JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri A.B.Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri R.C.Shukla appears for respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 and Sri Rajesh Kumar Pandey appears for respondent No. 1. Counter and rejoinder-affidavits have been exchanged. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties the writ petition is being finally decided. 2. By this writ petition the petitioners have prayed for quashing the order dated 19.5.2008, passed by Up Nagar Ayukat by which earlier order dated 11.6.2007 passed with regard to House No. 337/18, Shivkuti, Allahabad has been recalled and a direction has been issued to record the name of respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7. 3. Brief facts of the case which are necessary to be noted for deciding the writ petition are- that with regard to House No. 337/18 situate at Shivkuti, Allahabad an order for mutation dated 11.6.2007 was passed for mutating the name of the writ petitioners which was made subject to decision of the Civil Court, in pending Civil Suit No. 613 of 1989. After the said order was passed after hearing both the parties, the proceedings were reopened on the application submitted by the respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 before Mayor. The petitioners as well as respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 submitted application for mutating their names on the basis of respective sale-deeds. Both the parties resisted claim of other side. The dispute regarding title between vendors of both the parties is pending consideration before the Civil Court in Suit No. 613 of 1989. After the order dated 11.6.2007 mutating the name of petitioners and rejecting the objection of respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 an application was submitted to the Mayor of the Nagar Nigam by respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 in which certain directions were issued. It appears that on the aforesaid directions again notices were issued to the parties and after hearing the parties a fresh order dated 19.5.2008 has been passed by which earlier order dated 11.6.2007 has been set aside and a direction was issued for mutating the name of respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7. The petitioners aggrieved by the said decision has come up in the writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners challenging the order contended that the said order passed on 19.5.2008 being review of the earlier order dated 11.6.2007 is without jurisdiction. 5, 6 and 7. The petitioners aggrieved by the said decision has come up in the writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners challenging the order contended that the said order passed on 19.5.2008 being review of the earlier order dated 11.6.2007 is without jurisdiction. He submits that when earlier authority after hearing the parties passed the order dated 11.6.2007 mutating the name of the petitioners, the remedy if any available to the respondents was to file an appeal under Section 513 of the U.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to ‘Act’) and recourse of review was without jurisdiction. He further submits that there was no jurisdiction in the Mayor to direct to rehear the matter. In support of his submission he placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and others, AIR 1987 SC 2186 and the Full Bench decision of this Court in Shivraj and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and others, (1997) 2 CRC 266. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the Nagar Nigam refuting the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the proceedings were reopened on the directions issued by the Mayor, hence, there is no error in the proceedings. He submits that after the order dated 11.6.2007 an application was given by the respondents to the Mayor on which he directed for fresh hearing. 6. Sri R.C.Shukla, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 refuting the submission of the petitioners’ counsel contended that there is an inherent jurisdiction in the authority who has passed the order dated 11.6.2007 to correct any error. He submits that under Section 213 of the Act there is a power to alter or amend the assessment list which power includes for correcting the order as and when required. He further submits that every Court or authority has jurisdiction to correct any error. He has placed reliance on judgment of the Apex Court in Sri Dadu Dayal Mahasabha v. Sukhdev Arya and another, 1990 RD 47 and S. Satnam Singh and others v. Surender Kaur and another, 2009(108) RD 551. 7. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 8. He has placed reliance on judgment of the Apex Court in Sri Dadu Dayal Mahasabha v. Sukhdev Arya and another, 1990 RD 47 and S. Satnam Singh and others v. Surender Kaur and another, 2009(108) RD 551. 7. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 8. The present case is a case where the competent authority has exercised jurisdiction under Section 213 of the Act. Sub Sections (1) and (3) of Section 213 of the Act are as follows : “213. 7. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 8. The present case is a case where the competent authority has exercised jurisdiction under Section 213 of the Act. Sub Sections (1) and (3) of Section 213 of the Act are as follows : “213. Amendment and alteration of list.