JUDGMENT A.C. Upadhyay J. 1. This criminal petition has been filed by the accused/petitioners for quashing the proceedings of case No. NI 192 of 2009, registered under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, pending in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, at West Tripura, Agartala. 2. Heard Mr. B.N. Majumder, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P. Rathor, learned Counsel representing the respondents. 3. The accused/petitioner is the Director of the Information Interface India Private Limited, which is a registered private limited Company, having its registered Office in Mumbai. The petitioner's Company is engaged in the business of networking support and solution, which is providing collection services to various Banks (nationalized, private and foreign). The petitioner's company is also providing the services through coordinator networking by engaging/appointing coordinators. The networking system of the company was extended in the State of Tripura and, accordingly, the complainant-respondent No. 1 was appointed as the coordinator of the petitioner's company w.e.f. 14.7.2005, for the purpose of providing services to various customers of different Banks at Agartala. The sole purpose of appointment of the complainant-respondent No. 1 was for the purpose of collecting cheques from various customers of the company and to deposit those cheques immediately in the approved Banks and to send report of such deposits to the petitioners company. As per the terms of appointment of the complainant-respondent No. 1, he would be entitled to get his remuneration for such service rendered by him. 4. The business was going on smoothly and the complainant-respondent No.1 was also paid his remuneration regularly since 2005. The communication between the complainant respondent No. 1 and the petitioner was mostly exchanged through their respective e-mails and by telephonic conservations. The registered e-mail of the complainant-respondent No. 1 was sujitnupursaha@yahoo.co.in and that of the petitioner was mpatanker@gmail.com. 5. On 18.4.2009, a cheque bearing No. 461078, for a sum of Rs. 19,279/-, was issued in favour of the complainant respondent No. 1. However, in the meanwhile, since the company received complaint from his client against the complainant respondent No.1. relating to withholding of cheques of various customers unnecessarily, the company issued 'stop payment instruction' to its Banker in respect of the cheque dated 18.4.2009, issued in the name of the complainant-respondent No. 1, till resolution of the complaint received against the complainant-respondent No. 1. relating to withholding of cheques of various customers unnecessarily, the company issued 'stop payment instruction' to its Banker in respect of the cheque dated 18.4.2009, issued in the name of the complainant-respondent No. 1, till resolution of the complaint received against the complainant-respondent No. 1. It is stated on behalf of the petitioner that the 'stop payment instruction' was given by the company as the complainant-respondent No. 3 failed to perform his contractual obligations, in terms of the contract. 6. Even in spite of being alive of the facts aforesaid, the complainant-respondent No. 1 presented the cheque to the Banker for collection, which was in fact returned unpaid on 29.4.2009, and on that day the balance in the Bank account of the company was sufficient to satisfy the cheque amount of Rs. 19.279/-. However, the payment was not made for having issued instruction for stop payment to its Banker by the Company. 7. The complainant-respondent No. 1 admittedly on receipt of the information of return of the cheque aforesaid by the Banker of the petitioner on the instruction of stop payment, admittedly made a demand in writing through e-mail dated 29.5.2009, from his e-mail account to the petitioner's e-mail account viz. mpatankef@gmail.com, with a remark of special attention to the in-charge of the office of the Company Mr. Gore. It would be pertinent to depict herein below the e-mail dispatch of the complainant-respondent No. 1, under the e-mail id of the petitioner, which reads as follows: from sujit saha sujitnupur_saha@yahoo.co. in hide details May 29 to mpatankar@ gmail.com date May 29,2009 4.42 PM subject About STOP PAYMENT from Agartala. Attention Mr. GORE, I received a cheque on 27th April, 2008 the amount Rs. 19279.00 dated 18.4.2009 cheque No. 461078 pay to Sujit Saha, Agartala of SBI Bank. I received this cheque on 27.4.2009 and deposited this to Vijaya Bank on 28.4.2009. But the said cheque, unfortunately returned the cause of return reason is "Payment stopped discharged to the Bank required "by this time I am not in Town. When (8.5.2009) I reach Agartala I found the said are returned. Please confirmed me why you stop payment and pi. release another fresh cheque in favour of me. The Return reason copy and cheque are enclosed with this mail. Thanking you, Yours Sujit Saha Agartala Former Coordinator. However, according to the complainant-respondent No. 1, since the notice was addressed to Mr. Please confirmed me why you stop payment and pi. release another fresh cheque in favour of me. The Return reason copy and cheque are enclosed with this mail. Thanking you, Yours Sujit Saha Agartala Former Coordinator. However, according to the complainant-respondent No. 1, since the notice was addressed to Mr. Gore, it cannot be treated as valid demand in terms of Section 138 of N.I. Act. 8. However, even thereafter the complainant-respondent No. 1 once again presented the cheque for second time on 18.8.2009, for collection without any consent of the company, which certainly, followed the similar consequence, since instruction for stop payment was already issued and communicated to its Banker. 