Hon'ble BHAGWATI, J.—By way of the instant writ petition, the petitioner has beseeched to quash and set-aside the order dated 9th November 2010, whereby the learned Additional District Judge No. 7, Jaipur City, Jaipur held the document, in question to be an agreement to sell and directed the petitioner to get the document impounded from Collector, Stamps, Jaipur in accordance with law so as to make it admissible in evidence. 2. Adumbrated in brief, the facts of the case are that the plaintiff-petitioner filed a suit for specific performance of contract for the properties, as described in para no. 3 of the plaint, which is a field bearing khasra numbers 281/308 measuring 10 biswas, khasra no. 285/309 measuring 14 biswas, khasra no. 286 measuring 1 bigha 16 biswas, total 3 bighas situated in village Durgapura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur (the corresponding changed khasra numbers measuring in hectares are indicated in para no.2 of the petition). It is averred that on 25th January, 2003, the defendant through its Chief Trustee Manak Raj entered into an oral agreement to sell the land in question for a total consideration of Rs. 1.50 cr. and the Chief Trustee received 11,000/- rupees in cash as advance. On account of certain reasons, the oral agreement could not be acted upon and the defendant requested for increase of sale consideration and the sale consideration was increased from 1.50 cr. to 4.50 cr. Pursuant to the oral agreement, a written acknowledgment (agreement) was reduced to writing on 21.8.2009. In the agreement itself, the defendant admitted the fact of oral agreement of 25.1.2003. It is averred that on 18.10.2009, the defendant trust agreed to hand over the possession to the petitioner and receive the balance consideration and on that agreement also, Manak Raj, Chief Trustee put his signatures. It is further averred that the defendant Trust had allowed the plaintiff and her husband to raise the construction on an area of about 400 sq. yards, which was accordingly raised by the petitioner. However, the brother and the son of the Chief Trustee unauthorizedly demolished the construction so raised by the petitioner. The petitioner-plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of contract on the value of Rs. 3,42,30,175/-, whereupon the court fee of Rs. 6,43,276/- was submitted. The petitioner implored the court to decree the suit. 3. The respondent-defendant denied the averments made in the plaint. The petitioner-plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of contract on the value of Rs. 3,42,30,175/-, whereupon the court fee of Rs. 6,43,276/- was submitted. The petitioner implored the court to decree the suit. 3. The respondent-defendant denied the averments made in the plaint. He came out with a case that the sale deed was got executed after playing a fraud on Manak Raj. 4. Based on the pleadings, the court framed the issues and the trial of the suit began. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioner-plaintiff intended to exhibit a document i.e. an agreement to sell, but the learned trial court did not allow the petitioner-plaintiff to exhibit the document unless it was duly impounded in accordance with the provisions of law and passed an order dated 9th November, 2010, which has been impugned by the petitioner. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the relevant materail on record including the impugned order dated 9th November, 2010. 6. In the instant case, a very short question, which springs up for consideration is as to whether the document in question is an agreement to sell or an acknowledgment of oral agreement and further as to whether the said document is admissible in evidence sans being impounded under the provisions of the Stamp Act, 1899? 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner took me through the language of document i.e. agreement to sell (Annexure-2) and canvassed that prior to this document coming into existence, the parties entered into an oral agreement, which was later-on reduced to writing and as such the said agreement to sell cannot be said to be an agreement. It is, in-fact, an acknowledgment of the oral agreement having taken place between the parties. Hence, this document is not required to be impounded under Section 35 of the Stamps Act and the learned trial court has committed grave error in treating the said document to be an agreement to sell and the same deserves to be set-aside. Learned counsel further canvassed that merely for the reason that the sale consideration of land as agreed orally, was increased or enhanced when the same was reduced to writing, the document did not convert into an agreement to sell. Mere enhancement of the sale price does not make the oral agreement into a document i.e agreement to sell. Learned counsel further canvassed that merely for the reason that the sale consideration of land as agreed orally, was increased or enhanced when the same was reduced to writing, the document did not convert into an agreement to sell. Mere enhancement of the sale price does not make the oral agreement into a document i.e agreement to sell. Learned counsel further contended that the acknowledgment of oral agreement in the said agreement dated 9.11.2010 as well as acknowledgment in sale deed, which are the basis of the suit do not require any stamps and this aspect escaped from appreciation by the learned trial court. The impugned order is erroneous and not in conformity with the provisions of law, hence the same deserves to be set-aside. 8. E Converso, the learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and defended the impugned order stating the same to be just and proper. He further contended that the levy of stamp duty was not dependent upon the pleadings of the parties, but it was based on the nature of the agreement spelled out. Learned counsel further argued that right from the very beginning, the petitioner-plaintiff himself treated this document to be an agreement to sell and just with a view to save stamp duty, he came out with the case that the document was not an agreement to sell, but it was simply an acknowledgment of the oral agreement, which later-on, was reduced into writing. The said document cannot be said to be an acknowledgment from any stretch of imagination. The document suggests the enhanced sale consideration and even if the oral agreement is reduced to writing, it becomes the agreement to sell, which is the basis of the suit. This document also contains the terms and conditions of the sale and any purported letter containing terms and conditions is an "instrument" under Section 2(14) creating or purporting to create rights and liabilities of the parties, which ought to be adequately stamped. He has cited the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court delivered in the case of Gopi Krishna Trivedi vs. Sudama Prasad Ojha reported in (2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases 401 as also the judgment of Avinash Kumar Chauhan vs. Vijay Krishna Mishra reported in AIR 2009 Supreme Court 1489 in support thereof. 9. He has cited the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court delivered in the case of Gopi Krishna Trivedi vs. Sudama Prasad Ojha reported in (2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases 401 as also the judgment of Avinash Kumar Chauhan vs. Vijay Krishna Mishra reported in AIR 2009 Supreme Court 1489 in support thereof. 