Judgment :- 1. Heard Mr. C.S. Lenin, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. S. Gopinathan, the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 2. The challenge made in this Writ Petition is to a proceeding of the first respondent made in Letter No. 23064/E1/2006-07, dated 3.7.2008, whereby, the representation of the petitioner dated 17.9.2007 was examined by the first respondent, as per the orders of the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, dated 19.2.2008 made in W.P. (MD) No. 1424 of 2008, and an order was passed rejecting the request of the petitioner. The same is sought to be quashed by the petitioner in this writ petition. The petitioner also sought to direct the respondents to give notional promotion to her husband w.e.f. 1983 on par with his immediate junior and grant all monetary benefits due to him. 3. According to the petitioner, her husband, by name, S. Russelian, joined the Service of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Department (for short “Department”) as Extension Officer (Industries) on 26.10.1956. Subsequently, he was promoted as Block Development Officer on 26.12.1969. Thereafter, he was awarded Selection Grade (Block Development Officer) on 27.12.1979. The petitioner ‘ s husband served for more than 30 years in the Department, in various postsr at different places and retired from service on 30.9.1989. 4. The petitioner would state that in the year 1980, while her husband was working as Block Development Officer at Melpuram Block, some charges were framed against him for the irregularities alleged to have been committed by him, for which, an enquiry was also conducted by the District Collector, Nagercoil. However, due to ill-health, the petitioner ‘ s husband took medical leave from 5.4.1983 to 6.6.1983. When the petitioner ‘ s husband was on medical leave, he received an order on 8.4.1983 from the second respondent, vide proceedings No. 139860/82/M2, dated 18.3.1983, informing that he was reverted to next lower post as Extension Officer (Industries) for a period of three years irrespective of time spent on leave. In the mean time, the petitioner‘s husband was placed under suspension on 6.6.1983 for another charge, before joining in the reverted post as Extension Officer (Industries), by the first respondent. According to the petitioner, as per the Government Order in G.O. Ms. No. 211, dated 27.2.1980, suspension should be avoided, if it was possible to retain a person in an unimportant post, pending investigation. According to the petitioner, as per the Government Order in G.O. Ms. No. 211, dated 27.2.1980, suspension should be avoided, if it was possible to retain a person in an unimportant post, pending investigation. 5. The further case of the petitioner is that for the second charge, the petitioner ‘ s husband was awarded with a minor punishment of stoppage of two years increment, without cumulative effect, by the District Collector, Kanyakumari in proceedings No. D6.56656/83, dated 18.9.1984. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner ‘ s husband filed an appeal before the second respondent on 18.1.1985. The second respondent, by proceedings in D.Dis.155103/85 B-1, dated 4.5.1987, set aside the order of stoppage of two years increment and directed the District Collector, Kanyakumari, to conduct de nova enquiry. The Collector, Kanyakumari, in a vindictive manner framed charges against the petitioner ‘ s husband alone under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, while, for the other two accused officers, charges were framed only under Rule 17(a), thereby, showing discrimination. The District Collector, Kanyakumari District, conducted enquiry on the second charge memo and the punishment imposed on the petitioner‘s husband was reduced into a minor punishment of “Censure” vide proceedings in R.O.C. No. D6.68610/88, dated 9.7.1989. 6. Challenging the reversion order, the petitioner’s husband filed O.A. No. 172 of 1989 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “Tribunal” ), Chennai. The Tribunal by its order, dated 10.6.2002, set aside the order of reversion and directed to pay the difference of amount to the legal heirs as early as possible. 7. In view of the order passed by the District Collector, Kanyakumari District, on 18.9,1984, increments of the petitioner’s husband were withheld for a period of two years by the Department. Thereafter also, increments were not sanctioned citing the pendency of the appeal, due to which, the punishment, which was ordered by the District Collector, Kanyakumari, dated 18.9.1984 was fully complied with. Subsequently, the petitioner’s husband died on 4.12.1992. 8. After the order of Tribunal in O.A. No. 172 of 1989, dated 10.6.2002, the petitioner made a representation on 20.12.2003 seeking to pay the difference of amount due to her husband and for notional promotion from 1983. Subsequently, the petitioner’s husband died on 4.12.1992. 