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2011 DIGILAW 1957 (RAJ)

Monica and Vinay Malhotra v. The State of Rajasthan Through Pubic Prosecutor

2011-09-13

MOHAMMAD RAFIQ

body2011
JUDGMENT 1. - This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, 'the Criminal Procedure Code') was jointly filed by petitioners Smt. Monica and Smt. Vinay Malhotra, on 18.08.2007 seeking quashment of the First Information Report No.170/2007 registered with Police Station Moti Dungari, Jaipur, for offence under Sections 417, 466, 420, 468, 471 r/w 120 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, 'IPC'). When the matter was listed before the court on 28.07.2011, an objection was raised by learned counsel appearing on behalf of complainant/respondents that since the charge-sheet in the matter has been filed before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.6, Jaipur City, Jaipur, and that court has already taken cognizance of the matter on 22.12.2010, this petition should be dismissed as having become infructuous. Contention of petitioners, however, was that the order taking cognizance was passed by learned trial court despite their objection that complete set of documents enclosed with the charge-sheet, have not been supplied to her. Time prayed for was granted to petitioners to take appropriate steps with regard to cognizance order dated 22.12.2010 and trial court was directed to look into the application filed by the petitioner for supply of aforesaid documents. While it appears that relevant documents were subsequently supplied to the petitioners, petitioners challenged aforesaid order of this court dated 28.07.2011, before the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No.5811/2011, which was decided vide order dated 16.08.2011 observing that the order of this court, merely adjourned the matter, therefore, the petitioners should raise their grievance before this court in the present petition. This court however was requested to dispose of the present petition as early as possible but positively within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. It is in the backdrop of these facts that the present matter has been assigned to this Bench for hearing and disposal. 2. When the matter was listed before this court on 26.08.2011, learned counsel appearing for complainant/respondents, raised the same objection about maintainability of the petition. Learned counsel sought to rely on certain Supreme Court judgments. It is in the backdrop of these facts that the present matter has been assigned to this Bench for hearing and disposal. 2. When the matter was listed before this court on 26.08.2011, learned counsel appearing for complainant/respondents, raised the same objection about maintainability of the petition. Learned counsel sought to rely on certain Supreme Court judgments. This court, while taking note of the fact that petitioners are arguing the matter in person and not assisted by any counsel and that this petition has remained pending for last four years, granted permission to petitioner no.2, on her oral prayer, to file amended petition so as to challenge the order of cognizance dated 22.12.2010. The petitioners therefore filed amended petition on 01.09.2011 placing on record copy of order dated 22.12.2010 of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.6, Jaipur City, Jaipur, in Criminal Case No.876/2010, and prayed for quashment of the order of cognizance. The matter was heard on 02.09.2011 at length. With a view to explore possibility of out of court settlement, the matter was deferred to 06.09.2011. However, when parties could not agree on any amicable settlement, arguments on merits were heard on 06.09.2011. 3. Before however considering rival arguments, it is considered appropriate to notice brief facts giving rise to this petition. Marriage of petitioner no.1 Smt. Monica was solemnized with Vikas Sharma on 16.01.2004 at Sanatan Dharam Mandir, Lajpat Nagar-3, New Delhi. According to petitioner Monica, her husband Vikas Sharma deserted her five months after the marriage. He is a Non Resident Indian based in DR Congo. The petitioner Monica was driven out of home by her parents-in-law. They did not return her 'stridhan'. Petitioner filed a petition under Section 125 Criminal Procedure Code for grant of maintenance against her husband. She also filed a criminal complaint against her husband Vikas Sharma, father-in-law Bhaskar Lal Sharma and mother-in-law Vimla Sharma for offences under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 of the IPC 09.09.2004. Cognizance against husband Vikas Sharma, father-in-law and mother-in-law for offences under Section 498-A, 406 and 34 IPC was taken by the court of learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, (for short, 'the ACMM') on 21.03.2005. Cognizance against husband Vikas Sharma, father-in-law and mother-in-law for offences under Section 498-A, 406 and 34 IPC was taken by the court of learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, (for short, 'the ACMM') on 21.03.2005. She then filed another criminal complaint against her husband and parents-in-laws for offence under Sections 415/417 of the IPC for fraudulently inducing her to marry Vikas Sharma by concealing facts contained in his divorce decree regarding his first marriage and having two children from first wedlock. It is informed that criminal proceedings against Monica's father-in-law for offence under Section 498-A and 406 IPC and against her mother-in-law under Section 498-A IPC were quashed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 27.07.2009. However, in another complaint filed by the petitioner Monica against her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law for offence under Section 415/417 IPC, cognizance was taken by the learned ACMM at Delhi on 20.03.2006. Learned ACMM, New Delhi, by his order dated 10.05.2006 granted monthly interim maintenance of Rs. 5000/- to petitioner Monica in her petition. Dissatisfied with the quantum, she approached the High Court of Delhi by filing Criminal Revision Petition No.452/2005. Delhi High Court by its order dated 22.11.2006 enhanced the amount of interim maintenance to Rs. 50,000/- per month as interim measure. However, it is informed that Monica's husband Vikas Sharma approached the Supreme Court against said order. The Supreme Court, by interim order, reduced the amount of maintenance to Rs. 15,000/- per month requiring Vikas Sharma to participate in the proceedings before learned ACMM. It however appears that Vikas Sharma did not make payment of interim maintenance and continues to be in default even till date. His Special Leave to Petition was eventually dismissed by the Supreme Court. He and his mother Smt. Vimla Sharma were declared proclaimed offender in the trial pending against them before the court of ACMM for offence under Section 498-A IPC against all the three and under Section 406 IPC against husband and mother-in-law, and another trial against all of them for offence under Section 415/417 IPC. 4. When payment of arrears as well as monthly interim maintenance was not made to petitioner Monica, she submitted an application before the court of ACMM at New Delhi on 13.02.2007 for initiating proceedings under Section 82 