JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.—Raising a short dispute with regard to the ambit and scope of Section 42-A of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, the present writ petition has been filed against the order dated 6th of April, 1983 whereby the Deputy Director of Consolidation has rejected the application filed by the petitioner for rectification of mistake in the order dated 12th of December, 1974. 2. The background facts of the case may be noticed in brief. 3. At the very outset, Sri D.S.P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner states that the dispute in the present writ petition is confined to Khata No. 25 Ka. 4. A pedigree which is not in dispute has been given in para 2 of the writ petition. According to it, Suryanarain Singh was the common ancestor who left behind him three sons namely Jwala Prasad Singh, Mangla Prasad Singh and Ramnaresh Singh. The petitioner herein represents the branch of Ramnaresh Singh. The contesting respondents represents the branches of Jwala Prasad Singh and Mangla Prasad Singh. During the consolidation operation, Surendra Pratap Singh son of Jwala Prasad Singh filed an objection under Section 9-A of the UPCH Act for partition of his 1/6th share in the aforesaid Khata alongwith other Khatas which are no longer in dispute presently. It was stated that the holding is joint Hindu family property and after the death of Suryanarain Singh, his each son namely Jwala Prasad Singh, Mangla Prasad Singh and Ramnaresh Singh inherited 1/3rd share therein. Surendra Pratap Singh who is son of Jwala Prasad Singh claimed half share in Khata No. 24 Ka and 1/6th share in Khata No. 25 Ka. The said objection was rejected by the Consolidation Officer by order dated 26th of May, 1973. 5. The matter was carried unsuccessfully, in appeal No. 1089 before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation who by the order dated 28th November, 1973 dismissed the appeal. The matter was carried further in revision No. 532 by Surendra Pratap Singh before Deputy Director of Consolidation who by the order dated 12th of December, 1974 allowed the revision, set aside the orders of the two Courts below and passed an order holding the share of Surendra Pratap Singh 1/6th in Khata No. 25Ka. The matter was carried further in revision No. 532 by Surendra Pratap Singh before Deputy Director of Consolidation who by the order dated 12th of December, 1974 allowed the revision, set aside the orders of the two Courts below and passed an order holding the share of Surendra Pratap Singh 1/6th in Khata No. 25Ka. In the operative portion it was observed that the revision is allowed, the judgment and order of the two Courts below are hereby set aside and it is held that the revisionist will have half share in the other Khata and the opposite party No. 3 will have another half share. With regard to the Khata No. 25 Ka with which we are presently concerned it is mentioned that therein the opposite party No. 2 and opposite party No. 3 each will have 1/3rd share. 6. An application to rectify the mistake in the last sentence of the said order, giving rise to the present writ petition, was filed by the petitioner on the allegations that instead of “opp. Party Nos. 2 and 3” it should have been as “opposite party Nos. 2 and 1” in the said order. The said application has been dismissed by the impugned order on the ground that it amounts reviewing of the earlier order and it will have severe consequences on the rights of the parties. Hence, the present writ petition. 7. Heard Sri D.S.P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Aditya Narain, learned counsel for the contesting respondents. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is not in dispute that the holding is ancestral holding and it was inherited by all the three sons of Suryanarain Singh, in equal share. Each branch will have 1/3rd share in the holding and to this extent there was no dispute at any stage of litigation. This being so, the operative order of Deputy Director of Consolidation is not in conformity of the admitted case of the parties due to a typographical error therein. The mistake is apparent on record and it should be corrected. 8. The dispute arose only on the objection filed by Surendra Pratap Singh son of Jwala Prasad Singh whereby he is claiming 1/6th share in the disputed holding. In other words, he submits that it was not in dispute that the petitioner has not got 1/3rd share in Khata No. 25 Ka. 8. The dispute arose only on the objection filed by Surendra Pratap Singh son of Jwala Prasad Singh whereby he is claiming 1/6th share in the disputed holding. In other words, he submits that it was not in dispute that the petitioner has not got 1/3rd share in Khata No. 25 Ka. This was not in issue before any of the authorities below nor was the subject matter of revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, but the Deputy Director of Consolidation by passing the operative order has committed a clerical mistake and by mistake in place of opposite party No. 1 it has been written as opposite party No. 3. 9. Sri Aditya Narain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents submits that the mistake sought to be rectified under Section 42-A of the Act amounts reviewing of the earlier order dated 12th of December, 1974. He submits that in view of the decision of this Court, the power of review is not given to Deputy Director of Consolidation. He further submits that in view of the subsequent event after the order dated 12th of December, 1974, the petitioner is not entitled to get the mistake, if any, rectified under Section 42-A of the Act. 10. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. As mentioned herein above, it was not in dispute between the parties at any stage that all the three branches of Suryanarain Singh had 1/3rd share in all the Khatas including Khata No. 25 Ka which is presently in the dispute. The dispute arose on account of an objection filed by Surendra Pratap Singh son of Jwala Prasad Singh claiming his separate share to the extent of 1/6th share in the Khatas. The subject matter of dispute, thus, was whether Surendra Pratap Singh is entitled for separation of his 1/6th share or not. