JUDGMENT : K.A.PUJ – 1. The petitioners – in all seven – have filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying for modification of the award of the Industrial Tribunal to the effect that the petitioners may be regularized from the year 1987 i.e. the order of their initial recruitment or from the year 1989 i.e. after they have completed 2 years in service. The petitioners have also prayed for direction to the respondent authorities to give the petitioners all the consequential benefits that accrued to the petitioners on account of their being regularized from the year 1987 or 1989, as the case may be. 2. This Court has issued notice on 22.8.2000 and petition was admitted on 26.12.2000. During the pendency of this petition, the petitioner No.2 – Vishabhai Bijalbhai expired. The legal heirs of the petitioner No.2 therefore filed Civil Application No.8336 of 2010 for condonation of delay of 3035 days caused in filing the Civil Application (Stamp) No.4560 of 2010 for bringing the legal heirs on record. This Court vide its order dated 12.8.2010 rejected the said Civil Application for condonation of delay on the ground that no sufficient cause was shown to condone the delay. Since delay was not condoned, Civil Application (Stamp) No.4560 of 2010 also stood disposed off. In this view of the matter, the petition stands abated so far as petitioner No.2 is concerned. 3. So far as other petitioners are concerned, except petitioner No.7 – Kavabhai Danjibhai Dabhi all are pursuing this petition by themselves. The petitioner No.7 expired even much before the present petition is filed and hence it is being pursued by his legal heirs and wife. 4. It is the case of the petitioners that, pursuant to an advertisement published in the newspaper, they had applied to Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation for being appointed in the post of driver. The said advertisement had appeared in the local newspaper, namely, Saurashtra Samachar, on 8.1.1987. The petitioners had applied and were recruited as drivers and had started working as drivers in the Bus Traffic Section of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation from the month of April, 1987. Though they had been recruited pursuant to an advertisement their services were not regularized and they were treated as daily-wagers. The petitioners, therefore, approached Industrial Tribunal by way of a Ref. (IT) No.237 of 1991. Though they had been recruited pursuant to an advertisement their services were not regularized and they were treated as daily-wagers. The petitioners, therefore, approached Industrial Tribunal by way of a Ref. (IT) No.237 of 1991. During the pendency of the said reference, on 28.6.1999 services of the petitioners were regularized in Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation. 5. The case of the petitioners before the Industrial Tribunal was that their appointment had been made pursuant to an advertisement in the vernacular newspaper, namely, Saurashtra Samachar, pursuant to which all the petitioners had applied and after undergoing the test, they were given their first order which stated that their appointment was for the period of 40 days. Thereafter, they were treated as daily-wagers. It is also their case that from 7.4.1987 they were working in Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation as drivers continuously without any break whatsoever. In the interagnum period City Bus Transport Service of the Municipal Corporation had been handed over to one M/s. Viradha Transport Ltd., and, therefore, the petitioners were absorbed as drivers in different departments of the Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation. 6. It is also the case of the petitioners that two persons, namely, Mr.Sahdevsingh B. Gohil and Kishorkumar Babulal Gohil, who were working as drivers in the Security Department of the Municipal Corporation were regularized immediately after they had completed two years in the said post. The petitioners have, therefore, asked the same treatment. Despite the fact that the Industrial Tribunal, upheld all the contentions of the petitioners in its award upto para-12, it was ultimately held that the petitioners had been appointed temporarily from 21.2.1994 and considering the period of two years after which similarly situated persons were regularized, the petitioners were regularized from 21.2.1996. The grievance of the petitioners is, therefore, that instead of regularizing services of the petitioners from 1987 and/or 1989, the services of the petitioners were regularized from 21.2.1996 by the Industrial Tribunal. 7. Being aggrieved by the order of the Industrial Tribunal, the petitioners have filed present petition before this Court. 