8. After the order of Tribunal in O.A. No. 172 of 1989, dated 10.6.2002, the petitioner made a representation on 20.12.2003 seeking to pay the difference of amount due to her husband and for notional promotion from 1983. Aggrieved by the inaction on the part of the respondents in considering her claim, the petitioner approached the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court by filing a writ petition in W.P. (MD) No. 1424 of 2008 to consider her representation dated 17.9.2007, which was allowed by this Court on 19.2.2008, directing the respondents to pass appropriate orders, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order. Since the respondents failed to pass orders within the stipulated time, the petitioner sent a contempt notice through her counsel to the respondents on 30.6.2008. After receipt of the contempt notice, the first respondent rejected her request in Letter No. 23064/E1/2006-07, dated 3.7.2008. The same is challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition. 9. It is the stand of the respondents in the counter affidavit, that the petitioner’s husband was named as first accused officer and therefore, he was rightly placed under suspension as per G.O. Ms. No. 746, Rural Development and Local Administration Department, dated 24.5.1983, on the basis of the detailed enquiry conducted by the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption into allegations of corruption and malpractices in connection with the issuance of cement permit to four works in Kurunthencode Panchayat Union of Kanniyakumari District. 10. In the counter affidavit, the respondents would further submit that the Collector, Kanyakumari, has rightly framed charges against the petitioner’s husband under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, as he was named as first accused officer and he was responsible for issuing illegal cement permit in the capacity as the then Block Development Officer, Kuruthencode Panchayat Union. Besides that, they have stated that the period of suspension from 6.6.1983 to 28.1.1985 has been regularised as eligible leave. As regards another disciplinary case, the pay of the petitioner’s husband was re-fixed as per the proceedings of the Collector, Kanyakumari, dated 23.1.2004 and already withheld increments for two years as on 1.10.1983 and 1.10.1984, were sanctioned. 11. Besides that, they have stated that the period of suspension from 6.6.1983 to 28.1.1985 has been regularised as eligible leave. As regards another disciplinary case, the pay of the petitioner’s husband was re-fixed as per the proceedings of the Collector, Kanyakumari, dated 23.1.2004 and already withheld increments for two years as on 1.10.1983 and 1.10.1984, were sanctioned. 11. It is further averred by the respondents that the representation of the petitioner, dated 17.9.2007, was examined by the first respondent, as per tire orders of the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, dated 19,2.2008 made in W.P. (MD) No. 1424 of 2008, wherein, she had made three claims, viz., (i) To work out the subsistence allowance of her husband in the cadre of Block Development Officer and to pay the arrears amount; (ii) To treat the period of suspension from 6.6.1983 to 28.1.1985 as duty; and (iii) To give promotion to her deceased husband on par with his immediate junior. The said three claims were examined in detail and as regards her first claim, as per the order of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 172 of 1989, a sum of ` 25,895/- has already been paid towards the arrears for the period from 19.1.1985 to 27.11.1988 and a sum of ` 9,486/- being difference in subsistence allowance was paid for the period from 6.6.1983 to 28.1.1985. Insofar as the second claim relating to treating the period of suspension from 6.6.1983 to 28.1.1985 as duty is concerned, in G.O. (Rt) No. 415 Rural Development (E1) Department, dated 14.9.1992, petitioner’s claim for treating the period of suspension of the petitioner’s husband as duty has been regularised and nothing survives for consideration. Insofar as the third claim relating to promotion of petitioner’s husband on par with his immediate junior is concerned, while approving temporary panel for the post of Divisional Development Officer for the year 1983, the name of petitioner’s husband i.e., S. Russelian was passed over due to the punishment of reversion as Extension Officer (Industries) and due to his suspension in a Vigilance case. The punishment of reversion alone has been set aside by the Tribunal in its order dated 10.6.2002 in O.A. No. 172 of 1989. The punishment of reversion alone has been set aside by the Tribunal in its order dated 10.6.2002 in O.A. No. 172 of 1989. At the time of drawal of panel for the post of Divisional Development Officer for the year 1983, 17(b) charges were pending against the petitioner’s husband and it ended in ’Censure’ in July 1989 and he retired on 30.9.1989. In view of the above, the petitioner’s husband is not eligible for inclusion in the panel for the post of Divisional Development Officer for the year 1983 and subsequent panels till his retirement (i.e., 30.9.1989). All her three claims have been considered by the first respondent in detail and the impugned order dated 3.7.2008 has been passed, which needs no interference at the hands of this Court. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 12. The first limb of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the claim of subsistence allowance for the period of suspension has to be considered as the suspension culminated in subsequent punishment, which has been set aside by the Tribunal. Secondly, it is his submission that the period of suspension from 6.6.1983 to 28.1.1985 is to be treated as duty for all purposes when a minor punishment of “Censure” is awarded and that such a penalty cannot deny the benefit of regularization of the period of suspension as duty. Lastly, the stoppage of increment for two years without cumulative effect, was ordered by the District Collector, Kanyakumari, in proceedings No. D6.56656/83, dated 18.9.1984 and it comes to an end in the year 1986 and therefore, the petitioner’s husband ought to have been included in the promotion panel for the year 1986. 13. Per contra, the learned Additional Government Pleader would contend that as regards the claim of inclusion of the petitioner’s husband’s name in the panel for the post of Divisional Development Of ficer is concerned, as there are charges pending against him during the relevant period of time, his name could not to be considered for inclusion and for promotion. 13. Per contra, the learned Additional Government Pleader would contend that as regards the claim of inclusion of the petitioner’s husband’s name in the panel for the post of Divisional Development Of ficer is concerned, as there are charges pending against him during the relevant period of time, his name could not to be considered for inclusion and for promotion. Nextly, in respect of treating the period of suspension as duty is concerned, the learned Additional Government Pleader has pointed out that a Government Order has been issued in G.O. (Rt) No. 415 Rural Development (E1) Department, dated 14.9.1992, in which, the petitioner’s claim for treating the period of suspension as duty has been regularised and nothing survives for consideration. Lastly, the learned Additional Government Pleader, as regards the payment of subsistence allowance is concerned, would submit that it has already been paid to the petitioner and therefore, there exists no claim as on date. 14. On the above background pleadings and submissions, I have heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the relevant orders and material documents available on record. 15. Admittedly, the petitioner’s husband joined the service of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj Department, as Extension Officer (Industries) on 26.10.1956 and thereafter, he was promoted as Block Development Officer on 26.12.1969. Subsequently, the petitioner’s husband was awarded selection grade (Block Development Officer) on 27.12.1979. After serving for more than 30 years, the petitioner’s husband retired from service on superannuation on 30.9.1989. 16. It is seen that in the year 1980, while he was working as Block Development Officer at Melpuram Block, charges were framed against the petitioner’s husband for the alleged irregularities committed by him, thereafter, an enquiry was conducted by the District Collector, Nagercoil. However, due to ill-health, the petitioner’s husband took medical leave from 5.4.1983 to 6.6.1983. When the petitioner’s husband was on medical leave, an order of reversion has been passed by the second respondent vide proceedings No. 139860/82/M2, dated 18.3.1983, to the next lower post as Extension Officer (Industries) for a period of three years irrespective of time spent on leave. In the mean time, the petitioner’s husband was placed under suspension on 6.6.1983 for another charge before joining in the reverted post as Extension Officer (Industries) by the first respondent. The petitioner claims that as per the Government Order in G.O. Ms. In the mean time, the petitioner’s husband was placed under suspension on 6.6.1983 for another charge before joining in the reverted post as Extension Officer (Industries) by the first respondent. The petitioner claims that as per the Government Order in G.O. Ms. No. 211, suspension should be avoided, if it was possible to retain a person in an unimportant post, pending investigation. 17. For the second charge, after following the procedure contemplated, the District Collector, Kanyakurnari, in its proceedings No. D6.56656/83, dated 18.9.1984, imposed a minor punishment of stoppage of increment for two years, without cumulative effect. As against that punishment, the petitioner’s husband preferred an appeal to the second respondent. The second respondent, after considering the appeal, has set aside the punishment by an order dated 4.5.1987, with a direction to the District Collector, Kanyakurnari, to conduct de nova enquiry. 