JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner-Management Committee has filed this writ petition against the judgment of the Rajasthan Non Government Educational Tribunal dated 2/4/1997. 2. The Tribunal by the aforesaid judgment allowed the appeal filed by respondent No.2. In the appeal, he challenged the order passed by the petitioner on 24/7/1996 by which his services were terminated. The Tribunal by the impugned judgment held the order terminating services of respondent No.2 as illegal and set-aside the same. Respondent No.2 was held entitled to reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits. However, liberty was given to the petitioner to again dispense with his services by complying with provisions of Section 18 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal Act, 1989 (for short, "Act of 1989"). 3. Factual matrix of the case is that respondent No.2 was appointed with the petitioner-institution as Instructor vide order dated 4/12/1987 with effect from 1/8/1987 on consolidated salary of Rs. 500/- per month. Principal of the petitioner-institution by his order dated 17/1/1991 granted to him benefit of regular pay scale and pay fixation and accordingly fixed his pay in the Revised Pay Scale Rules with effect from 1/7/1990. Petitioner was directed to coordinate the work of admission of special batches vide order dated 6/8/1994. A similar order was passed on 11/8/1995. The Management Committee of the petitioner however on 27/6/1996 passed a resolution that since it did not have the work for the respondent and that there was no need now to retain him in service, therefore, the post of Instructor was abolished and service of the respondent was terminated vide order dated 24/7/1996 with immediate effect. A cheque of Rs. 3,468/- towards salary of three months was enclosed with the aforesaid order. Respondent filed appeal against the aforesaid order u/S.19(2) of the Act of 1989 before the Tribunal. Petitioner contested the aforesaid appeal by filing reply thereto, to which respondent No.2 filed his rejoinder. The Tribunal by the impugned-order aforesaid allowed the appeal. Hence, this writ petition. 4. Shri Kamlakar Sharma, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has argued that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that services of respondent No.2 were terminated vide order dated 24/7/1996 on the ground that there was no work available with them as the post was abolished. The Tribunal by the impugned-order aforesaid allowed the appeal. Hence, this writ petition. 4. Shri Kamlakar Sharma, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has argued that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that services of respondent No.2 were terminated vide order dated 24/7/1996 on the ground that there was no work available with them as the post was abolished. This was the order of termination simplicitor whereas appeal lies to the Tribunal only against an order passed by the Management Committee under Section 18. Appeal was thus not maintainable. It was argued that service of respondent No.2 was availed on contractual basis and he was a temporary employee. No notice was required to be served upon him nor any notice pay was required to be paid. Learned counsel submitted that petitioner-institution on 27/6/1996 decided to abolish the post of Instructor. Discontinuation of respondent No.2 from service is therefore only a consequence of abolition of post. Learned counsel for petitioner in support of his aforesaid argument has placed reliance on the constitutional bench judgment of Supreme Court in N. Ramanatha Pillai v. The state of Kerala and another, AIR 1973 SC 2641 to argue discontinuation of employment on abolition of post is neither a removal nor a dismissal from service and therefore according to the aforesaid judgment, necessity of issuing show cause notice does not arise. Learned Tribunal has thus erred in law in holding that order of termination was stigmatic and punitive. Tribunal in doing so, has relied on the letter of the Principal dated 11/7/1996 written by him to the Management only for the purpose of inquiring whether the services of respondent No.2 can be utilised on any other post. This letter was subsequent to the resolution of the Management Committee. In this letter, the Principal stated about the innocuous behavior of respondent No.2. On that basis, however, it cannot be said that order would be stigmatic or punitive. It was argued that respondent No.2 was engaged on account of special batches of students in special course. His salary was charged on the budget head of such special course. Since special batches were no longer available and there was no work left for respondent No.2, his services were discharged simplicitor. Merely because respondent No.2 had worked with the petitioner for ten years by itself is not a reason not to discontinue him from service even when the post is abolished. Since special batches were no longer available and there was no work left for respondent No.2, his services were discharged simplicitor. Merely because respondent No.2 had worked with the petitioner for ten years by itself is not a reason not to discontinue him from service even when the post is abolished. It was argued that the petitioner institution was not receiving any grant-in-aid for the post on which respondent No.2 was working and therefore it cannot be said that the post was permanent in nature. 