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2011 DIGILAW 2000 (PNJ)

Rawat son of Daya Ram v. State of Haryana

2011-11-08

K.KANNAN

body2011
JUDGMENT Mr. K. Kannan, J. (Oral) - The petition challenges the order passed by the Financial Commissioner affirming the decisions passed by two other authorities in the quasi-judicial hierarchy. The orders related to a claim of ejectment by a landlord under Section 14(A) (i) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (for short, ‘the 1953 Act’). The Assistant Collector had originally ordered the ejectment accepting the landlord’s plea by his order dated 01.06.1982 but this order was set aside at the immediate next appellate Forum and two other revisional Forums namely the Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner. 2. The contention of the landlord was that the tenant did not pay the lease for the land that he held to the extent of 16 kanal 12 marlas from Kharif 1974 to Rabi 1977. The application had been allowed on 05.10.1978. Again the tenant was alleged to have committed a default for the subsequent period from Kharif 1977 to Rabi 1979 for which he filed again another suit, which was allowed on 08.12.1980. The tenant subsequently filed a petition on 02.01.1981 under Section 14-A (iii) of the 1953 Act seeking for permission to pay the lease for Kharif 1979, Rabi 1980 and Kharif 1980. In the meantime, he claimed that he had also paid the lease for which the order has been passed. The landlord claimed that the past conduct of the tenant in not paying the rent regularly and the way he had allowed them to be accumulated for 3 crops when he moved a petition for deposit, was itself evidence of the tenant’s conduct and filed a petition for eviction on 30.04.1981 under Section 9(i) of the 1953 Act. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners assails the orders of the Financial Commissioner and the authorities below on the ground that the reasoning adopted that the tenant had actually sought for permission to deposit the rent even before he filed the petition for ejectment was itself sufficient to show that a ground of eviction did not exist. The learned counsel would contend that there had been admittedly recurrent periods of default and even one default was sufficient to found a cause of action for eviction. The learned counsel would contend that there had been admittedly recurrent periods of default and even one default was sufficient to found a cause of action for eviction. The learned counsel would rely on the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in “Kapur Chand v. B.S. Grewal and others, 1965 PLJ 91” that held as follows: “Where the tenant did not pay rent and for every year a suit land had to be filed and recoveries were only made through the Court, this establishes the very kind of conduct which is contemplated by Section 9(1)(ii) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act and this furnishes a ground for eviction of the tenant under Section 14-A(i).” The learned counsel would also place his reliance on yet another judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in “Mrs. Raj Kanta v. The Financial Commissioner and another, 1980 PLJ 346” that explained the words “failure to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause” as postulating three conditions: (1) there must be a failure on the part of tenant to pay rent; (2) such failure must be to pay rent regularly, i.e. rent should be paid punctually consistently without any break or breach; (3) if there is any default ranging from one to several, tenant has got to show sufficient cause if his case is to be taken out of the mischief of Section 9(1)(ii) Tenant in order to escape ejectment must be regular in payment of rent and to get rid of consequences of default, tenant must prove sufficient cause. The learned counsel pointed out that Hon’ble the Supreme Court was laying down the law Raj Kanta’s case (supra) finding fault with an interpretation made by this Court in its Full Bench decision in “Bhagirath Ram Chand v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1954, 167”. 4. As opposed to this, the learned counsel appearing for the tenant would contend that the tenant had deposited the whole rent and there was no default on the date when the landlord’s application was filed on 30.04.1981. The counsel for the petitioner would state that the tenant had not actually deposited the rent when he had moved petition for eviction on 30.04.1981 and a mere permission sought for deposit would not do. The counsel for the petitioner would state that the tenant had not actually deposited the rent when he had moved petition for eviction on 30.04.1981 and a mere permission sought for deposit would not do. The counsel for the respondent would contend that he was required to seek for such permission only because the landlord refused to accept the tender and he could deposit the rent only when permission was granted by the Assistant Collector on his application on 14.09.1983. 5. We must recognize that we have come a long way from the feudal mind set of a landlord complaining for default that has occurred for a crop by the tenant to found a justification for eviction. There have been periodical amendments brought at various times in various Agriculture Tenancy Acts taking a rather lenient view and protecting tenants when the defaulted amount is paid as per the directions of Courts or during procedings. In fact, Section 14-A itself had undergone an amendment with the proviso added, which reads as follows: “Provided that if the tenant makes payment of arrears of rent and interest to be calculated by the Assistant Collector, First Grade, at 8 per centum on such arrears together with such costs of the application if any, as may be allowed by Assistant Collector, First Grade, either on the day of first hearing or within 15 days from the date of such hearing, he shall not be ejected.” It allows for the proceedings to terminate if the tenant pays rent on the date of first hearing or within 15 days from the date of such hearing. In this case, if the tenant had earlier committed a default and therefore, the landlord had perforce to file a petition for recovery of rent, it must be only taken as an instance of when the landlord was satisfied in securing reliefs for recovery of rent and not pressing for a relief of eviction. If the landlord, therefore, was initially filing a petition for rent on two different occasions for claiming the rent from 1974 to 1979, the fact that he had to file a petition earlier, cannot be a ground for eviction for the subsequent period even when the tenant was prepared to tender the rent. If the landlord, therefore, was initially filing a petition for rent on two different occasions for claiming the rent from 1974 to 1979, the fact that he had to file a petition earlier, cannot be a ground for eviction for the subsequent period even when the tenant was prepared to tender the rent. It must be noticed that when the subsequent petition was filed on 30.04.1981, the tenant had already moved an application for deposit of rent even on 02.01.1981 and had also cleared the arrears of earlier years. The Act does not contemplate a situation of allowing the landlord to obtain eviction for non-payment when on the date of his petition there existed no default and the default that he complained was a past default for which a petition has been filed for recovery of rent or the default was sought to be rectified by the tenant himself moving a petition action for deposit of rent. A petition for deposit under Section 14-A(3) by the tenant is a complete answer and justifiable cause for landlord’s petition for eviction unless the landlord proves and the authority comes to a conclusion that the petition for deposit was merely a ruse to obtain further extensions of time and delay the payment of rent. In my view, when the tenant filed a petition seeking for permission to deposit on the ground that the landlord had refused the tender and that petition had been filed before the landlord’s petition for eviction, the tenant needs to explain no more and the petitioner cannot be heard to complain that the tenant has failed to pay the rent without sufficient reasons. The dismissal of the petition of the landlord by the Financial Commissioner was perfectly justified and I will find no reason to interfere with the same. 6. The writ petition is dismissed. ----------------