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has held that he was entitled for separation of 1/6th share. This also supports the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that all the three sons of Suryanarain Singh have 1/3rd share. As a matter of fact, it was not disputed by Sri Aditya Narain, learned counsel for the contesting respondents that the petitioner’s branch had 1/3rd share in Khata No. 25 Ka. 12. This also supports the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that all the three sons of Suryanarain Singh have 1/3rd share. As a matter of fact, it was not disputed by Sri Aditya Narain, learned counsel for the contesting respondents that the petitioner’s branch had 1/3rd share in Khata No. 25 Ka. 12. For the sake of convenience, the operative portion of the order dated 12.12.1974 is reproduced below : **vr% ;g fuxjkuh Lohdkj dh tkrh gS rFkk nksuksa v/khuLFk U;k;ky;ksa dk vkns’k fujLr fd;k tkrk gS vkSj fookfnr [kkrk la[;k 24d esa fuxjkuhdrkZa dk va’k 1@2 rFkk foi{kh la[;k 3 dk va’k 1@2 rFkk fookfnr [kkrk la[;k 25d esa fuxjkuhdrkZ dk va’k 1@6 rFkk foi{kh la[;k 3 dk va’k 1@6 ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gSA [kkrk la[;k 25d esa foi{kh la[;k 2 rFkk 3 izR;sd dk va’k 1@3 gksxkA** 13. A close reading of the said order shows that in Khata No. 25 Ka, the share of revisionist therein i.e. Surendra Pratap and 1/6th share of opposite party No. 3 namely Jwala Pratap Singh, was declared in the last but one sentence. In the last sentence again 1/3rd share of the opposite party No. 2 and opposite party No. 3 each was declared. A close reading of the operative portion of the order of Deputy Director of Consolidation makes it transpired that in the last sentence by mistake in place of word numeral ‘1’, numeral ‘3’ was typed out. A reading of the said order as a whole discloses in no uncertain terms that each one has 1/3rd share. As a matter of fact, 1/3rd share of the petitioner in the disputed Khata was never disputed at any stage either before the Consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer of Consolidation or even before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Even in the discussion part the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not found that the petitioner has not got 1/3rd share in Khata No. 25 Ka. This being so, it is clear that there is an error apparent in the order dated 12th of December, 1974 and the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not justified in not rectifying the said mistake. 14. At this stage, it is appropriate to discuss the citation relied upon by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents. 15. Reliance has been placed on Kandhai Lal v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, 1985 RD 367. 14. At this stage, it is appropriate to discuss the citation relied upon by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents. 15. Reliance has been placed on Kandhai Lal v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, 1985 RD 367. The relevant paragraph which has been relied upon is reproduced below : “................. Under Section 42-A of the Act only clerical or arithmetical error can be corrected by the Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. No doubt under the inherent power any Court or authority can rectify any error which has been committed by the Court itself, if the Court is so satisfied to that effect and provided the Court takes the view that the correct facts have not been stated in the view that were available on the record as canvassed or interpreted by the counsel for the parties.” 16. The aforesaid paragraph does not advance the case of the contesting respondents any further. 17. The application was not filed by the petitioner invoking the inherent power of Deputy Director of Consolidation. On the contrary, specific power has been conferred under Section 42 of the Act on the Consolidation Officer the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. For the sake of convenience Sections 42-A and 44-A of the Act is reproduced below : “42-A. Correction of clerical or arithmetical errors.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if the Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, is satisfied that a clerical or arithmetical error apparent on the face of the record exists in any document prepared under any provision of this Act, he shall, either on his own motion, or on the application of any person interested, correct the same.” “44-A. Powers of subordinate authority to be exercised by a superior authority.—Where powers are to be exercised or duties to be performed by any authority under this Act or the rules made thereunder, such powers or duties may also be exercised or performed by any authority superior to it.” 18. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid two Sections would clearly show that the Deputy Director of Consolidation would have also power to rectify the clerical or arithmetical mistake if he is satisfied that the error is apparent on the face of record. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid two Sections would clearly show that the Deputy Director of Consolidation would have also power to rectify the clerical or arithmetical mistake if he is satisfied that the error is apparent on the face of record. In Sheesh Ram and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 2009(5) ADJ 498 , it has been held that Section 42-A has an overriding effect and it can be exercised even after the notification under Section 52 of the UPCH Act. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon another judgement of this Court in Arun Kumar Pandey v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 2009 (106) RD 522 wherein I had an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of Section 42-A and in paragraphs 7 and 8 it has been held as follows : “7. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that under the said Section only an error apparent on the face of record can be corrected. Firstly, there should be an error in the order and the said error should be apparent. The said Section does not empower the consolidation authorities after the close of the consolidation operation to reconsider a matter on any other ground.” 