S.S. Chauhan, J.:- Since the common question of facts and law are involved in these petitions, therefore, they are being decided by a common judgment. In all these petitions the accused persons have been summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. on the basis of statements recorded in the court. The court after considering the gravity of the evidence and the nature of allegations made in the statements proceeded to summon the accused persons, who were not arrayed as an accused during the course of investigation or they were let off during the course of investigation. The learned Sessions Judge in the aforesaid cases has proceeded to rely upon the statements given in the court from which it was evident that the evidence given in the court was sufficient to constitute a prima facie offence against the petitioners. In the case of Prem Das Tripathi and others bearing Criminal Misc. Case No.3272 of 2011 it has specifically come in the statements of P.Ws-1, 2 and 3 that Prem Das exhorted the other accused persons to fire and thereafter fire was made. Therefore, specific role has been assigned to the petitioners and their participation in the crime on the basis of the aforesaid statements is prima facie made out. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no sufficient evidence available to summon the petitioners. In the case of Smt. Sweety bearing Criminal Revision No.307 of 2011 statement of P.W.-1 has been taken into consideration, who happens to be the brother of the deceased in which he has stated that he was in continuous touch with his brother, who has taken the house of Neelesh Srivastava in Moti Nagar, Unnao on rent and he was staying in the said house. The revisionist along with her husband Ashu were also staying in the said house. The post mortem was conducted in which it was found that the death has occurred as a result of strangulation. The trial court, prima facie, found that the evidence was also collected in furtherance of common intention and the revisionist along with her husband were present when the death has occurred as a result of strangulation. Therefore, the trial court found that, prima facie, evidence was existing for summoning the revisionist under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In the case of Waseem Ahmad alias Mohd. Waseem Khan bearing Criminal Misc. Therefore, the trial court found that, prima facie, evidence was existing for summoning the revisionist under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In the case of Waseem Ahmad alias Mohd. Waseem Khan bearing Criminal Misc. Case No.3460 of 2011 it has specifically come in the statements of P.W.-1 and P.W.-3 that the petitioner has helped in elopement of the prosecutrix. Therefore, specific role has been assigned to the petitioner and his participation in the elopement of the prosecutrix on the basis of the aforesaid statements is prima facie made out. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no sufficient evidence available to summon the petitioner. In the case of Shailendra alias Sanjay bearing Criminal Misc. Case No.3493 of 2011 the prosecutrix has specifically stated against the petitioner in the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. as well as in the statement on oath before the court and from the said statements specific participation of the petitioner cannot be ruled out. The court examined the statement of the victim recorded in the court and came to the conclusion that, prima facie, evidence was existing against the petitioner and as such proceeded to summon him under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In the case of Shanta Devi and another bearing Criminal Misc. Case No.3500 of 2011 statements of the victim and her father have been recorded and from both the statements specific allegation has been made against the petitioners, who happen to be the mother-in-law and the sister-in-law (Nanad). Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no, prima facie, evidence available to summon the petitioners. The incident is alleged to have taken place at 3 a.m. in the morning and so the story set up by the defence cannot be believed that the victim sustained injury while sitting before the bonfire. The husband of the victim is in Army and, therefore, she was all alone at her house. All the villagers gathered to save her. It has been stated that both the petitioners were present at the time of incident. Burn injuries are there and the statement in regard to participation of the petitioners and Kapil Deo Singh is there on record, therefore, the trial court has proceeded to summon the petitioners taking into consideration the evidence on record, which constitutes, prima facie, case against the petitioners. Burn injuries are there and the statement in regard to participation of the petitioners and Kapil Deo Singh is there on record, therefore, the trial court has proceeded to summon the petitioners taking into consideration the evidence on record, which constitutes, prima facie, case against the petitioners. In all the above cases the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that the trial court has not recorded any finding in regard to the satisfaction that in all likelihood there was a chance of conviction taking the evidence into consideration and apart from it, the trial court has not expressed its satisfaction regarding the evidence and the involvement of the accused persons. In sum and substance, the argument is