Criminal Procedure Code against them. 4. When payment of arrears as well as monthly interim maintenance was not made to petitioner Monica, she submitted an application before the court of ACMM at New Delhi on 13.02.2007 for initiating proceedings under Section 82 Criminal Procedure Code against them. Learned ACMM issued process under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code On 09.04.2007 against Monica's father-in-law Bhaskar Lal Sharma and her mother-in-law Smt. Vimla Sharma. Thereafter on 30.04.2007 fresh process under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code was issued against Monica's father-in-law Bhaskar Lal Sharma with respect to a property situate at 433, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur. An application was moved by the petitioner before the learned ACMM, New Delhi, with a prayer that direction be issued to the Inspector General of Police, Jaipur, for appropriate action. Thereafter the learned ACMM passed two separate orders on 10.07.2007 on the application of petitioners. One order that was passed in complaint case no.674/2005 (Annexure-12), which is for offence under Section 415/417 IPC, mentioned that the report submitted in terms of Section 83(4)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code was perused. Fresh process under Section 83 of the Criminal Procedure Code was directed against accused no.2 Bhaskar Sharma in property No.433, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur, in respect of his half share, for 13.08.2007. On request of the petitioner Monica, complainant therein, copy of said order was given 'dasti' to her, and she was asked to assist the local police and the S.H.O. concerned was directed to provide all necessary assistance to complainant Monica. Similar order on another application filed by petitioner Monica in criminal complaint no.30/01 for offence under Section 498-A and 406 IPC was also passed on same date, which is the bone of contention between the parties. The learned ACMM observed that the report received on fresh process under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code shows that accused Bhaskar Lal Sharma is nominee of original owner Smt. Sita Devi Sharma and has half share in the property. Fresh process for attachment of share of accused Bhaskar Lal Sharma in the said property, was issued in terms of provisions of Section 83(4)(c) Criminal Procedure Code according to the non-petitioners and Section 83(4)(a) Criminal Procedure Code according to petitioners, for 13.08.2007. On request of the petitioner Monica, copy of that order was given 'dasti' to her. Fresh process for attachment of share of accused Bhaskar Lal Sharma in the said property, was issued in terms of provisions of Section 83(4)(c) Criminal Procedure Code according to the non-petitioners and Section 83(4)(a) Criminal Procedure Code according to petitioners, for 13.08.2007. On request of the petitioner Monica, copy of that order was given 'dasti' to her. Petitioner no.2 Smt. Vinay Malhotra, claiming herself to be attorney of Monica, submitted an application before the Superintendent of Police, Jaipur City, Jaipur, on 23.07.2007 requesting that share of Shri Bhaskar Lal Sharma in the aforesaid property at Jaipur be sealed in accordance with Section 83(4)(a) Criminal Procedure Code Copies of two orders that were given 'dasti' to petitioner Monica, were enclosed with the said application. Non-petitioner no.2 Satish Sharma, brother of Monica's father-in-law, lodged impugned FIR with police-station Moti Dungari enclosing therewith certified copy of the order dated 10.07.2007 passed in complaint case for offence under Section 498-A and 406 IPC, alleging that petitioners, in the order dated 10.07.2007, that was given 'dasti' to Monica by the court of ACMM, New Delhi, have by overwriting made clause (c) as clause (a) of Section 83(4) Criminal Procedure Code by ink pen. This was a forgery committed by them with the order of the court and the purpose was to recover possession of, and evacuate them from, the property in question, which they are legally entitled to retain. The complainant also filed objection under Section 84(1)(2) Criminal Procedure Code that Bhaskar Lal Sharma had migrated to foreign country and was residing abroad since 1965. He had no possession over the property nor does he any share therein. Their application for staying the attachment order by S.H.O. was rejected by the Chief Judicial magistrate on 20.07.2007 where against they filed revision petition before the Additional Sessions Judge No.1, Jaipur City, Jaipur. The learned Additional Sessions Judge by his order dated 25.07.2007 while partly allowing the revision petition directed that till appropriate order is passed by the court at Delhi, they shall not be dispossessed from the disputed property. 5. The police after investigation into that FIR, filed a challan against both the petitioners for offence under Sections 417, 466, 420, 468, 471 IPC. Learned court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.6, Jaipur City, Jaipur, took cognizance of aforesaid offences against petitioners vide order dated 22.12.2010. Hence this petition. 6. I have heard petitioners Mrs. 5. The police after investigation into that FIR, filed a challan against both the petitioners for offence under Sections 417, 466, 420, 468, 471 IPC. Learned court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.6, Jaipur City, Jaipur, took cognizance of aforesaid offences against petitioners vide order dated 22.12.2010. Hence this petition. 6. I have heard petitioners Mrs. Monica and Mrs. Vinay Malhotra, who chose to appear in person, and Shri Vikash Pahwa, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri Saurabh Soni, Advocate, for complainant-respondents. 7. Petitioners have argued that sole allegation against them is of tempering with the order of the court of ACMM, New Delhi, by making clause (c) of Section 83(4) as clause (a) and therefore, according to the provisions of Section 195 (1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is the concerned court only which has competence to file a complaint against them. It was argued that Monica's husband Vikas Sharma and her mother-in-law Vimla Sharma, have been declared proclaimed offenders and another property of Vimla Sharma at Delhi has been ordered to be sealed by the said court. The property no.433, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur was already attached under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code on 20.06.2007, therefore the question of attaching share of Bhaskar Lal Sharma under Section 83(4)(c) did not arise and therefore it cannot be assumed that the court would again be passing an attachment order while issuing fresh of warrant on 10.07.2007. The application was made by petitioner Monica for appropriate order under Section 83(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the order that was passed by the court was also under that provisions and given dasti to her. No overwriting was made by any of petitioners and that the copy of said order was supplied to Monica by the court staff by mentioning that fresh process was being issued under Section 83(4)(a) Criminal Procedure Code for 13.08.2007. Petitioner no.2 Smt. Vinay Malhotra