18. While so, the petitioner’s husband challenged the order of reversion before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “Tribunal” ) by filing an application in O.A. No. 172 of 1989. The Tribunal, by an order dated 10.6.2002, set aside the order of reversion and directed to pay the difference of amount to legal heirs as early as possible. As directed by the second respondent by an order dated 4.5.1987, the District Collector, Kanyakurnari, after enquiry on the second charge memo, has reduced the punishment of the petitioner’s husband into a minor punishment of ’Censure’ on 9.7.1989, which became final, since, the petitioner’s husband has not chosen to challenge the punishment of ’Censure’. When the matter stood thus, the petitioner’s husband died on 4.12.1992. The petitioner pursued the case pending before the Tribunal, which resulted in favour of the petitioner and the order of punishment of reversion has been set aside, with a direction to pay the difference of amount to legal heirs as early as possible. Therefore, the petitioner made a representation on 20.12.2003 seeking to pay the difference of amount due to her husband and for notional promotion from 1983. Therefore, the petitioner made a representation on 20.12.2003 seeking to pay the difference of amount due to her husband and for notional promotion from 1983. Aggrieved by the inaction on the part of the respondents in considering her claim, the petitioner approached the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court by filing a Writ Petition in W.P. (MD) No. 1424 of 2008 to consider her representation dated 17.9.2007, which was allowed by this Court on 19.2.2008, directing the respondents to pass appropriate orders, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order. The first respondent, in Letter No. 23064/El/2006-07, dated 3.7.2008, rejected the petitioner’s claim. The petitioner claimed the benefits in three parts, viz., (i) The payment of arrears of subsistence allowance; (ii) to treat the period of suspension from 6.6.1983 to 28.1.1985 as duty for all purposes; and (iii) for notional promotion. The same is challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition. 19. This Court carefully examined the above claims of the petitioner. As regards the first claim of payment of arrears of subsistence allowance is concerned, in the impugned proceedings dated 3.7.2008, it has been specifically stated that, it has been reported by the Collector of Kanyakumari that a sum of ` 25,895/-towards the arrears for a period from 29.1.1985 to 27.11.1988 and a sum of ` 9,486/-, being the difference in subsistence allowance for the period from 6.6.1983 to 28.1.1985 was paid on the basis of the orders of Tribunal in O.A. No. 172 of 1989. It is not disputed by the petitioner and therefore, the claim in respect of the payment of difference in subsistence allowance and arrears towards that, are no longer in existence and hence, in respect of the first claim, nothing survives for consideration. 20. Insofar as the second claim seeking to treat the period of suspension from 6.6.1983 to 28.1.1985 as duty is concerned, in the impugned proceedings dated 3.7.2008, it has been explicitly stated that suspension was ordered in a different disciplinary case relating to Charge Memo No. 68610/88, dated 8.9.1988 of the Collector of Kanyakumari District, which has been proceeded and ended in a punishment of ’Censure’. It is reported by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has not chosen to challenge the above order of punishment of Censure, till date. It is reported by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has not chosen to challenge the above order of punishment of Censure, till date. From a perusal of the records, it is clear that the above disciplinary case was not covered by the order of Tribunal in O.A. No. 172 of 1989. Further, in G.O.(Rt) No. 415 Rural Development (E1) Department, dated 14.9.1992, the Government has already regularised the period of suspension. The request of the petitioner for treating the period of suspension as duty has not been considered by the first respondent in view of the pendency of the disciplinary case against the petitioner’s husband. It is also clear from the material documents that the petitioner’s husband was in service, consequent to the punishment of stoppage of increment for two years, without cumulative effect, as per the proceedings of the District Collector, Kanyakumari, dated 18.9.1984 and his annual increments as on 1.10.1983 and 1.10.1984 were not sanctioned as final orders on de nova enquiry were passed only on 9.7.1989, pending regularisation of the period of suspension from 6.6.1983 to 28.1.1985. Since the petitioner’s husband retired on 30.9.1989, the Government has issued an order in G.O. (Rt) No. 415 Rural Development (E1) Department, dated 14.9.1992, the period of suspension from 6.6.1983 to 28.1.1985 has been regularised as an eligible leave and that proceedings became final, which is also not challenged by the petitioner. As the period of suspension from 6.6.1983 to 28.1.1985 has been regularised as eligible leave as early as in the year 1992 itself and that proceeding of the respondents has not been agitated so far and therefore, the claim in this regard for treating the period of suspension from 6.6.1983 to 28.1.1985 as duty does not arise for consideration. 