9. After the cheque was returned unpaid the complainant respondent No. 1 issued second demand notice dated 29.8.2009, once again through his Lawyer demanding the amount of cheque along with additional Rs. 1,000/- as cost of the notice. 10. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner mat following the receipt of the demand notice from the complainant-respondent No. 1, the authorized signatory of the Company, sent an e-mail on 11.9.2009, intimating him that though complaints were received against him, however, the company was willing to disburse the amount in due course of time. Accordingly, on 20.10.2009 the authorized signatory of the company issued two letters, one addressed to the complainant-respondent No. 1 and another Xerox copy of the same along with a forwarding letter to the Advocate of the complainant-respondent No. 1, together with a Bank draft of Rs. 19,000/-. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that a good gesture of a gentleman and amiable intention of the petitioner to make payment of the amount to the complainant-respondent No. 1 was refused and accordingly, the registered letter containing the draft was sent back to the Company. Thereafter, the complainant-respondent No. 1 filed a case against the petitioner and the Company under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881 and the learned Court below after examining the complainant-respondent No. 1 under Section 200, Cr.P.C. issued summons upon the petitioner and the respondent No. 2. 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the complainant respondent was also offered payment of the cheque amount with an offer of compromise which was refused, which reflects oblique intention to harass the petitioner. 12. 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the complainant respondent was also offered payment of the cheque amount with an offer of compromise which was refused, which reflects oblique intention to harass the petitioner. 12. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner the complaint filed by the complainant-respondent No. 1 is liable to be quashed also for the reason that the complainant respondent No. 1 has refused to accept the draft issued by the Company against the disputed cheque, for an amicable settlement. 13. By referring to the statement of the complainant respondent No. 1 made in paragraph No. 11 of the complaint, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the statement has been made with a mala fide intention, since the draft dated 20.10.2009 for a sum of Rs. 19,000/-. issued in the name of the complainant-respondent No. 1, shows that the complainant respondent No. 1, refused to accept the said registered letter with a mala fide intention. Learned Counsel for the petitioner by referring to judicial pronouncement of various authorities submitted that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, such malafide proceedings deserves to be quashed. 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that facts available on the record in the instant proceeding shows that the complainant was offered the amount all the while, after launching of the criminal case by the respondent and also before the institution of the case by issuing draft dated 20.10.09, finally in the High Court, but consistently the complainant has refused to accept the same, which clearly demonstrates that the present prosecution is manifestly attended by absolute malafide intention to harass the petitioner and on that score also the proceeding is liable to be quashed. 15. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the date of filing the complaint cause of action in terms of Section 138 read with Section 142 of the N.I. Act was not alive since. 15. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the date of filing the complaint cause of action in terms of Section 138 read with Section 142 of the N.I. Act was not alive since. The cause of action for launching prosecution under Section 138 read with Section 142, N.I. Act arises only once and in the present case the cause of action arose from the date of sending the aforesaid e-mail dated 29.5.2009 (Annexure P/1), but the present criminal complaint was filed on 28.10.2009, after lapse of 3 months and prayer for condonation of delay of 4 days only was sought for without showing satisfactory ground to the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. 16. Before proceeding to examine the rival contention of the respective parties, it would be apposite to depict herein below Sections 138 and 142 of the N.I. Act, 1891, which read as under: 138. 