—(1) The Executive Committee or a sub-committee thereof appointed in this behalf may at any time alter or amend the assessment list,- (a) by entering therein the name of any person or any property which ought to have been entered or any property which has become liable to taxation after the authentication of the assessment list; or (b) by substituting therein for the name of the owner or occupier of any property the name of any other person who has succeeded by transfer or otherwise to the ownership or occupation of the property; or (c) by enhancing the valuation of, or assessment on, any property which [has become incorrectly valued or assessed or which, by reason of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake, has been incorrectly valued or assessed]; or (d) by revaluing or re-assessing any property the value of which has been increased by additions or alterations to buildings; or (e) where the percentage on the annual value at which any tax is to be levied has been altered by the Corporation under the provisions [of this Act] by making a corresponding alteration in the amount of the tax payable in each case; or (f) by reducing upon the application of the owner or on satisfactory evidence that the owner is untraceable and the need for reduction established, upon its own initiative, the valuation of any building which has been wholly or partly demolished or destroyed; or (g) by correcting any clerical, arithmetical or other apparent error; Provided that the Executive committee or the sub-committee, as the case may be, shall give at least one month’s notice to any person interested in any alteration [or amendment] which the Executive Committee or sub-committee proposes to make under clauses (a) , (b) , (c) or (d) of sub-section (1) and of the date on which the alteration [or amendment] will be made. [(1-A) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that it shall not be necessary to follow the procedure laid down in Sections 199 to 203 or in Sections 207 to 210 in respect of any alteration made under clause (e) of sub-section (1) as a result of a determination of the rate of tax under Section 148.]. (2) ................................ (3) Every alteration [or amendment] made under sub-section (1) shall be authenticated by the signature or signatures of the person authorised by Section 210 and, subject to the result of an appeal under Section 472, shall take effect from the date on which the next instalment falls due. Sub-section (3) of Section 213 clearly contemplates filing of an appeal under Section 472. 9. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 472 are relevant in the present case which are as follows : “472. Sub-section (3) of Section 213 clearly contemplates filing of an appeal under Section 472. 9. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 472 are relevant in the present case which are as follows : “472. Appeals when and to whom to lie.—(1) Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, appeals against any annual value or tax fixed or charged under this Act shall be heard and determined by the Judge : [Provided that any such appeal pending at any stage before the Judge may be transferred by the District Judge for hearing and disposal, to any Additional Judge of the Court of Small Causes or Civil Judge or Additional Civil Judge having jurisdiction in the City.] (2) No such appeal shall be heard unless- (a) it is brought within fifteen days after the accrual of the cause of complaint; (b) in the case of an appeal against an annual value an objection has previously been made [and has been disposed of under Section 209]; (c) in the case of an appeal against any tax in respect of which provisions exists under this Act for an objection to be made to the [Municipal Commissioner] against the demand; such objection has previously been made and disposed of; [(d) in the case of an appeal against any amendment or alteration made in the assessment list for property taxes under sub-section (1) of Section 213, an objection has been made in pursuance of a notice issued under the proviso to the said sub-section and such objection has been disposed of;] (e) in the case of an appeal against a tax, or in the case of an appeal made against an annual value after a bill for any property tax assessed upon such value has been presented to the appellant, the amount claimed from the appellant has been deposited by him with the [Municipal Commissioner].” 10. The submission which has been pressed by counsel for the petitioners is that the order passed under Section 213, dated 11.6.2007, could not have been reviewed by the authority since the said order was subject to result of an appeal under sub-section (3) of Section 213 of the Act and there is no specific provision for review under the statute. The submission which has been pressed by counsel for the petitioners is that the order passed under Section 213, dated 11.6.2007, could not have been reviewed by the authority since the said order was subject to result of an appeal under sub-section (3) of Section 213 of the Act and there is no specific provision for review under the statute. Whereas Sri Shukla refuting the submissions contended that under Section 213, Assessment List, can be altered and amended at any time and the authority who has passed the order dated 11.6.2007 was fully competent to review that order. 