5. Shri Kamlakar Sharma, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has argued that Tribunal has erred in law in holding that an enquiry contemplated by Section 18 read with Rule 39(2) of the Act of 1989 prior to terminating services of respondent No. 2, was necessary. Respondent's case was that of a simple discharge from service. His case did not come within the purview of dismissal and therefore Section 18 was not attracted. His termination was not made on account of any misconduct but only for the simple reason that the post was abolished and no work was available with the petitioner therefore question of his reinstatement in service does not arise. 6. Shri Kamlakar Sharma, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has argued that clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18 would not be applicable to the present case because the proviso merely carves out a different exception to the main provision whereas in the present case, main provision is relating to removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of employees. The said clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18 thus would not be applicable to simple discharge or termination simplicitor, which does not attach any stigma or which is not based on any allegation of misconduct. Second proviso to Section 18 refers to three such situations where order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank can be made without following the regular course of departmental enquiry. Clause (iii) thereof enumerates one such situation where management committee is of unanimous opinion that the services of an employee cannot be continued without prejudice to the interest of the institution, the services of such employees may be terminated after giving him six months notice or salary in lieu thereof and the consent of the Director of Education is obtained in writing. There may be many other such situations where management committee arrives at an opinion to the said effect but nevertheless termination of service contemplated in clause (iii) or any of other two clauses should broadly fall within the scope of main provision of Section 18 because proviso only carves out an exception to the main provision. If the legislature intended discharge or termination simplicitor to be dealt with in the manner provided by clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18, it would have engrafted a separate provision in the Act to the similar effect. 7. Shri Kamlakar Sharma, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has cited the judgment of Supreme Court in Shri Maheshwari Senior Higher Secondary School and Anr. v. Bhikha Ram Sharma & Ors., 1996 I AD S.C. 238 Civil Appeal No. 3645 of 1996 arising out of SLP(C) No. 21583 of 1995 decided on 12/2/1996 in which case, Supreme Court held that in an educational institution when a post is abolished, a service of the given employee is terminated as a consequence thereof, it is not necessary for the educational institution to hold an enquiry according to the rules and the judgment of High Court holding so was set-aside. It was held that on abolition of post, the existing holder of the post ceases to continue from the date of abolition of post and therefore question of conducting enquiry under the rules does not arise. Learned senior counsel submitted that the judgment of the full bench of this Court in Central Academy Society v. Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur & Ors., 2010 (3) WLC (Raj.) 21 has been rendered in an altogether different context where reference was made only on the question whether Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and the rules framed thereunder, would apply even to an unaided educational institution. Question whether Section 18 or for that matter, its second proviso would be applicable even in cases where termination is made on abolition of post was not directly in question. Observation made by the full bench in para 23 onwards in the judgment should therefore be treated as mere obiter dicta and not ratio of the judgment. Question whether Section 18 or for that matter, its second proviso would be applicable even in cases where termination is made on abolition of post was not directly in question. Observation made by the full bench in para 23 onwards in the judgment should therefore be treated as mere obiter dicta and not ratio of the judgment. Learned counsel submitted that the judgment of Supreme Court in Shri Maheshwari Senior Higher Secondary School supra was not brought to the notice of the full bench nor the division bench judgment of this Court in Managing Committee & Ors. v. Ram Phool Meena & Ors., 2009 (4) RLW 2997 was noticed by the full Bench, which was based on the judgment of Supreme Court in Shri Maheshwari Senior Higher Secondary School supra. Division Bench in Ram Phool Meena supra held that on abolition of the post, existing holder of the post ceases to continue from the date of abolition of post and right of creation and abolition of posts is an inherent right of the management and such right does not come from any statutory provision until and unless specifically provided. In that case too, termination of employee as a result of abolition of the post was held to be valid. Learned counsel also cited Division Bench judgment of this Court to the same effect in Dhanroop Chand v. State of Rajasthan, RLW 2000 (3) Raj. 1373 , It was argued that the full bench of this Court in Central Academy Society supra has not correctly appreciated ratio of Supreme Court judgment in T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., (2002) 8 SCC 481 , Observations of the Supreme Court have been quoted by the full Bench in para 6 in the context of disciplinary action. When an order of removal or reduction in rank is passed in a disciplinary proceeding, approval by the Director of Education has been held to be not necessary, there is no question why such necessity should arise in the case of termination simplicitor. 