Judgment :- N. Paul Vasanthakumar, J. 1. This Petition has been filed for condoning the delay of 121 days in filing the Review Application by the Petitioner against the Judgment passed by this Court in W.A.No.1094 of 2009 dated 4.12.2009. 2. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this Petition is that the Petitioner, who was appointed as Vocational Teacher in the 1st Respondent’s School, who was terminated from service by an order dated 4.1.2001. The said order of termination was challenged by the Petitioner and the learned Single Judge set aside the order of termination and ordered reinstatement with 50% of back wages by the order dated 19.1.2009. Aggrieved by the said order, 1st Respondent-Management has filed W.A. No.1094 of 2009. The said W.A. No.1094 of 2009 was disposed of on merits by order dated 4.12.2009, against which Petitioner herein filed S.L.P. (Civil) No.743 of 2010 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The said S.L.P. was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 30.4.2010 stating that “the Special Leave Petition is dismissed”. After the dismissal of S.L.P. (Civil) No.743 of 2010, the petitioner has filed this Review Application with condone delay Petition on 18.5.2010. When the Petition was posted for admission, we ordered notice to the Respondents. 3. Mr. Vijay Narayan, learned Senior Counsel for the 1st Respondent has raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the Review Application in the light of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court reported in N. Meghmala and others v. G. Narasimha Reddy and others, 2010 (7) MLJ 693 (SC), Pointing out Paragraph-17, the learned Senor Counsel contended that the Petitioner has filed the Review Application with Condone Delay Petition after the dismissal of S.L.P. and therefore, the said Review Application is not maintainable. 4. The Petitioner who appeared as party in person, submitted that the SLP has been dismissed in limine without stating reasons for dismissal,. Hence, the review Petition, filed, the after dismissal of the SLP is maintainable. 5. We have also gone through the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court reported in N. Meghmala’s case 2010 (7) MLJ 693, in detail. In Paragraphs-12 to 18, it is held as follows: “12. Hence, the review Petition, filed, the after dismissal of the SLP is maintainable. 5. We have also gone through the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court reported in N. Meghmala’s case 2010 (7) MLJ 693, in detail. In Paragraphs-12 to 18, it is held as follows: “12. In Abdul Maligai Partnership Firm and another v. K. Santhakumaran and Others, AIR 1999 SC 1486 : 1998 (7) SCC 386 : 1999 (1) MLJ 18, a Three Judge Bench of this Court considered the issue afresh and held that filing of the Review Petition after dismissal of the Special leave Petition by it against the self-same order amounted to an abuse of process of the Court and the entertainment of such a Review Application was in affront to its order and it was subversive of judicial discipline. 13. In Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and another, AIR 2000 SC 2587 : 2000 (6) SCC 359 : 2000 Supp M:J 77, Three Judge Bench of this Court reconsidered the issue and all above referred judgments and came to the conclusion that dismissal of Special Leave Petition in limine by a non-speaking order may not be a bar for entertaining a Review Petition by the Court below for the reason that this Court may not be inclined to exercise its discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution. The declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 where the matter has been decided on merit by a speaking judgment. In that case, Doctrine of Merger would come into place and lay down the following principles: (i) Where an Appeal or Revision is provided against an order passed by a Court, Tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses of affirms the decision put n issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law. (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by article 1`36 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is up to the disposal of prayer of special leave to file an Appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to Appeal is granted and the Special Leave Petition is converted into an Appeal. (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by article 1`36 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is up to the disposal of prayer of special leave to file an Appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to Appeal is granted and the Special Leave Petition is converted into an Appeal. (iii) Doctrine of Merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before, it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its Appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of Petition for Special leave to Appeal. He Doctrine of Mere can therefore be applied to the former and not to the later. (iv) An order refusing Special Leave to Appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case, it does not attract the Doctrine of Merger. An order refusing Special Leave to Appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not incline to exercise its discretion so as to allow the Appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to Appeal is a speaking order, i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications,. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, Tribunal or Authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme court being the Apex Court of the country. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, Tribunal or Authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, Tribunal or Authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme court rejecting the Special leave Petition or that that the order of the Supreme court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. 14. The Court came to the conclusion that where the matter has been decided by a no9n-speaking order in limine the party may approach the High Court by filing a Review Petition. Similar view has been reiterated in National Housing Coop. Society Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2005 (12) SCC 149. 15. In K. Rajamouli v. A.V.K.N. Swamy, AIR 2001 SC 2316 : 2001 (5) SCC 37 , this Court considered the ratio of the judgment in Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another (supra),; and Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm and Another v. K. Santhakumaran and Others (supra) and held that if a Review Application has been filed before the High Court prior to filing the Special leave Petition before this Court and Review Petition is decided/rejected, Special Leave Petition against that order of review would be maintainable. In case the Review Application has been filed subsequent to dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, it would amount to abuse of process of the Court and shall be governed by the ratio of the judgment in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm and another v. K. Santhakumaran and Others (supra). The said judgment has been approved and followed by this Court in Green View Tea and Industries v. Collector, Golaghat, Assam and another, AIR 2004 SC 1738 : 2004 (4) SCC 122 . 16. In Kumaran Silk Trade (P) Ltd. v. Devendra, AIR 2007 SC 1185 : 2007 (8) MLJ 751 , this Court held as under at p. 754 of MLJ: “9. ….. As a matter of fact at the earlier stage, this court did not consider the question whether one of the Appeals against the order dismissing the review Petition on merits was maintainable. ….. As a matter of fact at the earlier stage, this court did not consider the question whether one of the Appeals against the order dismissing the review Petition on merits was maintainable. At best the order of remand and the decision in Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and another (supra) would enable the petitioner to get over the ratio of the Three Judge bench decision in Abdul Maligai Partnership Firm and Another v. K. Santhakumaran and Others (supra) that the seeking of a Review after the Petition for Special Leave to Appeal was dismissed without reserving any liberty in the Petitioner was an abuse of process.” 17. Thus, the law on the issue stands crystallized to the effect that in case a litigant files a Review Petition before filing the Special Leave Petition before this Court and it remains pending till the Special leave Petition stands dismissed, the Review Petition deserves to be considered. In case it is filed subsequent to dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, the process of filing Review Application amounts to abuse of process of this Court. 18. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that filing of such a Review Application by the Respondents at a belated stage amounts to abuse of process of the Court and such an Application is not maintainable. Thus, the High Court ought not to have entertained the Writ Petition against the order of dismissal of the Review Application by the Special Court and order of the High Court to that extent is liable to be set aside.” On perusal of Paragraph-17 of the said judgment, it is evident that Review Application filed subsequent to the dismissal of the S.L.P. cannot be entertained. Applying the ratio of the above judgment to the facts of this case, we are unable to entertain the Review Application filed along with Condone Delay Petition. 6. In the result, the Petition for condonation of the delay in filing the Review Application is dismissed. Consequently, the review Application is rejected at the S.R. stage. No costs.