11. For appreciating the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties it is necessary to look into the ambit and scope of Section 213(1) of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 213 provides that the Executive Committee or a sub-committee thereof appointed in this behalf may at any time alter or amend the assessment list. The power under Section 213(1) can be exercised undoubtedly from time to time as occasion arises but the question which is to be considered is as to when an order was passed after hearing both the parties, whether that can be reviewed by the same authority or not. The present is a case where the mutation was sought under Section 213(1) (b) of the Act which was allowed on 11.6.2007, when specific provision for appeal is mentioned under sub-section(3) of Section 213 of the Act, the Legislature clearly contemplated challenge of such order by way of an appeal. Clause (g) of sub-section (1) Section 213 contemplates correction of any clerical, arithmetical or other apparent error in the assessment list. The present is not case of correction of clerical, arithmetical or other apparent error rather it was a case of deciding the claim of two set of persons who were claiming their mutation on the basis of the respective sale-deeds. 12. The Apex Court in the case of Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta (supra) held as under: “It is now well established that a quasi judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. The Vice-Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal, acts as a quasi judicial authority. The Vice-Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal, acts as a quasi judicial authority. It is not disputed that the provisions of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do not confer any power of review on the Vice-Chancellor. In the circumstances, it must be held that the Vice-Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction in reviewing her order dated January 24, 1987 by her order dated March 7, 1987. The said order of the Vice-Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 was a nullity.” 13. The Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sivraj (supra) considered the power of the Deputy Director of Consolidation to review the judgment given under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. After considering the provisions the Full Bench held that unless the the power of review is specifically conferred by the statute the consolidation authorities has no power to review or revise their judgment. The Full Bench of this Court held as under : “The aforementioned decisions of this Court, as we read them, do not support the proposition of law that any Tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power, which is not vested with power of review under the statute expressly or by necessary implication, has an inherent power of review of its previous order in any circumstances. In our view the decisions only lay down the proposition that a Tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power has the inherent power to correct a clerical mistake or arithmetical error in its order and has the power to review an order which has been obtained by practising fraud on the Court, provided that injustice has been perpetrated on a party by such order. Therefore, these decisions should not be construed as laying down any proposition of law contrary to the well settled principle of law that any order delivered and signed by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority attains finality subject to appeal or revision as provided under the Act and if the authority passing the order is not specifically vested with power of review under the statute, it cannot re-open the proceeding and review/revise its previous order. Coming to the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, it is our considered view that the consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy Director of Consolidation while deciding a revision petition exercises judicial or quasi judicial power and, therefore his order is final subject to any power of appeal or revision vested in superior authority under the Act. The consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy Director of Consolidation, is not vested with any power of review of his order and, therefore, cannot reopen any proceeding and cannot review or revise his earlier order. However, as a judicial or quasi-judicial authority he has the power to correct any clerical mistake/arithmetical error manifest error in his order in exercise of his inherent power as a tribunal.” 14. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sri Dadu Dayal Mahasabha (supra) where the Court was considering the inherent power of the Court under Section 151 C.P.C. The Apex Court in the said judgment laid down that the Court has inherent power under Section 151 to correct its own proceedings, if it was misled by one of the parties, that was a case where order of withdrawal of the suit was obtained which was sought to be cancelled. The Court held that if the same was obtained by misleading the Court, the same can very well be recalled. There cannot be any disputed to the proposition as laid down in the aforesaid judgment. However, the Court has inherent jurisdiction to recall its order which was obtained by misleading the Court. If fraud is played on the Court, it is the Court who has power to correct the said earlier order. Present is not a case where any fraud has been