitioners and the appellants were not able to deposit the amount during the vacation and hence they filed the application along with the proclamation amount only on 31.05.2010 ie. On the reopening date of the Court after summer vacation and that the application and the deposit was made well within the time as stipulated under Rule 92(2) of Order 21. 32. The learned senior counsel has also added that the explanation offered on behalf of the appellants/judgment debtors was rejected and the learned District Judge had dismissed the petition on the ground that the application was filed and the deposit was made beyond the period of sixty days. The learned senior counsel has also adverted to that while dismissing the application in E.A. No.171 of 2010, the learned District Judge had also raised a question as to why the appellants/judgment debtors could not have moved the vacation Court for filing such application and for the deposit of the amount. In this connection, the learned senior counsel had submitted that the learned District Judge had mis-construed the proposition of law and that was why it resulted in wrong conclusion. 33. The learned Senior Counsel has also made reference to Article 127 of the Limitation Act. Article 127 of Limitation Act prescribes a period of sixty days to set aside the sale in the execution of decree including any such application by judgment debtor. The sixty days is reckoning from the date of sale. Order 21 Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code, provides that where immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree any person claiming an interest in the property sold at the time of making the application may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court certain sums of money referred to in the rule. The requirement as to the deposit is mandatory and non-compliance with it would disentitle an applicant to get any relief. The requirement as to the deposit is mandatory and non-compliance with it would disentitle an applicant to get any relief. As held in Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh, (1930) LR 58 IA 50: AIR 1931 PC 33, this Article applies inter alia to an application to set aside a sale under Rule 89 of Order 21. 34. As discussed earlier, Order 21 Rule 89 prescribes no period either for making the application or for making the deposit. However, Article 127 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period within which an application to set aside a sale should be made. It is pertinent to note here that the period of sixty days has been substituted for “thirty” day’s by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 (104 of 1976). Section 98. Section 98 (2) of Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 provides as follows: “(2) Where the period specified in Article 127 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, had expired on or before the commencement of this Act, nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall be construed as enabling such application as is referred in the article to be filed after the commencement of this Act by reason only of the fact that a longer period, therefore is specified in the Act aforesaid by reason of provisions of sub-section(1).” Unless there is a period prescribed for making a deposit, the time to make to deposit would be the same as that of making the application. This is so because if an application is made beyond the period of limitation, then the deposit made at that time or after the period would be of no use. 35. In Nahhelal v. Umrao Singh, (1930) LR 58 IA 50 : AIR 1931 PC 33, it is held that the application as well as the deposit must both of them have been made within the time specified by the Article. 36. Similar ratio has also been laid down in Ronya V. Baliram, AIR 1928 Nag 111: 106 IC 333, in which it is held that provided both the application and the deposit are made within the time prescribed, the application would be deemed to be good even if it contained no express prayer to set aside that sale. 37. 36. Similar ratio has also been laid down in Ronya V. Baliram, AIR 1928 Nag 111: 106 IC 333, in which it is held that provided both the application and the deposit are made within the time prescribed, the application would be deemed to be good even if it contained no express prayer to set aside that sale. 37. With regard to the period within which the deposit is to be made, the learned senior counsel has also made reference to Section 4 of the Limitation Act. In support of his arguments, he has placed reliance upon the following decisions: 1. Gopal Chandra Ghosh v. Renu Bala Manjumadar (Smt.) and another, 1994 (2) MLJ 48 (SC), 2. Pattanswami v. Amirtha Jothi, AIR 1997 Madras 308 = 1997 -1-L.W. 603, 38. In the former case, ie. Gopal Chandra Ghosh V. Renu Bala Majumdar (Smt.) and