that the trial court must record a finding that in all likelihood there was a chance of conviction and the reasons must be explicit. The further argument is that as to in what manner the evidence was sufficient to constitute, prima facie, offence has also not been discussed. In support of their contention, counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the following decisions of the apex Court as well as this Court:- Michael Machado and another vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, (2000) 3 SCC 262 , Sarabjit Singh and another vs. State of Punjab and another, 2009 (66) ACC 32 (SC) : (2009) 16 SCC 46 , Suman vs. State of Rajasthan and another, (2010) 1 SCC 250 . Anoop Singh and others vs. State of U.P. and another, 2010 (71) ACC 233, Km. Pushpa vs. State of U.P. and others, 2011 (72) ACC 75, Rajendra Kumar vs. State of U.P. and another, 2011 (72) ACC 380 and Ishrawati vs. State of U.P. and another, 2011 (73) ACC 838. Learned AGA, on the other hand, has submitted that before summoning the accused the court has taken into consideration the statements and found that there was sufficient evidence to constitute prima facie offence against the petitioners. Learned AGA, on the other hand, has submitted that before summoning the accused the court has taken into consideration the statements and found that there was sufficient evidence to constitute prima facie offence against the petitioners. He has further submitted that recording of reasons and satisfaction was not necessary and the court has only to take into consideration the statement recorded in the court from which it may be evident that involvement of the accused was there and there was positive evidence in regard to the participation and, prima facie, case was existing for summoning the accused persons and to that extent only the court has to take into consideration the aforesaid principles. In support of his contention he has relied upon the following decisions of the apex Court as well as this Court:- Hassanne and others vs. State of U.P. and others, 2011 (1) JIC 178 (All) (LB), Kulwant Singh vs. State of U.P. and another, 2011 (2) JIC 10 (All) (LB), Mohd. Arif and another vs. State of U.P. And another, 2011 (73) ACC 57, Mohd. Shafi vs. Mohd. Rafiq and another, (2007) 14 SCC 544 Apart from it, the learned AGA has strongly relied upon the decision of the apex Court rendered in the case of Suman (supra) and has submitted that all the earlier cases have been considered in this case and have been clarified to certain extent laying therein that, prima facie, evidence was to be taken into consideration for summoning the accused persons and the requirement of finding that there was a chance of conviction on the basis of evidence which was recorded in the court, has been diluted and recording of satisfaction is also not mandatory in view of the aforesaid case law. He has also relied upon the latest judgment rendered on 10.8.2011 by the apex Court in the case of Sarojben Ashwinkumar Shah etc. He has also relied upon the latest judgment rendered on 10.8.2011 by the apex Court in the case of Sarojben Ashwinkumar Shah etc. vs. State of Gujarat and another, and the same has been placed before the Court for perusal, wherein the apex Court has laid down certain principles for summoning the accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and the principles laid down in the cases of Michael Machado (supra) and Sarabjit Singh (supra) have been diluted to that extent and the power to summon any person not being an accused before the court must be exercised only where there appears during inquiry or trial sufficient evidence indicating the involvement of a person in the offence as an accused and not otherwise. He, therefore, submits that the Court should take a pragmatic view and in the light of the latest view of the apex Court the matter should be decided. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned AGA and perused the record. Before considering the argument of counsel for the parties, the Court has to see the law prevailing as on today in respect of summoning of an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Whether the court has to record a finding that there are chances of conviction or that the satisfaction of the court is to be recorded or that, prima facie, satisfaction of the court on the basis of the evidence is sufficient to summon a person under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Instead of going back to the history of the case laws, which have been rendered time and again it would be proper and useful to refer some of the latest decisions which draw a line of distinction between the old view and the latest view expressed by the apex Court diluting the earlier view laid down in the cases of Michael Machado (supra), Sarabjit Singh (supra) and Mohd. Shafi (supra). In the case of Michael Machado (supra) it was found by the court that out of 49 witnesses three witnesses have given evidence against the accused persons and, therefore, the apex Court laid down the proposition in the aforesaid context that the power vested under Section 319 Cr.P.C. should be exercised judicially having regard to various factors including the stage at which the trial has proceeded and the quantum of evidence collected and time spent by the court in collecting evidence. It was also held that mere suspicion in regard to involvement in the offence was not sufficient. In para 14 of the aforesaid judgment the apex