JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—The petitioner - M/s Farrukhabad Dugdh Utpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd. (hereinafter referred to the Dairy Co-operative Society) has filed this petition aggrieved by award dated 20.12.1991, published on 8.4.1992, pronounced by labour Court in adjudication case No. 195 of 1989 (3), U.P., Kanpur. 2. The State Government vide notification dated 7.11.1989 in purported exercise of power under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) made following reference for adjudication before labour Court : “D;k lsok;kstdksa }kjk vius deZpkjh vHk; jke Msjh eSu iq= Jh rkys flag dks fnukad 14&2&87 ls dk;Z ls izFkd@oafpr fd;k tkuk mfpr rFkk@vFkok oS/kkfud gS o ;fn ugha gS rks lEcfU/kr deZpkjh D;k fgrykHk@miykHk ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS rFkk fdl vU; fooj.k lfgrA” 3. Labour Court vide award dated 20.12.1991 impugned in this writ petition has held termination of the workman-respondent No. 3 s/o Tale Ram unjust and illegal. It has directed to give continuity of service w.e.f. 14.2.1987 and benefits including entire period’s salary and also reinstatement in service. 4. The case set up by the employer namely, Dairy Co-operative Society was that workman was engaged on daily wage basis on 1.10.1986 to discharge the duty of dairyman. He was disengaged on 14.2.1987. Workman challenged his disengagement contending that it amounts to termination/retrenchment without any notice or retrenchment compensation and, therefore, is illegal. The employer contended that workman having discharged duties only on 135 days was not entitled for protection under Section 6-N of the Act. Besides, he himself has abandoned the job, hence was not entitled for any relief. It was also contended that there is no industrial dispute and since the workman was a daily wager and neither a member of Union nor otherwise is not competent to raise industrial dispute. 5. Labour Court while considering the matter observed that the workman’s written statement is supported with an affidavit while it is not so in respect to the employer’s written statement. It also observed that workman in his oral deposition stated that he was engaged on 11.10.1985 and was paid Rs. 18.75 p. per day and was terminated on 14.2.1987 when persons junior to him namely, Kunwar Pal and Munna Lal were retained, hence termination is unjust and illegal. It also observed that workman in his oral deposition stated that he was engaged on 11.10.1985 and was paid Rs. 18.75 p. per day and was terminated on 14.2.1987 when persons junior to him namely, Kunwar Pal and Munna Lal were retained, hence termination is unjust and illegal. Labour Court referred to Rule 12 (9) of the U.P. Industrial Dispute Rules, 1957 and observed that the workman’s written statement being supported by an affidavit has to be believed and in absence any thing otherwise shown by employer, the termination is held unjust and illegal. 6. On behalf of the petitioner Shri G.D. Mishra, Advocate contended that U.P. Industrial Dispute Act itself is not applicable in respect of the employees of Co-operative Societies governed by the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 and, therefore, the impugned award is without jurisdiction. He further submitted that labour Court has misread the entire facts mentioned in para 2 of the written statement filed on behalf of the workman. It was stated that he was engaged on 1.10.1986 while in the award labour Court in para 8 it has misread the statement of the workman by observing that he was engaged on 1.10.1985. Oral statement of the workman in absence of any document to support that he was engaged in 1985 could not have been relied on particularly when it was his own case in the written statement that he was engaged on 1.10.1986. Further, in order to consider that any person junior to him was retained, either seniority list ought to have been placed on record or workman must have placed on record letters of appointment of alleged juniors, but mere assertion that his juniors were retained is not sufficient. Further, he himself worked for just about four and half months could not have conferred any seniority and it appears that the finding has been recorded on misreading of documents and ignoring workman’s own case in paragraph 2 of the written statement. It is also stated that labour Court has not referred to any provision, which has been violated and, therefore, the impugned award is illegal. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the workman, however, contended that where juniors are retained, the termination would be illegal and in such a case that factum that workman has not worked for 240 days itself is of no relevance. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the workman, however, contended that where juniors are retained, the termination would be illegal and in such a case that factum that workman has not worked for 240 days itself is of no relevance. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd, Kanpur v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Kanpur and others, 2009 (7) ADJ 322 , where this Court declined to interfere with the award where juniors were retained and the workman concerned was terminated. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record and also the citations placed before the Court and the relevant provisions, I am of the view that the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 9. From the pleadings of respondent No. 3, it is evident that he was engaged on daily wage basis on 1.10.1986 and was disengaged on 14.2.1987. Whether he himself stopped coming to work or was disengaged by employer, for my purpose, is of no relevance. The important fact is that workman discharged his duties not for 240 days or more. Further, pleading of workman is that two new persons were appointed. In paragraph 13 of counter-affidavit, workman has stated before this Court that Kunwar Pal and Munna Lal were working under the petitioner and several other new employees on the posts of dairy man were appointed by the petitioner without giving opportunity to work to the deponent. Assuming that persons, as stated in paragraph 13 of the affidavit, were appointed by the petitioner and were working, unless the workman plead the nature of appointment of the persons, the capacity in which they were working so as to show that they were identically placed with the workman concerned, he cannot claim any parity with these persons. In order to claim parity one has to place on record relevant material to show that persons with whom he claims parity are same in all respect to person claiming parity. None of this kind of pleadings or material is available on record. In any case, none has been referred by labour Court in the impugned award. 10. In order to claim parity one has to place on record relevant material to show that persons with whom he claims parity are same in all respect to person claiming parity. None of this kind of pleadings or material is available on record. In any case, none has been referred by labour Court in the impugned award. 10. In what manner and why labour Court found Kunwar Pal and Munna Lal junior to the workman, who himself was working in most precarious nature of assignment namely, daily wage employee and had worked only for more than four months and odd has not been stated anywhere in the entire award by labour Court. Assuming that two new persons were appointed on daily wage basis unless the appointments are in the same manner in which workman was engaged that would not make any difference for the reason that if after due selection regular appointments are made, daily wage employees will have to make room for such regular appointments and a daily wage employee cannot claim parity with such regularly appointed persons. Plea that new appointees were also of same nature to which the workman belongs has not been made by workman and in absence of such plea to show, demonstrate and prove that termination of workman was unjust and illegal, relief could not have been granted to workman since onus lies on him to prove his case first. Even if employer has not defended its matter properly, that would not absolve the workman from proving its case to claim relief in adjudication case before labour Court. In this case the award of labour Court is very cryptic. It has not discussed and considered the relevant aspect of the matter while holding termination of workman unjust and illegal. In the circumstances, in my view, it is difficult to sustain the impugned award. 11. Now, I consider next question whether Industrial Dispute Act was applicable to the petitioner’s society and labour Court had any jurisdiction in the matter? The Apex Court in Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd. v. Additional Labour Commissioner and others, 2007 (113) FLR 50, has held that the employees of the Co-operative Societies are within the provinces of U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 and the rules made thereunder. The industrial dispute, therefore, is not applicable to the employees of co-operative societies. 12. The Apex Court in Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd. v. Additional Labour Commissioner and others, 2007 (113) FLR 50, has held that the employees of the Co-operative Societies are within the provinces of U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 and the rules made thereunder. The industrial dispute, therefore, is not applicable to the employees of co-operative societies. 12. Shri B.N. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the workman, however, submitted that the judgment of Apex Court in Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd. and Additional Labour Commissioner and others (supra) is not correct and, therefore, not binding precedent before this Court. He submitted that judgment requires reconsideration for the following reasons : “(a) Section 135 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 itself contains a provision that the same would come into operation from a date to be notified by the State Government. This according to Shri B.N. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the workman is a legislative function to be performed by the State Government by issuing appropriate notification for bringing into force the provisions of Section 135. The Supreme Court of India cannot usurp the legislative powers conferred upon the State Government under the said Section and could not have declared that it is irrelevant as to whether that the State Government has issued the notification for enforcing Section 135 of the Co-operative Societies Act or not. (b) A three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh and others, 1969 (9) FLR 56, has explained that not every part of the activity of the Co-operative Society is to be treated as touching the business of the Society, so as to be capable of being adjudicated under Section 70 of the Co-operative Societies Act. He clarifies that any activity undertaken by the Co-operative Society which is commercial in nature and is not touching the business of the Society may, therefore, not fall within the ambit of Section 70 of the Co-operative Societies Act and in respect of such activities industrial disputes can always be raised and adjudicated under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He submits that the legal consequences flowing from the three Judges judgment of the Supreme Court have gone un-noticed in the Case of Ghaziabad District Co-operative Bank Ltd. (Supra). He submits that the legal consequences flowing from the three Judges judgment of the Supreme Court have gone un-noticed in the Case of Ghaziabad District Co-operative Bank Ltd. (Supra). (c) It is then contended that the Supreme Court of India has not rightly appreciated the scope and the intent laid down in its earlier judgments in the case of Municipal Council Palai v. T.J. Joseph, AIR 1963 1561 as also in the case of R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka, JT 1991 (4) 82. He submits that in the aforesaid judgments the Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained that if there is conflict between the general law and the special law, any amendment in the general law will prevail and not vice versa. (d) Lastly it is contended that legislature while incorporating the Industrial Disputes Act has itself excluded certain activities from the definition of Industry as contained in Section 3 of the Industrial Disputes Act and there is absolutely no reason to exclude any other activity from the definition of Industry under the Industrial Disputes Act.” 13. Having heard the contention so raised, this Court may only record that the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India is binding on all Courts of law in view of the Article 141 of the Constitution of India and this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can neither disagree with the judgment nor can hold that the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India is not to be followed. 14. In view of the aforesaid this Court finds that the Labour Court has rightly relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad District Co-operative Bank Ltd. (Supra) and has rightly held that the dispute as referred is not maintainable. 15. Identical argument was also raised before this Court in Writ - C. No. 71022 of 2009 (Raj Kumar Singh v. Labour Court, Varanasi and others) and this Court vide judgment dated 8.1.2010 declined to make any comment on similar arguments observed that the law laid down by the Apex Court is binding on all Courts of law including the High Court and this Court neither can disagree with the judgment nor can hold that the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India is not to be followed. In fact, I find that in U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd, Kanpur v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Kanpur and others (supra) also similar argument was raised, but it was not accepted by the Court, as is evident from what has been stated in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the judgment. It is different thing that considering peculiar facts and circumstances of that case the Court proceeded not to interfere with the award of Labour Court in exercise of its power under Article 226, but those reasons, as such are not applicable in the case in hand. The issue of applicability of Industrial Dispute Act was already raised before this Court, which was decided vide judgment dated 1.7.1994 against employer holding that labour Court had jurisdiction. This finding was not reversed by the Apex Court while remanding the matter on limited point. These aspects are clear from paras 21 and 22 of the judgment. It is in these circumstances, in my view, it cannot be said that labour Court in the present case had jurisdiction, since the U.P. Industrial Dispute Act itself was not applicable in the case in hand. 16. At this stage, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 pointed out that pursuant to interim order passed by this Court on 2.4.1993, modified on 5.1.1994, workman-respondent No. 3 was reinstated and has been receiving his current salary. It is, therefore, contended that now after fifteen years his services may not be affected. 17. Any benefit availed by a person, pursuant to an interim order of this Court will not confer any right upon him to continue to avail benefit, in case the matter is ultimately decided against him. However, in the interest of justice, I provide that the payment made to the workman concerned, during the pendency of this writ petition, shall not be recovered from him. 18. With the aforesaid observations/clarifications/directions, writ petition is allowed. Impugned award dated 20.12.1991, published on 8.4.1992, pronounced by labour Court in adjudication case No. 195 of 1989 (3), U.P., Kanpur, is hereby quashed. No costs. ——————