JUDGMENT : Mathivanan, J. This civil miscellaneous appeal is directed against the order of dismissal dated 11.4.2002 and made in M.C.O.P. No. 17 of 2002, on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate), Tuticorin. The facts which are absolutely necessary for the disposal of the appeal may be summarised as under: That on 6.2.1999, at about 11 a.m., the motor cycle bearing registration No. TN 69-B 5437 had hit against the deceased boy Vijayamuthu, aged about 6 years, when he was standing near Ayyar Battery Company at Harbour Extension Road Camp-I, Tuticorin. As a result of this, he had sustained fracture over his head and multiple injuries all over his body. Soon after the occurrence, he was removed to the Government Medical College & Hospital at Tuticorin wherein he was treated as inpatient from 6.2.1999 to 9.2.1999. Thereafter, he had succumbed to injuries while he was under treatment. Hence, the appellants being the parents of the deceased had filed a claim petition in M.C.O.P. No. 71 of 1999, on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate), Tuticorin, claiming a sum of Rs. 5,00,000. 2. Respondent No. 1 being the owner of the motor cycle and the respondent No. 2 being the insurer had resisted the claim petition. 3. In order to establish their respective cases, both the appellants and the respondents went for trial. Two witnesses which includes the appellant No. 1/claimant No. 1 were examined and during the course of their examination, Exhs. P1 to P6 were marked. On the other hand, the respondent No. 1 was examined as RW 1 and during the course of his examination Exhs. R1 to R3 were marked. 4. On evaluating the evidence both oral and documentary, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had dismissed the claim of the claimants on the ground that they are not entitled to get compensation from the respondents. 5. Being aggrieved by the impugned order, the claimants have approached this court by way of this appeal. 6. Heard both sides. 7. The involvement of the vehicle bearing registration No. TN 69-B 5437, TVS Suzuki Max 100 R motor cycle has been questioned in this appeal. Only on this ground, the claim petition filed by the appellants had been dismissed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The first information report plays a pivotal role in this case. 6. Heard both sides. 7. The involvement of the vehicle bearing registration No. TN 69-B 5437, TVS Suzuki Max 100 R motor cycle has been questioned in this appeal. Only on this ground, the claim petition filed by the appellants had been dismissed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The first information report plays a pivotal role in this case. The first information report under Exh. P1 seems to have been lodged by the mother of the deceased boy. It appears that the accident has taken place on 6.2.1999, when the deceased boy was standing on the northern side of Ayyar Battery Company in order to cross the road. It also reveals that the statement of the mother of the deceased boy was recorded by a Head Constable, H.C. No. 432, Sorimuthu, while she was attending her son in the hospital. It is written by the Head Constable as if the boy was hit by a lorry. But, in the averments of the first information report, it is stated that a blue colour scooter came fast and dashed against her son and thereafter, proceeded further and fled away from the scene of occurrence. 8. PW 2 has given a valuable and important piece of evidence and he alone has given a vivid account about the manner in which the accident has taken place, because he was the eyewitness. Soon after the occurrence, he along with the mother of the boy had removed him to the hospital. Exh. R2 is the certified copy of the judgment dated 24.10.2001, and made in C.C. No. 54 of 2000, on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. II, Tuticorin, acquitting the respondent No. 1, who is the owner-cum-rider of the motor cycle bearing registration No. TN 69-B 5437. The learned Judicial Magistrate No. II had recorded the evidence of PW 2 in the above said case. 9. In the above said case, PW 2 herein Subburaj was examined as PW 3. He had stated that on 6.2.1999, at about 11 a.m. at Harbour Main Road, when the deceased boy was standing near the Ayyar Battery Company, the respondent No. 1 had ridden TVS Suzuki motor cycle in a high speed and hit against the deceased boy and came to a halt at some distance and thereafter fled away. 10. He had stated that on 6.2.1999, at about 11 a.m. at Harbour Main Road, when the deceased boy was standing near the Ayyar Battery Company, the respondent No. 1 had ridden TVS Suzuki motor cycle in a high speed and hit against the deceased boy and came to a halt at some distance and thereafter fled away. 10. PW 2 had deposed in the above said case that the respondent No. 1 was known to him and he was able to identify the registration number of the vehicle also without any hesitation. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had treated this case on a par with a criminal case as if in the nature of a heinous crime. In motor accident claim cases, the Tribunal need not delve deep into the evidence to explore the proof beyond all reasonable doubts. It is well settled principle of law that standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not be applied in accident claim cases. The testimony of the evidence of PW 2 alone is sufficient to hold that the motor cycle, i.e., TVS Suzuki Max 100 R bearing registration No. TN 69-B 5437 belonging to the respondent No. 1 was involved in the occurrence. In the first information report, the mother of the boy was not able to identify the motor cycle. She said that the kind of vehicle was scooter and its colour was blue. But, the respondent No. 1 has contended that his vehicle was red in colour. That may not be sufficient for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to wriggle out of the clutches of the liability. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has not justified the dismissal of the claim petition. 11. Mr. R. Manimaran, learned counsel appearing for Mr. S. Meenakshisundaram, learned counsel on record for the appellants, while advancing his arguments, has submitted that the mother of the boy was a rustic woman and when she was under pell-mell she was not able to give correct account about the vehicle which was involved in the occurrence and hence her statement with regard to the colour of the vehicle could not be a ground for total rejection of their claim. In support of his arguments, he has placed reliance upon the following decisions: (i) Bimla Devi and Others Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Others, (2009) 13 SCC 530 (ii) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kamli 2010 ACJ 1340 (MP). In support of his arguments, he has placed reliance upon the following decisions: (i) Bimla Devi and Others Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Others, (2009) 13 SCC 530 (ii) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kamli 2010 ACJ 1340 (MP). (iii) Smt. Bhimavva and Others Vs. Shankar @ Adya and Others, (2005) ACJ 301 : (2004) ILR (Kar) 3562 12. In Bimla Devi and Others Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Others, (supra) the deceased, a police constable, died when the driver reversed the bus without blowing horn. The respondents, driver and conductor denied and disputed the occurrence. According to them the deceased died in the previous evening. In this case, the Supreme Court has held that for the purpose of determining the said issue, the court is required to apply the principle underlying burden of proof in terms of the provisions of section 106 of the Evidence Act as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by the respondent. Strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. 13. It is also a settled principle of law that the first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and it cannot be placed on pedestal higher than the statement on oath. The first information report could be used in criminal case for corroboration or for contradiction. It is lodged before an officer, who is in-charge of the police station to set the law in motion with regard to an incident, which takes place within his jurisdiction and nothing beyond that. This principle is laid down in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kamli, 2010 ACJ 1340 (MP). 14. In Bhimavva v. Shankar's case, 2005 ACJ 301 (Karnataka), it is held that the first information report can at best be made use of for purposes of corroborating or contradicting the person who has lodged the same. 15. This principle is laid down in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kamli, 2010 ACJ 1340 (MP). 14. In Bhimavva v. Shankar's case, 2005 ACJ 301 (Karnataka), it is held that the first information report can at best be made use of for purposes of corroborating or contradicting the person who has lodged the same. 15. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 would submit that when the vehicle itself was not identified and its involvement was in question, neither the respondent No. 1 nor the respondent No. 2 could be held responsible for the occurrence. He has also submitted that the mother of the boy, who had lodged a complaint, was not examined in this case and that appellant No. 1, who is the father of the deceased boy, alone was examined in this case. He would further submit that in the first information report, the mother of the boy had stated that the kind of the vehicle was scooter and it was blue in colour. But the respondent's vehicle was red in colour and, therefore, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal's decision dismissing the claim petition need not be interfered with. 16. Further, the learned counsel has submitted that once the contention of the first information report is admitted, the person who lodged the complaint could not be allowed to turn round and contend that other contents contained in the rest part thereof had not been proved. He would submit further that the claimants have marked the first information report as Exh. P1 and once a part of it was relied upon by both parties, there might not be any illegality in relying upon other part, irrespective of the contents. In respect of her arguments she has placed reliance upon the decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Premlata Shukla, 2007 ACJ 1928 (SC). 