produced that copy before the S.P./S.H.O. on 23.07.2007. No overwriting was made by any of petitioners and that the copy of said order was supplied to Monica by the court staff by mentioning that fresh process was being issued under Section 83(4)(a) Criminal Procedure Code for 13.08.2007. Petitioner no.2 Smt. Vinay Malhotra produced that copy before the S.P./S.H.O. on 23.07.2007. Immediately then another copy of the said order dated 10.07.2008 was produced by the respondents before the S.H.O., wherein provision that was mentioned was 83(4)(c) Criminal Procedure Code Subsequently, petitioner no.1 Monica, moved an application before the Court of ACMM at New Delhi on 24.07.2007 that appropriate direction be issued to S.H.O., Police Station Moti Dungari, Jaipur, to seal half share in the property in dispute in vie of provisions of Section 83(4)(a) Criminal Procedure Code Another application was submitted by petitioner no.1 Monica before the court of ACMM on 13.08.2007 with assertion that it was the court staff which has made correction in the order dated 10.07.2007 while giving its copy to her whereas in the court file no corresponding correction was made. In support of this argument, petitioners relied on the judgment in Patel Lalji Bhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat, (1971) 2 S.C.C. 376 , and argued that the Supreme Court in that case held that underlying purpose of Section 195 is to control the temptation on the part of the private parties to start criminal prosecution on frivolous vexations or unsufficient grounds inspired by a revengeful desire to harass or spite their opponents. 8. Petitioners argued that no doubt can be raised about their bona-fides as they immediately submitted an application for clarification to the concerned court at Delhi on 24.07.2007 stating that there was typographical error in the order dated 10.07.2007 and clause (a) has been inadvertently described as clause (c) of Section 83(4) which should be clarified. Similar applications were made on 28.07.2007, 13.08.2007, 03.09.2007, 15.10.2007 and 17.08.2007. No order was passed on any of the applications by the said court. In between, efforts were made for mediation between the parties and in fact it was owing to that petitioners moved an application on 15.09.2009 to withdraw the entire proceedings under Section 83 against the accused in both the matters as a gesture of goodwill. Even though the court has not dropped the proceedings under Section 83 against Shri Bhaskar Lal Sharma, it also did not issue any clarification despite specific prayer. Even though the court has not dropped the proceedings under Section 83 against Shri Bhaskar Lal Sharma, it also did not issue any clarification despite specific prayer. Learned ACMM by the aforesaid order issued fresh process under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code against Bhaskar Lal Sharma holding that process under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code cannot precede Section 82 Criminal Procedure Code That was done by the court on its own. In facts like these, filing and continuation of criminal proceedings against petitioners would merely be a harassment to them. Such malicious proceedings ought not be allowed to proceed. It was argued that once the proceedings under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code, out of which the disputed order arose, have been completely withdrawn, the very basis of lodgment of the first information report/complaint goes. Allowing the criminal proceedings before the learned trial court and compelling the petitioners to face such proceedings would only amount to abuse the process of the court. Petitioners in support of this argument relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 . 9. Petitioner no.2 Smt. Vinay Malhotra, argued that even though petitioners were granted benefit of transit bail by Delhi High Court vide order dated 10.08.2007, both the petitioners filed application for grant of anticipatory bail before the District & Sessions Judge, Jaipur, on 14.08.2007, which application was adjourned. Apprehending arrest therefore they filed application for anticipatory bail before this court. Even as such application was pending, the respondents engaged the petitioners in negotiation for settlement. The learned counsel for respondents sent an mail to petitioner Monica on 27.11.2010, under the instructions of her husband and parents-in-law, along-with a proposed memorandum of understanding; one of the conditions of which was that if the petitioner would withdraw the criminal case registered against his clients, then present criminal cases would also be withdrawn. While on the one hand, the respondent engaged the petitioner in negotiation for settlement, on the other petitioner no.2 Vinay Malhotra, mother of petitioner no.1, a senior citizen, was dragged out of the bus when she left Jaipur for Delhi after attending court proceedings before this court on 29.11.2010, and she was taken in to police custody for a day. When ultimately anticipatory bail was not granted, petitioner Monica had to surrender before the trial court on 30.11.2010. When ultimately anticipatory bail was not granted, petitioner Monica had to surrender before the trial court on 30.11.2010. She was sent to judicial custody to Central Jail, Jaipur. Eventually, they were both granted bail by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur vide order dated 02.12.2010. Present litigation has thus been used as negotiating tool to pressurise the petitioners to withdraw criminal complaints filed by them against Vikas Sharma. 10. It was argued that the FIR as also the order taking cognizance deserve to be quashed and set aside for the reason that complete papers enclosed with the charge-sheet were not supplied to the petitioner. An application was filed by petitioners before the trial court on 17.06.2011 demanding such documents. This court on 28.07.2011 directed supply of documents much after the order taking cognizance was passed. Cognizance was thus taken in utter violation of Section 207 of the Criminal Procedure Code It was argued that not only the petitioner Monica applied for clarification of the order dated 10.07.2007 but S.H.O., Police Station Moti Dungari, Jaipur, also submitted a similar application before the said court of ACMM on 29.07.2007. However, no clarification has so far been issued by the court concerned till date. When the S.H.O., himself had applied for clarification and no such clarification order was passed by the court of ACMM, there was no justification with the SHO to file charge-sheet in the matter. It was argued that the impugned order taking cognizance has been passed on proforma which has been mechanically passed by just filling the blanks without the application of mind. This order should therefore be quashed and set aside. 