21. As regards the third claim of the petitioner for notional promotion to her husband on par with his immediate junior is concerned, it is the petitioner’s case that the first respondent failed to take note of the punishment of stoppage of increment for two years without cumulative effect, as ordered by the District Collector, Kanyakumari, on 18.9.1984, which will have effect upto the year 1986 and hence, the name of the petitioner’s husband ought to have been included in the promotion panel as early as on 1986. It is to be seen that the temporary panel was prepared in the year 1983 for the post of Divisional Development Officer and the petitioner’s husband, by name, S. Russelian was passed over due to the punishment of reversion as Extension Officer (Industries) and due to his suspension in the Vigilance case. It is seen from the records that the subject matter of challenge before the Tribunal in O.A. No. 172 of 1989 was with regard to the punishment of reversion alone, whereas, the other Vigilance/disciplinary cases, which were pending against the petitioner’s husband at the time of preparation of panel for the post of Divisional Development Officer for the year 1983, ended in ’Censure’ vide proceedings of the Collector of Kanyakumari District, dated 9.7.1989.’Censure’is a codified punishment under the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules. At the time of drawal of panel for the post of Divisional Development Officer for the year 1983, 17(b) charges were pending against the petitioner’s husband and it ended in ’Censure’ in July 1989 and thereafter, he retired orv 30.9.1989. Even assuming that ’Censure’ will have effect for one year, in the mean-time, the petitioner’s husband retired from service and therefore, his claim for inclusion of his name in the panel for the post of Divisional Development Officer for the subsequent years could not be done by the respondents in view of the pendency of charges as well as punishment of ’Censure’. It is unfortunate that the petitioner has not chosen to challenge the punishment of ’Censure’. The punishment of ’Censure’ is operating against the petitioner’s husband for inclusion of her husband’s name even for notional promotion. While that being the position, the third claim of the petitioner also fails. 22. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the Government Order in G.O. Ms. No. 368 Personnel & Administrative Reforms (S) Department dated 18.10.1993, but, it has no relevance to the petitioner’s claim, as G.O. Ms. While that being the position, the third claim of the petitioner also fails. 22. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the Government Order in G.O. Ms. No. 368 Personnel & Administrative Reforms (S) Department dated 18.10.1993, but, it has no relevance to the petitioner’s claim, as G.O. Ms. No. 289 Personal and Administrative Department, dated 12.3.1980 alone was in force during the relevant period of time, wherein, it is specifically stated that the Government has examined a particular question with regard to overlooking of cases of promotion and it arrived at a view that it is not proper to overlook cases of promotions for the reasons that an individual has stoppage of increments within a period of three years or ’Censure’ within one year as orders prescribing such time limits for considering punishments were already canceled and the question of taking into account such punishments for the purposes of promotion and confirmation etc. is now left to the discretion of the appointing authority. In the said Government Order, the Government has specifically given a direction that the appointing authority should exercise the discretion vested with them judicially and they should not be guided merely by the number of punishments received by an individual, but should examine the lapses for which the punishments were imposed and decide his fitness for promotion. 23. To examine, whether the currency of punishment inflicted on the petitioner’s husband would cause any prejudice to him in claiming the promotion, it is worth-while to refer the following decisions of the Supreme Court: (i) In a decision in State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. P. Bose and Another, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 491 : 1994-II-LLJ-429 , it was held by the Supreme Court that the respondent awarded in the immediate past (the preceding year in this case) punishments of censure for failure to attend to duty to restore law and order, postponement of increment for delaying the registration of a case of a serious offence and censure for disobeying the instructions of a superior. In such circumstances, non-inclusion of the appellant in the list of candidates eligible for promotion to next higher post of Inspector of Police did not warrant interference by the Tribunal and his non-inclusion is valid. In Para No. 1 of the said judgment, it was held as follows at p. 429 of LLJ: “1. In such circumstances, non-inclusion of the appellant in the list of candidates eligible for promotion to next higher post of Inspector of Police did not warrant interference by the Tribunal and his non-inclusion is valid. In Para No. 1 of the said judgment, it was held as follows at p. 429 of LLJ: “1. This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal whereby the Tribunal set aside the decision of the department not to include the name of respondent 1 in the list of candidates eligible for promotion to the next higher post of Inspector of Police. It transpires that in the year 1987 respondent 1 was visited with three punishments: (i) a censure on 17.11.1987 for neglect of duty in not attending to law and order situation which arose due to water scarcity; (ii) postponement of increment for neglect of