JUDGMENT A.C. Upadhyay, J. 1. By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner has challenged the power and jurisdiction of the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sonamura, West Tripura to review its own order in Misc. (Review) 04 of 2009, arising out of T.S. (MAC) 35 of 2008. 2. Heard Mr. P.K. Dhar, learned Counsel for the Petitioner. Also heard Mr. T.D. Majumder, learned Counsel, for the Respondents. 3. Sans elaborate details, necessary facts, for the purpose of disposal of this petition, may be stated, as follows: Smt. Rekha Paul, preferred T.S.(MAC) 35 of 2008, before the Member Motor Accidents claims Tribunal, Sonamura, praying for compensation, on account of injuries sustained by her in a motor vehicle accident caused by Auto Canter No. TR-01-D-1687. The claim case was contested by the owner and the driver of the vehicle as well as by the insurer i.e. New India Assurance Company Ltd. The learned Member, MACT, Sonamura after holding enquiry in the claim case, passed the judgment and award dated 04.04.2009, directing the owner of the vehicle, Respondent No. 1 herein to pay compensation of Rs. 2,84,660/-to the claimant . The owner of the vehicle, Respondent No. 1, being aggrieved, preferred a review application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, before the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sonamura, for review of the said judgment and order. In the aforesaid review application, Respondent No. 1 had sought for modification and correction of the error apparent on the face of the records, due to misinterpretation with a direction upon the New India Assurance Company Ltd. to satisfy the award of compensation. The Petitioner Insurance company, contested the review application by filing written statement. After hearing the parties, the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, passed the impugned order dated 02.12.2009, allowing the review application filed by Respondent No. 1 and accordingly modified and corrected the technical error in the judgment and award dated 04.04.2009, passed in TS (MAC) No. 35 of 2008, by shifting the liability of payment of compensation, upon the Petitioner-Insurance Company. 4. The moot question for consideration revolves round the issue as to whether the provisions of Order 47 read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, can be pressed into service to extend the relief sought for by the Petitioner. 4. The moot question for consideration revolves round the issue as to whether the provisions of Order 47 read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, can be pressed into service to extend the relief sought for by the Petitioner. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal modifying its earlier order dated 04.04.2009 is without jurisdiction and, therefore, has prayed for quashing the said order dated 02.12.2009 passed by the learned Tribunal. 5. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the Petitioner by referring to the provision of Section 169 of the M.V. Act, 1988, submitted that a Claims Tribunal would not have jurisdiction to entertain a review petition against any judgment and award passed by it. 6. According to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, since there is no express provision of law in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 or Rules framed there under, conferring the power of review upon the claim Tribunal, it cannot exercise review power like a Civil Court of ordinary jurisdiction, as per relevant provision of C.P.C. 7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner referring to a decision of the Division Bench of this High Court, reported in 2007 ACJ 1341 (Goljan Nesha v. Gammon India Ltd. and Ors.), has submitted that since review power has not been specifically conferred on the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, it will not have review jurisdiction. 8. In Goljan Nesha(supra),the issue before the Division Bench was whether the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, had the jurisdiction either to revise or to review its own order. 9. While examining review power of the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, and Rules framed there under, the Division Bench of this Court held that law has been made limiting the power of review by the Commissioner, Workmen Compensation, therefore, the Commissioner committed an apparent error of law by invoking jurisdiction, which was not made available to him by the statute. 10. In this context, the relevant extract of in Goljan Nesha(supra) may be gainfully quoted as follows: 5. 10. In this context, the relevant extract of in Goljan Nesha(supra) may be gainfully quoted as follows: 5. Rule 32(2) of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1924 reads as under: (2) The Commissioner, at the time of signing and dating his judgment, shall pronounce, his decision, and thereafter no addition or alteration shall be made to the judgment other than the correction of a clerical or arithmetical mistake arising from any accidental slip or omission. 7. It is true that the Commissioner should have passed his orders in terms of the unamended provisions of the Act, but we do not accept the submission that the order in question was void or nullity, which could have been revised and/or reviewed through the applications filed by the Respondents. Commissioner has committed an apparent error of law in invoking jurisdiction, which was not available to him. 11. In Goljan Nesha(supra), the Division Bench pointed out that the law specifically provided the Commissioner with the power to correct a clerical or arithmetical mistake and nothing beyond. Therefore, the Commissioner Workmen Compensation did not have jurisdiction as per the statute to exercise power of review, except correcting clerical or arithmetical mistakes. 12. Learned Counsel for the Respondents vehemently submitted that the application for review of the order filed by the owner of the vehicle was entertained by the learned Tribunal since there is no express bar imposing restraint on entertaining review power in the M.V. Act, 1988 and /or Rules, framed by the State. 13. Learned Counsel for the Respondents pointed out that the decision of this Court in Goljan Nesha (supra) is distinguishable from the present case for two reasons, (i) the Commissioner had limited jurisdiction to review its own order under Rule 32(2) of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1924, whereas in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, no limit has been indicated restricting the power of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 14. Learned Counsel for the Respondents relying on the decision reported in 2010 ACJ 1926 (Pranab Dhar v. Rajesh Deb & Anr.), submitted that the Tribunal has not been prohibited from following the general procedure prescribed under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and thus review of an order passed by it, being for doing substantive justice, cannot be circumvented. The relevant observation made by the learned Single Judge of this Bench is reproduced herein below: 24. The relevant observation made by the learned Single Judge of this Bench is reproduced herein below: 24. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , which is again followed by the Apex Court in Kewal Chand Mimani (D) by L Rs, (2001) 6 SCC 512 , power of review is not an inherent power unless the same is conferred wither by law specifically or by necessary implication. But these cases are not much helpful for the case in hand as in the present case question arises whether Sub-section (1) of Section 169 of the Act vests the power of review by necessary implication or not in the Tribunal. In view of the decision in Sunita Devi Singhania Hospital Trust AIR 2009 SCW 1650 of the Apex Court and also the decision in Lachhi Bai 1998 ACJ 169 as decided by Madhya Pradesh High Court and the decision of this Court in Samar Roy 2002(2) GLT 595, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the Tribunal has the power of review as the same is implicit in every court of civil nature, even when the stature is expressly not armed with power of review, and also the Tribunal is free to follow the general procedure prescribed under Order 47 Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure as the legislature vested wide power to it under Sub-section (1) of Section 169 regarding what should be the procedure for holding inquiry under Section 168 of the Act. 15. Learned Counsel for the Respondents relied on yet another decisions reported in 2002 (2) GLT 595 (New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Samar Roy and Anr.), in which a coordinate Bench of this Court held that "power of review is implicit in every Court of civil nature, regardless of the power expressly provided under the Code of Civil procedure, of course in exercising such implicit power of review, the Court/ tribunal is supposed to follow the procedure prescribed under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC." 16. In 2000 Crl.L.J. 2433 (Lily Thomas v. Union of India and Ors.), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view and such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. In 2000 Crl.L.J. 2433 (Lily Thomas v. Union of India and Ors.), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view and such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise, but at the same time it cannot be denied that justice is a virtue that transcends all barriers, and, the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed, but for erroneous assumption, which is fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice, nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error. The observation of the Apex Court in this context is depicted herein below: 52. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji arjunsinghji AIR 1970 SC 1273 held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which is fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error. This Court in S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka 1993 Supp(4) SCC 595 held: Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or re-consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. This Court in S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka 1993 Supp(4) SCC 595 held: Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or re-consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the Courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest Court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the Courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai AIR 1941 FC 1 the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh (1836) 1 Moo PC 117 that an order made by the Court has final and could not be altered. ... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in.... The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have however gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies. Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under: It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard. Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. 17. Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in so far as the same is relevant for the purpose of this controversy reads as under: 169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals.- (1) In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (Emphasis supplied) 18. On close examination of the provision of Section 169 of the M.V. Act, it appears that the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any Rule, that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit, for the purpose of holding an enquiry under Section 168 of the Act and he shall have all the powers of a Civil Court, for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects. Therefore, the Claims Tribunal in order to award a just compensation may adopt a procedure, which it thinks fit and appropriate. 19. Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure read as under: 114. Review. - Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved, - (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit. Order 47 Rule 1: 1. Order 47 Rule 1: 1. Application for review of judgment. - (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved - (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the Appellant, or when, being Respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. Explanation. - The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. (emphasis supplied) 20. In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors. 1980 (Suppl.) SCC 420, Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained that the expression review is used in the two distinct senses, namely, (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a Court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits, when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. When a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justiciae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal. When a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justiciae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal. The principle that the power to review must be conferred by statute either specially or by necessary implication is inapplicable to decisions of Judicial Tribunal, which is supposed to do complete justice to the parties before it. To extend the principle to decisions rendered by a Judicial Tribunal would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. Surely, any Judicial Tribunal must be free to review its decision if it has to dispense justice to the parties though of course principles of fair play should be observed. 