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2011 DIGILAW 2060 (RAJ)

Jagdish Singh v. Ramkaran

2011-09-22

G.K.TIWARI

body2011
Dr. TIWARI, M.—Both the above cited revision petitions filed under section 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 (in short `the Act), are taken together for a common decision as the contesting parties are almost the same in both the cases involving common law points. A copy of the judgment may be kept in each of the file separately. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the non-petitioners, during the course of a regular suit filed in the court of Assistant Collector Tonk, submitted applications under Section 212 of the Act against the petitioners for the grant of temporary injunction in respect of the suit lands. These applications were rejected by Assistant Collector vide his judgments dated 24.11.1997. The non-petitioners challenged the judgments dated 24.11.1997 in appeals under Section 225 of the Act before Settlement Officer-cum-Revenue Appellate Authority Tonk who allowed the appeals and enjoined upon both the parties for maintaining status quo of the land and record till disposal of the final suit, by his impugned judgments dated 2.4.1998 passed in appeal No. 166/97 and 167/97. Aggrieved against it, above cited two revision petitions are preferred in this court. 3. I have heard the learned counsels of both the parties. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are presently recorded khatedars of the disputed lands. The non-petitioners want khatedari rights claiming to be mortgagee-in-possession of the disputed lands; at the same time they are claiming to be in adverse possession of the suit lands. Both these issues can be decided in the main suit after framing of the necessary issues and leading evidence thereon. Presently the non-petitioners do not have any prima facie case in their favour. On the contrary the petitioners are the prima facie title holders in possession of the lands in question. Therefore, the trial Court rightly rejected the applications of temporary injunction. But Revenue Appellate Authority illegally allowed the appeals and restrained both the parties with an order for maintaining status quo of land and records, without setting aside the judgment of the trial Court. The learned counsel contended that a matter of section 212 of the Act cannot be finally decided by an order for maintaining status quo of the land and record. Such a case should either bee allowed or rejected with specific order. The learned counsel contended that a matter of section 212 of the Act cannot be finally decided by an order for maintaining status quo of the land and record. Such a case should either bee allowed or rejected with specific order. The learned counsel submitted 2009(2) RRT 1393, 2003 RRD 264, 2009(2) RRT 1398 and 2010(1) RRT 149 in support of his contention. 5. Opposing the contentions of the petitioners, the learned counsel (brief-holders) for the non-petitioners contended that the petitioners are claiming khatedari right on the basis of the registered sale deed of the disputed lands; but these sale deeds are not produced and such sale of the disputed lands is not proved so far. As such there is no prima facie case in favour of the petitioners. Revenue Appellate Authority did not commit any illegality in giving order for maintaining status quo of land and record in his final judgment of appeals under Section 225 of the Act. 6. I have given thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, perused the impugned judgment and gone through the material on record. 7. Admittedly, the non-petitioners, who have filed an application under Sec. 212 of the Act for the grant of temporary injunction, do not have prima facie title in their favour so far. The non-petitioners are claiming khatedari right on the suit lands on the basis of their being allegedly mortgagee-in-possession, as also on the basis of the alleged adverse possession. The plea of alleged adverse possession and being mortgagee-in-possession cannot be ground for grant of temporary injunction under section 212 of the Act. On the contrary the petitioners, presently, are the khatedar tenants of the suit lands on the basis of registered sale deed. The trial Court rejected the application under Section 212 of the Act for the want of prima facie case in favour of the non-petitioners, but Revenue Appellate Authority, without setting aside the judgment of Assistant Collector Tonk, issued order for maintaining status quo of the land and record by way of disposal of both the appeals filed before him under Section 225 of the Act. It has been consistently held by this Court that an application of Section 212 of the Act should be finally decided either with the grant or rejection of the temporary injunction; such application cannot be finally decided with an order for maintaining status quo of the land and record. It has been consistently held by this Court that an application of Section 212 of the Act should be finally decided either with the grant or rejection of the temporary injunction; such application cannot be finally decided with an order for maintaining status quo of the land and record. While holding so, I am placing reliance on the citations of this court as reported in 2003 RRD 264 (Gurjant Singh vs. Ajmer Singh), 2010(1) RRT 149 (Manni Devi (Smt.) vs. G.G. Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd.) and 2011 RRD 22 (Dauji vs. Nathu and Ors). Unless gross illegality is demonstrably shown to have crept in, no temporary injunction should be granted against recorded khatedars. I am fortified in my this contention by the citations reported in 2009(2) RRT 1398 (Ramjuddin & Ors. vs. Ganesh Kumar & Ors.) and 2009(2) RRT 1393 (Dhupa vs. Mannan & Ors.). 8. In view of the foregoing discussion, both the revision petitions succeed. The impugned judgment dated 2.4.1998 of Settlement Officer-cum-Revenue Appellate Authority. Tonk passed in appeal Nos. 166/97 and 167/97 are set aside and the judgments dated 24.3.1997 of Assistant Collector Tonk passed in case No. 193/92 and 194/92 are upheld. Pronounced.