Court held as under:- " 14. The court while deciding whether to invoke the power under Section 319 of the Code, must address itself about the other constraints imposed by the first limb of sub- section (4), that proceedings in respect of newly added persons shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses re-examined. The whole proceedings must be re-commenced from the beginning of the trial, summon the witnesses once again and examine them and cross-examine them in order to reach the stage where it had reached earlier. If the witnesses already examined are quite large in number the court must seriously consider whether the objects sought to be achieved by such exercise is worth wasting the whole labour already undertaken. Unless the court is hopeful that there is reasonable prospect of the case as against the newly brought accused ending in conviction of the offence concerned we would say that the court should refrain from adopting such a course of action." In the case of Mohd. Shafi (supra) the apex Court while considering the question as to when an accused can be summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. came to the conclusion that the court must arrive at a satisfaction that there exists a possibility that the accused so summoned is to be convicted in all likelihood. In this case the apex Court also held that such satisfaction can be arrived at inter alia upon completion of the cross-examination of the said witness or if the court concerned may also like to consider other evidence. While endorsing the aforesaid view, the apex Court relied upon a decision rendered in the case of MCD vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi (1983) 1 SCC 1 and Yuvaraj Ambar Mohite vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 12 SCC 512 . In para 12 of the aforesaid judgment the apex Court held as under: " 12. From the decisions of this Court, as noticed above, it is evident that before a court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction in terms of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it must arrive at the satisfaction that there exists a possibility that the accused so summoned is in all likelihood would be convicted. From the decisions of this Court, as noticed above, it is evident that before a court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction in terms of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it must arrive at the satisfaction that there exists a possibility that the accused so summoned is in all likelihood would be convicted. Such satisfaction can be arrived at inter alia upon completion of the cross-examination of the said witness. For the said purpose, the court concerned may also like to consider other evidence." Thereafter, in the case of Sarabjit Singh (supra) the apex Court after considering various judgments including Mohd. Shafi (supra) ruled and emphasized therein that the materials brought before the court must also be such which would satisfy the court that it is one of those cases where its jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly. In para 17 of the aforesaid judgment it was held as under:- "17. The provision of Section 319 of the Code, on a plain reading, provides that such an extraordinary case has been made out must appear to the court. Has the criterion laid down by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) been satisfied is the question? Indisputably, before an additional accused can be summoned for standing trial, the nature of the evidence should be such which would make out grounds for exercise of extraordinary power. The materials brought before the court must also be such which would satisfy the court that it is one of those cases where its jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly. We may notice that in Y. Saraba Reddy v. Puthur Rami Reddy and another, [JT 2007 (6) SC 460], this Court opined: "... Undisputedly, it is an extraordinary power which is conferred on the Court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking action against a person against whom action had not been taken earlier. The word "evidence" in Section 319 contemplates that evidence of witnesses given in Court..." An order under Section 319 of the Code, therefore, should not be passed only because the first informant or one of the witnesses seeks to implicate other person(s). Sufficient and cogent reasons are required to be assigned by the court so as to satisfy the ingredients of the provisions. Mere ipse dixit would not serve the purpose. Sufficient and cogent reasons are required to be assigned by the court so as to satisfy the ingredients of the provisions. Mere ipse dixit would not serve the purpose. Such an evidence must be convincing one at least for the purpose of exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. For the aforementioned purpose, the courts are required to apply stringent tests; one of the tests being whether evidence on record is such which would reasonably lead to conviction of the person sought to be summoned." Further, the apex Court also considered the requirement of framing of charge and summoning the accused persons under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and held that the higher standard was required for summoning an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. as compared to the framing of charge under Section 227 Cr.P.C. In para 18 of the aforesaid judgment the apex Court held as under:- "18. The