played. Earlier order was passed mutating the name of the petitioners after hearing the contesting respondents. The second case relied by learned counsel for the petitioner is Indian Charge Chrome, Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others, 2005(98) RD 720 where the review was sought of a judgment of the Apex Court. The Apex Court admitted the review against its own judgment. The Court as noted above has power to review its own judgment. But, in the present case, the question for consideration is the power of a statutory authority who have been conferred certain limited jurisdiction under the statue. The Apex Court admitted the review against its own judgment. The Court as noted above has power to review its own judgment. But, in the present case, the question for consideration is the power of a statutory authority who have been conferred certain limited jurisdiction under the statue. The above decision also does not help the respondent in the present case. 15. The last judgment which is relied is S. Satnam Singh (supra) which case had arisen out of the suit in the Civil Court. The Court laid down the proposition that the Court is always empowered to rectify the mistake the Court has committed. Present is not a case where any Court is correcting its own mistake rather present is a case where after decision is taken by the statutory authority under Section 213, the same authority again re-hear the matter on the direction of the Mayor and review its judgment. No provision has been shown to the Court which empowers the Mayor to issue any direction to reopen the matter which has been decided by a statutory authority. 16. In the present case we are of the view that the petition has substance and the order dated 11.6.2007 could not have been reviewed by the Up Nagar Ayukt and the remedy available to the respondents was to file an appeal under Section 472 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1959. Learned counsel for the respondents have submitted that the petitioners having challenged the order passed by the municipal authorities in mutation proceedings, the remedy available to the petitioners is to institute a suit in the competent Court and the writ petition be not entertained. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Ram Bharose Lal v. State of U.P. and others, 1991 RD 72. In the case of Ram Bharosey Lal the petitioner has filed a writ petition for a mandamus directing the District Magistrate to effect a change in the relevant village record scoring out the name of individuals. The writ petition was dismissed by a Division Bench against which a Special Leave Petition was filed, which was permitted to be withdrawn and therefore, thereafter a review application was filed by the petitioner before the Division Bench. The writ petition was dismissed by a Division Bench against which a Special Leave Petition was filed, which was permitted to be withdrawn and therefore, thereafter a review application was filed by the petitioner before the Division Bench. Following was laid down by the Division Bench : “The main relief sought by the petitioner is to direct the District Magistrate to effect change or mutation in the relevant record or rights by expunging the name of the vendors and entering the names of vendees, actually seeking direction to the Collector to make mutation of the name of the petitioner similar to an application under Section 34 of U.P. Land Revenue Act 1901. Even though relief sought by the petitioners may be under different Act but legal effect of the order of mutation in that event also remains the same. As a matter of fact, the mutation proceedings may be under Section 34 of U.P. Land Revenue Act or under some other similar Act, but the legal effect in both the events remains the same. These proceedings do not decide the right or title of the parties rather these proceedings are just fiscal in nature. They have just got legal effect of entering name of vendee in place of the vendor or the name of lessee in place of lessor or donee in place of doner. These mutation proceedings are to enable the State to receive revenue from vendee. By now it is well settled that where the dispute is in mutation proceedings which do not adjudicate upon rights or title of the parties, this Court need not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such matters persons aggrieved shall have rider to seek remedy in the appropriate Court. Even though the order of Division Bench was not detained one, but in our opinion it is absolutely correct. There is no justification to review or recall the order dated 5.2.1988 passed by Division Bench. Review petition fails and is dismissed. It shall, however, remain open for the petitioner to seek remedy before appropriate Court.” 18. The above case was on entirely different premise. The writ petition was directly filed in this Court praying relief akin to mutation of name, which petition was dismissed by this Court. Review petition fails and is dismissed. It shall, however, remain open for the petitioner to seek remedy before appropriate Court.” 18. The above case was on entirely different premise. The writ petition was directly filed in this Court praying relief akin to mutation of name, which petition was dismissed by this Court. Although observation was made that mutation proceedings does not adjudicate upon rights and titles of the parties and the aggrieved persons shall have to seek remedy in the appropriate Court but the said case did not lay any proposition that even if the order passed by statutory authority in mutation proceedings is without jurisdiction this Court under Article 226 cannot interfere in such an illegal order. 