another, 1994 (2) MLJ 48 (SC), the appellant has come to be evicted from the premises (a shop room) on his failure to deposit rent for November,1984 within December 15, 1984, which is held to have incurred the wrath of Sec.17 of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. There is no dispute that the rent was deposited on December 17, 1984. There was thus, if at all, delay of two days. This would even be not so, if notice is taken of the fact that 16th was a Sunday, which shows that 15th was Saturday. If it would have been a half-working day, Explanation to Section 4 of the Limitation Act would have taken care of 15th as well, in which case there would have been no delay at all. 39. In paragraph No.12 the Division Bench of Apex Court has held as follows: “12. Being seized with a beneficial piece of enactment, we have to take a view which would advance the object and purpose of the Act, advance the object and purpose of the Act, which apparently is to give protection to a tenant and not to allow the law to permit throwing out of a tenant merely because of some technical violation of the statute. That this is the approach which has to be adopted would be clear from Union of India v. Philip Tiago Dev Gama of Vedem de Gama, (1990) 1 S.C.C. 277 , in paragraphs 16 and 17 of which it was stated that text of a statute is not to be construed merely as a piece of prose without reference to its nature or purpose; and that if the strict grammatical interpretation were to give rise to absurdity or inconsistency, the Court would discard such interpretation and adopt one which will give effect to the purpose of the legislature. The purpose insofar as the Act at hand is concerned is, as already noted, to give protection to a tenant. While construing such a statute, the substance of matter has to be seen, and not merely the form. Technicalities would have no place when the court is seized with a human problem, as is the one at hand, relatable as it is to the earning of livelihood by the appellant by carrying on business in the shop premises. In such case it is the heart of the matter which counts, and not the facade of it.” 40. In Paragraph No.16 the Division Bench of Apex Court has held as follows: “16. Thus, not only Khemka Case, (1987) 2 S.C.C. 407 , but Shyamcharan Sharma case, (1980)2 S.C.C. 151 , also helps the appellant and according to us, it was a fit case where two days delay in depositing the rent for the month of November, 1984 ought to have been condoned. The failure not to do so has resulted in failure of justice. This apart, the respondents not having established their case of default in paying rent from November, 1979 onwards, on which plea eviction was prayed for when the suit was filed, the decree of eviction could not have been legally passed. 41. In the later case i.e. Pattanswami v. Amirtha Jothi, AIR 1997 Madras 308 = 1997-1-LW. 603, in Paragraph No.15, this Court (Madras High Court) has held as follows: “15. Section 4 of the Limitation Act can also be beneficially looked into in this context. It reads thus: “4. 41. In the later case i.e. Pattanswami v. Amirtha Jothi, AIR 1997 Madras 308 = 1997-1-LW. 603, in Paragraph No.15, this Court (Madras High Court) has held as follows: “15. Section 4 of the Limitation Act can also be beneficially looked into in this context. It reads thus: “4. Expiry of prescribed period when Court is closed.- Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the Court reopens.” This section enables a party to a legal proceedings to initiate the same on the next day if the previous day happened to be the last day and on that day the Court remained closed for any part of the day. The language of the Section indicates that it does not extend the period prescribed for the presentation of any suit or appeal or application but that it only provides that where the period prescribed expires on a particular day when the Court is closed, notwithstanding that fact the application may be made on the day the Court reopens. Thus, Section 4 of the Limitation Act does not extend the period of limitation. It provides for the contingency when the prescribed period expires on a holiday and the only contingency contemplated is “when the Court is closed’. The expression “when the Court is closed” refers to the Court in which the revision ought to have been made.” 42. Both the above cited Judgments have given vivid account about the scope of Section 4 of the Limitation Act and its applicability enabling a party to a legal proceedings to act in a contingency when the prescribed period expires on a holiday. The same dictum is held in Nityananda Joshi v. LIC of India, (1969) 2 SCJ 749 : 1 SCR 396 : AIR 1970 SC 209 = (1970) 83 L.W. 3 S.N. 43. The same dictum is held in Nityananda Joshi v. LIC of India, (1969) 2 SCJ 749 : 1 SCR 396 : AIR 1970 SC 209 = (1970) 83 L.W. 3 S.N. 43. Section 4 of the Limitation Act reads as follows: “Section 4 Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed.- Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens.” Explanation.- A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day. 44. A different view was taken in Devineni Durgamba vs. M/s. Raj Kumar Financiers, Vijayawada, reported in AIR 1998 AP 365 . In which it was held that the benefit of Section 4 of Limitation Act is available only to suit, appeal or application and not to the deposits required to be made under Rules 89, 92(2) of Order 21 C.P.C. 45. But, in Rama v. Sumitra, AIR 1979 B14, another view was taken that if the Court is unable to accept money on account of strike of staff-case falls under explanation of Section 4 of Limitation Act. As discussed earlier, the explanation to Section 4 of Limitation Act, enables a party to a legal proceedings to initiate the same o the next day if the previous day happened to be the last day and on that day the Court remained closed for any part of the day. 46. On the other hand, Mrs. Hema Sampath, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. Subramanian, learned counsel who is on record for the respondent/decree holder would submit that though the appellants were having sufficient opportunities to deposit the amount within sixty days, they had not done so and hence they could not be permitted to sub-let the prescribed law. 47. Further, the learned counsel has also submitted that the appellants with a view to bring the execution proceedings into a complete grinding halt they had filed various revision petitions before the High Court. But, all the obstacles were broken into pieces by the respondent and ultimately he was permitted to bid the Court auction and he had also succeeded in his attempt and purchased the properties under A and B Schedule. 48. But, all the obstacles were broken into pieces by the respondent and ultimately he was permitted to bid the Court auction and he had also succeeded in his attempt and purchased the properties under A and B Schedule. 48. The learned senior counsel has also added that purposely in order to prevent the respondent from tasting the fruits of the decree, they had filed this appeal only to protract the proceedings as well as to gain the time. 49. In support of he arguments, she has place reliance upon the decision made in Kalidasa Chetty v. Dodda Siddha Chetty, reported in AIR (34) 1947 Madras 56 (C.N.17) = (1946) 59 L.W. 409 . In this case it is observed that in making a deposit to have a sale set aside, the amount deposited in respect of commission was short by Rs. 1-4-0 due to mistake and the deficiency was made good as soon as it was pointed out but after 30 days from the date of sale. 50. Under this circumstance, it was held that the delay could not be excused as the responsibility for paying the correct amount lies with the payer who wishes to have the sale set aside and not with the clerk who receives the lodgment schedule. Further, it was held that neither the principle of de minimis no curatelex could be applied nor could the amount paid towards poundage fee be appropriated towards the deficiency. 51. The learned senior counsel has placed reliance upon another decision made in Dharamsi Morarji Chemical Co., Ltd., v. Ochavlal Hargovandas Shah, reported in AIR 1927 Bombay 480. In this case, a Division Bench of Bombay High Court has held that the principle enunciated under Section 4 of Limitation Act the party should not be prejudiced by Court’s Act. It is also observed that the principle underlying Section 4 is that when a party has to do something before a certain day and if upon that day or before that day he cannot do that thing by reason of the act of the Court, then he is entitled to an extension of time over that period during which he is delayed by the Court’s action. Further it is also observed that whether a Court is closed depends upon practice of the particular Court. 52. Further it is also observed that whether a Court is closed depends upon practice of the particular Court. 52. In addition to that the learned senior counsel for the respondent has also submitted that even one day is delay in making the application and depositing the proclamation amount, the judgment debtors cannot be allowed to file an application along with the amount to have the sale set aside. 