Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 2002 (ALL)

Kanhaiya Lal v. A. D. J. ,Court No. 17, Meerut and others

2011-08-25

SHASHI KANT GUPTA

body2011
Shashi Kant Gupta, J.:- 1. This writ petition has been filed against the judgment and order dated 16.7.2011 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 7, Meerut whereby the appeal filed by the landlady was allowed and the order dated 12.10.2000 passed by the Prescribed Authority, Meerut was set aside. 2. Brief facts of the case are as follows; 3. Respondent No. 3, late Smt. Vimla Devi, mother of Respondent No. 4, Vijay Kumar Rajwanshi filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the UP Act No. 13 of 1972 (in short "Act") for release of the shop in dispute whereby need was set up to establish her son Respondent No. 4 which was registered as P. A. Case No. 62 of 1998. After the exchange of pleadings and affidavits, the Prescribed Authority by judgment and order dated 12.10.2000 rejected the said release application. Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order, the Respondent No. 3 filed a Rent Control Appeal No. 281 of 2000. During the pendency of the said appeal Smt. Vimla Devi, Respondent No. 3 died. Thereafter, her husband also died and the Respondent No. 4, son of the Respondent No. 3, late Vimla Devi was substituted in her place. Thereafter, Respondent No. 4 moved an amendment application, seeking an amendment in the application filed under Section 21 of the Act, whereby need was set up to establish his son Ravi Rajvanshi. 4. It was stated, inter alia, in the amendment application that the family of the applicant consists the applicant himself, his wife, one son Ravi Rajvanshi aged about 23 years, and two daughters aged 24 and 131/2 years, and the applicant is carrying on the business of Surrafa and Money Lending on the ground floor shop of the premises. It was further stated that the son of the applicant has passed B.Com but could not study further and is at presently assisting the petitioner on the ground floor shop and has become of marriageable age, and wants to set up his own independent business separately. It was further stated in the amendment application that the disputed shop is on the first floor of the shop, which is an ideal place for the establishing his son, and the son of the applicant, who is major, has a right to do his own independent business and to earn for himself separately. It was further stated in the amendment application that the disputed shop is on the first floor of the shop, which is an ideal place for the establishing his son, and the son of the applicant, who is major, has a right to do his own independent business and to earn for himself separately. It was also stated that the income from the business of the applicant was not so much that it may fulfill the needs of his family and besides this, the applicant has two young daughters and one of them is of marriageable age. 5. The said amendment application was allowed and the Respondent No. 4 was permitted to incorporate aforementioned facts in the release application filed under Section 21 of the Act. The appellate court by judgment and order dated 16.7.2011 allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 12.10.2000 passed by the Prescribed Authority. Hence, the present writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that after the death of the original landlady Smt. Vimla Devi, during the pendency of the appeal, Respondent No. 4 could not have been substituted in her place. It was further submitted that the Respondent No. 4, after the death of original landlady, could not have also set up the need of his son Ravi Rajvanshi to carry on the business from the disputed shop. It was further submitted that the need of the Respondent No. 4 is neither bonafide nor genuine. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner further referred to the decision of Apex Court in the case of Smt. Phool Rani and others Vs. NaubatRaiAhluwalia, AIR 1973 SC 2110 . 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 8. It is not disputed that during the pendency of the appeal original landlady, Smt. Vimal Devi was substituted by his son Vijay Kumar Rajvanshi who filed an amendment application for amendment in the release application filed under Section 21 of the Act whereby the need of his son Ravi Rajvanshi was set up. It is also not disputed that Ravi Rajvanshi has already completed the studies and is of marriageable age, and also does not have any independent businesses. 9. It is also not disputed that Ravi Rajvanshi has already completed the studies and is of marriageable age, and also does not have any independent businesses. 9. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Respondent No. 4, after the death of her mother the original landlady Smt. Vimla Devi, could not have set up the need of his son Ravi Rajvanshi instead the Respondent No. 4 should have filed a fresh release application for setting up the need of his son and in support of his contention further referred to the case of Smt. Phool Rani and others (supra). The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is totally untenable and cannot be accepted. It will be useful, in this connection, to quote Section 21 (7) of the Act as follows; "(7) Where during the pendency of an application under clause (a) of sub-section (1), the landlord dies, his legal representatives shall be entitled to prosecute such application further on the basis of their own need in substitution of the need of the deceased." 10. From perusal of the aforementioned provision, it is evident that after the death of the landlord, his legal heirs shall be entitled to prosecute application on the basis of their own need in substitution of the need of the deceased. Thus, the aforementioned provision is fully applicable to the case of the Respondent No. 4 and he was fully justified in setting up the need of his son qua disputed premises. 11. The decision of the Apex Court in Smt. Phool Rani and others (supra) is not at all applicable in the present matter and has got no relevance to the case in hand. The U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is a special Act wherein Section 21 (7) of the Act empowers the legal representatives to prosecute such application further on the basis of his own need in substitution of the need of the deceased. 12.The lower appellate court after perusing the pleadings and evidence on record held that the need of the landlord for setting up his son is bonafide and genuine and the comparative hardship also tills in favour of the landlord. There is nothing on record to show that during the pendency of the appeal the petitioner had made any effort to search out any alternative accommodation. 13. There is nothing on record to show that during the pendency of the appeal the petitioner had made any effort to search out any alternative accommodation. 13. The court below have recorded a finding of fact holding the need of the landlord to be bonafide and genuine and the said finding is based on the evidence available on record. The lower appellate court has given cogent, convincing and satisfactory reason while passing the order in favour of the landlord. The finding recorded by the lower appellate court is neither perverse nor based on any extraneous or irrelevant material. The lower appellate court has on meticulous evaluation of evidence and material available on the record, found the need of the landlord to be bonafide and genuine. This court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can not substitute its own opinion for the opinion of the court below unless it is found that the conclusion drawn by the lower court is erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law or based on inadmissible evidence or arrived at findings without evidence. 14. No other point has been pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. 16. After the judgment was dictated, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that at least six months' time may be granted to him for vacating the premises in question. 17. As urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, six months' time is granted to the petitioner to vacate the premises in dispute provided the petitioner gives his undertaking in the form of an affidavit before the prescribed authority within one month from today specifically stating therein that he will handover the peaceful possession of the said accommodation to the landlord opposite party without inducting any third person within a period of six months from today. It is further provided that the petitioner shall pay the entire arrears of rent including the rentupto the date of delivery of the vacant possession of the disputed premises within one month from today. 18. In the event of default in any of the aforesaid conditions, the landlord opposite party will be at liberty to proceed to evict the petitioner if necessary by coercive process with the aid of police force.