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2011 DIGILAW 1942 (ALL)

RANA PRATAP SINGH v. K. K. SINHA

2011-08-17

SANJAY MISRA

body2011
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sanjay Misra, J.—Heard Sri Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for the applicants and Sri K.R. Singh, learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents. 2. Affidavits have been exchanged between the parties. 3. Contempt is alleged of an interim order dated 13.8.2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 20531 of 2010 (Rana Pratap Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others). According to Sri Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for the applicants, the writ Court clearly directed that the Commissioner should consider grant of approval regarding continuance of Collection Amin/Collection Peon and further provided that the petitioners shall be allowed to discharge their functions as they were being allowed to discharge prior to the order dated 30.9.2009. Learned counsel states that the writ petition is pending and the interim order is operating. According to him the applicants were appointed between the years 1981-1987 or there about as Collection Amin/Collection Peon. According to Sri Siddharth Khare when they were prevented from discharging their duties they filed Writ Petition No. 18230 of 2000 (which was subsequently connected alongwith Writ Petition No. 14425 of 2004) and an interim order dated 19.4.2000 was passed on the strength of which they continued to discharge their duties. He submits that both the writ petitions were decided on 30.7.2009 directing the State Authorities to consider the claim of the petitioners for regularization. Sri Siddharth Khare submits that in pursuance thereof an order dated 30.9.2009 was passed by the District Magistrate which was challenged in the instant writ petition wherein the interim order dated 13.8.2010 has been passed contempt whereof has been alleged. 4. He submits that when the applicants were continuing to discharge their duties regularly without any break then under the interim order the respondents cannot prevent the petitioners from discharging their duties as such. Learned counsel states that in pursuance of the interim order dated 13.8.2010 the District Magistrate, Ballia, has passed an order dated 7.9.2010 wherein he has recorded that the applicants are working only on the basis of sanction granted by the Commissioner from time to time and they are to be continued on the basis of such sanction. The said order according to Sri Siddharth Khare is a disobedience of the interim order dated 13.8.2010. 5. The said order according to Sri Siddharth Khare is a disobedience of the interim order dated 13.8.2010. 5. Sri K.R. Singh, learned Standing Counsel has referred to the directions issued in the interim order dated 13.8.2010 and emphasized on the direction where it is provided as an interim measure that the matter regarding grant of approval shall be immediately considered by the Commissioner and if there is no legal impediment it is expected that the approval shall be granted. He submits that in light of the aforesaid the District Magistrate has passed the order dated 7.9.2010 awaiting the sanction from the Commissioner. Learned Standing Counsel submits that the applicants were engaged on seasonal basis as Seasonal Collection Amin/Seasonal Collection Peon and therefore it is only on the basis of requirement of work and approval granted by the Commissioner that they are to discharge their duties. While referring to the records he states that when there is perennial requirement of work in a particular year the applicants have been continued to be engaged but only on the basis of sanction granted by the Commissioner from time to time. At the present moment he submits that the sanction is awaited from the Commissioner according to the requirement of work and therefore it cannot be said that the applicants are entitled to work each and every day of the year. 5. While interpreting the interim order dated 13.8.2010 learned Standing Counsel submits that the provision that they shall be allowed to discharge their functions as they were being allowed to discharge prior to the order dated 30.9.2009 is concerned the circumstance even prior to 30.9.2009 was on the basis of sanction granted by the Commissioner which may have been granted regularly without any interruption. However, at present the Commissioner is yet to grant the sanction. 6. He states that when the functioning of the petitioner is dependent on the sanction of the Commissioner which is normally for a period of 89 days then the petitioners cannot claim any more or further rights beyond the sanction granted by the Commissioner. He therefore submits that even prior to 30.9.2009 the discharge of duties by the petitioners was based on such sanction granted by the Commissioner in view of the interim order in earlier writ petition and even after 30.9.2009 it has to be on the basis of sanction granted by the Commissioner. He therefore submits that even prior to 30.9.2009 the discharge of duties by the petitioners was based on such sanction granted by the Commissioner in view of the interim order in earlier writ petition and even after 30.9.2009 it has to be on the basis of sanction granted by the Commissioner. He submits that by passing the order dated 7.9.2010 the District Magistrate has sought the sanction of the Commissioner hence the District Magistrate has not disobeyed the interim order dated 13.8.2010 passed by the writ Court. 7. From the aforesaid submission it appears that there were two directions issued by the interim order. The first was that the Commissioner should consider the grant of approval regarding continuance of engagement of Seasonal Collection Amin/Seasonal Collection Peon. The second direction was that they shall be allowed to discharge their functions as they were being allowed to discharge prior to the order dated 30.9.2009. 8. The State-respondents claim that continuance prior to 30.9.2009 was provisional and even at that time initial sanction had been granted by the Commissioner for a period of 89 days from time to time. After the earlier writ petitions have been disposed of the regularization of the petitioners was required to be considered. It is when the interim order dated 13.8.2010 was passed in the subsequent writ petition that the order is to be passed by the Commissioner regarding grant of sanction therefore the functioning of the petitioners is based on the sanction granted by the Commissioner whether it be prior to 30.9.2009 or after 30.9.2009. 9. In case the Commissioner does not grant sanction on expiry of 89 days the said action would be a cause of action for the petitioners which can be assailed before the appropriate forum since in the interim order it has been very clearly recorded that the grant of approval (sanction) is to be considered by the Commissioner. There is no direction to grant approval (sanction). Therefore, the continuance of the petitioners to discharge their duties is also dependent on such consideration by the Commissioner. 10. The word ‘consideration’ used in the order of the writ Court clearly means that the authority should deliberate with care on the matter and as a result of such careful deliberation pass an order. It cannot be interpreted to mean that the writ Court has issued a direction to accept the claim of the applicant. 10. The word ‘consideration’ used in the order of the writ Court clearly means that the authority should deliberate with care on the matter and as a result of such careful deliberation pass an order. It cannot be interpreted to mean that the writ Court has issued a direction to accept the claim of the applicant. When consideration is directed by the Court and if on consideration the claim is found genuine then the authority has to proceed in accordance with law but not on an interpretation of such direction to consider to be a direction to allow the claim. 11. In case there is no consideration made by the Commissioner which according to the applicants is disobedience of the interim order dated 13.8.2010 they could have agitated that grievance. In the present contempt petition the Commissioner has not been made a party nor there is any allegation against the Commissioner. Consequently when even prior to 30.9.2009 the functioning of the petitioners was based upon an interim order of the High Court and consequent sanction granted by the Commissioner their functioning after the interim order dated 13.8.2010 has also to be on the basis of sanction granted by the Commissioner from time to time. If the Commissioner does not grant the sanction the applicants can always seek appropriate remedy which is not under these contempt proceedings. 12. The contempt petition is accordingly finally disposed of. 13. Notice issued is discharged. No order is passed as to costs. —————