53. Insupport of her arguments, the learned counsel has placed reliance upon a decision made in Francis vs. John Britto, reported in 2004 (3) KLT 1113 . In this case on 03.12.2003 beyond the time limit 60 days from the date of the sale, the first respondent, who is the fifth judgment debtor deposited an amount of Rs. 4,205/- being 5% of the purchase price. The purchaser filed E.A. No.510 of 2002 under Order XXI Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the sale in favour of the petitioner. In E.A. No.510 of 2002, instead of 04.10.2002, instead of 03.10.2002. To the above application, the petitioner had filed objection. In the objection, the petitioner has categorically contended that E.A. No.510 of 2002 is not maintainable, as the deposit was made beyond 60 days. The petitioner had further contended that with ulterior motive the first respondent mentioned the date of auction as 04.10.2002 and in addition to this he has absolutely no interest in the decree schedule property. Under this circumstance, a question was arisen to whether Section 5 of Limitation Act would apply to execution proceedings. 54. Inthis backdrop, it was held that under Article 127 of the Limitation Act, a petition to set aside the sale has to be filed within 60 days of sale. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to execution proceedings. There was no dispute by the Court below that the application was filed on the 61st day. The Court below went wrong in holding that the delay happened due to the delay in the office of the Court. That was not a matter that was to be taken into consideration. The petition was not filed within sixty days and hence the petition is not maintainable. 55. The learned senior counsel for the respondent, while advancing her arguments has made reference to Page Nos. 31, 35 and 36 of Paper Book furnished by the appellants. That was not a matter that was to be taken into consideration. The petition was not filed within sixty days and hence the petition is not maintainable. 55. The learned senior counsel for the respondent, while advancing her arguments has made reference to Page Nos. 31, 35 and 36 of Paper Book furnished by the appellants. Page Paper Book furnished by the appellants. Page No. 31 of the Paper Book contains the averments of the application in E.A.No. 171 of 2010, whereas Page Nos. 35 and 36 contains the discussion of the Order of the learned District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagarkoil. As adumbrated supra from Page No.31 it reveals that B-Schedule property was sold on 11.03.2010 and the A-Schedule property was sold on 25.03.2010. The proclamation amount in respect of the schedule mentioned properties is determined at Rs. 14,00,000/-. Further, it also reveals that the schedule mentioned properties situate in the heart of Kuzhithurai Municipality and the total value of the E.P. schedule property comes nearly Rs.3,00,00,000/- and that the respondent /decree holder was trying to knock-off the E.P.Schedule property for meagre amount. The total amount as per the sale proclamation is Rs. 10,68,911/- along with the interest and that even one cent of vacant site is more than sufficient to the E.P.amount. Further, it is submitted that B-Schedule property was sold for Rs. 9,01,000/-, which is very low and inadequate. Therefore, the appellants have come forward with this application to set aside the sale, after depositing the upset price of Rs. 14,00,000/- before the trial Court. This is what contained in Page No.31 of the Paper Book. 56. On the other hand, in Page No. 35 of the paper book, the learned District Judge has referred the decision of this Court and made in Chandira vs. Subramanian, reported in 2010 (3) CTC 66 , wherein it is held that the decree holder became auction purchaser after obtaining leave of Court under Rule 72 of Order 21 and the judgment debtor cannot contend that property was sold for a lesser price, after consenting to reduction of upset price on two occasions. In this connection, the learned senior counsel has submitted that as rightly observed in the above cited decision as well as by the learned District Judge, the respondent/judgment debtor had obtained permission of the Court to bid the auction. In this connection, the learned senior counsel has submitted that as rightly observed in the above cited decision as well as by the learned District Judge, the respondent/judgment debtor had obtained permission of the Court to bid the auction. He had also purchased the properties specified in A and B Schedule and having consented to reduce the upset price it is not open for the appellants to come forward with the petition to set aside the sale that too after the prescribed period of sixty days and hence she has urged that the appeal be dismissed. 57. Further, the learned senior counsel has also referred to Rule 154 of the Civil Rules of Practice and submitted that Limitation Act is not applicable for deposit in Court and that it might be applicable to file an application alone. The Rule 154 of the Civil Rules of Practice need not to be discussed elaborately as it deals with the payment into and out Court and the procedures to be followed. 