JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has been filed for a direction to respondents to hand over possession of Thadi/ Platform/ shop in Sabji Mandi Bandikui in pursuance of the order dated 12-6-1995. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, and perused the material available on record. 3. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is apparent that writ petition filed in the year 2006, for implementation of the order dated 12-6-1995, passed by Municipal Board Bandikui is plainly hit by laches. 4. On a query by the court why the petition should not be dismissed at the threshold on the ground of laches, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has been making representations to Municipal Board for the last decade and more, and it is only when officials of Municipal Board finally showed their reluctance, the petitioner has approached this court. 5. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Yunus (Baboobhai) A. Hamid Padvekar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 3 SCC 281 has observed thus:- 8. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution'). In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, AIR 1970 SC 769 . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 9. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurde etc., (1874) 5 PC 221 at page 239 was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts, AIR 1967 SC 1450 and Maharashtra State Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329 . Sir Barnes had stated: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Sir Barnes had stated: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." 10. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. (Emphasis mine) It was observed in R.N Bose v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 470 that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 11. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, AIR 1987 SC 251 that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. 11. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal, AIR 1987 SC 251 that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its trail new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 6. The explanation for the laches that repeated representations had been filed with hope of relief does not commend itself to the court. Subjectivity of the petitioner cannot be allowed to determine the efficacy of an explanation of laches and prayer for condonation. On objective facts, I find that there is no material to condone the laches in approaching this court. 7. In view of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, I find no merit in the instant writ petition, which deserves to be dismissed on the ground of laches alone.Dismissed as such.Writ petition dismissed. *******