JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shashi Kant Gupta, J.—This writ petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 3.8.2011 passed by the Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kairana, District Muzaffar Nagar in P.A. Case No. 19 of 2007 (Nand Kumar v. Suresh Chandra), whereby an application (Paper No. 20 “Ga”) filed by the petitioner for dismissal of the proceedings under Section 21 (1)(a) of the UP Act No. 13 of 1972 (in short “Act”) on the ground that the respondent has claimed status of the petitioner as unauthorized occupant was dismissed, and further allowed the application of the respondent for amendment of the plaint. 2. The relevant facts as set out in the writ petition may be recapitulated as follows; 3. The respondent had initially filed a SCC Suit No. 11 of 2000 in which he claimed the status of the petitioner as an unauthorised occupant in the disputed property i.e. shop. It was further alleged in the said suit that the tenancy was in the name of Brahama Nand and the petitioner was not his tenant. After the death of Brahma Nand, the petitioner is occupying the premises as an unauthorised occupant/sub-tenant for which the respondent reserves the right of initiation of proceedings under Section 12/16 of the Act. The said SCC Suit No. 11 of 2000 filed for arrears of rent and ejectment is still pending in the lower Court. 4. In the meantime, the respondent initiated yet another proceedings under Section 21 of the said Act for release of the disputed premises on the ground of bona fide and genuine need for carrying on the business from the said shop. The said release application was registered as P. A. Case No. 19 of 2007. The petitioner filed his written statement. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application No. 20 “Ga” for dismissal of the release proceedings as not maintainable on the ground that the respondent had claimed the status of the petitioner as unauthorised occupant. The respondent filed his objection to the said application No. 20 “Ga” wherein, inter alia, he stated that the tenancy of the petitioner was terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thereafter, the respondent filed an amendment application (Paper No. “28 C”) by which he sought an amendment in the release application to add the word “tenant” in the last line of paragraph 3 of the release application. Thereafter, the respondent filed an amendment application (Paper No. “28 C”) by which he sought an amendment in the release application to add the word “tenant” in the last line of paragraph 3 of the release application. The Prescribed Authority by judgment and order dated 3.8.2011 rejected the application Paper No. 20 “Ga” and allowed the amendment application of the respondent. Hence, the present writ petition. 5. The petitioner has submitted that the respondent has never accepted the petitioner as tenant and an issue to this effect was framed in the earlier SCC Suit No. 11 of 2000 filed by the respondent against the petitioner for arrears of rent and ejectment. It was further submitted that the said amendment is in contradiction to the pleadings of the earlier suit, as such, the present release application is not maintainable. It was further submitted that it is well settled law that party cannot withdraw from its own admission and once the respondent has claimed/alleged the status of the petitioner as unauthorised occupant, it was not open to change his stand in the subsequent proceedings and claim him as his tenant. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned order passed by the prescribed authority and stated that the petitioner is not withdrawing from his admission. It was further submitted that the amendment is basically clarificatory in nature. It was further submitted that the proceedings under Sections 21 and 20 of the Act are distinct, separate and independent proceedings. 7. Heard Sri Ashish Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Sumit Daga, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record. 8. In Rakesh Kumar Agarwal and others v. K.K. Modi, (2006) 4 SCC 385 ; it was laid down that the Rule of amendment is essentially a Rule of justice, equity and good conscious; and the power of amendment should be exercised in the larger interest of doing full and complete justice to the parties before the Court. 9. In this connection, it is also apt to extract Rule 17 of Order VI CPC, which is as under: “17. 9. In this connection, it is also apt to extract Rule 17 of Order VI CPC, which is as under: “17. Amendment of pleadings.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that inspite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. “ 10. The first limb of the Rule 17 of Order VI CPC viz. “the Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend their pleadings in such manner” is discretionary in view of the word “may” used therein; The second limb of the Rule 17 of Order VI CPC i.e. “all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties” is imperative in view of the word “shall” used. However, the proviso to Rule 17 of Order VI CPC expressly bars such amendments after the commencement of the trial of suit. But still, the bar imposed under the proviso to the Rule 17 of Order VI CPC is not absolute, because, even after the commencement of the trial, the Court may allow either of the parties to amend or alter their pleadings, if the Court comes to the conclusion that despite due diligence, the parties could not raise the matter before the commencement of the trial. It is in this sense, the power to amend the pleadings, is wide, and such power of the Court should not be mere hypertechnical. It should be exercised liberally. With this background, now let us consider the submissions made by either side. 11. It is in this sense, the power to amend the pleadings, is wide, and such power of the Court should not be mere hypertechnical. It should be exercised liberally. With this background, now let us