Judgment Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the Affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction; more particularly one I the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the termination order in Memo No.DE/O/RCP/JAO/ADM/U/F.No./D.No.03/10, dated 02.06.2010 issued by the 2nd respondent terminating my services as Junior Lineman on contract basis as illegal, unjust, contrary to law, amounting to victimization and unfair labour practice and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This writ petition is instituted by a Junior Lineman calling in question the orders passed on 02-06-2010 by the Divisional Electrical Engineer (Operations), Eastern Power Distribution Company, Ramachandrapuram, canceling the selection of the writ petitioner as Junior Lineman and consequently terminating his contractual agreement of service. The writ petitioner claimed that he has completed the Industrial Training Institute Certificate Course and passed the examination of the National Trade Certificate. He seems to have produced a certificate signed by the Deputy Director, Employment & Training Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, vouching that he has passed the said examination. The writ petitioner further claimed that he has undergone the training between August 1996 to July 1998 at Srikanth Industrial Training Center, Thimmapuram, Kakinada Rural Mandal. He initially joined the service of the Eastern Power Distribution Company, as Shift Operator in 33/11 KV Substation at Kutukuluru of Anaparty Mandal, East Godavari District on 19-01-2007 and completed three years of service there. The respondents Insofar as Sri Mohd. Ismail is concerned, it was noted that as per their records, the candidate has only secured 51 marks in Engineering Drawing Paper, but not 61 and hence, in the certificate produced by the said candidate, 51 marks to be noted instead 61. When it came to the writ petitioner, a specific remark has been made by the Deputy Director that his marks are not genuine. It was clearly noted in his report that as per the C-Form record, the writ petitioner appears to have secured 321 marks in practical examination, while in theory, he has secured 80 marks. Insofar as the rest of the 3 papers are concerned, there is no variation between the certificate produced by the writ petitioner and the record maintained by the department. Insofar as the rest of the 3 papers are concerned, there is no variation between the certificate produced by the writ petitioner and the record maintained by the department. However, in the certificate produced by the writ petitioner it was noted as if he has secured 371 marks in practical examination, while he was shown to have secured 100 marks out of 120 in theory paper. Because of this variation in the marks noted in the certificate produced by the writ petitioner with regard to the practical examination and the theory paper, it was remarked by the Deputy Director that the writ petitioner has not produced a genuine certificate. This triggered the impugned action. Heard Sri A.K. Jayaprakash Rao, learned counsel for the writ petitioner and Ms. Jyothi Eswar Gogineni, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. Sri Jayaprakash, submits that the writ petitioner has been signed out for hostile treatment leaving out Sri Mohd. Ismail for no valid or tenable reasons. He next contends that the allegation thrown against the petitioner is too serious a one, namely, that he has produced a bogus certificate. The writ petitioner is not guilty of any such misdemeanor, inasmuch as the certificate, which is signed by the Deputy Director, was furnished to him by the Srikanth Industrial Training Center, Thimmapuram, Kakinada Rural Mandal and hence, if some error has crept into his certificate inadvertently, not because of any fault of his, he should not be penalized. The learned counsel would further submit that the writ petitioner has been denied a fair opportunity to controvert the allegations leveled against him. He has not been provided with any opportunity to verify or cross-examine the Deputy Director, who has furnished an adverse report against him. Based upon the adverse report, he was provided a mere opportunity to file his reply. Non-producing the Deputy Director for further examination amounts to denying a fair and reasonable opportunity to the petitioner and hence, the impugned order deserves to be set at naught. He has also placed reliance upon the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court inROOP SINGH NEGI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND OTHERS ( (2009) 2 SCC 570 ), HARDWARI LAL v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ( (1999) 8 SCC 582 ), and the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in N. SUBRAMANYAM v. CHAIRMAN, VISAKHAPATNAM PORT TRUST AND OTHERS (1998 LAB.I.C. 1004). Per contra, Ms. Jyothi Eswar Gogineni, learned Standing Counsel submits that the writ petitioner is not a regular employee of the Corporation for the Corporation to have an obligation to comply with the detailed procedure provided for in the Electricity Board Employees (Classification, Control & Appeal) Regulations. He has only been engaged on a contractual basis and when once the Divisional Engineer comes to know that the writ petitioner has not produced a valid or genuine certificate, he is entitled to take the consequential action of terminating the contract entered into with the writ petitioner. The learned Standing Counsel would further submit that the Deputy Director is the competent authority to verify the records and that he has verified and furnished detailed report in the matter. He has clearly noted that the writ petitioner was awarded only 321 marks in practical examination and 80 marks in theory paper, whereas these marks have been inflated in the certificate produced by him as 371 and 100 respectively. In the process, the petitioner has inflated his total marks by 70 and hence, as against 537 marks secured by him, he wanted to take advantage of a higher total of 607 marks, which will help him to secure the selection. The learned Standing Counsel would further submit that the writ petitioner has never made any attempt to secure a certificate from the competent authority, which could be trustworthy. For his own failure, he cannot take advantage and call in question the orders passed by the Divisional Engineer. As it turned out, from the verification report of the Deputy Director, that the writ petitioner