8. Lastly, learned senior counsel for petitioner has cited judgment of Supreme Court in G. Vallikumari v. Andhra Educatiion Society and others, (2010) 2 SCC 497 . Learned counsel argued that even if the order of termination is held to be illegal, this Court can suitably mould the relief. 8. Lastly, learned senior counsel for petitioner has cited judgment of Supreme Court in G. Vallikumari v. Andhra Educatiion Society and others, (2010) 2 SCC 497 . Learned counsel argued that even if the order of termination is held to be illegal, this Court can suitably mould the relief. The respondent cannot be accommodated by the petitioner particularly when there is no post available because of the abolition of the post. It is therefore prayed that writ petition may be allowed in the terms aforesaid. 9. Shri Rajveer Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.2 and Shri Ganesh Meena, learned Government Counsel have opposed the writ petition and argued that in the order of removal passed by the petitioner-institution on 24/7/1996, there was no mention that the post was abolished but only a mention was made that now petitioner-institution has no work against the post of Instructor. This argument has been developed by the petitioner-institution subsequently. Copy of the resolution/unanimous opinion of the management committee regarding abolition of post was not produced with reply to the appeal. This resolution has been produced only before this Court for the first time. It is argued that petitioner is an aided institution, which fact has not been denied even by the petitioner institution. Contention that the post on which respondent was working was not receiving grant-in-aid and it is not an aided institution is disputed. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that though respondent was initially appointed on the post of Instructor on temporary basis vide order dated 4/12/1987 but he was fixed in the regular pay scale granting regular pay thereof. He also started receiving increments and benefits of revised pay scales. The Tribunal therefore rightly allowed appeal of the respondent with the observation that the impugned-order of termination is stigmatic and punitive order. There was ample evidence to show that termination order of the respondent was punitive one and this is why the learned Tribunal rightly relied on the letter of the Principal dated 11/7/1996 wherein he expressed opinion that respondent was not capable of discharging any work and his behaviour was also creating a lot of problem. It was argued that fact that the respondent continued in the employment of the petitioner-institution for more than 10 years would go to show that he could not be treated as a temporary employee. It was argued that fact that the respondent continued in the employment of the petitioner-institution for more than 10 years would go to show that he could not be treated as a temporary employee. If at all petitioner-institution wanted to dispense with services of the petitioner, it was required to comply with the clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18 and even in that, it was required to serve upon the respondent either notice of six months or give notice pay of six months, apart from unanimous decision of the management committee and the written consent of the Director of Education. Learned counsel submitted that departmental enquiry envisaged under Section 18 of the Act should have been held and termination order should have been passed only with the approval of the Director of Education as provided in clause (iii) of second proviso of Section 18 of the Act of 1989. 10. Shri Rajveer Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent relied on the decision of Full Bench in Central Academic Society supra to argue that the full court has approved the line of reasoning given in Division Bench judgment of Saint Meera Brotherhood Society v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2006 (1) WLC (Raj.) 677 . In that case too, before abolition of post, prior consent of the Director Education was not obtained. Division Bench held termination to be illegal. Full Bench has quoted the relevant part of the judgment in para 35 onwards, Division Bench held that even in the case of unaided recognised institution, if services of employees is dispensed with by recourse to clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18, three conditions were required to be satisfied namely; (i) decision must be based on a unanimous opinion of the management committee that the services of an employee cannot be dis-continued without prejudice to the interest of the institution, (ii) services of such employee are terminated after giving him six months notice or salary in lieu thereof and (iii) consent of the Director of Education is obtained in writing. In the present case, even if, first condition is taken to have been satisfied, notice of three months would not be a sufficient compliance of the section and moreso here is a total absence of the consent of the Director of Education. In the present case, even if, first condition is taken to have been satisfied, notice of three months would not be a sufficient compliance of the section and moreso here is a total absence of the consent of the Director of Education. Learned counsel therefore submitted that even if the argument of the petitioner-institution of termination simplicitor