58. The issue involved in this appeal is as to whether the application in E.A.No. 171 of 2010 filed by the appellants/Judgment debtors before the District Court, Kanyakumari at Nagarkoil on 31.05.2010 along with the required deposit is maintainable or not. 59. In support of her arguments, the learned senior counsel has also made reference to Section 10 of the General Clauses Act. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act contemplates in respect of computation of time, it reads as follows: “10. Computation of time.-(1) Where, by any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open.” 60. As per the words of His Lordship Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in the Supreme Court case reported in Harindev Singh v. Karnail Singh, AIR 1957 SC 271 at P.273, the object of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is : “Broadly stated, the object of the section is, to enable a person to do, what he could have done on a holiday, on the next working day. Where, therefore, a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a Court o or office, and the period expires on a holiday, then according to the section, the act should be considered to have been done within that period, if it is done on the next day on which the Court or office is open. For that section to apply, therefore, all that is requisite is that there should be a period prescribed, and that period should expire on a holiday.” It is therefore made clear that the very object of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act is to enable a person to do an act, what he could have done on a holiday, on the next working day. 61. In this connection, the learned senior counsel would submit that Section ‘10’ of the General Clauses Act also does not prescribe any time limit for deposit of amount, which the appellants ought to have deposited within the period of sixty days and hence the appeal shall have to be dismissed. 62. The learned senior counsel has also in support of her arguments placed reliance upon the following decisions: 1. Devineni Durgamba vs. M/s. Raj Kumar Financiers, Vijayawada, reported in AIR 1998 AP 365 . 2. Muthuvenkatapathy Reddi vs. Kuppu Reddi and others, reported in 1940 1 MLJ 629 = (1940) 51 L.W. 527 , 3. P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries, reported in AIR 1990 SC 933 = 1990-1-L.W.364, 4. Babu Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and Other v. Babu Girdhari Lal Chaudhuri and others, reported in AIR 1939 Patna 667, 5. Raja Pande v. Sheopujan Pande, reported in AIR (29) 1942 Allahabad 429, 63. In Devineni Durgamba vs. M/s. Raj Kumar Financiers, Vijayawada’s case ( AIR 1998 AP 365 ), it seems to have been disposed of only on the basis of Section 4 of the Limitation Act (36 of 1963). In this case, the plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of the amount and obtained a decree. In Devineni Durgamba vs. M/s. Raj Kumar Financiers, Vijayawada’s case ( AIR 1998 AP 365 ), it seems to have been disposed of only on the basis of Section 4 of the Limitation Act (36 of 1963). In this case, the plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of the amount and obtained a decree. In execution of the said decree, the landed properties belonging to the defendents were brought to sale and auction was held on 04.04.1991 for a sum of Rs. 82,000/-. It is the case of the appellant that she deposited the amount in to the Court on 03.06.1991 and filed an application under Order XXI Rule 89 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. for setting aside the sale of her property held on 04.04.1991. It was also her case that the Court was closed for summer vacation from 27.04.1991 to 02.06.1991 and therefore the application to set aside the sale was filed on 03.06.1991 ie. On reopening day and therefore the application was within time. The application was resisted by the Decree Holder stating that the deposit ought to have been made within 30 days from the date of sale and therefore there was noncompliance of Order XXI Rule 92(2) C.P.C. 0The lower Court after considering the respective contentions held that deposit ought to have been made within 30 days from the date of the sale irrespective of the closure of the Court for summer vacation since the deposit was made beyond 30 days, the application was dismissed. Aggrieved by the said order, the judgment debtor had preferred the appeal before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. 