11. Petitioners argued that the very basis of FIR that petitioners had made interpolation or overwriting in the 'dasti' order with a view to taking possession of the property, is completely unfounded. Consequence of applicability of Section 83(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code would have at the maximum been sealing of the property and not of taking of possession by the petitioners. In any case, the attachment order has been passed to the extent of share of Bhaskar Lal Sharma in disputed property, therefore, respondents herein could not have field any complaint/FIR against petitioners. Present complaint/FIR has been registered against petitioners as coercive method to compel petitioner Monica to divorce Vikas Sharma on their terms by mutual consent and withdraw all pending litigation against them. 12. Present complaint/FIR has been registered against petitioners as coercive method to compel petitioner Monica to divorce Vikas Sharma on their terms by mutual consent and withdraw all pending litigation against them. 12. It was argued that the sole purpose in issuing the process under Section 83 was to secure presence of Vikas Sharma in criminal proceedings initiated against him separately in two cases, one under Section 498-A, 406 IPC and, another under Section 415/417 IPC. Therein, Vikash Sharma (husband of the petitioner no.1 Monica and son-in-law of petitioner no.2) and her mother Smt. Vimla Sharma, have been declared proclaimed offenders. Despite order of interim maintenance passed by the court on ACMM, as modified by the High Court, Vikas Sharma has not paid maintenance to petitioner Monica, for last several years inasmuch as a huge amount of Rs. 40,00,000/- (Rupees forty lacs) has become due to be paid to her. On one hand, Vikas Sharma and his mother Vimla Sharma are not submitting to the jurisdiction of the courts in this country, on the other, their relatives, the respondents herein, have initiated criminal proceedings against the petitioners only with a view to coercing them into a settlement on their terms. 13. It is therefore prayed that impugned order of taking cognizance be quashed and set aside and consequential charge-sheet/FIR against petitioners should also be quashed. 14. Per contra, Shri Vikash Pahwa, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, opposed the petition and argued that proceedings in a criminal case can be quashed only if the contents of the FIR and/or complaints, even if accepted in their entirety do not constitute any cognizable offence. In the present case, certified copy of order dated 10.07.2007 passed by learned court of ACMM, New Delhi, that was obtained by respondent, mentions that share of Bhaskar Lal Sharma, who is father of Vikas Sharma, in the disputed property at Jaipur, was to be attached in terms of Section 83(4)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code whereas the petitioners in the copy of the said order, which was given 'dasti' to them, converted Section 83(4)(a) Criminal Procedure Code by overwriting sub-clause (c) of sub-section (4) of Section 83 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which is evident from the naked eyes. This became obvious when respondent no.2 obtained certified copy of order dated 10.07.2007 from the court concerned. This became obvious when respondent no.2 obtained certified copy of order dated 10.07.2007 from the court concerned. It is therefore that the complaint was filed by the respondents. Shri Vikash Pahwa, learned senior counsel, argued that dispute between petitioner no.1 Monica, wife, and her husband Vikas Sharma has nothing to do with the present criminal case, which has been registered against the petitioner by complainants (respondents herein) as they were subjected to harassment and humiliation by petitioners; and they were evacuated from their house. The house was about to be sealed but for their obtaining a certified copy of the order dated 10.07.2007 directly from the court of ACMM and on comparison of two, it becomes obvious how and in what manner the petitioners have committed forgery with the order by making clause (c) into clause (a) of sub-section (4) of Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code, which would have meant sealing the house rather than merely attaching it. It was for the petitioners to obtain clarification from the court when they claimed that this order was passed under Section 83(4)(a) Criminal Procedure Code and not under Section 83(4)(c). Certified copy of the order obtained by the respondent no.2, was based on the actual state of the record of the said court. Learned senior counsel argued that non supply of some of the documents along-with challan papers sent to the petitioner, in any manner do not affect validity of the order taking cognizance because at that stage, the accused was not required to be heard. Although that may be relevant for the purpose of framing of the charge. 15. Citing judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation v. K.M. Sharan, (2008) 4 SCC 471 : 2008 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 634 , learned senior counsel argued that while considering challenge to the order taking cognizance, High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code should not embark upon the enquiry whether the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet were reliable or not and thereupon to render definite finding about truthfulness or veracity of the allegations. What the High Court is required to examine is whether the allegations made in the First Information Report and the charge-sheet taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety, would prima facie constitute an offence making out a case against the accused, which in this case it does. What the High Court is required to examine is whether the allegations made in the First Information Report and the charge-sheet taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety, would prima facie constitute an offence making out a case against the accused, which in this case it does. There is no case for quashing the proceedings. Learned senior counsel also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla, (1996) 8 SCC 164 . Another judgment of the Supreme Court relied on by learned senior counsel for the respondents on the scope of interference by this court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, is in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, (2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 191 Learned senior counsel also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan and Another, (2009) 4 SCC 439 ; and K. Neelaveni v. State of Rep. By Inspector of Police and Others, 2010 Crl. L.J. 2819 : 2010 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 562 . 