observation of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) and other decisions following the same is that mere existence of a prima facie case may not serve the purpose. Different standards are required to be applied at different stages. Whereas the test of prima facie case may be sufficient for taking cognizance of an offence at the stage of framing of charge, the court must be satisfied that there exists a strong suspicion. While framing charge in terms of Section 227 of the Code, the court must consider the entire materials on record to form an opinion that the evidence if unrebutted would lead to a judgment of conviction. Whether a higher standard be set up for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code is the question. The answer to these questions should be rendered in the affirmative. Unless a higher standard for the purpose of forming an opinion to summon a person as an additional accused is laid down, the ingredients thereof, viz., (i) an extraordinary case and (ii) a case for sparingly exercise of jurisdiction, would not be satisfied." The journey of law has travelled further after Michael Machado (supra), Mohd. Shafi (supra) and Sarabjit Singh (supra) and has crystalised in the case of Suman (supra). Shafi (supra) and Sarabjit Singh (supra) and has crystalised in the case of Suman (supra). While considering the initial requirement for forming an opinion that the evidence would result in conviction of the accused, which was consistently followed by the apex Court, stands diluted by the apex Court in the aforesaid case and the Court came to the conclusion that if on inquiry or trial it appears to the court concerned from the evidence that such person has also committed any offence, then he can be tried with other accused. It was also held that there is nothing in the language of Section 319 (1) Cr.P.C. from which it can be inferred that a person who is named in the FIR or complaint but against whom charge-sheet has not been filed by the police, cannot be proceeded against even though in the course of any inquiry into or trial of any offence the court finds that such person has committed any offence for which he could be tried together with the other accused. The apex Court while examining the ratio of law in the aforesaid case held as under:- " 18. The question whether a Sessions Court can take cognizance against a person qua whom there is no committal order was considered and answered in affirmative in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab and another (1979) 1 SCC 345 . The facts of that case were that on a complaint made by one Mohinder Singh, a criminal case was registered at Police Station Dakha against Joginder Singh, Ram Singh (the two appellants), Bhan Singh, Darshan Singh and Ranjit Singh. During investigation police found Joginder Singh and Ram Singh to be innocent and, therefore, charge-sheet was submitted only against the remaining accused. The learned Magistrate committed the three accused to the Sessions Court. 20. This Court noticed the provisions of Sections 193, 207-A and 209 Cr.P.C. and observed: (Joginder Singh case SCC pp 350-51, paras 6-8) " 6. .... During investigation police found Joginder Singh and Ram Singh to be innocent and, therefore, charge-sheet was submitted only against the remaining accused. The learned Magistrate committed the three accused to the Sessions Court. 20. This Court noticed the provisions of Sections 193, 207-A and 209 Cr.P.C. and observed: (Joginder Singh case SCC pp 350-51, paras 6-8) " 6. .... It is true that there cannot be a committal of the case without there being an accused person before the Court, but this only means that before a case in respect of an offence is committed there must be some accused suspected to be involved in the crime before the Court but once the case in respect of the offence qua those accused who are before the Court is committed then the cognizance of the offence can be said to have been taken properly by the Sessions Court and the bar of Section 193 would be out of the way and summoning of additional persons who appear to be involved in the crime from the evidence led during the trial and directing them to stand their trial along with those who had already been committed must be regarded as incidental to such cognizance and a part of the normal process that follows it; otherwise the conferral of the power under Section 319(1) upon the Sessions Court would be rendered nugatory. Further Section 319(4)(b) enacts a deeming provision in that behalf dispensing with the formal committal order against the newly added accused. Under that provision it is provided that where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1) then the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced; in other words, such person must be deemed to be an accused at the time of commitment because it is at that point of time the Sessions Court in law takes cognizance of the offence. 7. In the above context it will be useful to refer to a decision of this Court in Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar where this Court has explained what is meant by taking cognizance of an offence. The appellant was one of the 15 persons mentioned as the assailants in the first information report. 