16. Before proceeding to examine the rival contention of the respective parties, it would be apposite to depict herein below Sections 138 and 142 of the N.I. Act, 1891, which read as under: 138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a Banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the Bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that Bank such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for [a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the Bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the Bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be. to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation--For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. 142. to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation--For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. 142. Cognizance of offences--Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)- (a) no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138: [Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period;] (c) no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138. 17. For successfully prosecuting the drawer for an offence under Section 138 of the Act, the following requirements are, essential: (i) A cheque was drawn for payment in discharge of liability/debt. (ii) Such cheque was presented for payment within its validity period. (iii) The payment of the cheque was not made due to "insufficiency of funds" and accordingly returned to the payee by the Bank. (iv) That the complainant had issued notice to the drawer, but the drawer had failed to make payment of the cheque amount within fifteen days from the dale of the receipt of the notice. 18. In today's business world ordinarily cheques are presented again and again to the Banker, for payment after dishonour or return by the Bank, during the validity period of the said cheque. Sections 138 and 142 of the Act, nowhere bar or prohibit such multiple representation. In Prem Chanel Vijay Kumar v. Yash Pal Singh & Anr., III(2005) BC 198(SC)=II(2005) CCR 210(SC)= 2005(4) SCC 417 , the Supreme Court examined the provisions of Sections 138/142 of the Act and observed that on each presentation of a cheque and dishonour a fresh right, but no cause of action accrues in favour of the payee. In Prem Chanel Vijay Kumar v. Yash Pal Singh & Anr., III(2005) BC 198(SC)=II(2005) CCR 210(SC)= 2005(4) SCC 417 , the Supreme Court examined the provisions of Sections 138/142 of the Act and observed that on each presentation of a cheque and dishonour a fresh right, but no cause of action accrues in favour of the payee. The payee may, therefore, without taking preparatory action in form of notice under Section 138(b) of the Act, represent the cheque during the validity period. However, once notice under Section 138(b)of the Act is issued, the complainant/payee forfeits his right to file a complaint on the basis of second subsequent dishonour of a cheque on representation. It is observed that cause of action for filing of the complaint under Section 142(c) of the Act arises only once i.e. when a cheque is presented and dishonoured and notice is issued under Section 138(b) of the Act. After the cause of action has arisen, it is not permissible to the payee/complainant to create another cause of action by representing the dishonoured cheque again. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that in case notice is not issued under Section 138(b), then the complainant/payee is entitled to represent the cheque and on dishonour, issue notice' and thereafter file a complaint. 19. The relevant extract of Prem Chand Vijay Kumar v. Yashpal Singh (supra), reads as follows: 8. Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 does not put any embargo upon the payee to successively present a dishonoured cheque during the period of its validity. This apart, in the course of business transactions it is not uncommon for a cheque being returned due to insufficient funds or similar such reasons and being presented again by the payee after some time, on his own volition or at the request of the drawer, in expectation that it would be encashed. The primary interest of the payee is to get his money and not prosecution of the drawer recourse to which, normally, is taken out of compulsion and not choice. On each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour a fresh right -- and not a cause of action -- accrues in his favour. The primary interest of the payee is to get his money and not prosecution of the drawer recourse to which, normally, is taken out of compulsion and not choice. On each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour a fresh right -- and not a cause of action -- accrues in his favour. He may, therefore, without taking peremptory action in exercise of his such right under Clause (b) of Section 138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. 9. But once he gives a notice under Clause (b) of Section 138, he forfeits such right as in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time, he would be liable for offence and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. 10. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (in short 'CPC') 'cause of action' means every fact which it is necessary to establish to support a right or obtain a judgment. Viewed in that context, the following facts are required to be proved to successfully prosecute the drawer for an offence under Section 138 of the Act- (a) that the cheque was drawn for payment of an amount of money for discharge of a debt/liability and the cheque was dishonoured; (b) that the cheque was presented within the prescribed period; (c) that the payee made a demand for payment of the money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer within the stipulated period; and (d) that the drawer failed to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. Proceeding on the basis of the generic meaning of the term 'cause of action', certainly each of the above facts would constitute a part of the cause of action but Clause (b) of Section 142 gives it a restrictive meaning, in that, it refers to only one fact which will give rise to the cause of action and that is the failure to make the payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. A combined reading of Sections 138 and 142 makes it clear that cause of action is to be reckoned accordingly. A combined reading of Sections 138 and 142 makes it clear that cause of action is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of Section142(b) arises--and can arise--only once. 11. The period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer expires. 12. As noted in Sadanandan Bhadran case once a notice under Clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act is 'received' by the drawer of the cheque, the payee or holder of the cheque forfeits his right to again present the cheque as cause of action has accrued when there was failure to pay the amount within the prescribed period and the period of limitation starts to run which cannot be stopped on any account. 13. One of the indispensable factors to form the cause of action envisaged in Section 138 of the Act is contained in Clause (b) of the proviso to that section. It involves the making of a demand by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque 'within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the Bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid'. If no such notice is given within the said period of 15 days, no cause of action could have been created at all. 14. Thus, it is well settled that if dishonour of a cheque has once snowballed into a cause of action it is not permissible for a payee to create another cause of action with the same cheque. 15. In SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters it was held that the language used in Section 142 admits of no doubt that the Magistrate is forbidden from taking cognizance of the offence if the complaint was not filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arose. Completion of the offence is the immediate forerunner of rising of the cause of action. In other words, cause of action would arise soon after completion of the offence and period of limitation for filing of the application starts running simultaneously. 20. Completion of the offence is the immediate forerunner of rising of the cause of action. In other words, cause of action would arise soon after completion of the offence and period of limitation for filing of the application starts running simultaneously. 20. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that order condoning the delay of 4 days, as mentioned in paragraph 13 of the complaint (Annexure P/5 to the criminal petition No. 12/2010), was admittedly passed (without giving a notice to the petitioner, which also violates the basic principle of natural justice namely audi alteram partem and on that score also the present prosecution before the learned trial Court is vitiated and liable to be quashed. Moreover, it is apparent from the order dated 28.10.2009 and order dated 27.11.2009 respectively, passed by the learned Court below that the cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the act was taken before condoning the delay of 4 days, as prayed for by the complainant, which is absolutely contrary to the statutory prescription. 21. In reply to the above, learned Counsel for the respondent, in his written argument however contended that though the petitioner cited many grounds for quashing the criminal case in his revision petition before this Court, however, at the time of argument, he confined to his submission mainly on two grounds; (1) whether the e-mail sent in the address of the petitioner, with a remark of special attention of Mr. Gore amounts to demand notice, in terms of Section 94of the N.I. Act and, if so, whether demand notice dated 29.8.2009, sent by the complainant-respondent No. 1 to the petitioner and the accused-Company on the dishonor of cheque for the second time amounts to second notice; and (2) whether the complainant-respondent No. 1 in terms of Section 142 of the N.I. Act filed any petition explaining delay in filing the complaint petition and, if so, whether the learned Court below can take cognizance of the complaint without hearing the petitioner and the accused-Company? 