16. Shri Vikash Pahwa, learned senior counsel, argued that the petitioners have committed serious offence of forging the court's order and have thereby interfered with the administration of justice. This had led to harassment of respondents. Petitioners thereafter approached the Supreme Court by filing transfer petition seeking transfer of the investigation from Jaipur to Delhi. Initially, investigation in the FIR was stayed; however the transfer petition was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court vide judgment dated 27.07.2009. Thereafter, investigation resumed and charge-sheet was filed in 2010. Learned counsel argued that bar of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not attracted in the facts of the present case. This controversy has been set at rest by constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah and Another v. Minakshi Marwah and Others, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 557 , wherein it has been authoritatively held by the Supreme Court that the clause (b)(ii) of Section 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code would be attracted only when the offences enumerated therein have been committed with respect to document after it has been produced or given in proceedings in any Court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. If such offence is committed prior to its production or being given in evidence in court, no criminal complaint by the court would be necessary and a private complaint would be maintainable. It was argued that same principle would apply when somebody has obtained certified copy of an order from the court and has thereafter tempered with the same or made interpolations or changes therein because all that has been done outside the court, when such document was not in custody of the court. 17. All that the court at the stage of taking cognizance is called upon to do is to take judicial notice of the offence. Detailed examination and discussion of evidence at that stage is not necessary. learned senior counsel in this respect referred to provisions of Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code It was argued that proceedings in the present matter cannot even otherwise be said to be abuse of process of the court because what has been done by the petitioners tantamount to interference with the administration of the court. It is trite that discretionary jurisdiction of this court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised fairly, carefully and with caution and only in rarest of rare cases. Such remedy would be available to litigant when no other specific remedy is available to him. In the present case, the petitioners can agitate all what they have argued here, before the learned trial court itself at the time of framing of charge. It is therefore prayed that this petition be dismissed. 18. I have given my anxious and thoughtful consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 19. Adverting first of all to the argument of the petitioners that learned trial court could not have taken cognizance in view of the bar contained in Section 195 (1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Code, suffice it to say that that controversy has been set at rest by the constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah, supra. 19. Adverting first of all to the argument of the petitioners that learned trial court could not have taken cognizance in view of the bar contained in Section 195 (1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Code, suffice it to say that that controversy has been set at rest by the constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah, supra. Considering the import of Section 195 Criminal Procedure Code, their Lordships in Iqbal Singh Marwah held that expression used therein that "when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in a Court" occurring in clause (b)(ii) should normally mean commission of such an offence after the document has actually been produced or given in evidence. It was held that the situation or contingency where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already been committed earlier and later on the document which is produced or is given in evidence in Court, does not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with the scheme of Section 195 Criminal Procedure Code This indicates that clause (b)(ii) contemplates a situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any Court. 20. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Patel Lalji Bhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat , supra, on which reliance has been placed by the learned senior counsel for respondents, cannot therefore be of any assistance to them. The constitution bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah, supra, in fact relied on this very judgment. There is another reason why bar of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code would not be attracted to this case because Section 195 (1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Code merely provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court. Present one is not a case where any document produced in the court has been forged or given in evidence in proceeding in any court in the capacity of a party to such proceedings in the court. Present one is not a case where any document produced in the court has been forged or given in evidence in proceeding in any court in the capacity of a party to such proceedings in the court. In present case, the allegation is that petitioners obtained 'dasti' order and then by making interpolations therein changed sub-clause (c) into sub-clause (a) of Section 83(4), which means that the property that was originally to be merely attached would now be required to be sealed. The allegation thus is of tempering with the document after copy thereof was obtained from the court, which has been done outside the court. Objection under Section 195 cannot possibly be therefore attracted. This argument of the petitioners is therefore rejected. However, rejection of this argument should not detain the court from upholding her other arguments, for the reasons which shall be presently stated. 21. The whole endeavour of the petitioner no.1 Monica in initiating proceeding against her husband Vikas Sharma and her mother-in-law Vimla Sharma, who have been declared proclaimed offender and against whom red-corner notices have also been issued, under Section 83 of the Criminal Procedure Code in two complaint cases, one under Section 498A and 406 IPC, and another under Section 415/417 IPC, was to ensure attendance of Vikas Sharma in the proceeding before the courts where those cases are pending. It is evident from the record that the Monica's husband Vikas Sharma was avoiding to participate in those proceedings and even in proceeding under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code pending in the court of ACMM, New Delhi. Ever since the order was passed requiring Vikas Sharma to make payment of interim maintenance to petitioner no.1 Monica initially to the tune of Rs. 5000/- per month by the learned ACMM, New Delhi, thereafter to the tune of Rs. 50,000/- per month by the Delhi High Court, except for few initial months, he has not made payment of interim maintenance. The total arrears of the amount of interim maintenance have now mounted to more than Rs. 40,00,000/-. 5000/- per month by the learned ACMM, New Delhi, thereafter to the tune of Rs. 50,000/- per month by the Delhi High Court, except for few initial months, he has not made payment of interim maintenance. The total arrears of the amount of interim maintenance have now mounted to more than Rs. 40,00,000/-. The possession of half share in the property of Bhaskar Lal Sharma, father of petitioner Monica's husband, could not have been taken by the petitioners in the scope of Section 83(4)(a) Criminal Procedure Code Primary step required to be taken under Section 83 of the Criminal Procedure Code is to attach the property of an accused after issue of proclamation. Secondary step with reference to Section 83(4)(a) Criminal Procedure Code, would be to take possession of such property, which is already attached. Third mode that is provided in clause (b) of Section 83(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code is to appoint receiver. Clause (c) of Section 83(4), where-under the order dated 10.07.2007 is purported to have been passed by the learned ACMM, provides for an order in writing prohibiting the payment of rent on delivery of property to the proclaimed person or to any one on his behalf. 22. Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code provides for inherent power of the High Court. It provides that nothing in this Section shall be deemed to limit or affect inherent powers of the High Court to make such order as may be necessary - (i) to give effect to any order this Code, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court or (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. No doubt, one, and in fact first, of those seven cardinal principles of law, which were evolved by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , supra, which still holds the field, is that the inherent powers under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised by the High Court to quash criminal proceeding in a first information report/ complaint, where the allegation made therein, even if accepted at their face value and in entirety, do not constitute any offence or make out a case against accused. In addition thereto, however, the Supreme Court in that case laid down six other parameters where such proceedings can be quashed. In addition thereto, however, the Supreme Court in that case laid down six other parameters where such proceedings can be quashed. The seventh principle that their Lordships evolved is to the effect that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code either to prevent any process of court or otherwise to secure ends of justice, may quash criminal proceeding which is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Endeavor of the petitioners is to bring their case within this category that they have been embroiled into this criminal case only to coerce them into entering a compromise with Shri Vikas Sharma and his mother Vimla Sharma. In my considered view, in a case where High Court is called upon to consider such prayer for quashment of cognizance order in a criminal proceedings/FIR/ complaint, it is not necessary that each of these seven parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal, supra, should be satisfied, nor is it necessary that one of those seven parameters should be considered to the exclusion of any or all of them. 23. Before adverting to that argument, however, what is to be seen is whether the offences of cheating, forgery and conspiracy, so to say, offences punishable under Section 417, 420, 466, 468, 471 and 120-B, were indeed made out against the petitioners to justify filing charge-sheet and taking of cognizance against them. The complete set of challan papers has been produced for perusal of the court. Evidently, all what the investigating officer has done in the name of investigation in the matter is to record statement of Satish Sharma, Ved Prakash, Madhuri Bahal, Brig Mohan Bahal, occupants of the half share in the property in dispute, and Hari Singh. This Hari Singh is the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, Moti Dungari, Jaipur, who on 29.07.2007 submitted the application before the court of ACMM, New Delhi, seeking clarification whether it was clause (c) or (a) of sub-section (4) of Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code that was used by the court in the order dated 10.07.2007. He stated that when he appeared before the learned ACMM it was observed by him that the application be submitted on the next date of hearing. He stated that when he appeared before the learned ACMM it was observed by him that the application be submitted on the next date of hearing. On instruction by S.H.O., he however deposited the application with the clerk concerned of the court and obtained a receipt. Besides that, copy of the affidavit of surrender deed executed by Bhaskar Lal Sharma, copy of the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 27.07.2009, two arrest memos of accused-petitioners, the application submitted to the court of ACMM, New Delhi, dated 29.07.2007, the entry of the 'rojnamcha aam' no.1539 showing departure of Hari Singh to New Delhi, the attachment memo of the House No.433, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur, the copy of the entry No.1224 of 'rojnamcha aam', copy of the order of the Superintendent of Police, Jaipur City (east), dated 25.07.2007, also formed part of charge-sheet. 24. Although this much is correct and has not been disputed even by petitioners that there is a difference in the clause referred to in the 'dasti' order produced by them before the Superintendent of Police, Jaipur, and subsequent certified copy, which the respondents procured and produced, in so far as reference to the relevant clause (c) of Section 83 (4) is concerned. While in the first it is clause (c) which appears to have been made into (a), in the second it is clause (a). But then, the petitioners have taken unusual step of immediately applying to the court of ACMM, New Delhi, on 24.07.2007, which though small but indicates a definite tinge of bona-fide on their part. Such application was immediately filed by the petitioner no.1 before the court of ACMM on 24.07.2007 requesting that when the order was pronounced in the open court on 10.07.2007, the direction was issued to attach the said property under Section 83(4)(a) Criminal Procedure Code but it was erroneously recorded as Section 83(4)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code in the order and therefore it was prayed that appropriate correction therein be made and clear instructions be issued to the S.H.O., Police Station, Moti Dungari, Jaipur, to seal half share of Shri Bhaskar Lal Sharma, in the property at Jaipur under Section 83(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code It however appears that the said application remained undecided and pending. Petitioner No.1 Monica submitted another application on 28.07.2007 before the said court wherein she categorically stated that she had applied on 24.07.2007 for correction of typographical error of the order of Section 83. The application was listed on 30.07.2007 but it could not be taken up and taking advantage of the delay in disposal of the application, Satish Sharma, brother of accused no.2 lodged the FIR against petitioners. It was stated that the FIR lodged at Jaipur was a counter blast to her complaints lodged at Delhi under Section 498A and 406 IPC. Prayer was made for declaring accused no.2 Bhaskar Lal Sharma as proclaimed offender and for issuance of red corner notice against him and open dated warrant of arrest to be executed by interpol CBI with a specific prayer that pending application dated 24.07.2007 may be disposed of. Curiously, a similar application was made by S.H.O., Police Station, Moti Dungari, Jaipur, also before the same court on 29.07.2007 seeking clarification in the order dated 10.07.2007 to the same effect, which too remained undecided. 