7. In the above context it will be useful to refer to a decision of this Court in Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar where this Court has explained what is meant by taking cognizance of an offence. The appellant was one of the 15 persons mentioned as the assailants in the first information report. During the investigation the police accepted the appellant's plea of alibi and filed a charge-sheet against the others for offences under Sections 302, 201 and 149 IPC, before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate recorded that the appellant was discharged and transferred the case for inquiry to another Magistrate, who, after examining two witnesses, ordered the issue of a non-bailable warrant against the appellant, for proceeding against him along with the other accused under Section 207-A of the old Code. The order was confirmed by the Sessions Court and the High Court and in further appeal to this Court it was held first, that there could be no discharge of the appellant as he was not included in the charge-sheet submitted before the Magistrate by the police and, second that the appellant could be proceeded against along with other accused under Section 207-A Cr PC and this Court confirmed the order of the Magistrate. One of the contentions urged before this Court was that the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence so far as the other accused were concerned but not as regards the appellant and with regard to this contention Sikri, J. (as he then was) observed as follows: " In our opinion, once cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, he takes cognizance of an offence and not the offenders; once he takes cognizance of an offence it is his duty to find out who the offenders really are and once he comes to the conclusion that apart from the persons sent up by the police some other persons are involved, it is his duty to proceed against those persons. The summoning of the additional accused is part of the proceeding initiated by his taking cognizance of an offence. As pointed out by this Court in Pravin Chandra Mody v. State of Andhra Pradesh the term `complaint' would include allegations made against persons unknown. The summoning of the additional accused is part of the proceeding initiated by his taking cognizance of an offence. As pointed out by this Court in Pravin Chandra Mody v. State of Andhra Pradesh the term `complaint' would include allegations made against persons unknown. If a Magistrate takes cognizance under Section 190(l)(a) on the basis of a complaint of facts he would take cognizance and a proceeding would be instituted even though persons who had committed the offence were not known at that time. The same position prevails, in our view, under Section 190(l)(b).' 8. It will thus appear clear that under Section 193 read with Section 209 of the Code when a case is committed to the Court of Sessions in respect of an offence the Court of Sessions takes cognizance of the offence and not of the accused and once the Sessions Court is properly seized of the case as a result of the committal order against some accused the power under Section 319(1) can come into play and such Court can add any person, not an accused before it, as an accused and direct him to be tried along with the other accused for the offence which such added accused appears to have committed from the evidence recorded at the trial. Looking at the provision from this angle there would be no question of reading Section 319(1) subject or subordinate to Section 193." 21. The argument that Section 319 Cr.P.C. excludes from its operation an accused who has been released by the police under Section 169 Cr.P.C. was rejected by the Court by making the following observations: (Joginder Singh case, SCC pp.350-52 para 9) " 9. The said expression clearly covers any person who is not being tried already by the Court and the very purpose of enacting such a provision like Section 319(1) clearly shows that even persons who have been dropped by the police during investigation but against whom evidence showing their involvement in the offence comes before the criminal court are included in the said expression." 22. The scope of Section 319 Cr.P.C. was considered in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and others (1983) 1 SCC 1 , in the backdrop of the fact that the High Court had, in exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., quashed the proceedings taken against respondent Nos.1 to 5 of whom respondent No.1 - Ram Kishan Rohtagi was the Manager of the company engaged in manufacturing Modern Toffees and respondent Nos.2 to 5 were its Directors. This Court reversed the order of the High Court insofar as respondent No.1 was concerned, but upheld the same in respect of other accused and proceeded to observe: (SCC p.7, para 17) "17. Although we uphold the order of the High Court we would like to state that there are ample provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in which the Court can take cognizance against persons who have not been made accused and try them in the same manner along with the other accused. In the old Code, Section 351 contained a lacuna in the mode of taking cognizance if a new person was to be added as an accused. The Law Commission in its 41st Report (para 24.81) adverted to this aspect of the law and Section 319 of the present Code gave full effect to the recommendation of the Law Commission by removing the lacuna which was found to exist in Section 351 of the old Code." 23. The Court then referred to the judgment in Joginder Singh and another v. State of Punjab and another (supra) and held: "In these