duty in delaying the registration of a case Madurai City B-8 Police Station Cr. No. 567 of 1987, under Sections 448 and 376 IPC and (iii) a censure on 15.12.1987 for irresponsible conduct and disobedience of instructions of Deputy Superintendent of Police. All these acts of misconduct and misdemeanour were during the period of two months, i.e. April and May 1987. When the question of considering whether or not respondent 1 was fit for promotion to the next higher post came up for consideration in 1988, on account of the aforesaid punishments with which he was visited in the year 1987 for acts of misconduct/misdemeanour during the months of April and May 1987 the authorities did not consider him fit for inclusion in the panel for promotion. Thereupon, respondent 1 approached the Tribunal and the Tribunal relying on. G.O. Ms. No. 289 dated 12.3.1980 came to the conclusion that since “the misconduct was not of a serious nature e.g., corruption, gross negligence or failure in the discharge of duties and responsibilities but the charges for which the punishments were imposed being relatively of a minor nature, the authorities ought to have considered his overall performance. We are afraid we cannot accede to this line of reasoning. Respondent 1 being a police officer, was expected to show devotion and dedication to duty and this is what he lacked if we are to bear in rnind the reasons why he was visited with three punishments during the year 1987. We are afraid we cannot accede to this line of reasoning. Respondent 1 being a police officer, was expected to show devotion and dedication to duty and this is what he lacked if we are to bear in rnind the reasons why he was visited with three punishments during the year 1987. Failure to attend to duty to restore law and order, failure to promptly register a serious offence and refusal to carry but or obey instructions of a superior, though visited with minor penalties are not matters which are not germane to the selection process. The next higher post of Inspector of Police being a very responsible post a person with a weak record with three punishments in the immediately preceding year if not selected could not be heard to say that though fit for promotion to the next higher post he was wrongly ignored. The post of Inspector of Police being a pivotal post in a uniformed service must be filled in by persons of integrity and devotion to duty and internal discipline and anyone who has betrayed a tendency to ignore the same in the immediate past cannot aspire for promotion. The Tribunal was, therefore, wrong in interfering with the selection process. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal ought not to have interfered with the discretion of those who were charged with the duty to select persons eligible for promotion.” (ii) Similarly, in. a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. K.S. Murugesan and Others (1995) 3 SCC 273 : 1996-III-LLJ (Suppl)-333, it was held that where the rules provided for promotion on the basis of merit and ability, withholding of promotion on account of currency of punishment of stoppage of increments would neither amounted to double jeopardy nor arbitrary exercise of power. In Para No. 7, it was held as follows at p. 335 of LLJ: “7. It would thtis be clear that when promotion is under consideration the previous record forms the basis and when the promotion is on merit and ability, the currency of punishment based on previous record stands as an impediment. Unless the period of punishment gets expired by efflux of time, the claim for consideration during the said period cannot be taken up. Otherwise, it would amount to retrospective promotion which is impermissible under the rules and it would be a premium on misconduct. Unless the period of punishment gets expired by efflux of time, the claim for consideration during the said period cannot be taken up. Otherwise, it would amount to retrospective promotion which is impermissible under the rules and it would be a premium on misconduct. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the doctrine of double jeopardy has no application and non-consideration is neither violative of Article 21 nor Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution.” (iii) In a decision in L. Rajaiah v. Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, Hyderabad and Others, AIR 1996 SC 2199 : (1996) 8 SCC 246 , the Supreme Court has held that an employee undergoing punishment of stoppage of increment is not entitled to be considered for promotion during that period of punishment. In Para No. 4, it was held as follows: “4. A reading thereof clearly indicates that notwithstanding anything contained in special ad hoc rules, all promotions to non-selection category or grade shall, subject to the provisions of Rule 16, may be made in accordance with seniority-cum-fitness unless promotions of a member has been withheld as a penalty. Though due to stoppage of increment, he is not ineligible for consideration for promotion, he is otherwise entitled to be considered in accordance with the rules, namely, seniority-cum-fitness. However, when seniority-cum-fitness is the criteria, the imposition of the penalties for one year on 1.3.1988 and in another