Prakash Krishna, J.;- Questioning the legality and validity of the orders dated 27th of August, 2008 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court no.1, Varanasi in Misc. Case No.115 of 2004 and order dated 7th of May, 2004 passed by Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Court No.3, Varanasi in Misc. Case No.5 of 1995, the present writ petition has been filed also for quashing the judgment and decree dated 25th of October, 1986. 2. The only point involved in the present writ petition is whether the Courts below have committed any illegality in refusing to condone the delay of about ten years in filing the application for setting aside the exparte money decree. 3. The petitioner no.1 is a partnership firm and the petitioner no.2 is one of its partners. The other partners have been impleaded as respondent nos.2 to 6 herein as proforma defendant respondents. 4. The original suit no.544 of 1983 was instituted by the Karnataka State Silk Co-operative, Marketing Federation Ltd. Against M/s. Hajee Barkatullah & sons, a partnership firm, through its one of partners Nooruddin. The partners of the Firm were also impleaded as defendant nos.2 to 7. The suit was brought on the allegations that the defendants in connection with their business purchased silk goods of the value of Rs.1,46,674.71 on credit on different dates, as described in the various paragraphs of the plaint. But they have failed to pay the same. The cheques have been dishonoured. A decree for a sum of Rs.2,07,039.36 including interest as also pendentelite and future interest was claimed. The summons and notices were issued to the defendants of the suit. The notice was served personally on Nooruddin (petitioner no.2) herein. It was also served on the other defendants. Service of notice on other defendants is not a matter of dispute. It appears that Mohd. Asraf and Mohd. Mustaq who were impleaded as defendant nos.6 and 7 came out with the case that they have nothing to do with the said firm as they are not partners on the relevant dates. The suit was contested by the defendant nos.6 and 7 namely Mohd. Asraf and Mohd. Mustaq by filing written statement. The issues were struck. As many as five issues were framed in the light of pleadings of the parties and the suit was ultimately decreed on 25.10.1986 against the defendant nos.1 to 5. The suit was contested by the defendant nos.6 and 7 namely Mohd. Asraf and Mohd. Mustaq by filing written statement. The issues were struck. As many as five issues were framed in the light of pleadings of the parties and the suit was ultimately decreed on 25.10.1986 against the defendant nos.1 to 5. It was dismissed against the defendant nos.6 and 7 on the finding that their names were not included as partners in the certificate of registration of the firm with the Registrar of the Firms, Chits and Funds. 5. On 20th of January, 1995 the petitioners herein filed an application which was registered as Misc. Case No.5 of 1995 under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C for setting aside the exparte decree on the allegations that the petitioner no.2 when he came to Varanasi on 21.12.1994 was told that an execution case No.20 of 1989 is going on. The house property no.J.1/130-A, Sheshman Bazar, Varanasi and property no. J.4/39 Hanstal, Varanasi are reported to have been auctioned in the said case. He thereafter examined the record of the execution case and filed an application. It was set out therein that the petitioner no.2 was never served with any summons in the Original Suit No.544 of 1983 nor with any notice in the execution case. It was further pleaded that on the inspection of the file of the original suit it also transpired that summon is reported to have been delivered to him. But the said report of the process server is false, fabricated and forged in as much as the signature appearing purported to have been signed by him on the receipt of the summon is not his signature and the said signature is forged. Plea that the opposite party nos.4 to 6 (Aminuddin, Mohd. Asraf and Mustaq Ahmed) are not on good terms with him and they have been acting in collusion with the decree holder against him was also put forward. No application for condonation of delay was filed. 6. The proceedings were contested by the plaintiff by denying the contents of the application and the affidavit. It was also contended that the application has been filed with malafide intention. In any case, the decree was passed against the partners of the firm after due service on them and as such there is no illegality. 6. The proceedings were contested by the plaintiff by denying the contents of the application and the affidavit. It was also contended that the application has been filed with malafide intention. In any case, the decree was passed against the partners of the firm after due service on them and as such there is no illegality. Plea that the petitioners had the full knowledge of the proceedings as he has been appearing before the Courts at Varanasi in other cases wherein statement etc. of the petitioner no.2 were recorded, was also raised. 7. The parties gave evidence oral and documentary. The trial court by the order dated 7th of May, 2004 reached to the conclusion that no case for condonation of delay has been made out. It took into consideration that no application for condonation of delay was filed. Secondly, he had been appearing in other pending cases and had the knowledge of the suit proceedings. Thirdly, summon was served on the other partners. This being so, the service of notice on the firm is sufficient. The matter was carried unsuccessfully in appeal. The appellate court by the impugned order dated 28th of July, 2008 dismissed the appeal. 8. Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the finding recorded by the Courts below that the application under Order 9 Rule 13 is barred by time, is perverse and contrary to the provisions of Limitation Act. The submission is that the period of limitation will start to run from the date of knowledge as far as Order 9 Rule 13 is concerned. Reliance has been placed on Gaon Real Estate Construction Limited and others Vs. People's Movement for Civic Action and others, 2010 (111) RD 666 and Yashoda Devi and others Vs. Special/Additional District Judge, Pratapgarh and others, 2008(104) RD 708 . It was further submitted that the finding that Nooruddin, petitioner no.2 herein, had the knowledge of the pendency of suit no.544 of 1983 as he was doing pairavi of cases, is not sufficient to reject the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC and that the service of summon on one partner is not sufficient service on other partner. It was further submitted that no finding has been recorded by the Courts below holding that the summons were served upon the defendants. It was further submitted that no finding has been recorded by the Courts below holding that the summons were served upon the defendants. In reply, the learned counsel for contesting respondents submits that it is a case where firm was impleaded as defendant no.1 and its partners were other defendants in the suit. Besides the fact that service of summon was affected on petitioner no.1, the firm and petitioner no.2, one of the partners, it was also affected on other partners and some of them contested the matter by filing written statement. Elaborating the argument it was submitted that in view of the Order 30 CPC, the service of summon on one partner is sufficient to hold the service of summon on firm itself. In view of undisputed fact that the other partners did file written statement as also the fact that the summon was served on Aminuddin in particular (brother of the petitioner no.2) who did not contest the suit, is sufficient to hold that the decree is not an exparte decree and is binding on the present petitioners. Strong reliance has been placed upon a judgment of Apex Court in Gambhir Mal Pandiya (since deceased) and others Vs. J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd, Kanpur and another, AIR 1963 SC 243 . 9. Considered the respective submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. It is admitted that the application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C for setting aside the exparte decree dated 25th of October, 1986 was filed in the month of January, 1995, giving rise to the present writ petition, but it did not accompany with any application for condonation of delay in its filing. To overcome the said difficulty, the case of petitioners is that they were not served with summons of suit. The question, therefore, arises as to whether the petitioners were served or not. The issue regarding limitation is interlinked with it. 10. Order 30 of C.P.C. provides for suits by or against firms and persons carrying on business in names other than their own. The question, therefore, arises as to whether the petitioners were served or not. The issue regarding limitation is interlinked with it. 10. Order 30 of C.P.C. provides for suits by or against firms and persons carrying on business in names other than their own. Rule 1 thereof provides that any two or more persons being liable as partners and carrying on the business in India may sue or be sued in the name of the firm of which such persons were partners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, and any party to a suit may in such case apply to the Court for a statement of the names and addresses of the persons who were, at the time of the accruing of the cause of action, partners in such firm, to be furnished and verified in such manner as the Court may direct. 11. Rule 3 of Order 30 is relevant for the present purpose. It deals with service of summon. It provides where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, the summons shall be served either--(a) upon any one or more of the partners, or (b) at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried............... It lays down that such service shall be deemed good service upon the firm so sued, whether all or any of the partners are within or without India. 12. The aforesaid provision namely Order 30 of CPC was up for consideration before the Apex Court in Gambhir Mal Pandiya (supra) along with Order 21 Rule 50 (2) CPC. Proceeding of the said case arose out of execution proceeding wherein the decree was obtained against the firm. The said decree was sought to be executed against a person who was not impleaded as a partner in the suit. A question arose as to whether such person can be held liable to discharge the decree passed against the firm and defences available to such person. It has been held that although Order 21 Rule 50(2) deals with execution, but really is a part of provisions relating to the suits against firm contained in Order 30 and must be viewed alongside to get the true meaning of the words, "The liability of such person". It has been held that although Order 21 Rule 50(2) deals with execution, but really is a part of provisions relating to the suits against firm contained in Order 30 and must be viewed alongside to get the true meaning of the words, "The liability of such person". It has been held that Order 30 permits suits to be brought against firm and summons may be issued against the firm or against persons who are alleged to be partners individually but the suit, however, proceeds only against the firm. It has been further laid down that the persons who admit that they are partners may defend the firm, take as many pleas as they like but cannot enter upon issues between themselves. 