21. These principles were also reiterated by the Apex Court in S. Nagaraj and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Anr. and in Lily Thomas v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 1650 (para 52). It is also well settled that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute the view and that such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. 22. In Ram Kirpal v. Union of India 1998 (103) ELT8 (Guj.) , a Division Bench held as under: As a general rule, a judgment, decree or final order once drawn up and signed, cannot subsequently be altered, varied or amended in any manner by the Court or Tribunal which pronounced it. However, there is well recognized exception to the said general rule. It is a maxim of law that an act of a Court shall prejudice no man actus curiae neminem gravabit. Every Tribunal has an inherent jurisdiction, apart from statutory jurisdiction to correct any error committed by itself. It can invoke such jurisdiction and can exercise it in an appropriate case when its conscience is aroused and if it considers that without the exercise of such powers, the ends of justice would be frustrated. 23. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has also held in National Insurance Co. It can invoke such jurisdiction and can exercise it in an appropriate case when its conscience is aroused and if it considers that without the exercise of such powers, the ends of justice would be frustrated. 23. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has also held in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lachhi Bai AIR 1997 MP 172 that under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a review application is maintainable when review is sought due to a procedural defect or inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal. 24. In AIR 2000 SC 1165 , United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and Ors., Appellant-Insurance Company alleged rank fraud had been played by two claimants and wangled two separate Awards from a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for a bulk sum. But neither the Tribunal nor the High Court of Allahabad, before which the Insurance Company approached for annulling the awards, opened the door but expressed helplessness even to look into the matter and hence the Insurance Company filed appeals by Special leave, before Hon'ble Supreme Court, where it was observed as follows: 15. Therefore, we have no doubt that the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in such a situation. No Court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim. 25. Learned Counsel for Respondent submitted that apparently in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Rules framed there under, no restriction has been imposed on the learned Tribunal to exercise review jurisdiction and therefore, he Motor Accident Claims Tribunal shall be able to adopt a reasonable procedure to correct its own error apparent on the face of record, so that the record of the Tribunal may not remain with incorrect facts. Thus, a review application would be maintainable, when it is sought due to a procedural defect, or inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal, solely to prevent abuse of its process. 26. Thus, a review application would be maintainable, when it is sought due to a procedural defect, or inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal, solely to prevent abuse of its process. 26. In National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Lachhi Bai, reported in 1998 ACJ 169 (MP), it has been held that a review application is maintainable when it is sought due to a procedural defect, or inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal, to prevent abuse of it's process,. The relevant extract reads as follows: 11. The expression 'review' is used in two distinct senses, namely (i) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a Court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it and (ii) review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of record. In the case of Narshi Thakershi's case ( AIR 1970 SC 1273 ) it is held that no review lies on merits unless the statute specifically provides for it. Obviously, when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justiticea to prevent the abuse of its process and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has given a limited power of review to the Tribunal and while considering the scope of Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 11, it was held that the review is maintainable. Similarly, in Satnam Verma's case AIR 1985 SC 294 ) (supra), considering the scope of powers of the Tribunal under Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was held that the Tribunal is endowed with such ancillary or incidental power as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal under the wide powers cannot be denied by the Tribunal itself. 12. The jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal under the wide powers cannot be denied by the Tribunal itself. 12. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the power of review vests with the Tribunal in its inherent power under Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act though Rule 240 of the M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 has not expressly provided for application of Order 47, Code of Civil Procedure A review application is maintainable when it is sought due to a procedural defect, or inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal, to prevent abuse of it's process. Such power inheres in the Tribunal. The contention of the learned Counsel for the non-applicant cannot be accepted that power of review is not provided by the statute, therefore, it cannot review its own order. As considered by me earlier, wide powers are vested with the Tribunal under Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, review on limited grounds as mentioned above is permissible. 27. In view of the above discussion, more particularly taking into consideration the decision of our own High Court in (i) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Samar Roy and Anr.(supra) (ii)Pranab Dhar v. Rajesh Deb and Anr. (supra) , the impugned order passed by the claims Tribunal by reviewing its own order, can not be said to be without jurisdiction, as sought to be pointed out by the Petitioner by filing this application under Article 227 of the Constitution. 28. Consequently, the impugned order does not deserve any interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 29. In the result, the writ petition filed by the Petitioner stand dismissed. However, I pass no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.