is accepted, then also, as per ratio of the full bench judgment, Section 18 was required to be complied with. Learned counsel submitted that the judgment of this Court in Managing Committee Through Chairman (Brig.) Dy. G.O.C. Army School & Anr. v. Smt. Pushpa Sharma & 4 Ors., 2006 (3) WLC (Raj.) 504 has also been approved by the full bench in the aforesaid judgment. Division Bench in that case held that clause (iii) of second proviso of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 covers all cases whether disciplinary action or simplicitor termination. This section has been introduced with a view to checking arbitrary action of the department in termination matters. Full Bench has noticed the aforesaid division bench decision of this court. Learned counsel also relied on the Single Bench judgment of this Court in Managing Committee Tagore v. Smt.Neelam Sisodia & Ors., SBCWP No.4300/1999 decided on 5/11/1999 wherein also, similar view was reiterated. It is therefore prayed that writ petition be dismissed. 11. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. 12. Before dealing with the contentious issue whether or not termination of the respondent in the present case would fall within the purview of clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18 of the Act of 1989, I begin with examination of validity of the finding recorded by the Tribunal that termination of the respondent was punitive in nature and therefore it should have been preceded by a departmental enquiry contemplated by Section 18 of the Act of 1989. Tribunal has allowed the appeal of the respondent only on the basis of letter dated 11/7/1996, which was addressed by the Principal of the College of the petitioner-institution to the Management but the Tribunal in my view, overlooked the contention that the letter addressed by the Principal was in the context of the enquiry made by the Management from the Principal whether after abolition of the post, the respondent could be accommodated on any other post or not. This was because of the resolution passed by the Management Committee for abolition of the post. Letter of the Principal thus admittedly was written after the management committee passed such resolution. Principal in this letter has advised against continuance of respondent on any other post. It was in that context that he observed that respondent was not capable of executing his duty properly and that his behaviour was such, which at times created difficulties. But on that basis alone, there was no reason to hold that the order was stigmatic and was punitive in nature. Perusal of the judgment passed by the Tribunal and other material available on record does not show any justification for this finding. Except the letter of the Principal, there was no other material to substantiate the finding of the Tribunal that the order was punitive in nature. I therefore find myself unable to uphold that finding of the Tribunal. 13. Adverting now to the argument of the learned senior counsel for petitioner that third proviso to Section 18 should be read in the context of main provision of Section 18, which relates to dismissal, removal and reduction in rank, this argument is sought to be supported on the analogy that proviso carves out exception to the main rule, and that the proviso by itself cannot create a new situation out of the scope of the main rule, which is out of the scope of the main rule. While first proviso enumerates a rider on the power of the management to remove, dismiss or reduce in rank an employee and ordains that such orders can be passed only after reasonable opportunity of being heard is given to the employee and shall not become final unless prior approval of the Director in this behalf is obtained but second proviso enumerates three such categories, which are completely taken out of the purview of Section 18 itself. Argument that even clause (iii) to second proviso to Section 18 should be read relating to only the cases of removal, dismissal and reduction in rank has been raised before the Division Bench of this Court and also before Full Bench of this Court and was not accepted even in cases of termination on account of abolition of post. Argument that even clause (iii) to second proviso to Section 18 should be read relating to only the cases of removal, dismissal and reduction in rank has been raised before the Division Bench of this Court and also before Full Bench of this Court and was not accepted even in cases of termination on account of abolition of post. It should have been appropriate, as rightly put by Shri Kamlakar Sharma, learned senior counsel for the petitioner that what is provided in second proviso should have found place in the main part of the Act of 1989 in a separate section. But then, on the analogy of this argument, second proviso cannot be taken as a "redundant" just because it has found place below Section 18 and not as a main provision. 14. In Shri Maheshwari Senior Higher Secondary School supra, Supreme Court observed that in an educational institution when a post is abolished, a service of the given employee is terminated as a consequence thereof, it is not necessary for the educational institution to hold an enquiry according to the rules and the judgment of High Court holding so was set-aside and it was held that on abolition of post, the existing holder of the post cease to continue from the date of abolition of post and therefore question of conducting enquiry under the rules does not arise. 