JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.—Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. The petitioner has preferred this petition challenging the validity and correctness of the order dated 11.11.1997 passed by the DIOS, Allahabad appended as Annexure 13 to the petition, by which he refused to grant financial approval to the petitioner’s appointment. The petitioner seeks quashing of the aforesaid order and further a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay arrears of salary as well as current salary and not to interfere in his working as lecturer in English. 3. The facts as appear from the writ petition, are that petitioner claims that a post of lecturer in English fell vacant due to resignation of Sri Badri Narain Mehrotra; that committee of management vide its resolution dated 1.6.1997 resolved to fill up in the post of lecturer in English, regarding which information had been sent to the D.I.O.S. and Adhyachan had been submitted; that post was accordingly advertised in “Rashtriya Sahara” and “Northern India Patrika” on 1.6.1997 after due information to the DIOS and U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission; that selection committee was constituted on 7.6.1997, in which the petitioner claims to have been selected on the basis of quality point marks; that appointment letter dated 23.6.1997 was consequently issued appointing him as lecturer in English in the pay scale of Rs. 1600 - 2660 till a regularly selected candidate by the commission joins the post and information in this regard was also submitted by Manager of the institution to the DIOS vide Annexure 6 to the writ petition. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner joined the institution on 1.7.1997 and all the relevant papers of appointment were sent by the committee of management to the DIOS for grant of approval and financial sanction. When no response was received from Lekhadhikari/Accounts Officer in the office of DIOS., reminders were sent by the Manager of the institution on 7.10.1997. However, inspite of the reminders sent, neither salary was paid to the petitioner nor financial approval was accorded by the office of DIOS which compelled the petitioner to move the DIOS by means of representations dated 10.10.1997 and 14.10.1997 which remained unactioned. In the meantime, he claims to have been performing his duties and taking classes of the student. However, inspite of the reminders sent, neither salary was paid to the petitioner nor financial approval was accorded by the office of DIOS which compelled the petitioner to move the DIOS by means of representations dated 10.10.1997 and 14.10.1997 which remained unactioned. In the meantime, he claims to have been performing his duties and taking classes of the student. Manager of the institution thereafter sent another letter dated 21.10.1997 to the DIOS, who instead of deciding his representation, rejected financial sanction on the sole ground that committee of management had no power to appoint the petitioner, as such he is not entitled to payment of salary. 4. The order impugned is assailed on the ground that financial sanction has been rejected on extraneous considerations, hence the order is illegal and bad in the eyes of law. It is urged by the counsel for petitioner that petitioner was appointed in accordance with law after following the procedure prescribed and that High Court has stayed similar orders passed by the DIOS in many cases where they have pleaded that there is ban on the power of management to make appointment. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Ashika Prasad Shukla v. DIOS, Allahabad and another, (1998) 3 UPLBEC 1722 . 5. Per contra, learned standing counsel submits that as a matter of fact no post of lecturer in English has ever been sanctioned in the institution, therefore, there is no question of it having fallen vacant as claimed by the petitioner. It is also submitted that as the post of lecturer in English was not sanctioned, there was no question of sending any resolution by the committee of management appointing the petitioner on the said post and the committee of having was not possessed of any authority or jurisdiction to make appointment on the post of lecturer in English said to be lying vacant. In any case the power of making ad hoc appointment has been vested in Regional Director of Education vide notification No. I.M. 91/15-7-1(102) dated 6.6.1997. Further, in non governmental institutions the selection of the teachers has to be done by the Commission/Selection Board, as such the committee of management had no power, authority or jurisdiction under law to make ad hoc appointment. Further, in non governmental institutions the selection of the teachers has to be done by the Commission/Selection Board, as such the committee of management had no power, authority or jurisdiction under law to make ad hoc appointment. It is lastly submitted that petitioner’s appointment was also not approved by the DIOS in the aforesaid circumstances, as such there is no question of payment of salary to the petitioner who is alleged to have been appointed in derogation of the rules. 6. In rebuttal, counsel for the petitioner submits that at the relevant time when the petitioner was appointed, Section 18 of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, was in force and the committee of management had power to make appointment in short term vacancies. 7. Record indicates that this petition was filed in the year 1998 and no interim order has been granted in this case. 8. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, it is apparent that petitioner claims that he was appointed on a substantive vacancy which fell vacant due to resignation of one Sri Badri Narain Mehrotra and not a short term vacancy, hence the decision relied upon by the counsel for petitioner in Ashika Prasad Shukla’s case (supra), is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case as it pertains to appointment on short term vacancy. When there is no sanctioned post in the institution, financial approval appears to have rightly been refused by the impugned order. Approval to appointment of the petitioner has been refused as far back as in the year 1997and there being no interim stay order, no relief can be granted in the facts and circumstances of the case. 9. For all the reasons stated above, this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. —————