13. Reverting to the facts of the present case, in the case on hand, summons were served on the petitioner no.1 through petitioner no.2 although the petitioner no.2 is disputing his signature on the summons. Admittedly, service of summon was also affected on the other partners (defendant nos. 6 and 7) who came out with the case that they were not partners in the firm at the relevant point of time. In addition, the service was affected on defendant no.4, Aminuddin, admittedly. In other words, the service of summons on Aminuddin is not being disputed by the petitioners either earlier or even today, this being so in view of Rule 3 of Order 30 CPC logically it follows that the defendant no.1 was sufficiently served. At this juncture, the contention of petitioners' counsel is that Aminuddin colluded with the plaintiff. 14. The argument of the petitioners' counsel that there was a collusion with the plaintiff may be examined. The said argument has no merit in view of clear dicta by the Apex Court in the case of Gambhir Mal Pandiya (supra). It has been laid down that the interse dispute between the parties, if any, is of no consequence. The relevant extract is reproduced below:- ".............The law is thus not concerned with a fight between the partners inter se, and an action between the partners is not to be tried within the action between the firm and the plaintiff. Of course, the partners who admit that they are partners need not raise a common defence. The relevant extract is reproduced below:- ".............The law is thus not concerned with a fight between the partners inter se, and an action between the partners is not to be tried within the action between the firm and the plaintiff. Of course, the partners who admit that they are partners need not raise a common defence. They may raise inconsistent defences, but all such defences must be directed to defend the firm and the plaintiff must surmount all such defences. See Ellis v. Wadeson (1889) 1 QB 714. The purport of the rules as well as the two English cases which have correctly analysed the rules on the subject (the English and the Indian rules being alike) is that the partnership is sued as a partnership, and though the partners may put in separate defences, those defences must be on behalf of the firm. If some of the partners do not appear, those that do, must defend the firm; but if no proper defence is raised by them, the plaintiff cannot be deprived of a judgment. The judgment and decree thus obtained are executable against the partnership assets. This brings in the provisions of O. 21, R. 50 of the Code." 15. Besides the above, the said plea appears to have been set out without there being any foundation or material just to get over the money decree suffered by the petitioners' firm. Pointedly, a query was put as to whether the petitioners firm has been dissolved; to which the learned counsel for the petitioners could not give any reply. It may be noted that the petitioner no.2 and respondent no.4, Aminduddin, both are real brothers being sons of late Haji Barkatullah. The plea of collusion has been set out without there being any material and is a bogus plea, it is by way of legal engineering. 16. It may be noted that the petitioner no.2 came out with the case that most of time he was residing at different places at Bangalore and Pakistan and he came to know of the decree on his visit to Varanasi on 21st of December, 1994 from one Sri R.K. Mohapatra. Indisputably, Sri R.K. Mohapatra has not been examined as a witness to support the petitioner that he gave any such information to the petitioner no.2 about pending execution proceedings. Indisputably, Sri R.K. Mohapatra has not been examined as a witness to support the petitioner that he gave any such information to the petitioner no.2 about pending execution proceedings. How and in what connection Sri R.K. Mohapatra came to know of the pending execution proceedings is totally lacking. It has also not been disclosed that who is Sri R.K. Mohapatra and what was the occasion for him to get any such information and to convey the same to the petitioner no.2. Sri R.K. Mohapatra has been set up just for the purposes of the case. 17. The summons of suit bears signature of Nooruddin in English and mere denial of his signature in absence of any corroborative material, on the particular facts of the present case, when his brother has admittedly received the summons is nothing but an eyewash. It appears that the petitioners by some legal engineering are trying to frustrate the decree which was passed after contest by the other defendants way back in the year 1986. The decree is a money decree for the recovery of certain amount which was advanced to the petitioner no.1(defendant no.1) through petitioner no.2 in connection with business transactions to enable the firm to carry on the business, the goods were supplied to the firm on credit and when suit for recovery was filed, all these sorts of pleas have been put forward. 18. Along with the writ petition a copy of judgment dated 25.10.1986 delivered in suit no.544 of 1983 has been annexed. Its bare perusal shows that the said judgement was delivered after contest by some of the defendants in the suit. After the exchange of pleadings, as many as five issues were struck and those issues have been decided in the light of evidence led by the parties. The suit has been decreed for recovery of Rs.2,06,368/- against the defendant nos.1 to 5 along with interest. The decree has been put to execution and in execution thereof property has been sold and sale has been confirmed but delivery of possession on account of stay order passed by this Court has been stayed. 19. A feeble attempt was made with help of section 24 of the Partnership Act that service of notice on Aminuddin is not sufficient. For the sake of convenience the said section is reproduced below: "24. 19. A feeble attempt was made with help of section 24 of the Partnership Act that service of notice on Aminuddin is not sufficient. For the sake of convenience the said section is reproduced below: "24. Effect of notice to acting partner.