By The Court—Parties have exchanged their affidavits. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. This writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenges the order of suspension dated 1.6.2011, by means of which the petitioner, who was working as Executive Engineer in the Irrigation Department, has been suspended in contemplation of departmental proceedings, on certain charges, which have been broadly mentioned in the suspension order itself. 4. There are six charges mentioned in the suspension order, which speak of illegal appointments made by the petitioner on Class IV posts, namely, on the posts of Dhawak, Chaukidar, Beldar, etc. The charge, in nutshell, is that the said appointments were made without holding any selection and that the posts were converted into other posts by the petitioner, for which he did not have any authority as Executive Engineer and that after making appointments on such changed posts, the earlier posts were not abolished and appointments were made on those posts also. The charge is also that the conduct of the petitioner in converting the posts as aforesaid and making appointments in excess of the posts, caused unnecessary burden upon the public exchequer. 5. Sri Raghvendra Singh, learned Senior Advocate, assailing the suspension order, has made an attempt to justify the action taken by the petitioner on the ground that all such actions were undertaken by him on the directives issued to him by superior officer, namely, the Superintending Engineer. The submission is that when the Superintending Engineer himself directed for such change of posts, the petitioner was bound to follow the dictates of superior officer and if he had not done so, he would have been held guilty of insubordination and the result would have been, to face an enquiry after suspension. He has relied upon the letter dated 1.1.2009, wherein the Superintending Engineer has issued directives to the petitioner as Executive Engineer and Sri Rajiv Kumar, another Executive Engineer for converting the posts and making appointments. Many directions have been issued in the said letter with respect to the appointments which we need not repeat. The petitioner says that he having complied with the directives of the Superintending Engineer, cannot be subjected to disciplinary proceedings nor can be awarded any punishment. 6. Many directions have been issued in the said letter with respect to the appointments which we need not repeat. The petitioner says that he having complied with the directives of the Superintending Engineer, cannot be subjected to disciplinary proceedings nor can be awarded any punishment. 6. A charge-sheet has also been issued to the petitioner levelling all charges and saying that he had made appointments in excess of the posts without any authority, causing loss of public money. 7. It is the case of the State that in fact it was a designed plan by the Superintending Engineer as well as Executive Engineers both to make appointments in illegal manner and that it was the result of conspiracy hatched up by the officers aforesaid, for which reason action against the Superintending Engineer has also been initiated and to whom also a charge-sheet has been issued for initiation of enquiry and award of punishment. The charge-sheet issued to the Superintending Engineer is also on record. 8. In response, the petitioner’s plea is that no action would be taken against the Superintending Engineer as he has already retired on attaining the age of superannuation and that one of the charges in the aforesaid charge-sheet is that orders for such conversion of posts and making such appointments were taken by the petitioner from the Superintending Engineer by misrepresentation, which obviously means that the respondent State is trying to put all blame upon the petitioner for being instrumental in making such appointments, though he acted only on the directives issued by the Superintending Engineer. 9. In a matter of suspension, the High Court would not sit as enquiry officer or as appellate authority for administrative decision taken by the competent authority. The suspension order can be challenged on the ground that there was no material on the basis of which any action could be taken in departmental proceedings, or on objective consideration of such material if the appointing authority being subjectively satisfied that no such action could be taken, or the suspension order has not been passed by competent authority or it was in violation of any statutory rule or provision or it is a purely mala fide and arbitrary action. 10. 10. The truthfulness of the charges levelled against the delinquent in the charge-sheet or mentioned in the suspension order is not to be tested by the Court while judging the validity of suspension order, unless ofcourse the charges as mentioned in the suspension order or in the charge-sheet on the face of it do not make out a case for any action being taken against the delinquent. Whether a charge stands proved or not would be the subject matter of departmental enquiry where the parties are given full opportunity to lead their evidence and the department is to prove the charges whereas the delinquent is to rebut the evidence so that his innocence is proved. 11. The present suspension order was passed on precisely clear charges in contemplation of departmental proceedings by the competent authority. It does not suffer from any procedural illegality or irregularity. The plea of mala fide would not be available to the petitioner for challenging the suspension order as the alleged appointments were made contrary to the rules by the petitioner who was the appointing authority of such posts and which posts were converted without sanction of the competent authority. The plea of the petitioner that it was because of the directives issued by the Superintending Engineer that he did so, is a plea to be considered during enquiry where explanation given by the petitioner may or may not be accepted, but this Court would not substitute or record its own finding on such an issue, which necessarily is the subject-matter of enquiry. 12. Equally, the plea of the petitioner that initiation of enquiry against the Superintending Engineer is not possible, cannot be considered in writ jurisdiction. In view of the fact that the Superintending Engineer has also simultaneously been charged, for which a charge-sheet has been issued to him levelling certain charges against him, it would be too speculative for this Court to record any finding or to assume the outcome of enquiry merely on the apprehensions of the petitioner and on the pleas raised by him. We, however, do not find any reason that if a charge-sheet has been issued to the Superintending Engineer, then why the State Government would not proceed in the matter and complete the enquiry against him. 13. We, however, do not find any reason that if a charge-sheet has been issued to the Superintending Engineer, then why the State Government would not proceed in the matter and complete the enquiry against him. 13. Lastly, the petitioner’s counsel has submitted that the charges, levelled against the petitioner, if stood proved, cannot be said to be so grave to entail any major punishment. This again is a plea which if considered by this Court may prejudice the case of either party. Learned counsel has relied upon a Division Bench case of this Court reported in 2009 (27) LCD 297, Basant Lal Singh v. State of U.P. and others. 14. Ofcourse suspension cannot be resorted to on trivial matters or on charges which are very minor and if they stand proved in the enquiry, no major punishment is likely to be given. What should be the test of gravity of charges in matters where such a plea is raised would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Here, in the instant case, the charges are of making illegal appointments and causing loss to public exchequer. If the charges are proved, what punishment would be awarded, cannot be assessed at this stage. The plea aforesaid, therefore, is not of any assistance to the petitioner in challenging the suspension order. 15. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in challenge to the suspension order passed against the petitioner. The writ petition being devoid of merit is dismissed. 16. However, considering the fact that the charge-sheet has already been issued and served upon the petitioner, we direct that the petitioner may submit his reply to the charge-sheet within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order or in such extended period as may be permitted by the enquiry officer, and the enquiry officer shall submit his report within a maximum period two months from the date of receipt of petitioner’s reply, subject to co-operation of the petitioner in the enquiry. In case the petitioner seeks any adjournment, the period of such adjournment shall be excluded from the time schedule referred to above. Appropriate final orders shall be passed by the disciplinary authority within next one month after taking necessary steps. _____________