15. In the present case, it is not even case of the respondent nor it is warranted by clause (iii) of Section 18 that termination simplicitor brought on account of abolition of post should be preceded by an enquiry. Although, learned counsel for petitioner may be justified in relying on the division bench judgment of this court in Ram Phool Meena supra relying on the judgment of Supreme Court in Shri Maheshwari Senior Higher Secondary School supra whereby, judgments of the Tribunal and that of the Single Bench were reversed holding that nothing was placed on record to show that particular post of Gardener was in fact created and sanctioned by the Management Committee or it is a substantive post and grant-in-aid for the said post was not received by the State Government. In that case, order of the Tribunal was challenged before the Single Bench of this Court by the Management Committee in which, initially an interim-order was passed and which interim-order had been complied with by the Management Committee but subsequently by another interim-order passed by this Court, fresh termination order was passed, which respondent-employee directly assailed before the trial court. Court held that this is sheer exercise of due process of law. Judgment of Supreme Court in Shri Maheshwari Senior Higher Secondary School supra and division bench judgment of this court in Ram Phool Meena supra were not cited before the full bench but nevertheless two judgments of Saint Meera Brotherhood Society supra and Smt.Pushpa Sharma supra were considered by full bench of this Court in Central Academy Society supra wherein reference was made only on the question of applicability of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 and the rules framed thereunder, in the context of an unaided educational institution. Full bench observed that even in cases of termination simplicitor clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18 would apply. Saint Meera Brotherhood Society supra was a case of termination on account of abolition of the post whereas, Smt.Pushpa Sharma supra was a case of termination on account of abolition of post but contention that was raised by the Management Committee before the division bench was that cases of termination simplicitor would not fall within the purview of clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18, was dealt with by the division bench in para 11 of the judgment holding thus:- "11. As regards further submission on applicability of Section 18 of the Act of 1989, only in case action is taken by way of disciplinary action and not simple termination, we are of the view that the main section 18 and Proviso (ii) of the Act of 1989 will cover both type of cases and said Section has been enacted with a view to check the arbitrary action of the management in removing, dismissing, reducing in rank and termination also. Therefore, the provisions of reasonable opportunity/unanimous resolution of Managing Committee and approval/ consent of the Director are made mandatory in the order to ensure the fairness of the action. Therefore, the provisions of reasonable opportunity/unanimous resolution of Managing Committee and approval/ consent of the Director are made mandatory in the order to ensure the fairness of the action. Neither there is unanimous resolution of the Managing committee no six months notice was given nor payment of six months salary in lieu of notice was given nor consent of the Director was taken. Therefore, even if the case is taken to be of termination, then also mandatory Proviso (iii) of Section 18 of the Act of 1989 has been violated. The said Section is applicable in respect of all the employees whose services have been dismissed by way of disciplinary action or simple termination." 16. Full Bench after noticing the above referred to judgments in Saint Meera Brotherhood Society and Smt.Pushpa Sharma supra, in paras 37 to 40 of the aforesaid judgment held as under:- "37. The three eventualities as referred in second proviso wherefore Section 18 would be inapplicable are clearly carving out exceptions to principal proviso of Section 18; and after examining the scheme of the Section 18 as a whole and applying the dictum from Pai Foundation, even when we hold the first proviso inapplicable to the unaided institution in disciplinary action, the same cannot be said to be true for the second proviso too. 38. The second proviso is essentially an exception whereby, in the given eventualities, the principal provision of Section 18 is altogether ruled out of application. The principal provision of Section 18 is that no employee of a recognised institution shall be removed, dismissed or reduced in rank unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard by the management. This is on the very first principles of natural justice. Even when the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pai Foundation has ruled against the requirement of obtaining prior or post approval of the Governmental authorities by an unaided institution while taking disciplinary action, the Hon'ble Court has not ruled that the institution, whether aided or unaided, could otherwise obviate the necessity of extending a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the employee concerned while taking an action prejudicial to him in his service. Even in the case of an unaided institution, the requirements of the principal provision of Section 18, of extending reasonable opportunity of hearing to the employee against the proposed action, remains mandatory. Even in the case of an unaided institution, the requirements of the principal provision of Section 18, of extending reasonable opportunity of hearing to the employee against