enquiry, stoppage of increment for five years from 1.3.1989, i.e., till 28.2.1994, disentitled him to be considered; so he did not regain fitness for consideration for promotion as he was under disability undergoing punishment. Consequently, when the promotion to the post of Senior Assistant is on the basis of merit and ability under special rules, fitness is one of the considerations for the purpose. Since he was undergoing punishment during the relevant period, he is not eligible for consideration for promotion. Therefore, his juniors have stolen march over the appellant as Senior Assistants. He cannot thereby have any grievance. Since he was undergoing punishment during the relevant period, he is not eligible for consideration for promotion. Therefore, his juniors have stolen march over the appellant as Senior Assistants. He cannot thereby have any grievance. However, he is entitled to be considered for promotion according to rules after 1.3.1994.” (iv) In a decision of the Full Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Others v. C. Krishnan, AIR 1992 SC 1898 , it was held that denial of promotion during the currency of penalty in disciplinary proceedings against an employee would not be said to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India or it does not subject the employee to double jeopardy. In Para No. 4, it was held as follows: “4. We have considered the matter closely and in our opinion the view taken by the Tribunal both in the impugned judgment and in the earlier decisions holding that as a result of the provisions of Rule 157 forbidding the promotion of a State employee during the currency of the penalty results in a second punishment, is not correct. There is only one punishment visiting the respondent as a result of the conclusion reached in the disciplinary proceeding leading to the withholding of increment, and the denial of promotion during the currency of the penalty is merely a consequential result thereof. The view that a government servant for the reason that he is suffering a penalty or a disciplinary proceeding cannot at the same time be promoted to a higher cadre is a logical one and no exception can be taken to Rule 157. It is not correct to assume that Rule 157 by including the aforementioned provision is subjecting the government servant concerned to double jeopardy. We do not find any merit in the argument that there is no justification or rationale behind this policy; nor do we see any reason to condemn it as unjustified, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the . On the other hand, to punish a servant and at the same time to promote him during the currency of the punishment may justifiably be termed as self-contradictory. The impugned judgment is, therefore, set aside.” In all the above decisions, the Supreme Court had categorically held that denial of promotion during the currency of punishment by the employer is warranted. On the other hand, to punish a servant and at the same time to promote him during the currency of the punishment may justifiably be termed as self-contradictory. The impugned judgment is, therefore, set aside.” In all the above decisions, the Supreme Court had categorically held that denial of promotion during the currency of punishment by the employer is warranted. Hence, once there is a punishment in currency, he will not be entitled for promotion. 24. In the instant case, the authority, taking into consideration of the pendency of the punishment during the relevant period of time and also the over-all aspect of the matter, rejected the claim of the petitioner for her husband’s notional promotion. After examining the discretionary powers in respect of matters of promotion and in the light of the decisions cited supra, this Court is of the considered opinion that when charges were pending against the petitioner’s husband and punishment being awarded, it is for the authority concerned to exercise its discretion. When the authority has duly exercised its discretionary powers, it is not for this Court to examine such right, unless, it is shown to this Court that the discretion is arbitrarily exercised or otherwise. In the absence of any such materials before this Court to show that the respondents have exercised their discretion arbitrarily, this Court cannot direct them to exercise jurisdiction for considering the case of the husband of the petitioner for promotion. 25. Having regard to the above, I do not find any irregularity or illegality in the action of the respondents. This Court could interfere only if the decision taken by the authority is found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or in violation of principles of natural justice and not taken in public interest. As I have already narrated supra, the impugned order does not suffer from any arbitrariness or unfairness or lack of jurisdiction warranting interference. 26. For the foregoing reasons as well as the discussions made above, upon perusing all the material documents, besides the orders in question and in the light of the decisions cited supra, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner’s claim deserves no merrt consideration and therefore, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.