22. Learned Counsel for the complainant respondent No. 1 referring to the provision of Section 94of the N.I. Act submitted that the e-mail, addressed with a remark 'special attention of Mr. Gore', cannot be treated as demand notice to the petitioner on dishonour of cheque because Mr. Gore admittedly is an official of the accused-company, to whom a request e-mail was sent. Mr. Gore', cannot be treated as demand notice to the petitioner on dishonour of cheque because Mr. Gore admittedly is an official of the accused-company, to whom a request e-mail was sent. Mr. Gore cannot represent the petitioner, who was the Director of the accused-Company, without any resolution of the Board of Directors. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 contended that the contents of the e-mail does not fulfil the requirement of demand notice in terms of Section 94read with Section 138 of the N.I. Act and so. Advocates notice dated 29.8.2009, sent by the complainant-respondent No. 1. On dishonour of cheque for the second time to the petitioner and the accused-company was a valid notice. 23. Section 94 if N.I. Act provides mode in which notice may be given, which reads as follows: 94. Mode in which notice may be given. Notice of dishonour may be given to a duly authorized agent of the person to whom it is required to be given, or, where he has died, to his legal representative, or, where he has been declared an insolvent, to his assignee; may be oral or written; may, if written, be sent by post; and may be in any form; but it must inform the party to whom it is given, either in express terms or by reasonable intendment, that the instrument has been dishonoured, and in what way and that he will be held liable thereon; and it must be given within a reasonable time after dishonour, at the place of business or fin case such party has no place of business) at the residence of the party for whom it is intended. If the notice is duly directed and sent by post and miscarries, such miscarriage does not render the notice invalid. 24. As a matter of fact, in terms of provision of Section 94 of the N.I. Act, a notice on dishonour of a cheque may be given to a duly authorized agent of the person to whom it is required to be given. 24. As a matter of fact, in terms of provision of Section 94 of the N.I. Act, a notice on dishonour of a cheque may be given to a duly authorized agent of the person to whom it is required to be given. A demand notice may be given orally or in writing may, if written, be sent by post and may be in any form, but it must inform the party to whom it is given either in express terms or by reasonable intendment that the instrument has been dishonoured and in what way, he will be held liable thereon, it must be given within a reasonable time alter dishonour, at the place of business or at the residence of the party for whom it is intended if the notice is duly directed and sent by post and miscarries, such miscarriage does not render the notice invalid. 25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also culled down the manner of compliance of the mandatory requirement of Section 138(c) of the Act and has expanded the arena to that effect by interpreting the statute as to how a written demand for the amount of bounced cheque, as available in Section 138 of the Act, is to be construed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aids Silk Exporters. Bangalore, 79 (1999) DLT 414 (SC)=I (2000) BC 668 (SC)=III (1999) CCR 15 (SC)=1999 Cri. L.J. 2276, has specifically explained that the statutory interpretation of a particular Act has to be in accordance with the need to treat it as correct law. And the Hon'ble Court held that radiogram, fax, e-mail are to be treated as modes of making demand. Section 94 of the N.I. Act also is in conformity with the said interpretation of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 26. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances, e-mail notice issued by the complainant-respondent No. 1 in the e-mail address of the petitioner, contained all the ingredients of a valid notice as per provision of Section 94 of the N.I. Act, 1891. The notice having all the ingredients of Section 94 of the N.I. Act was addressed to the petitioner's e-mail address. Though the name of Mr. Gore was referred, but apparently Mr. Gore naturally would not access a mail addressed to the petitioner. The notice having all the ingredients of Section 94 of the N.I. Act was addressed to the petitioner's e-mail address. Though the name of Mr. Gore was referred, but apparently Mr. Gore naturally would not access a mail addressed to the petitioner. The complainant respondent No. 1 cannot be heard to submit that since the notice addressed to the accused-petitioner was issued drawing attention of Mr. Gore, it would not be sufficient notice to the petitioner. Notice obviously was addressed to the accused/petitioner, in his e-mail id. which naturally would amount to proper service of notice on the petitioner. Consequently, the e-mail notice addressed to the petitioner has to