19. A learned Single Judge had occasion to consider mutation proceedings under U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. In , Hukmanand Sharma v. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun and others, 1993(35) ALR 332, it was observed by this Court that in the said case that proceedings for mutation in the Municipal record are fiscal in nature. However, in the case an illegal order is passed in the mutation proceedings, the same can be expunged. This Court observed that the fact that either of the parties can approach to the Civil Court does not mean that an illegal order passed by the Nagar Palika can be allowed to stand. Following was laid down in the said judgment : “Proceedings for mutation in the municipal records are fiscal in nature and are limited to the realisation of municipal taxes. The Nagar Palika has no authority to conclusively decide as to who is the rightful owner of the property. This power is vested in a Civil Court and the party, who is aggrieved by mutation, can go to a civil Court for declaration of its rights and for such relief, as the circumstances of the case may warrant. The learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, contended that the petitioner’s remedy lies in approaching a Civil Court for determination of its rights. It is true that either of the parties can approach to the Civil Court, but that does not mean that an illegal order passed by the Nagar Palika can be allowed to stand merely because it is not conclusive. The petitioner’s name was already recorded in the municipal records. The respondent No. 4 did not appeal to the appellate authority. It is true that either of the parties can approach to the Civil Court, but that does not mean that an illegal order passed by the Nagar Palika can be allowed to stand merely because it is not conclusive. The petitioner’s name was already recorded in the municipal records. The respondent No. 4 did not appeal to the appellate authority. After the order, it applied in 1973 for mutation of its name and the proceedings lingered on for several years. The administrative authorities are not at liberty to pass any order whatever and when ever they like. The order passed by the executive officer expunging the name of the petitioner was, therefore, illegal and deserves to be quashed. The writ petition is, accordingly allowed and the order dated 15th June, 1981 passed by the executive officer, Nagar Palika, Rishikesh, a copy of which is Annexure ‘2’ to the writ petition, is hereby quashed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs.” 20. This Court while considering the provisions of Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 has examined the ambit and scope of entertaining the writ petition against the order passed in mutation proceedings in Lal Bachan v. Board of Revenue , U.P., Lucknow and others, 2002(93) RD 6, referring to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Jaipal, Minor v. The Board of Revenue, U.P., Allahabad and others, 1956 ALJ 807 following was laid down by this Court : “12. In view of the above discussions, it is clear that although the writ petition arising out of the mutation proceedings cannot be held to be non-maintainable but this Court do not entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution due to reason that parties have right to get the title adjudicated by regular suit and the orders passed in mutation proceedings are summary in nature. 13. The second question which needs to be considered is as to in what circumstances the writ petition can be entertained arising out of the mutation proceedings. 13. The second question which needs to be considered is as to in what circumstances the writ petition can be entertained arising out of the mutation proceedings. The Division Bench of this Court in Jaipal’s case (supra) has referred to “exception” to the general rule in following words : “The only exception to this general rule is in those cases in which the entry itself confers a title on the petitioner by virtue of the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. This petition does not fall in that class and we think therefore this Court should not entertain it. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.” 14. Learned Single Judge in Sridhar’s case (supra) also entertained the writ petition. The learned Single Judge in the aforesaid writ petition by entertaining the writ petition had noted that the aforesaid case was not simple mutation case but in the said case mutation was being claimed on the basis of the orders passed by the consolidation authorities on the basis of the sale-deed. It was claimed in that writ petition that the name on the basis of the sale-deed was mutated by consolidation authorities and name also came in C.H. Form No. 45 but the said entry was not corrected in the revenue records hence the mutation was filed. That was the distinguishing feature which was found by the Court and due to that reason the said writ petition was entertained. The Court in the aforesaid case also endorsed the view that had it been the case of simple mutation the writ petition could not have been entertained. It was held in paragraph 9 of the aforesaid