8. Mr.B.P.Tanna, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Tanna Associates, has submitted that the Industrial Tribunal after observing completely in favour of the petitioners, has wrongly come to the conclusion that the petitioners are entitled to be regularized from 21.2.1996 and not from the date of their appointment or two years there from. 8. Mr.B.P.Tanna, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Tanna Associates, has submitted that the Industrial Tribunal after observing completely in favour of the petitioners, has wrongly come to the conclusion that the petitioners are entitled to be regularized from 21.2.1996 and not from the date of their appointment or two years there from. He has further submitted that the Industrial Tribunal should have considered the period of two years from the date of their actual appointment and not from the date when they were temporarily appointed in the year 1994. He has further submitted that the petitioners were appointed through regular course pursuant to an advertisement in a vernacular newspaper after which the petitioners were interviewed and having been succeeded in the said interview they were appointed in the year 1987 as drivers. The advertisement never stipulated that the petitioners' services would be of temporary nature or would be of daily rated nature. In absence of any such clear mention in the advertisement itself, it is totally illegal and arbitrary on the part of the respondent authorities to have continued the petitioners as daily rated employees for 7 years after the date of their initial appointment. Mr.Tanna further submitted that the Industrial Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the petitioners should have been regularized two years from the date of their temporary appointment. The petitioners in their reference had made a specific complaint that two other persons similarly situated like them had been regularized immediately on completion of two years and, therefore, the petitioners should have been regularized after they have completed two years. He has, therefore, submitted that the Industrial Tribunal has committed a grave error of law and of fact while taking the date of 21.2.1994 when the petitioners were appointed as temporary employees as the material date and the two years period was calculated from the said date. 9. Mr.Tanna further submitted that their dispute with the respondent Corporation is that inspite of the petitioners being regularly employed with the Corporation they were made to work as daily rated employees for seven years without any justification whatsoever. This was the cause of action. The same was challenged before the Industrial Tribunal. He has, therefore, submitted that the impugned award passed by the Industrial Tribunal is required to be modified by directing the respondent Corporation to regularize the services of the petitioners either from 1987 or from 1989. This was the cause of action. The same was challenged before the Industrial Tribunal. He has, therefore, submitted that the impugned award passed by the Industrial Tribunal is required to be modified by directing the respondent Corporation to regularize the services of the petitioners either from 1987 or from 1989. 10. After filing the above petition in the year 2000, an additional affidavit is filed by the petitioner No.4 i.e. Chandrakantbhai Bhaktibhai Gondaliya. It is stated in the said affidavit that there was interim stay/injunction granted by the Industrial Tribunal on 29.5.1991 restraining the respondents from filling up vacancies till the final disposal of the said reference. Despite this injunction order, certain persons (drivers), namely, Shri Kishor Babubhai Gohil and Shri Sahadevsinh, who were on temporary basis and who are serving as drivers to the senior officers of the Corporation have been inducted as permanent employees. This was reflected in Ex.27 being Office Order dated 26.9.1997. It was further pointed out that such persons had been juniors in service to the petitioners and had joined the Corporation as temporary drivers in the year 1995. It is further pointed that two other drivers, namely, Shri Narbheram Premjibhai Dhandaliya and Shri Inderjitsinh Jhala, both being juniors to the petitioners came to be made permanent within a period of two years of their completing services by more than 240 days. It was, therefore, urged that the petitioners were discriminated and though they were joined in 1987 they were made temporary drivers in the year 1994 and under the award they were regularized in the year 1996. 11. Based on this additional affidavit Mr.Tanna has strongly urged before the Court that the award passed by the Labour Court is contrary to the provisions contained under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and hence the same requires modification by this Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 12. On behalf of the respondent Corporation Mr.H.S.Munshaw, learned advocate appeared. An affidavit-in-reply is filed on behalf of the respondent on 22.8.2010. He has submitted that no injustice is caused to the present petitioners. The petitioners were granted due benefit in the status of temporary drivers and they were regularized in due course in accordance with the policy of the Corporation. On behalf of the respondent Corporation Mr.H.S.Munshaw, learned advocate appeared. An affidavit-in-reply is filed on behalf of the respondent on 22.8.2010. He has submitted that no injustice is caused to the present petitioners. The petitioners were granted due benefit in the status of temporary drivers and they were regularized in due course in accordance with the policy of the Corporation. He has further submitted that the petitioners, who have been taken up as daily-wage drivers are considered for status of temporary drivers and, thereafter they were regularized as drivers in accordance with the policy in the year 1999. He has further submitted that the petitioners were also given benefit of award dated 27.1.2000 delivered by the Industrial Tribunal, Bhavnagar in Reference (IT) No.237 of 1991 and they were regularized with effect from 1996. He has further submitted that the Industrial Tribunal has assigned cogent reasons while