did appear for the Industrial Training Institute Certificate Course examination and his roll number also matched. It is, therefore, obvious that he took the examination and also passed the same. But however, there is a variation with regard to the marks secured by him in the practical examination and the theory paper. That is what the Deputy Director has found. The petitioner’s name is Sri K. Subba Rao and it is quite probable, since, the said name is a very common name that more than one candidate bearing the same name could have appeared for the test and somewhere down the line some error could have crept in recording the marks properly. That is what the Deputy Director has found. The petitioner’s name is Sri K. Subba Rao and it is quite probable, since, the said name is a very common name that more than one candidate bearing the same name could have appeared for the test and somewhere down the line some error could have crept in recording the marks properly. Whether the writ petitioner has tampered with the document in question or not is a difficult question to be answered in view of lack of relevant material to link up the role of the writ petitioner. The learned standing Counsel is, perhaps, right in her criticism that since, the writ petitioner is the direct beneficiary, it can safely be inferred that he must have resorted to the tampering of the document. But, at the same time, no one with any degree of assuredness or certainly say that there was no error committed by anyone else, unintentionally though, in furnishing the certificate to the petitioner. Until it is ruled out, it will be difficult to return a finding that the writ petitioner is guilty of producing a non-genuine certificate. In ROOP SINGH NEGI’s case cited (1) supra, the Supreme Court has pointed out the necessity to establish the contents of documentary evidence in the following words. “14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charged leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.” In the instant case, if an opportunity is proved to the writ petitioner, possibly he would have demonstrated to the satisfaction of the respondents that he is not guilty of tampering the document at all and on the other hand, it is the result of an error committed at some other end, over which he has no control. In such circumstances, it would be unfair to penalize an otherwise innocent person. Whether the writ petitioner is really guilty of tampering with the certificate, which he has produced, has been left undecided in very clear terms of the respondents. Obviously, they are also conscious of the limits in that regard that merely relying upon the findings of the Deputy Director that the document is not a genuine document, particularly, in view of the variation noticed by the Deputy Director in the marks recorded in the certificate produced by the petitioner in the practical examination and the theory paper. I accept the submission of Ms. Jyothi Eswar Gogineni with regard to the distinction that is available in the case of Mohd.Ismail. The learned Standing Counsel has rightly pointed out that there was some scope left for mis-considering the marks, i.e., 51 as 61. That is what the Deputy Director has clarified. When the certificate produced by Sir Ismail is looked at, only when his marks are reckoned as 51, the total number of marks secured by him matches correctly. If he were to be treated as to have secured 61 marks, the total number of marks would be falling short by corresponding 10 marks. Therefore, this is a case, where Sri Ismail cannot be said to be guilty of producing a wrong certificate or tampered document. The certificate left inappropriate impression as to whether the marks are 61 or 51. I, therefore, consider that Ismail’s case does not offer a platform for comparison to that of the writ petitioner. However, Mohd.Ismail’s case also, in a way, lends support to the preposition canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the sense, that there appears to be some scope left for confusion in noting down the marks properly by the authorities in the certificates, which they were issuing. In all fairness, the learned Standing Counsel has also submitted that only 18 candidates, who were required to be recruited, have submitted their applications and if, perhaps, more number of candidates have applied, the attempt of inflating the marks committed by the petitioner could have possibly denied another genuine candidate, who secured more marks than him actually, from getting recruited. In all fairness, the learned Standing Counsel has also submitted that only 18 candidates, who were required to be recruited, have submitted their applications and if, perhaps, more number of candidates have applied, the attempt of inflating the marks committed by the petitioner could have possibly denied another genuine candidate, who secured more marks than him actually, from getting recruited. Therefore, it is safe to assume that as against 18 persons to be recruited only 18 candidates having applied, the petitioner may not have resorted to a deliberate act of overreaching the situation of seeking to inflate the marks in his certificate. As the Deputy Director has pointed, the writ petitioner has secured 321 and 80 marks respectively in practical examination and theory paper and he has also secured 537 out of 700 total marks, thus, it is clear that the writ petitioner has passed at the examination with a decent score. I, therefore, do not consider that this is a fit case, where the respondents could have dispensed with the services of the writ petitioner, wholly based upon the findings recorded by the Deputy Director. Something more is, perhaps, needed to bring home the charge. In that process, perhaps, the writ petitioner also could have established that he is nowhere responsible for the error noticed by the Deputy Director. In that view of the matter, I consider it appropriate to set aside the impugned order and direct the respondents to reengage the writ petitioner as Junior Lineman on contract basis taking into account and consideration the marks shown to have been obtained by the writ petitioner by the Deputy Director in his report dated 19-06-2007. For the aforementioned reasons, this writ petition stands allowed, setting aside the impugned order dated 02-06-2010 and thirty days time is granted for renewing the contract of employment of the petitioner, if not already done. The petitioner is not entitled to any other benefit. No costs.