consider the submissions made by either side. 11. In paragraph 3 of the original plaint filed in P.A. Case No. 19 of 2007 under Section 21 of the Act, it was stated as follows; ^^3- ;g fd izkFkZuk i= ds vUr esa layXu utjh uD’ks esa v{kj v c l n ls iznf’kZr lEifRr esa mRrj dh vksj Hkwry ij fLFkr nqdku ij foHkktu ds i’pkr izkFkhZ dh vksj ls Mk0 lsokjke iwoZ dh Hkkafr 45@& :0 ekfyd rFkk vfrfjDr tydj o xzgdj ds fglkc sls fdjk;snkj pys vkrs Fks rFkk nf{k.k dh vksj ls nqdku ftldks uD’ks esa v{kj y l n u r ; ls iznf’kZr fd;k x;k gS ds igys i0 czg~ekuUn vadu 55@& :0 ekfld rFkk vfrfjDr tydj o xzgdj ds fglkc ls fdjk;snkj pys vkrs FksA i0 czgekuUn ds LoxZokl ds i’pkr foi{kh lqjs’k pUnz bl nqdku ij dkfct pyk vkrk gSA** 12. Thereafter, an amendment application was filed by the respondent and the word “tenant” was sought to be added in the last line of the paragraph No. 3 of the original plaint. For ready reference, the proposed amendment sought by the respondent is quoted as below; ^^1- ;g fd izkFkZuk i= mDr dh /kkjk 3 dks vkf[kjh ykbZu esa 'kCn nqdku 'kCn ds i’pkr 'kCn crkSj fdjk;snkj fy[kk tkosA** 13. It is not disputed that one Brahama Nand was the erstwhile tenant of the disputed premises and after his death, the disputed premises is being continuously occupied by the petitioner. It is also not disputed that before filing the suit for arrears of rent and ejectment under Section 20 of the Act against the petitioner, a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was issued by the respondent to the petitioner whereby the tenancy of the petitioner was terminated. It is also not disputed that in the aforementioned SCC Suit, the respondent had claimed the status of petitioner as an unauthorised occupant. 14. It is also not disputed that in the aforementioned SCC Suit, the respondent had claimed the status of petitioner as an unauthorised occupant. 14. Bare perusal of the plaint filed by the respondent in the release application filed under Section 21 of the Act, it is evident that in cause title of the plaint (P.A. Case No. 19 of 2007), the petitioner has been referred to as “opposite party/tenant”. The cause title of the plaint reads as follows; ^^uUn dqekj dey iq= Jh 'kksHkkjke fuoklh eksgYyk xqEcn dLck dSjkuk rglhy dSjkuk ftyk eqtQ~QjuxjA - - - - - - - - izkFkhZ @ oknh cuke Jh lqjs’k pUnz 'kekZ ds;j vkQ czgek fizfVax izsl] guqeku jksM 'kkeyh rglhy 'kkeyh ftyk eqtQ~QjuxjA - - - - - - - -foi{kh @ fdjk;snkjA** 15. Thus it is clear that the respondent has described the petitioner as tenant in the cause title of the plaint. It also appears that in the plaint filed in the aforementioned release application, the respondent has not claimed the status of the petitioner as an unauthorised occupant. In paragraph No. 3 of the original plaint, inter alia, this much has been said that the earlier, one Pandit Ramanand was the tenant of the disputed premises, paying rent at the rate of Rs. 55/- per month apart from the taxes and after his death, the disputed shop was being occupied by the opposite party (herein the petitioner). Thus, the petitioner in the said release application filed under Section 21 of the Act has not been treated as an unauthorised occupant. 16. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent cannot take contradictory pleas in different proceedings. In this connection it is relevant to refer to paragraph No. 4 of the plaint filed in the release application wherein, inter alia, it has been stated by the respondent that he reserved his right to continue SCC Suit No. 11 of 2000 and the averment made in the present release application will neither amount to any waiver nor acquiescence, and it will not have any bearing on the other proceedings. 17. There are three provisions in the Act under which a landlord can recover possession of his building which is in occupation of the tenant. 17. There are three provisions in the Act under which a landlord can recover possession of his building which is in occupation of the tenant. Sub-clause (2) of Section 20 of the Act provides that a suit for eviction of a tenant from a building after determination of the tenancy may be instituted on one or more grounds as provided in Clause (a) to (g) in the Court of Judge Small Causes. The prescribed authority may on an application of the landlord order eviction of a tenant from the disputed premises under his tenancy on the grounds provided in clause (a) and (b) to Section 21 (1) of the Act and the said application has to be filed before the Prescribed Authority. Section 16 (1)(b) of the Act provides that the District Magistrate may release the whole or any part of a building in favour of the landlord which are either vacant or deemed to be vacant under Section 12 of the Act. 18. Thus, the aforementioned proceedings viz. under Sections 20, 21 and 16 (1)(b) of the Act have to be taken before different authorities. The proceedings under Sections 20 and 21 of the Act are two distinct and separate proceedings. This Court is of the considered opinion that any averment made in the SCC Suit filed for arrears of rent and ejectment cannot be an obstacle to the landlord to claim the status of the petitioner as of a tenant in the disputed premises in the release proceedings. As already indicated hereinabove, the respondent had described the petitioner as “tenant” in the cause title of the plaint in release proceedings and the respondent has not treated the petitioner as an unauthorised occupant in the release proceedings under Section 21 of the Act. Thus, the present amendment sought by the respondent by adding a word “tenant” in the last line of the paragraph No. 2 of the plaint is merely clarificatory in nature and it neither changes the nature of the case nor the respondent is withdrawing from his own admission and pleadings. It is also very relevant to note that the petitioner himself has claimed himself to be the tenant of the disputed premises, as being the son of the erstwhile tenant Pandit Brahma Nand, as such, the