case : “9. In the present case, as already mentioned, it was not a case of simple mutation of the name of the respondent No. 3 on the basis of the sale-deed. The said deed is said to be dated 10.7.1967 allegedly executed by the petitioner in favour of the respondent No. 3. The fact that the sale-deed was executed by the petitioner has been denied vehemently. The said sale-deed is claimed to have been placed before the consolidation authorities in 1968 and the name of the respondent No. 3 was recorded as owner on the basis of the said sale-deed over the plot in question. The fact that the sale-deed was executed by the petitioner has been denied vehemently. The said sale-deed is claimed to have been placed before the consolidation authorities in 1968 and the name of the respondent No. 3 was recorded as owner on the basis of the said sale-deed over the plot in question. Had that been the simple case based on that mutation of names in consolidation proceedings was made in 1968 soon after the execution of the sale-deed and on the basis of the said consolidation entries on C.H. Form No. 45, the name of the opposite party No. 3 continued to be recorded in the revenue records thereafter denotification of village under Section 52 of the Act continuously, there was no difficulty in refusing to entertain the writ petition challenging the mutation entries under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 15. Another case in which this Court had entertained the writ petition was Rudra Pratap’s case (supra) in which case the Court interfered on the ground that the Board of Revenue while deciding the mutation case has also decided the question of title. The learned Single Judge observed in paragraph 2 in the said judgment as under : “In that case no doubt it was held that mutation proceedings ordinarily relate to the question of possession and do not decide the question of title for which there is a separate remedy by way of a suit and as such the High Court should not interfere in the order passed in mutation proceedings. But it was also observed in that case that this consideration should not be applied in cases where the question of title is also decided in mutation proceedings. In my opinion the present case belongs to that category of cases in as much as the Board of Revenue has proceeded to decide the question of title. The Board of Revenue has not ordered mutation in favour of the third respondent merely on the basis of her possession, but it has ordered mutation in her favour on the ground that she is entitled to succeed to the land in dispute whereas the petitioners are not so entitled. The finding even if not conclusive, does throw a shadow on the clear title of the petitioners. The finding even if not conclusive, does throw a shadow on the clear title of the petitioners. The petitioners, in my opinion, are entitled to seek the assistance of the Court to remove that shadow and it is not necessary to drive them to the remedy of a suit.” 16. The cases in which the writ petition can also be entertained arising out of the mutation proceedings may be cases in which an authority not having jurisdiction has passed an order or interfered with an order passed in the proceedings. The writ petition challenging an order passed without jurisdiction can be entertained by the Court despite availability of an alternative remedy. However. In that case also the Court will interfere only when it appears that substantial injustice has been suffered by a party. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the writ petition arising out of the mutation proceedings under Section 34, U. P. Land Revenue Act cannot be entertained by this Court subject to only exception as laid down by the Division Bench in Jaipal’s case (supra) . The writ petition may also be entertained where authority passing the order had no Jurisdiction.” 21. In mutation proceedings when an order is passed by the authority which is without jurisdiction this Court can interfere with such an order in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Present is the case of a nature where the Up Nagar Adhikari having already decided the matter on merit has reviewed the same without there being any jurisdiction to review the judgment on merits. 22. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that the order impugned dated 19.5.2008 cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside. However, in view of the fact that this writ petition challenging the order dated 19.5.2008 was filed in this Court on 2.6.2008 and an interim order was passed on 4.2.2008 staying the effect of order dated 19.5.2008 which interim order has been continuing in this writ petition, in the ends of justice the respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 may be given an opportunity to file an appeal under U.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1959. 23. In the result the order dated 19.5.2008 is set aside. Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 may be given an opportunity to file an appeal under U.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1959. 23. In the result the order dated 19.5.2008 is set aside. Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 may file an appeal against the order dated 19.5.2008 under Section 472 of the U.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1959 in accordance with law. 24. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. —————