64. After hearing both sides, the learned single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that the provisions of Section 4 of Limitation Act are not attracted to the deposits which are required to be made under Rule 92 (2) of Order XXI. Filing of application and making deposit stand on two different footings. The Supreme Court also while interpreting the above provisions overruled the contra decisions of various High Courts and also disagreed with the view expressed in Basavantappa v. Gangadhar Narayan Dharwadkar, AIR 1987 SC 53 . Filing of application and making deposit stand on two different footings. The Supreme Court also while interpreting the above provisions overruled the contra decisions of various High Courts and also disagreed with the view expressed in Basavantappa v. Gangadhar Narayan Dharwadkar, AIR 1987 SC 53 . Ultimately, the learned Judge has held that the application to set aside the auction sale has to be filed within sixty days and if during the intervening period, the Courts are closed for vacation, the benefit can be availed under Section 4 of the Limitation Act. But, however, the same benefit cannot be extended for making deposit of sale amount. The deposit has to be made by the judgment debtor within thirty days from the date of sale. The benefit under Section 4 is available only to suit, appeal or application and not to the deposits required to be made under Rules 89, 92 (2) of Order 21. Thus even if the application to set aside the sale was within time (saved under Section 4 ), it cannot be construed that the deposit, which is made after thirty days of sale was also in time. 65. In the above cited decision, the view expressed by the learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High court is that filing of application and making deposit stand on two different footings and that the benefit under Section 4 is available only to suit, appeal or application and not to the deposits required to be made under Rules 89, 92(2) of Order 21 of C.P.C. 66. In Muthuvenkatapathy Reddi vs. Kuppu Reddi and others ( 1940 1 MLJ 629 = (1940) 51 L.W. 527 ), a Full Bench of this Court has held that any payment or adjustment made by the judgment debtor which satisfies the decree holder is a payment within the meaning of Order 21 Rule 89. Where the decree holder was paid most of the amount due to him by assignment of a mortgage out of Court and the small balance was deposited into Court by the judgment debtors when they made the application for setting aside the sale, it is sufficient compliance with Order 21 Rule 89. This decision is almost in favour of the case of the appellants herein. 67. This decision is almost in favour of the case of the appellants herein. 67. The decision in P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries ( AIR 1990 SC 933 = 1990 -1-L.W. 364) has been overruled in view of the Full Bench Judgment of the Honorable Supreme Court in Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu, reported in AIR 2001 SC 2699 . 68. In Babu Lachmeshwar Prasead Shukul and others v. Babu Girdhari Lal Chaudhari and others (AIR 1939 Patna 667) it is held that an act directed or allowed to be done or taken in an office is used in Section 10 in contradistinction to an act directed or allowed to be done or taken in a Court. “Office” does not include the office of a Court. Hence, the fact that the office of a Court remains open while the Court itself is closed for judicial business will not a deprive a litigant of the extended time for doing an act to which Section 10, General Clauses Act, applies. The High Court is closed for ordinary business during the annual vacation. Hence printing costs deposited on day when Court reopens will be within time under Section 10. The principle laid down in this decision is that the fact that the office of a Court remains open while the Court itself is closed for judicial business will not deprive a litigant of the extended time for doing an act to which Section 10 General Clauses Act applies. 69. In Raja Pande v. Sheopujan Pande (AIR (29) 1942 Allahabad 429), it has been held that Section 10 of General Clauses Act, applies to a creditor’s petition of insolvency filed under Section 9. Consequently, if the period of three months prescribed by Section 9 (1) (C) expires on a day when the Court is not sitting the petition can be validly presented on the next day when the Court is sitting. 70. On coming to the instant case on hand, it is manifest that the appellants/ judgment debtors have filed the application in E.A. No. 171 of 2010 and deposited the amount mentioned in the proclamation along with 5% as provided under Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 31.05.2010 ie. On the reopening date. 70. On coming to the instant case on hand, it is manifest that the appellants/ judgment debtors have filed the application in E.A. No. 171 of 2010 and deposited the amount mentioned in the proclamation along with 5% as provided under Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 31.05.2010 ie. On the reopening date. It is pertinent to note here that the sale in respect of B-Schedule property was held on 11.03.2010 and in respect of A-Schedule property it was held on 25.03.2010. As contemplated under Rule 92 (2) of Order 21, the