be treated as a valid notice in the facts and circumstances of the case. 27. Learned Counsel for the complainant-respondent No. 1 in reply to the submission made on behalf of the petitioner further contended that Section 142 of the N.I. Act has been amended by the Act 55 of 2002 dated 17.12.2002, by inserting enabling provision permitting the Court to take cognizance of the complaint after the prescribed period of limitation if the complaint satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period and the provision so incorporated in the N.I. Act stand on a separate footing and thus, cannot be co-related with the provision of the Limitation Act. Such discretions are exclusively within the domain of the Court and the complainant and, the accused-petitioner would not have a right of hearing before considering such applications by the Courts for condonation of delay. Learned Counsel for the complainant respondent No.l submitted that in the complaint petition it has been clearly stated that the delay of 4 days occurred in filing the complaint and for condonation of the said 'delay a separate petition supported by an affidavit stating grounds of delay was filed find and the said petition was allowed by the learned Court below. 28. As discussed above, Annexure P/1 dated 29.5.2009, was a demand in terms of Section138(b) of the Act. 28. As discussed above, Annexure P/1 dated 29.5.2009, was a demand in terms of Section138(b) of the Act. The cause of action for the criminal proceeding arose after expiry of time in terms of Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act and any further deposition of the cheque, for collection in any subsequent date cannot give any fresh cause of action as per the statute and hence the N.I. Case No. 192/09 having been filed without satisfying the Court for the delay of 3 months is a clear express legal bar. 29. To substantiate the grounds for quashing the instant proceeding, the petitioner's side relied upon the following proposition of law propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in I (2006) CCR 209 (SC)= AIR 1992 SC 604 , State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., wherein in paragraph 108, the explanations 1 to 7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in no uncertain terms culled out and indicated grounds for quashing a pending criminal proceeding has stated as follows: 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Reporter the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 30. To substantiate the argument that the cause of action has arisen in the present case immediately after receipt of the mail dated 29th May, 2009 the petitioner relied on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court III (1998) CCR 238 (SC)= AIR 1998 SC 3043 in the case of Sadananda Bhadran v. Madhaban Sunil Kumar. In the said decision the Supreme Court has in unequivocal terms has culled down that for a particular cheque the cause of action to file a criminal case arises only once after completion of the statutory period as stipulated in Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Act. 31. The aforesaid law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is followed in the decision reported as (supra), Premchand Vijaykumar v. Jashpal Singh & Ors., I (2009) CCR 18 (SC)=I (2009) BC 234 (SC)=II (2009) DLT (Crl.) 334 (SC)=AIR 2009 SCW 1044, S.L. Construction & Anr. v. Alapati Srinivas Rao & Anr. and 2010 AIR SCW 828, Tameswar Vaishnab v. Ram Vishal Gupta. All the previous decisions were considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in 2010 AIR SCW 828. v. Alapati Srinivas Rao & Anr. and 2010 AIR SCW 828, Tameswar Vaishnab v. Ram Vishal Gupta. All the previous decisions were considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in 2010 AIR SCW 828. The report of S.L Construction (supra) is a case where the first notice was returned without service, the 2nd notice was withdrawn as per the advice and as such, the Hon'ble Supreme Court agreeing with the proposition of Sadananda Bhadran v. Madhaban Sunil Kumar (supra) has held that in view of the fact of this case since there was no service of notice in terms of Section 138(C) of the Act, the 3rd notice was accepted as valid notice which gave the cause of action. 32. The ratio laid down in Sadananda Bhadran v. Madhaban Sunil Kumar (supra) reveal that once a notice is issued, duly received by the payee, immediately thereafter the cause of action arises and no cause of action would arise after subsequent deposit/presentation of the cheque, for collection by the holder of the cheque. 33. In view of the above settled position of law apparently the N.I. Case No. 192/2009 had no cause of action alive on the date of its filing i.e. on 28.10.2009 and as such it is amply clear that the instant criminal proceeding before the learned lower Court is barred under the express provision of the statute. 34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah &Anr., III (2008) DLT (Crl) 895 (SC)= AIR 2008 SC 3086 in paragraph 24 has expressly provided that in absence of the condonation of the delay caused in filing the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, no Court can take cognizance of the case. Admittedly in the instant case, no prayer was made by the complainant-respondent No. 1 for condonation of delay, by reckoning the date of demand notice as 29.5.2009. 