granting the said relief. He has further submitted that the reliance placed upon cases of Shri Sahdevsinh V. Gohil and Shri Kishorbhai B. Gohil are misplaced. Both these workmen were given benefit of regularization of Secretary Department of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation. He has further submitted that there are three separate department known as (1) Secretary Department (2) Audit Department and (3) Commissionerate Department. The appointing authority as well as disciplinary authorities are separate for all these three departments and, therefore, the petitioners cannot be equated with respective cases of Shri Sahdevsinh V. Gohil and Shri Kishorbhai B. Gohil. He has further submitted that even the seniority list of respective cadre of these three departments are separately maintained and the employees are usually not inter-transferable. The Secretary Department is known as a Board of Committee Department and the Standing Committee is appointing authority for the said Department. The Municipal Corporation is appointing authority for the staff members of Commissionerate Department. The petitioners, who are also regularized as drivers with effect from 1996 are not eligible for any further relief on the basis of instances relied upon by them. Their prayers for treatment at par with the cases of Shri Sahdevsinh V. Gohil and Shri Kishorbhai B. Gohil cannot be granted as these are not comparable cases on the facts and circumstances of the case. Their prayers for treatment at par with the cases of Shri Sahdevsinh V. Gohil and Shri Kishorbhai B. Gohil cannot be granted as these are not comparable cases on the facts and circumstances of the case. The pre-sanction for the post of different cadre of these three wings of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation is duly constituted under the provisions of Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 and are also different depending upon the administrative requirements. He has, therefore, submitted that the petitioners are not entitled to any further relief and the petition deserves to be dismissed. 13. Mr.Munshaw further submitted that on behalf of the respondent Corporation written arguments were filed before the Industrial Tribunal wherein it is specifically stated that the advertisement issued in newspaper, namely, Saurashtra Samachar, is only for Scheduled Tribe candidates and no petitioner is belonging to Scheduled Tribe. It is also pointed out before the Industrial Tribunal that the Office Order No.64 of 1987 issued to the petitioners makes it very clear that they were appointed as daily-wagers and this fact was known to them. He has further submitted that even at the time when the order for temporary driver was issued in favour of the petitioners, it was brought to their notice and the petitioners have never raised any objection against the said order issued in 1994. 14. Mr.Munshaw further submitted that he has also received written instructions from the Office Superintendent of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation dated 29.11.2010 stating therein that an advertisement was published by Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation on 8.1.1987 for five posts of drivers out of which four posts were kept reserved for Scheduled Tribe. Pursuant to the said advertisement, no appointment of driver was made. It is further stated that none of the petitioners is belonging to the Scheduled Tribe and hence their appointment was not made pursuant to the said advertisement. 15. Based on the above submissions, Mr.Munshaw has strongly urged that the petitioners were also given the same treatment and their services were regularized after two years from the date of their appointment as temporary drivers. 15. Based on the above submissions, Mr.Munshaw has strongly urged that the petitioners were also given the same treatment and their services were regularized after two years from the date of their appointment as temporary drivers. Since in the year 1994 they have completed five years, as per policy of the respondent Corporation they were made temporary from daily-wagers and since other two drivers were made permanent after two years from the date of their appointment as temporary drivers the Industrial Tribunal has rightly regularized services of the petitioners in 1996. He has, therefore, submitted that no interference is called for in the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal. 16. Mr.Munshaw in support of his submissions has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. Vs. Umadevi (3) and Ors. reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 , wherein it is held that, the High Court acting under Article 226 should not, therefore, ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because an employee had continued under cover of an order of the Court, under “litigious employment” he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The Courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the state or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. 17. Mr.Munshaw further relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Official Liquidator Vs. The Courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the state or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. 