the proposed action, remains mandatory. However, as per the second proviso, which is essentially carving out three exceptions, such a requirement of extending reasonable opportunity of hearing could be dispensed with in the given eventualities but then, only with the given conditions. The first one is when the person is dismissed or removed for his conviction on a criminal charge. The second one, per clause (ii), is when it would be impracticable or inexpedient to give the employee an opportunity of showing cause. For this eventuality, the requirement of obtaining the consent of Director of Education does not, in our considered opinion, contradict the dictum of Pai Foundation. The provision itself being for the purpose of dispensing with the normal procedure of opportunity of hearing, its requirements are to be strictly adhered to. 39. Similarly, clause (iii) of second proviso is also of dispensing with the requirement of reasonable opportunity of hearing but here the managing committee has to form unanimous opinion that services of an employee cannot be continued without prejudice to the interest of the institution; and, upon such unanimous opinion, the services of such an employee can be terminated after giving him six months notice or salary and obtaining the consent of Director of Education. Here again, for the permissibility of dispensing with regular enquiry and opportunity of hearing, the requirements as stated are to be strictly complied with and cannot be ignored. The requirement of obtaining consent in this clause is also, in our opinion, not such a consent which may stand at contradiction to the dictum in Pai Foundation. Here, in clause (iii), the Institution is not taking disciplinary action but is dispensing with the services on a unanimous decision. The necessity of obtaining consent in this provision is also a mandatory one and cannot be avoided. 40. Thus, we find that even while the first proviso to Section 18 of the Act of 1989 would not apply in the disciplinary action by the unaided private educational institution, the other provisions of Section 18 are, without any doubt, applicable to all the institutions aided or unaided." 17. 40. Thus, we find that even while the first proviso to Section 18 of the Act of 1989 would not apply in the disciplinary action by the unaided private educational institution, the other provisions of Section 18 are, without any doubt, applicable to all the institutions aided or unaided." 17. In view of above, the fact whether or not petitioner-institution was receiving grant-in-aid of the post held by the respondent and whether it was receiving grant-in-aid only against other posts, would not make any diffidence because the full bench by the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement held that provision contained in clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18 of the Act would apply even to unaided but recognised educational institution. Division Bench judgment cited by the learned in Dhanroop Chand supra arose out of the case of termination order passed on 29/6/1992 and would not help to the petitioner because the Act of 1989 was enforced w.e.f. 1/1/1993. 18. At this stage, learned counsel for petitioner has argued that since petitioner has already served upon the respondent notice of three months and notice pay of three months and now in compliance of the aforesaid provisions, petitioner-institution is ready to pay to respondent No.2 additional three months notice pay. I am however not inclined to accept that plea because none of three pre-requisite conditions in clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18 of the Act of 1989 was complied with and apart from second condition of paying six months notice, third condition is that of written consent of the Director Education. 19. I am however not inclined to accept that plea because none of three pre-requisite conditions in clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18 of the Act of 1989 was complied with and apart from second condition of paying six months notice, third condition is that of written consent of the Director Education. 19. Coming now to the alternative submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner as to what relief should ultimately be granted to the respondent and that petitioner should not be required to reinstate the respondent after lapse of 15 years now, I found that respondent in the present case was working with the petitioner-institution for 10 long years and that he was receiving salary in the regular pay scale of 925-50-1026; but at the same time, this Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that services of the respondent were terminated due to abolition of post therefore, requiring petitioner-institution to reinstate the respondent by compliance of clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18 of the Act of 1989 may not be appropriate in view of the fact that already 15 years have gone by from the date of termination of respondent. 20. In my view, ends of justice would be met if petitioner-institution is required to pay to respondent No.2 a lump sum of Rs. 1.5 lacs in lieu of full and final settlement of his entire claim, which shall be paid to respondent No.2 within a period of three months from the date copy of this order is produced before the petitioner-institution. If the said amount is not paid within three months, the petitioner would pay interest on the aforesaid amount to respondent No.2 @9% p.a. 21. With the above observation and direction, the writ petition is allowed in part.Writ Petition in Part as above. *******