35. That in the instant case it is available from the para 13 of the complaint petition that the complainant has sought for 4 (four) days condonation before the learned Trial Court and the same was allowed and thereafter summons was issued to the petitioner. It is a trite law that any order which has a criminal consequence has to be passed after hearing the other party. It is a trite law that any order which has a criminal consequence has to be passed after hearing the other party. In the present case the delay of 4 days being condoned without hearing the petitioner is a clear violation of the established provision of law i.e. the audi alteram partem. This being a manifest illegality the present proceeding before the learned Trial Court has to be quashed. On this point the following judgments are referred to wherein the various judicial authorities have clearly mandated that the discretion to condone delay has to be exercised after giving notice to the other side and not other ways. 36. While considering the exercising power for extension of period of limitation under Section 473of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P. K. Choudhry v. Commender, 48 BRTF (GREF), 11 (2008) CCR 131 (SC)=II (2008) DLT (Crl.) 203 (SC)= AIR 2008 SCW 2197 , taking a reference of the decision render in State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre & Anr., 1994 AIR SCW 4301 has, in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the report, approved the proposition of law that if delay for launching prosecution is to be condoned the other party should be given notice and the delay cannot be condoned without notice and behind their back and without recording any reason for that. 37. The argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the complainant respondent No. 1 that the N.I. Act being a special statute the Magistrate has the power to ignore the basic rule of natural justice, cannot have any flavour in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has approved the said proposition of law, in the above noted case, while dealing with a case under Army Act. 38. Further the order dated 28.10.2009 and 27.11.2009, passed by the trial Court, would clearly show that no notice whatsoever was ever given to the petitioner before condonation of four days delay and there is absolutely no reason assigned by the Magistrate for the condonation of such delay. 39. 38. Further the order dated 28.10.2009 and 27.11.2009, passed by the trial Court, would clearly show that no notice whatsoever was ever given to the petitioner before condonation of four days delay and there is absolutely no reason assigned by the Magistrate for the condonation of such delay. 39. Further, it is apparent from the above orders of the trial Court that the cognizance of the case was taken under section 138 and Section 141 of the N.I Act before condoning the delay of 4 (four) days which the Magistrate cannot do in view of the specific bar under Section 142 of the N.I. Act. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court I (2008) BC 651=(2007) 2 GLT 895, Vijay Singh & Anr. v. Abdul Rahman, has clearly settled the legal proposition on this point and has laid down that the cognizance of the offence cannot be taken without condoning the delay caused in filing the complaint. 40. The complainant-respondent admittedly ignored the 1st demand notice addressed to the petitioner in his e-mail dated 29.5.2009 while calculating the delay in lodging the complaint. The complainant-respondent by treating the 2nd notice issued by him as the valid notice, prayed for condonation of delay of 4 days' in lodging the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act against the petitioner and the petition for condonation of delay was allowed without hearing the accused/petitioner, which is apparently illegal. 41. In Tameeshwar Vaishnav v. Ramvishal Gupta (supra), a complaint was filed against dishonour of cheque. The complaint proceeded to issue second notice on the accused, however, no action was taken after sending first notice under Section 138(b). Question which arose for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court is--whether after the notice is already issued once and it is received by the drawer of the cheque, if the payee or holder of the cheque fails to take any action as per law within the time period prescribed, whether a fresh notice can be issued and thereafter proceed to file a complaint? It was held by the Supreme Court, that a cheque may be presented several times within the period of its validity, the cause of action for a complaint under Section138 arises but once, with the issuance of notice after dishonour of the cheque and the receipt thereof by the drawer. 42. It was held by the Supreme Court, that a cheque may be presented several times within the period of its validity, the cause of action for a complaint under Section138 arises but once, with the issuance of notice after dishonour of the cheque and the receipt thereof by the drawer. 