17. Mr.Munshaw further relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Official Liquidator Vs. Dayanand and others, reported in (2008) 10 SCC 1 , wherein it is held that menace of illegal and backdoor appointments compelled the Courts to rethink and in a large number of subsequent judgments the Supreme Court declined to entertain the claim of ad hoc and temporary employees for regularization of services and even reversed the orders passed by the High Court and Administrative Tribunals. The shift in the Supreme Court's approach became more prominent in Umarani case, (2004) 7 SCC 112 , decided by a three-Judge Bench, wherein it was held that the State cannot invoke Article 162 of the Constitution for regularization of the appointments made in violation of the mandatory statutory provisions. The Court further observed that in exercise of power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot issue a mandamus and compel the State and its instrumentalities/agencies to regularize the services of temporary/ad hoc/daily wager/casual/contract employees and directions cannot be issued to the public employer to prescribe or give similar pay scales to employees appointed through different modes, with different conditions of service and different sources of payment. 18. Based on the above principles laid down by the Apex Court, Mr.Munshaw has submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed and no relief may be granted to the petitioners. 19. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered their rival submissions, in light of the facts and circumstances of the case and also in light of the settled legal position, the Court is of the view that the petitioners are not entitled to the relief prayed for in this petition. The very foundation of the petitioners' claim seems to be fallacious. The petitioners' appointment was not made pursuant to the advertisement issued in the newspaper. It is true that an advertisement was issued by the respondent Corporation on 8.1.1987, inter alia, for the five posts of driver. However, four posts are kept reserved for Scheduled Tribe and none of the petitioners belonged to Scheduled Tribe. The petitioners' appointment was not made pursuant to the advertisement issued in the newspaper. It is true that an advertisement was issued by the respondent Corporation on 8.1.1987, inter alia, for the five posts of driver. However, four posts are kept reserved for Scheduled Tribe and none of the petitioners belonged to Scheduled Tribe. It has also come on record that no appointment was made pursuant to the said advertisement. Since the Scheduled Caste candidates were not available at the relevant time, ad hoc appointments were made. The petitioners were, therefore, appointed as daily-wage drivers. As per policy of the respondent Corporation, when they have completed five years as daily-wage drivers, they were appointed as temporary drivers and after expiry of the period of two years from the date of their appointment as temporary drivers, their services were regularized pursuant to the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal. The award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, therefore, does not call for any interference by this Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 20. The two instances relied upon by the petitioners cannot be said to be comperable instances, as there were three different departments in the respondent Corporation and the seniority list of respective cadre of all these three departments were separately maintained. Their services were not usually inter-transferable. It is only when City Bus Transport Service of the respondent Corporation was handed over to a private transport Company, the petitioners were absorbed as drivers in different departments. Even otherwise, the said two persons were appointed as temporary drivers and after two years of their service as temporary drivers, they were regularized. The petitioners were not initially appointed as temporary drivers. They were daily-wage drivers and since they were not appointed pursuant to any advertisement it cannot be said that their initial appointment was through a regular, known and legal mode. 21. As per the settled legal position, the Court's jurisdiction in issuing the direction with regard to absorption, regularization or permanent continuance is very limited. They were daily-wage drivers and since they were not appointed pursuant to any advertisement it cannot be said that their initial appointment was through a regular, known and legal mode. 21. As per the settled legal position, the Court's jurisdiction in issuing the direction with regard to absorption, regularization or permanent continuance is very limited. The Apex Court in number of cases made it very clear that in exercise of power vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it should not or it cannot issue a mandamus and compel the State and its instrumentalities/agencies to regularize the services of temporary/ad hoc/daily wager/casual/contract employees nor it can give directions to the public employer to prescribe or give similar pay scales to employees appointed through different modes, with different conditions of service and different sources of payment. 22. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court does not find any infirmity or illegality in the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal which requires an interference by this Court while exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 23. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. Rule is discharged without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.