25. While all these applications remained pending, the investigation in the impugned FIR lodged at Jaipur also did not proceed further because there was stay on investigation by the Supreme Court in transfer petition filed by the petitioners seeking transfer of investigation from Jaipur to Delhi. That petition was eventually dismissed by the Supreme Court on 27.07.2009. It was thereafter that the investigation recommenced. 26. The record however reveals that the parties were in contact with each other and in fact were actively engaged in negotiations for settlement. This is evident from the application which the petitioner submitted to the court of ACMM, New Delhi, on 15.09.2009. That was an application for withdrawing action under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code against accused no.2 Bhaskar Lal Sharma and declaring him a proclaimed offender. In that application too, it was stated by petitioner Monica that she had moved an application under Section 83(4)(a) on 27.06.2007 and the court was persuaded to issue fresh process for attachment of the half share of the property of accused no.2, on 10.07.2007, but taking undue advantage of typographical error in the court's order dated 10.07.2007, relatives of accused no.2 lodged the FIR implicating her and her mother for aforementioned offences under Sections 417, 467, 420, 468, 471 and 120B IPC. Similar applications were moved by her on 24.07.2007, 13.08.2007, 03.09.2007, 15.10.2007 and 17.08.2009 seeking clarification in the order dated 10.07.2007/confirmation of Section 83(4)(a) Criminal Procedure Code under which the half share of accused no.2 in the property in question had to be sealed vide order dated 10.07.2007. Said application dated 17.08.2009 was listed in the court on 20.08.2009 and thereafter on 08.08.2009 in two complaint cases separately. It was further stated that she does not want to attachment of the property situate at 433, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur, of accused no.2 Shri Bhaskar Lal Sharma, as per any sub-section under Section 83 of the Criminal Procedure Code and wants to drop the proceedings under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code against him in totality in the present case as well as in the connected matter under Section 415/417 IPC. Therefore, prayer was made to drop the proceedings under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code against accused Shri Bhaskar Lal Sharma and cancel the order passed in respect of the same, however with a further prayer for clarifying crucial matter regarding sub-section 83(4) Criminal Procedure Code, referred to above. 27. Petitioners have argued that they were persuaded to submit said application because petitioner no.1 Monica was engaged in mediation proceedings with her husband/his advocate but despite several rounds of negotiations, nothing tangible came about. The said application however was disposed of by learned ACMM by an order passed on 15.09.2009 itself. Though the court of ACMM has taken note of her application seeking withdrawal of action under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code against accused Bhaskar Lal Sharma, but it mentioned that proceedings under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code could not have been initiated unless the process was issued under Section 82. Process under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code cannot precede Section 82 Criminal Procedure Code Therefore fresh process under Section 82 Criminal Procedure Code was directed to be issued. Once the petitioners as a goodwill gesture on their part applied for withdrawal of proceedings of Section 83, which stood withdrawn, there is no justification of continuation of present criminal proceeding against them because the very basis has ceased to exist. 28. Once the petitioners as a goodwill gesture on their part applied for withdrawal of proceedings of Section 83, which stood withdrawn, there is no justification of continuation of present criminal proceeding against them because the very basis has ceased to exist. 28. Although the petitioner no.1 applied for withdrawal of the process under Section 83 Criminal Procedure Code but their case is that the learned court of ACMM on its own issued fresh process under Section 82 Criminal Procedure Code and yet rejected the application of the petitioner for clarification as infructuous. Petitioners cannot be therefore blamed for any typographical error or any mistake in the copy of the order dated 10.07.2007 handed over to them. But the respondents started using the criminal case against petitioners as pressurising tool to coerce them into compromise on conditions favourable to them. The copy of e-mail dated 27.11.2010 sent to the petitioners by Shri Vikas Pahwa, learned senior counsel, accompanied by a memo of conditions that were proposed for compromise is on record, which includes, amongst other things, the condition that the parties shall withdraw the cases registered against each other including the FIR No.170/07 which is subject matter of this petition, on the basis of which the charge-sheet was filed by the SHO, Police Station Moti Dungari, and cognizance was taken against accused-petitioner by the learned court of ACJM in the present case. 29. Sequence of events as has been noted herein above thus clearly indicates that the criminal proceeding in the present case is manifestly attended with mala-fide and maliciously instituted with ulterior motives for wreaking vengeance on the petitioners with a view to pressurising them to withdraw two criminal complaints and proceedings under Section 125 Criminal Procedure Code filed by petitioner no.1 Monica against her husband Vikas Sharma. Subject proceeding is thus actuated more by those considerations rather than being concerned with the alleged interference by the petitioners with the administration of justice. As of now, Vikas Sharma owes to petitioner no.1 more than forty lac rupees as interim maintenance in terms of the order passed by Delhi High Court. Subject proceeding is thus actuated more by those considerations rather than being concerned with the alleged interference by the petitioners with the administration of justice. As of now, Vikas Sharma owes to petitioner no.1 more than forty lac rupees as interim maintenance in terms of the order passed by Delhi High Court. One of the complaints filed by the petitioner no.1 Monica against her husband Vikas Sharma is under Section 415/417 IPC on allegation of cheating by fraudulently introducing her to marry him by concealing information about true reasons of his divorce from his first wife in Kongo, owing to which her life has been ruined. Significantly, in the present case, not only the petitioner repeatedly applied for clarification of the order dated 10.07.2007 but the Investigating Officer himself submitted such application before the court of ACMM, New Delhi, but no specific order was passed on that application by the learned court of ACMM for quite some time, but, on the other application filed by her on 15.09.2009 seeking withdrawal of proceedings, the Court of ACMJM dismissed the same as having become infructuous by order dated 15.09.2009 observing that now no clarification is required. What happened to the application submitted by the SHO, Police Station Moti Dungari, Jaipur, is not known. The report under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code and the enclosures therewith, do not indicate as to what steps were taken by the SHO and/or Investigating Officer to make further investigation on that aspect. Charge-sheet was filed without any further enquiry into that aspect. While, on the one hand respondents kept petitioners engaged in negotiations for settlement, which is evident from e-mail message dated 27.11.2010 of Shri Vikash Pahwa, learned Senior Advocate, who incidentally also represents the respondents herein, on the other, both the petitioners were arrested presumably at their instance at Jaipur and were released on bail only after they remained in jail for two days. 30. What is still more disturbing is to note that the learned court ACJM has also mechanically passed the order taking cognizance against petitioners on a printed proforma, which cannot at all be appreciated. 