42. In Tameshwar Vaishnav v. Ramvishal Gupta (supra), it was observed as follows: In support of his said submission, the learned Counsel firstly referred to and relied on the decision of this Court in Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar, wherein this Court held that the cause of action to file complaint on non-payment despite issue of notice, arises but once. Another cause of action would not arise on repeated dishonour on representation. Learned Counsel pointed out that this Court also held that while the payee was free to present the cheque repeatedly within its validity period, once notice had been issued and payments not received within 15 days of the receipt of the notice, the payee has to avail the very cause of action arising thereupon and file the complaint. Dishonour of the cheque or each representation does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. Taking note of the amendment to Section 142(b) of the Act, this Court also held that the complaint would have to be filed within one month from the day immediately following the day on which the period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the first notice is by the drawer expires. 16. On careful scrutiny of the decision in S.L. Constructions case, it would appear that the facts on the basis of which the said decision was rendered, were different from a case of mere presentation and dishonour of the cheque after issuance of notice under the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. While the decision in Sadanandan Bhadran case, clearly spells out that a cheque may be presented several times within the period of its validity, the cause of action for a complaint under Section 138 of the Act arises but once, with the issuance of notice after dishonour of the cheque and the receipt thereof by the drawer. The same view has been reiterated in Prem Chand Vijay Kumar case. The only distinguishing feature of the decision in S.L. Constructions case is that of the three notices issued, the first two never reached the addressee. The same view has been reiterated in Prem Chand Vijay Kumar case. The only distinguishing feature of the decision in S.L. Constructions case is that of the three notices issued, the first two never reached the addressee. It is only after the third notice was received that the cause of action arose for filing the complaint. In effect, the cause of action for filing the complaint in the said case did not arise with the issuance of the first two notices since the same were never received by the addressee. 17. The provisions of Section 138 and Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso thereto indicate that a cheque has to be presented to the Bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. Clause (b) indicates that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, has to make demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 30 days of the receipt of information by him from the Bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid and Clause (c) provides that if the drawer of the cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or to the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of receipt of the said notice, the payee or the holder of the cheque may file a complaint under Section 142of the Act in the manner prescribed. 18. In the instant case, it is clear that the first notices were received by the appellant on 14.6.2006, whereas the complaints were filed on 10.7.2006. It must, therefore, be held that the complaints were filed beyond the period of limitation and the learned Magistrate erred in taking cognizance on the complaints filed on the basis of the second notices issued on 7.6.2006. Similarly, the High Court was also wrong in affirming the order of the learned Magistrate. 43. The proposition of law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly revealed that there can be multiple presentation of cheque for encashment in the Bank but there cannot be multiple demands for the same cheque amount. 44. Similarly, the High Court was also wrong in affirming the order of the learned Magistrate. 43. The proposition of law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly revealed that there can be multiple presentation of cheque for encashment in the Bank but there cannot be multiple demands for the same cheque amount. 44. In the instant case, cause of action is clearly based on dates of receipt of first notices and die complaint was obviously filed beyond the period of limitation and the learned Magistrate erred in taking cognizance on the complaints filed on the basis of the second notices. 45. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this Criminal Petition succeeds. The order, dated 27.11.2009, taking cognizance of offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act in. N.I Case No. 192/09, against the present petitioners is hereby set aside and the whole proceeding is hereby quashed. 46. With the above observations and directions, this Criminal Petition shall stand disposed of. 47. No order as to cost. 48. Send back the LCR.