8. In the guise of correction of clerical or arithmetical errors, consolidation authorities cannot re-open a matter. A very limited jurisdiction under Section 42-A of the Act has been given to the consolidation authorities which can be exercised on the fulfilment of the fact that there is a clerical or arithmetical error apparent on the face of the record. In other words, the said Section does not empower consolidation authorities to entertain any application and decide a dispute so raised therein on merits, afresh.” 20. After all a mistake is a mistake. A mistake may be either of law or fact. This is a case of mistake of fact. The mistake has been committed not by the parties but by the Deputy Director of Consolidation who was under legal obligation to decide the right, title or interest of the parties with respect to the holding without committing any mistake. To err is human. This is a case of mistake of fact. The mistake has been committed not by the parties but by the Deputy Director of Consolidation who was under legal obligation to decide the right, title or interest of the parties with respect to the holding without committing any mistake. To err is human. The mistakes are mistakes and they can always be corrected by following due procedure of law as said by the Apex Court in Union of India and another v. Narendra Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 750 . 21. Now, a question arises as to whether the petitioner should suffer for the mistake of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. To me the answer is very simple and the answer is provided by “Actus curiae neminem grabavit” a maxim, purporting that an act of Court should do no harm to a litigant. It is a well known maxim of law. The said maxim is part of the mode of administering the justice, as mentioned in Broom’s Legal Maxim. 22. It has been said, time and again, that the above maxim is founded upon justice and good sense, and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of law as was said by CRESS WELL J. in Freeman v. Tranah, 12 C.B. 406. An unintentional mistake of the Court which may prejudice the cause of any party must and alone could be rectified. In Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1047 it was observed that the arithmetical mistake is a mistake of calculation, a clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or typing whereas an error arising out of or occurring from accidental slip or omission is an error due to careless mistake on the part of the Court liable to be corrected. To illustrate this point it was said that in a case where the order contains something which is not mentioned in the decree, it would be a case of unintentional omission or mistake as the mistake or omission is attributable to the Court which may say something or omit to say something which it did not intend to say or omit. No new arguments or re-arguments on merits can be entertained to facilitate such rectification of mistakes. No new arguments or re-arguments on merits can be entertained to facilitate such rectification of mistakes. The provision cannot be invoked to modify, alter or add to the terms of the original order or decree so as to, in effect, pass an effective judicial order after the judgment in the case. 23. The Apex Court in Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey, JT 1987 (3) SC 555; Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, JT 1996 (1) SC 647; Mohammod Gazi v. State of M.P. and others, JT 2004 (4) SC 55; South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P. and others, 2003 (8) SCC 648 and Krishna Swami S. Prasad and another v. Union of India and others, 2006 AIR SCW 1046 has approved the applicability of the above maxim. 24. The Apex Court in Nagraj and others v. State of Karnatak and others, 1993 Supp. 4 SCC 595 has observed as follows : “It is the duty of the Court to rectify, revise and recall its orders as and when it is brought to its notice that certain of its orders were passed on a wrong or mistaken assumption of facts and that implementation of those orders would have serious consequence. As act of Court should prejudice none “of all these things respecting which learned men dispute”, said, Cicero,” there is none more important than clearly to understand that we are born for justice and that right is founded not in opinion but in nature.” This very idea was echoed by James Madison (The Federalist, No. 51 at p.352). He said : Justice is the end of the government, it is the end of the civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained or until liberty be lost in pursuit.” 25. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the mistake in the operative portion of the order of Deputy Director of Consolidation is apparent and the said mistake was liable to be rectified. By rejecting the rectification application, grave injustice has been caused to the petitioner. 26. It was rightly pointed out that there is nothing in the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation holding that each party has 1/3rd share. The 1/3rd share of the petitioner in Khata No. 25 Ka was never in dispute at any stage. By rejecting the rectification application, grave injustice has been caused to the petitioner. 26. It was rightly pointed out that there is nothing in the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation holding that each party has 1/3rd share. The 1/3rd share of the petitioner in Khata No. 25 Ka was never in dispute at any stage. The Deputy Director of Consolidation in his order dated 12.12.1974 was not called upon to decide the extent of share of the petitioner nor there was any occasion for him to hold that the petitioner had no share in the disputed Khatas. It was never so meant. 27. The argument of the learned counsel for the contesting respondents that in view of the subsequent development, the application is not maintainable, is meritless. No such plea was pressed before the Deputy Director of Consolidation nor the order contains any such plea. The scope of litigation between the parties was with regard to the objection filed by Surendra Pratap Singh and not beyond it. Any other point was not pressed. 28. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 6th of April, 1983 is hereby set aside. 29. The rectification application filed by the petitioner stands allowed. 30. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with cost of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) payable by the heirs of respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 to the petitioner. —————