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2011 DIGILAW 19 (CHH)

Santosh Kumar Kashyap v. Tijauram Sahu

2011-01-21

N.K.AGARWAL

body2011
ORDER N.K. Agarwal, J. 1. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 20-8-2002 passed in Civil Appeal No. 26-A/2010 by IX Additional District Judge, (FTC) Bilaspur dismissing Appellant's appeal and affirming the judgment and decree dated 21-4-2010 passed by the trial Court whereby Plaintiff's suit has been decreed. Facts of the case in brief are as under: 2. Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction for the suit land situated at village Jonki bearing Khasra No. 758/1 area 0.30 Acre against the Appellant as well as Respondents No. 2 to 8. According to the Plaintiff, the suit land was his ancestral property. In the Adhikar Abhilekh 1954-55, it was recorded in the name of his father Nakchhed Sahu. After death of his father Nakchhed Sahu, Plaintiff along with his brothers inherited the suit land and their names were jointly recorded in the revenue records. Pursuant to partition between the Plaintiff and his brothers in the year 1985, the suit land fell in his share and since then he is continuously in its possession. In the year 2007, the Appellant applied for demarcation and at the time of demarcation, the Plaintiff came to know that the suit property has been sold by father of the Respondents No. 2 to 6 and husband of Respondent No. 7 to the Appellant without any right or title over it and the Appellant in connivance with the revenue authorities got his name entered into the revenue records and is threatening the Plaintiff to dispossess him. The Appellant as well as Respondents No. 2 to 7 have filed separate written statement. According to Respondents No. 2 to 7, the suit property was earlier ancestral property of late Ledhva. On partition, the suit property fell in his share. His name was entered into revenue records, was also in its possession, therefore, he sold the suit property to Appellant vide sale deed dated 31-12-1999 by executing registered sale deed in Appellant's favour. The suit land is not Plaintiffs ancestral property nor the Plaintiff is having any interest or possession over it and the suit is liable to be dismissed. 3. The suit land is not Plaintiffs ancestral property nor the Plaintiff is having any interest or possession over it and the suit is liable to be dismissed. 3. The Appellant in his written statement has stated that on due inquiry it was found by him that the suit land was recorded in the name of late Ledhva in Adhikar Abhilekh, 1954-55 and thereafter it remained in the name of late Ledhva in the revenue records till its purchase by him on 31-12-1999 and he got the land mutated in his name and the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. Learned trial court framed issues. Parties led evidence. Learned trial court based on evidence adduced held, Plaintiff is the owner of the suit land; late Ledhva was not having any right to execute the sale deed in Appellant's favour; the above sale deed is void; the Plaintiff is in its possession and decreed the suit. 5. The first appellate court on re-appreciation of the entire evidence and pleadings of the parties and documents filed therein affirmed the finding recorded by the trial court and dismissed the appeal preferred by the Appellant as well as Respondents No. 2 to 7. 6. Shri Rajeev Shrivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant, would submit, at the time of purchase of the suit land, the land was recorded in the name of late Ledhva and therefore, the Appellant is a bonafide purchaser of the suit property. This aspect of the matter has not been dealt by both the courts below; the partition deed Ex. P-7 is an unregistered document and it does not confer any title in Plaintiff's favour as the document is inadmissible and this goes to the root of the matter which has been ignored by both the courts below and lastly, the suit is time barred, the plea of limitation can be raised at any stage of proceedings. Placing reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nani Bai v. Gita Bai Kom Rama Gunge AIR 1958 SC 706, B.Y. Narasimha Prasad v. M. Veerappa and Anr. 2008 (5) Supreme 438 and K.G. Shivalingappa v. G.S. Eswarappa and Ors. (2004) 12 SCC 189, he submits that the judgment and decree of both the courts below deserve to be set aside. 7. 2008 (5) Supreme 438 and K.G. Shivalingappa v. G.S. Eswarappa and Ors. (2004) 12 SCC 189, he submits that the judgment and decree of both the courts below deserve to be set aside. 7. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the records of both the courts below. 