9. It is relevant to record that in the case of Gopi Krishan Trivedi (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court upheld the judgment of Calcutta High Court, wherein the Calcutta High Court allowing the revision petition held thus: "The purported letter contains all the terms and conditions of an agreement for sale of immovable property. What were the terms and conditions of the alleged oral agreement are not known. There is nothing on record to show that rights and interest had been created following execution of an oral agreement. What we find is the existence of a document incorporating the terms and conditions of an agreement for sale of an immovable property and receipts acknowledging receipts of consideration amount. The agreements containing the terms and conditions for transfer of an immovable property, as such, are required to be property stamped in terms of the recent amendment of the Stamp Act in West Bengal. Adequate stamp not having been paid, the trial court is not right in making the observation that the documents in question are not to be impounded. Since it is the agreement for sale, stamp duty will have to be paid in terms of Schedule 1-A as amended. Right and liability having been created or purported to have been created, transferred and extended or recorded, the documents in question will come within the meaning of 'instrument' as defined in Section 2(14) of the Stamp Act." Ultimately, the High Court held that the right and liability having been created or purported to have been transferred and extended or created, the documents in question come within the meaning of "instrument" as defined in Section 2(14) of the Stamp Act, 1899 (in short "the Act"). Therefore, the revision petition was allowed and the trial court was directed to take steps for impounding the documents before having the documents being marked as exhibits." 10. This view of Calcutta High Court was based on the judgment of Brij Mohan's case delivered by Hon'ble Apex Court and reported in 1994 SCC 147. Therefore, the revision petition was allowed and the trial court was directed to take steps for impounding the documents before having the documents being marked as exhibits." 10. This view of Calcutta High Court was based on the judgment of Brij Mohan's case delivered by Hon'ble Apex Court and reported in 1994 SCC 147. Following the dictum of Brij Mohan's case, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed thus: "In view of what has been stated in Brij Mohan case, the High Court was right in holding that the document in question being an agreement for sale, stamp duty will have to be paid by treating the document to be an "instrument", as defined in Sec. 2(14) of the Act." 11. It is further relevant to point out that in the case of Gopi Krishan Trivedi (supra), both the parties had entered into an oral agreement and thereafter the terms and conditions of the oral agreement were reduced into writing and when that document was produced in evidence, the learned trial court directed the parties to get this document impounded as the said document was unregistered and insufficiently stamped. The facts of the case on hand are akin to that of the case of Gopi Krishan Trivedi and the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court truly holds good in the instant case. 12. In the case of Avinash Kumar Chauhan (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "The unregistered deed of sale was an instrument which required payment of the stamp duty applicable to a deed of conveyance. Adequate stamp duty admittedly was not paid. The court, therefore, was empowered to pass an order in terms of Section 35 of the Act. The plea that the document was admissible for collateral purpose, would not be tenable. Thus, the order directing impounding of said document was not liable to be interfered with." 13. The Hon'ble Apex court further held that "Section 35 of the Act, however, rules out applicability of such provision as it is categorically provided therein that a document of this nature shall not be admitted for any purpose whatsoever. If all purposes for which the document is sought to be brought in evidence are excluded, we fail to see any reason as to how the document would be admissible for collateral purposes. If all purposes for which the document is sought to be brought in evidence are excluded, we fail to see any reason as to how the document would be admissible for collateral purposes. Thus, it is now well settled that there is no prohibition under Section 49 of the Registration Act, to receive an unregistered document in evidence for collateral purpose. But the document so tendered should be duly stamped or should comply with the requirements of Sec. 35 of the Stamp Act, if not stamped, as a document cannot be received in evidence even for collateral purpose unless it is duly stamped or duty and penalty are paid under Section 35 of the Stamp Act." 14. Reliance is also placed on Firm Chuni Lal Tukki Mal vs. Firm Mukat Lal Ram Chanda and others (AIR 1965 All. 164) and Chandra Sekhar Misra vs. Gobinda Chandra Das, ( AIR 1966 Ori. 18 ). 15. The learned trial court is found to have considered all these aspects and having analyzed all the issues ad-longum, rightly observed that the document could not be allowed to be admitted in evidence unless it was duly stamped. The learned trial court is also found to have observed that the petitioner plaintiff herself had called this document to be an agreement to sell in para (Ka) of relief clause as also at many other places in the body of the plaint, which have been quoted by him in the impugned order and now she was estopped by not saying so. The learned trial court is found to have arrived at a right conclusion that the said document unless was impounded in accordance with the provisions of law, was not admissible in evidence. The impugned order is found to be just and proper and based on cogent reasoning and it suffers from no infirmity. 16. To conclude, having placed reliance upon the loud pronouncements made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the afore-cited judgements as also in very many umpteen cases, it can safely be held that the document in question is an agreement to sell and not an acknowledgment of oral agreement. It is further held that the said document (agreement to sell) dated 21st August, 2009 cannot be allowed to be admitted in evidence unless the same is impounded under the provisions of Stamp Act, 1899. It is further held that the said document (agreement to sell) dated 21st August, 2009 cannot be allowed to be admitted in evidence unless the same is impounded under the provisions of Stamp Act, 1899. The argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that the document is simply an acknowledgment of oral agreement and not an agreement to sell is not tenable and the same being totally devoid of any force deserves to be dishonoured. I am in unison with the finding arrived at by the learned trial court and to my firm view, the impugned order warrants no intervention. 17. For the reasons afore-stated, the writ petition fails and the same being bereft of any merit stands dismissed. 18. Consequent upon the dismissal of writ petition, the stay application, filed therewith, does not survive and that also stands dismissed.