--Notice to a partner who habitually acts in the business of the firm of any matter relating to the affairs of the firm operates as notice to the firm, except in the case of a fraud on the firm committed by or with with consent of that partner." 20. Elaborating the argument, it was submitted that since it is a case of fraud, the service on Aminuddin is liable to be ignored. It is difficult to accept the aforesaid argument for the reasons more than one. The argument presupposes that there was any fraud which was committed by Aminuddin on the firm. Secondly, the said section has no concern with the service of summons of a suit or a legal proceeding. For such purpose, specific provision has been provided under Order 30 of CPC. The specific provision will prevail over a general provision. A Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Sardar Cold Storage and Ice Factory vs. Punjab National Bank, 1988 AWC 1455 has held that under Order 30 Rule 3 CPC in case persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm service of summons could be affected on one or more partners. Thus, the service of summons affected through a partner is to be considered as sufficient service of summons on all partners of the firm. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioners could not place any material to show that any contrary view has been taken by any other Court. The said decision is binding and is also in consonance and conformity of Apex Court judgment in the case of Gambhir Mal Pandiya (supra) although the judgement of Gambhir Mal Pandiya (supra) does not find place in the Division Bench decision of M/s. Sardar Cold Storage and Ice Factory (supra). 22. Along with the supplementary counter affidavit a copy of the order dated 11.5.2009 passed by the executing court has been annexed to show that auction sale has been confirmed and sale certificate has been issued, to the auction purchasers. 23. The summons contain the signature of the petitioner no.2. 22. Along with the supplementary counter affidavit a copy of the order dated 11.5.2009 passed by the executing court has been annexed to show that auction sale has been confirmed and sale certificate has been issued, to the auction purchasers. 23. The summons contain the signature of the petitioner no.2. It was for him to prove by cogent and reliable evidence that the said signature is forged or fabricated. He never signed on the copy of the summons in token of receipts, which he failed to do so. Mere denial is not sufficient, in the facts and circumstance of the case in particular. 24. Before saying omega to the case, it may be placed on record that after the close of the argument when the judgement was reserved, the learned counsel for the petitioners has supplied photostat copies of following citations including written submission. These are as follows:- 1. Bhagmal and others vs. Kunwar Lal and others, 2010 (111) RD 666; 2. Yashoda Devi and others Vs. Special/Additional Judge, 2008 (104) RD 708 ; 3. Mohinder Singh Gill and another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, AIR 1978 SC 851 ; 4. Sushil Kumar Sabharwal Vs. Gurpreet Singh and others, (2002) 5 SCC 377 ; 5. G.P. Srivastava Vs. R.K. Raizada and others, (2000) 3 SCC 54 ; 6. Rabindra Singh Vs. Financial Commissioner and others, (2008) 7 SCC 663 ; 7. Habsburyls Law of England 4th Edition para 44; 8. Ashutosh Vs. State of Rajasthan and others, (2005) 7 SCC 308 ; 9. Textile Association (India) Bombay Unit v. Balmohan Gopal Kurup and another, AIR 1990 SC 2053 ; 10. Gauri Shankar Gupta Vs. Anita Mishra and another, 2004(1) ARC 200 ; 11. Chandra Shekhar Mishra and others Vs. Shambhu Sharan, 2010 (111) RD 466; 12. Abdul Rauf Vs. Must. Jubaida Khatoon and others, 2010 (1) ARC 760; 13. Smt. Risalo (D) through L.Rs. Vs. IInd A.D.J., Ghaziabad and others, 2007(3) AWC 2385 ; 14. Hafiz Fazal Haq Vs. VIIth Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Agra and others, 1997 (1) AWC 321 ; and 15. Mithlesh Vs. Punjab National Bank, Body Corporate Institution, Head Office, New Delhi and others, 1995 (1) ARC 88. 25. These citations are not being discussed individually as they are tangent to the point. Hafiz Fazal Haq Vs. VIIth Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Agra and others, 1997 (1) AWC 321 ; and 15. Mithlesh Vs. Punjab National Bank, Body Corporate Institution, Head Office, New Delhi and others, 1995 (1) ARC 88. 25. These citations are not being discussed individually as they are tangent to the point. They are on the point that the period of limitation starts running from the date of knowledge when the party was not served with the summons, which is not the case here. The other cases are that in the matters of condonation of delay the Court should take a liberal view of the matter and the phrase "sufficient cause" is elastic. 26. In view of the above, the arguments that the application is not time barred or that Nooruddin had no knowledge of the pendency of the suit no.544 of 1983 or service of summons on one partner is not sufficient on other partners and the impugned judgements are erroneous cannot be accepted. They are meritless and are hereby rejected. The authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Gambhir Mal Pandiya (supra) and of the Division Bench judgement of this Court in the case of M/s. Sardar Cold Storage and Ice Factory (supra) cover the entire issues against the petitioners. 27. Any other point was not pressed. There is no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed and the stay order is vacated with cost of Rs.5,000/- payable by the petitioners to the contesting respondent no.1 within a period of one month, failing which it shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue, by the Collector, along with collection charges, if any, in accordance with law.