30. What is still more disturbing is to note that the learned court ACJM has also mechanically passed the order taking cognizance against petitioners on a printed proforma, which cannot at all be appreciated. No doubt, at the stage of taking cognizance, the court is not required to sift and appreciate evidence but at the same time, a court of law cannot be expected to work mechanically and pass orders of taking cognizance by just filling in the blanks on a printed proforma, wherein some columns have been left unfilled to be filled on case to case basis. How possibly a judicial magistrate could frame an order taking cognizance in this fashion, can neither be appreciated nor approved. This belies the judicial application of mind. 31. The Supreme Court in Devendra and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2009) 7 SCC 495 , while dealing with a case where dispute was between the co-sharers in relation to a joint property and one of the co-sharers had sold certain share to third party. Another co-sharer filed a complaint of cheating. The charge-sheet was also filed before the Magistrate which referred the same to the police for being registered as FIR. The appellant filed an application for quashing of the said FIR. The High Court declined to quash the FIR but directed that efforts be made to conclude the investigation within three months. A charge-sheet was then submitted before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who took cognizance of the offence but in doing so, no reason was assigned in support of the order taking cognizance. Petition under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code was filed questioning legality of the order taking cognizance. In those facts, the Supreme Court observed thus, High Court has refused to quash a First Information Report as a different standard therefor was required to be applied. However, when materials are collected and a charge-sheet is filed on the basis whereof the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence, the same would give rise to a new cause of action. An order taking cognizance of an offence on the basis of a charge-sheet filed by the investigating officer and/or directing issuance of summons on a complaint petition, indisputably, would attract the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if a case has been made out for invocation thereof. 32. An order taking cognizance of an offence on the basis of a charge-sheet filed by the investigating officer and/or directing issuance of summons on a complaint petition, indisputably, would attract the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if a case has been made out for invocation thereof. 32. It is thus trite law that different standards are required to be applied for quashing an FIR than an order taking cognizance. When materials were collected, a charge-sheet was filed and cognizance was taken on that basis, the same would give rise to a new cause of action which would attract the provisions of Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code It was therefore obligatory on the part of the magistrate to apply his mind to the contents of the charge-sheet. 33. The Supreme Court in Parminder Kaur v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2010) 1 SCC 322 : 2010 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. Cri. 1 , which is a case somewhat identical on facts, was considering challenge to an order taking cognizance. Impugned therein was judgment of the High Court which dismissed petition filed by the appellant under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code seeking quashment of the proceedings for offence under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. The appellant in that case was an old lady. Allegation against her was that she tempered with certified copy of revenue records wherein date 6.5.2002 and 7.5.2002 were alleged to have been changed to 16.5.2002, 17.5.2002 and 27.5.2002. The certified copies so tempered with were made use of in civil suit. It was held by their Lordships that the appellant was not to gain anything in civil suit by tempering and facts also did not disclose commission of alleged offences. It was also doubtful whether the appellant had filed civil suit or they were filed by someone else in her name. The Supreme Court in that case quashed the proceedings holding them to be abuse of process of law. The Supreme Court in that case deprecated conduct of the investigating officer and observed that there was no justification for arrest of the appellant and for subsequent investigation of the non-existing crimes. This was a case of malicious and revengeful prosecution, which has no base and therefore was covered by the principles 1 and 7 laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , supra. This was a case of malicious and revengeful prosecution, which has no base and therefore was covered by the principles 1 and 7 laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , supra. The Supreme Court holding thus, quashed the proceedings against appellant therein. 34. Similar is the allegation of the respondents in first information report in this case that petitioners changed clause (c) in the order dated 10.07.2007 to clause (a) with a view to taking possession of the property in question, which cannot be accepted. All that the petitioners wanted was to ensure compliance of the orders passed by the court of ACMM, New Delhi as modified by the Delhi High Court, for payment of interim maintenance and that accused Vikas Sharma, who, at that time, was declared proclaimed offender and red corner notice was issued against him, submit to the jurisdiction of the courts in India. Present case would therefore fall within the purview of principle 7 evolved by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , supra, according to which a criminal proceeding can be quashed if it is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 35. In view of the above discussions present petition deserves to succeed and it is accordingly allowed. The order taking cognizance dated 22.12.2010 against accused-petitioners for offence under Sections 417, 420, 466, 468, 471 and 120B IPC and consequential proceedings initiated against them on the basis of FIR No.170/2007, Police Station Moti Dungari, Jaipur, are quashed and set aside.Petition allowed. *******