petitioner is admitting the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 19. It is also very relevant to note that the petitioner himself has claimed himself to be the tenant of the disputed premises, as being the son of the erstwhile tenant Pandit Brahma Nand, as such, the petitioner is admitting the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 19. The petitioner has not been able to show as to how he will be prejudiced by the impugned order. The proceedings initiated under Section 21 of the Act is entirely a different proceedings that of the proceedings under Section 20 of the Act pending before the SCC Court. Both these proceedings arise out of a different cause of action. If the submission of the petitioner is conceded, in that event, the respondent will be estopped from initiating proceedings for all times to come under Section 21 of the Act and he would remain just a silent spectator and doing nothing. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Haji Mohd. Amin v. VIIth Addl. District Judge, Varanasi and others, 1988 (2) ARC 416, wherein it has been held as follows : “A compromise had been arrived at in the present case in Suit No. 123 of 1975, which simply mentioned that the landlord would have no right to get the tenant ejected in case the tenant continued paying rent. In this case the compromise is not absolute and does not take away the right of a landlord to bring the application under Section 21(1)(a). As Section 21(1)(a) is a provision entitling a landlord to apply for release on the ground of his or his family members personal need. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 gives another ground to the landlord for release, that is, when the house is in dilapidated condition and is required re-construction after demolition. If the right of the petitioner-tenant, as claimed before us, is so absolute that neither Section 21(1)(a) or 1(b) would apply that will create a situation which is abherrent to law. A tenant cannot insist on living in a house although the accommodation is in a dilapidated condition. If that is conceded to, his property would come to ruins and in that even he would just watch standing by and doing nothing. 20. A tenant cannot insist on living in a house although the accommodation is in a dilapidated condition. If that is conceded to, his property would come to ruins and in that even he would just watch standing by and doing nothing. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the Case of Krishna Bihari Mehrotra v. Additional District Judge, Court No. 5, Khiri and others, 2009 (3) ARC 398, wherein it has been held as follows: “Application under Section 21 of the Act was dismissed in the present case by the prescribed authority, simply on the ground that landlord moved application without admitting the petitioner his tenant of the shop. Now the applicant came with clean hands showing that he was wrongly advised by his counsel so in paragraph 6 tenancy was denied. It is established law that ordinary litigant on such technical points should not suffer for the wrong advice of his counsel. Petitioner is depositing rent treating him landlord under Section 30 of the Act. Now he cannot deny his status as tenant in the shop in question. Landlord has raised any objection denying his tenancy and opposed the application of such deposit of the rent in the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act, it is nowhere said on behalf of the petitioner. It is established law that such deposit amounts payments to the landlord. Now if he had applied to struck of the word “NAHI” from paragraph 6 of the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act and appellate Court had allowed the same there is no illegality, invalidity and impropriety and also jurisdictional error in the order of the appellate Court. No prejudice can be said has been caused to the petitioner by the impugned order”. 21. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Union of India and others, 2007 ACJ 97, wherein it has been held that an admission made in the pleading cannot be permitted to be withdrawn by way of amendment. This judgment has no bearing to the facts of the present case. This judgment has no bearing to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the respondent in the original plaint in the release proceedings has not claimed the status of the petitioner as an unauthorised occupant, as such, the amendment sought by the respondent is merely clarificatory in nature and it cannot be said that the respondent is trying to wriggle out from his own admission. 22. This Court in the case of Kamal Regmi Sharma and others v. Neapal Bank Ltd and others, 1987 All LJ 349 has held as follows : “10. While exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C. the revisional Court ought not to interfere with a discretion which has been exercised by the Court below in allowing the amendment of the pleadings. Such an interference may be permissible with cogent reasons or compelling circumstances have been shown. In the instant case learned counsel for the applicants have failed to show any such reason or circumstance much less cogent or compelling one warranting interference. In the case of Haridas Alidas v. Godrej Rustom Kermani, AIR 1983 SC 319 (supra) it has been held that the Court should be extremely liberal in granting prayer for amendment of pleading unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is likely to be caused to the other side.” 23. The Court below has given cogent, convincing and satisfactory reasons while passing the orders in favour of the plaintiff. 24. The reasons mentioned in the impugned orders are good enough to satisfy the order and no fault can be found with the approach adopted by the Court below. Thus, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders passed by the Court below. 25. In view of the above, I do not see any merit in the writ petition. 26. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. —————