17. Further, the learned counsel has also placed reliance upon another decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rattani and Others, (2009) 2 SCC 75 , In this case, a truck carrying 30-40 passengers turned turtle and some passengers sustained injuries and two of them succumbed to their injuries. It was contended that deceased and injured were travelling in the truck as members of marriage party. In the first information report it was not mentioned that the dowry articles were loaded in the said vehicle. It was contended that deceased and injured were travelling in the truck as members of marriage party. In the first information report it was not mentioned that the dowry articles were loaded in the said vehicle. The claimants had deposed that those persons were travelling in the vehicle as representatives of owner of goods. Under this circumstance, the Supreme Court has held that 30-40 persons could not have been representatives of owner of gift articles from bride side, if any, in the vehicle and has come to the conclusion that the victims of the accident were travelling in the truck as gratuitous passengers and hence insurance company could be exempted from liability. 18. A principle laid down in this case is that originally allegations made in first information report are not admissible in evidence but if first information report has been made a part of claim application, it can be looked into by the Tribunal/court. This ratio cannot be applied in the present case. 19. In the earlier case, i.e., Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Premlata Shukla, 2007 ACJ 1928 (SC)., the Apex Court has held that once a part of contents of document admitted in evidence party bringing same on record cannot be permitted to turn round and contend that the other contents contained in the rest part thereof had not been proved. 20. On coming to the instant case, the presence of PW 2 in the place of occurrence has not been disputed. He has also been examined as a witness in the criminal case in C.C. No. 54 of 2000, on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. II, Tuticorin. This court does not see any discrepancy in his evidence. But, the Tribunal has not correctly appreciated and weighed the tenor of PW 2 and that was why it went on to dismiss the claim of the petitioners. 21. This court has also considered the submissions of both sides, after analysing and evaluating the evidence, this court is of confirmed view that the vehicle bearing registration No. TN 69-B 5437 alone was involved in the accident, because the evidence of PW 2 withstood the test of cross-examination and ultimately the negligence is fixed on the respondent No. 1 and only because of his wrongful act, the boy at his tender age had to succumb to his injuries. Since the vehicle was insured with the respondent No. 2, the respondent No. 2/insurance company is liable to indemnify the respondent No. 1. 22. In the claim petition, the age of the appellant No. 1, who is the father of the deceased, has been shown as 29 years and appellant No. 2, who is the mother of the deceased boy, has been shown as 26 years. At the time of occurrence, the age of the boy was 6 years. As per the Second Schedule to section 163-A of the Act up to 15 years 15 is the appropriate multiplier. For arriving at the quantum of compensation, if the age of the father of the deceased boy is taken into account, i.e., the age of 29 then the multiplier would be 18. Therefore, in order to arrive at just compensation, the multiplier of 15 can be adopted. Since the boy was a non-earning person, the annual income at Rs. 15,000 can be taken into account. On application of multiplier of 15, the dependency would be Rs. 2,25,000. After deducting 1/3rd, the 2/3rd remainder would be Rs. 1,50,000, which is the loss of income of the family and besides this, the appellants being the parents of the deceased are each entitled to get a sum of Rs. 15,000 towards the loss of love and affection as they had lost their only son at the age of six. Apart from this, they are also entitled to get a sum of Rs. 5,000 towards the funeral expenses. The claimants have produced medical bills under Exh. P6, which shows that they have incurred a sum of Rs. 5,926.75 rounded off to Rs. 5,900 towards the medical expenses. 23. It appears from the claim petition that the deceased was admitted to hospital on 6.2.1999 and he died on 9.2.1999. Therefore, this court considered that a sum of Rs. 5,900 can be allowed towards medical expenses. Totally, the claimants are entitled to get a sum of Rs. 1,90,900 as detailed hereunder: In the result, this civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed. The order dated 11.4.2002 and made in M.C.O.P. No. 17 of 2002, on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate), Tuticorin is set aside and the claim made in M.C.O.P. No. 17 of 2002 is partly allowed. The appellants-claimants are entitled to get a sum of Rs. 1,90,900. The order dated 11.4.2002 and made in M.C.O.P. No. 17 of 2002, on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate), Tuticorin is set aside and the claim made in M.C.O.P. No. 17 of 2002 is partly allowed. The appellants-claimants are entitled to get a sum of Rs. 1,90,900. The respondent No. 2 being the insurer of the respondent No. l's vehicle is directed to pay this amount to the claimants with interest at the rate of 7.5 per cent per annum from the date of claim application, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No order as to costs.