amount mentioned in the proclamation along with 5% shall have to be deposited within the period of sixty days. 71. In so far as the B-Schedule property is concerned, the prescribed period of sixty day is expired on 09.05.2010, whereas in the case of A-Schedule property it expires on 23.05.2010. Both the expiry dates fall on summer recess between 01.05.2010 and 30.05.2010. During this period, the Court was almost closed and hence the application to set aside the sale under Order 21 Rule 89 on depositing the proclamation amount with 5% was made on 31.05.2010, which according to the learned counsel for the appellants is in time. 72. For better appreciation of this case, it may be relevant to extract Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure: R.89 Application to set aside sale on deposit.- (1) Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree [ any person claiming an interest in the property sold at the time of the sale or at the time of making the application, or acting for or in the interest of such person,] may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court,- (a) for payment to the purchaser, a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase-money, and (b) for payment to the decree-holder, the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale ordered, less any amount which may, since the date of such proclamation of sale, have been received by the decree-holder. 73. The language of Rule 89 (1) has been very carefully coined by the legislators. 73. The language of Rule 89 (1) has been very carefully coined by the legislators. It contemplates that where any person claiming an interest in the immovable property sold at the time of sale in execution of decree may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court. The words “ may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court” indicates that the act of making application and payment of deposit shall be taken place simultaneously. Hence, at the time of making application, the amount of proclamation shall have to be deposited. In other words, this Court would say that filing of application shall go along with the deposit of money. 74. As rightly held in Challamane Huchha Gowda vs. M.R. Tirumala and another, reported in 2004-2-L.W. 350, Rule 89 postulates two conditions: they are : depositing – 1) of sum equal to five percent of the purchase money to be paid to the purchaser, 2) of the amount specified in the proclamation of sales less any amount received by the decree holder since the date of such proclamation, in the Court. If these two conditions are satisfied the Court shall make an order for setting aside the sale under Rule 92 (2) of Order 21 of CPC on an application made to it. 75. Obviously these two conditions have been complied with by the appellants/judgment debtors. As discussed earlier since the Court was closed for summer vacation from 01.05.2010 to 30.05.2010, the appellants/judgments debtors have filed the application under Order 21 Rule 89 by depositing the proclamation amount with 5% equal to proclamation amount on 31.05.2010. 76. The learned District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagarkoil in the impugned order has held that since the application along with the deposit was made beyond the period of sixty days that petition was dismissed as not maintainable. The conclusion of the learned District Judge is absolutely erroneous. Because in Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu, AIR 2001 SC 2699 , a larger Bench of the Honorable Supreme Court has held that for setting aside the sale of immovable property an application can be made with the period of sixty days as prescribed under Article 127 of the Limitation Act. Because in Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu, AIR 2001 SC 2699 , a larger Bench of the Honorable Supreme Court has held that for setting aside the sale of immovable property an application can be made with the period of sixty days as prescribed under Article 127 of the Limitation Act. Though the prescribed period of sixty days expired during summer recess the appellants have filed the application under Order 21 Rule 89 by depositing the proclamation amount with the amount equal to 5% of the proclamation amount on 31.05.2010 ie. On the reopening date of Court and therefore the application along with the deposit made on 31.05.2010 is well within time and hence the application for setting aside the sale is liable to be allowed. 77. In the result this civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 05.10.2010 and made in E.A.No.171 of 2020 in E.P.No.2 of 2004 in O.S.No.49 of 1997 on the file of the learned District Judge, Kanayakumari at Nagarkoil is set aside and the application in E.A.No.171 of 2010 in E.P.No.2 of 2004 in O.S.No.49 of 1997 is allowed as prayed for.