circumstances, therefore, if the prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the court that the other accused or those who have not been arrayed as accused against whom proceedings have been quashed have also committed the offence the Court can take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused. But, we would hasten to add that this is really an extraordinary power which is conferred on the court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken." After the Suman's case (supra) the apex Court in a latest judgment rendered on 10.8.2011 in the case of Sarojben Ashwinkumar Shah (supra) again reviewed the case law in respect of summoning an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and after considering the power conferred under Section 319 Cr.P.C. laid down certain parameters in regard to summoning of the accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In para 16 their Lordships of the apex Court held as under:- " 16. The legal position that can be culled out from the material provisions of Section 319 of the Code and the decided cases of this Court is this : (i) The Court can exercise the power conferred on it under Section 319 of the Code suo motu or on an application by someone. (ii) The power conferred under Section 319(1) applies to all courts including the Sessions Court. (iii) The phrase "any person not being the accused" occurring in Section 319 does not exclude from its operation an accused who has been released by the police under Section 169 of the Code and has been shown in Column 2 of the charge-sheet. In other words, the said expression covers any person who is not being tried already by the court and would include person or persons who have been dropped by the police during investigation but against whom evidence showing their involvement in the offence comes before the court. (iv) The power to proceed against any person, not being the accused before the court, must be exercised only where there appears during inquiry or trial sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence as an accused and not otherwise. The word `evidence' in Section 319 contemplates the evidence of witnesses given in court in the inquiry or trial. The court cannot add persons as accused on the basis of materials available in the charge-sheet or the case diary but must be based on the evidence adduced before it. The word `evidence' in Section 319 contemplates the evidence of witnesses given in court in the inquiry or trial. The court cannot add persons as accused on the basis of materials available in the charge-sheet or the case diary but must be based on the evidence adduced before it. In other words, the court must be satisfied that a case for addition of persons as accused, not being the accused before it, has been made out on the additional evidence let in before it. (v) The power conferred upon the court is although discretionary but is not to be exercised in a routine manner. In a sense, it is an extraordinary power which should be used very sparingly and only if evidence has come on record which sufficiently establishes that the other person has committed an offence. A mere doubt about involvement of the other person on the basis of the evidence let in before the court is not enough. The Court must also be satisfied that circumstances justify and warrant that other person be tried with the already arraigned accused. (vi) The court while exercising its power under Section 319 of the Code must keep in view full conspectus of the case including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then. (vii) Regard must also be had by the court to the constraints imposed in Section 319 (4) that proceedings in respect of newly -added persons shall be commenced afresh from the beginning of the trial. (viii)The court must, therefore, appropriately consider the above aspects and then exercise its judicial discretion." From the parameters of law laid down in para 16 of the aforesaid judgment, it is clear that the accused can be summoned only where there appears during inquiry or trial sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence as an accused and not otherwise. In other words, it was held that the court must be satisfied that a case for addition of persons as accused, not being the accused before it, has been made out on the additional evidence led before it. In other words, it was held that the court must be satisfied that a case for addition of persons as accused, not being the accused before it, has been made out on the additional evidence led before it. From the aforesaid proposition of law rendered in the case of Sarojben Ashwinkumar Shah (supra) the law has travelled further and the theory of probability in regard to summoning of an accused that there are chances of conviction stands diluted by the latest judgment wherein the requirement has been found to be that there must be satisfactory and prima facie evidence to summon the accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. I have given my anxious consideration to the law propounded by the apex Court as well the facts of all the petitions in the present case and I find that prima facie satisfaction expressed by the courts below cannot be doubted and the evidence led against the petitioners certainly connects them with the crime and the satisfactory nature of evidence cannot be doubted so far the summoning of the petitioners is concerned. The petitions, therefore, fail and are hereby dismissed.