8. As per Plaintiff's case, the suit land stands recorded in Adhikar Abhilekh, 1954-55 in the name of late Nakchhed Sahu i.e. father of the Plaintiff which has been partitioned between Plaintiff and his brothers in the year 1985 and thereupon he became the exclusive owner of the suit property. It is also specific case of the Defendants as per their written statement that the suit land was recorded in the name of late Ledhva, predecessor of Respondents No. 2 to 7 in the Adhikar Abhilekh, 1954-55 and the same was sold by late Ledhva to the Appellant vide sale deed Ex. D-16. A bare perusal of document Ex. P-2 i.e. Adhikar Abhilekh prepared based on entries in Jamabandi, 1954-55, Nakchhed was Bhumidhari of the land. Therefore, the defence raised by the Defendants is factually incorrect. Further, Khasra Panchshala from 1984-85 to 1988-89, would show that the suit land stands recorded in the name of Plaintiff along with his brothers. It is only the B-1 kistbandi Khatauni of year 1989-90 which shows that the suit land was recorded in the name of Ledhva. How it came in the name of late Ledva, the Defendants failed to explain because as per their case, Ledhva was owner of suit property as per Adhikar Abhilekh, 1954-55 which is not correct. The Appellant's own case is that he purchased the suit property after making roaming enquiry and having found name of Ledhva recorded in the Adhikar Abhilekh, 1954-55 which was found factually incorrect as in the year 1954-55 it was recorded in fact in the name of late Nakchhed i.e. father of the Plaintiff, so the plea of bonafide purchaser is devoid of merit. 9. So far as inadmissibility of partition deed Ex. P-7 as raised by Shri Shrivastava is concerned, it is also sans substance. Once it is clear that the suit property was ancestral property, the Appellant/Defendant has no right to challenge the title of the Plaintiff over it whether or not partition deed Ex. P-7 is valid, it is for the brothers of the Plaintiff to challenge it. P-7 as raised by Shri Shrivastava is concerned, it is also sans substance. Once it is clear that the suit property was ancestral property, the Appellant/Defendant has no right to challenge the title of the Plaintiff over it whether or not partition deed Ex. P-7 is valid, it is for the brothers of the Plaintiff to challenge it. The Appellant being third party has no right nor it will in any way help him inasmuch as he will only succeed if it is found that earlier owner of suit property was late Ledhva and not Nakchhed, to which he was unable to prove and, therefore, the judgments cited is of no help to him. 10. An attractive plea of limitation has also been raised with the contention that it can be raised at any point of time. But Shri Shrivastava failed to demonstrate from the records how the suit was time barred. In demarcation report Ex. P-5 dated 8-4-2008, the Plaintiff was found in possession of the suit property. Both the courts below have found Plaintiff in possession of the suit property on the date of suit. The finding is essentially a finding of fact. The Defendants have not raised any plea of limitation in their written statement nor it can be inferred by reading written statement as a whole. Both the courts below on appreciation of evidence found that the Plaintiff is in possession of the suit property and passed the decree of declaration and injunction. Therefore, this plea is also sans substance. 11. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant has failed to point out any illegality or perversity in the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below. There is no quarrel with the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred cases, however, the same were of no help to Shri Shrivastava in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that no substantial question of law arises for determination in this appeal. 12. This Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without there being any substantial question of law involved in the appeal. Existence of substantial question of law is the sine-qua-non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended Section 100 of the Code. 12. This Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without there being any substantial question of law involved in the appeal. Existence of substantial question of law is the sine-qua-non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended Section 100 of the Code. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant failed to point out any substantial question of law which may arise for determination in the case. In the absence of any substantial question of law arises for determination of this Court, this Court has no option but to dismiss the appeal. 13. In view of above, since no substantial question arises for determination of the case, the appeal is dismissed. 14. No order as to costs.