ORDER I have heard the learned counsel, Mr. Waliur Rehman on behalf of the appellant and Mr. S.S. Dwivedi, the learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondents on the interlocutory application No.3632 of 2011. The parties have filed counter affidavit, supplementary affidavit and rejoinder etc. 2. The plaintiff-appellant has filed this appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated 07.01.2011 passed by Subordinate Judge 8th Saran at Chapra in Title Suit No.184 of 1997 dismissing the plaintiff suit for declaration of title and further for declaration that the defendants have no title over the suit property. The learned Court below dismissed the said suit. 3. The appellant filed the interlocutory application No.3632 alleging that during the pendency of this appeal, the defendant-respondent transferred major portion of the suit property to different persons by executing sale deeds through power of attorney holder, Fahin Akhtar. Many sale deeds have been annexed with the injunction application. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that if the respondents are not restrained from transferring the suit property further the appellant shall suffer loss and irreparable injury and in the event if the appeal will be allowed, he will not be able to recover the possession of the property from various transferee and moreover, it will lead to multiplicity of proceedings. The learned counsel further submitted that the transferee is trying to make construction over the transferred land during the pendency of the appeal. In such view of the matter, the appellant had no option but to file the application for injunction. 4. It appears that subsequent transferee has been added as respondent in this First Appeal on the application filed by the appellant who are respondent No.5 to 25. 5. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent No.1 and 2 and also on behalf of the transferees. In the counter affidavit on behalf of the respondent No.1 and 2 written as rejoinder at paragraph 22, it has been mentioned that these defendants-respondents are giving undertaking that they will not alienate any property in future without permission of the Court. The learned senior counsel in support of the said statement has submitted before the Court that because of family requirement, the property has been sold and, therefore, the necessity has been fulfilled. The learned senior counsel in support of the said statement has submitted before the Court that because of family requirement, the property has been sold and, therefore, the necessity has been fulfilled. In such circumstances, the respondent No.1 & 2 will not transfer any further land and if necessary will arise in future during the pendency of the appeal, they will file application for permission to transfer but at this stage, their undertaking may be noted. In view of these undertaking given by the respondent No.1 & 2 that they will not transfer the property without the permission of the Court, the same is recorded here in this order so as to bind them. 6. So far the counter affidavit of respondent No.3 to 25 is concerned, they have stated that they may be allowed to construct the residential house at their own risk and if the appeal will be allowed, they will not claim equity and the appellant will get the possession of the property with structure thereon. Because, they have purchased the property with a view to construct a residential house. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that this appeal is of the year 2011 and it is not likely to dispose of in near future and, therefore, for unlimited period, the purchasers who are bonafide purchasers cannot be restrained from enjoying the fruits of their property because by the transfer, the defendant-respondent have got valid title. 7. In reply to the above submission, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that on the ground that the appeal will not be disposed of in near future, the respondents cannot be allowed to construct residential house because in such circumstances, the real difficulty will be faced by the appellant only after if the First Appeal is allowed. 8. The respondent cannot be allowed to construct even at their own risk because if they are restrained, there will be no hardship to them but if they are not restrained, the appellant shall suffer irreparable loss if the appeal is allowed. 9. In a decision reported in A.I.R. 2005 Supreme Court 104 (Maharwal Khewaji Trust Vs. 8. The respondent cannot be allowed to construct even at their own risk because if they are restrained, there will be no hardship to them but if they are not restrained, the appellant shall suffer irreparable loss if the appeal is allowed. 9. In a decision reported in A.I.R. 2005 Supreme Court 104 (Maharwal Khewaji Trust Vs. Baldev Dass), the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph 10 has held as follows:– “We do not think in the facts and circumstances of this case, the lower appellate Court and the High Court were justified in permitting the respondent to change the nature of property by putting up construction as also by permitting the alienation of the property, whatever may be the condition on which the same is done. In the event of the appellant’s claim being found baseless ultimately, it is always open to the respondent to claim damages, or, in an appropriate case, the Court may itself award damages for the loss suffered, if any, in this regard. Since the facts of this case do not make out any extraordinary ground for permitting the respondent to put up construction and alienate the same, we think both the Courts below, namely, the lower appellate Court and the High Court erred in making the impugned orders. The said orders are set aside and the order of the trial Court is restored.” 10. In A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 527 (Manohar Lal Chopra Vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal), the Apex Court has held that “Section 151 itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court; it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. Further, when the Code itself recognizes the existence of the inherent power of the Court, there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Code. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court; it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. Further, when the Code itself recognizes the existence of the inherent power of the Court, there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Code. Thus, there being no such expression in S.94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order 39 or by any rules made under the Code, the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39, C.P.C., if the Court is of opinion that the interests of justice require the issue of such interim injunction.” 11. In (2001) 2 P.L.J.R. 268 (Dharam Nath Ojha Vs. Raghunath Ojha), this court has held that “law is well settled that if a lis has been admitted for adjudication, then it becomes the duty of the Court to preserve the subject matter of the litigation by an appropriate order so that the same is available at the time of final adjudication and the decree does not become a barren one.” 12. It appears that the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent was the submission before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharwal Khewaji Trust (supra). It appears that in that case, the lower appellate Court and also the High Court set aside the order of injunction granted by the trial Court. The Apex Court held that the appellate Court and the High Court were not justified in permitting the respondent to change the nature of the property by putting of construction. It further appears that the order of the trial Court was set aside by High Court on the ground that the transfer and / construction will be hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Apex Court also considered the hardship to the parties. 13. In view of the above settled principle of law, in my opinion, this is a fit case where the subsequent purchasers should be specifically restrained from transferring or making any construction over the suit property which they have purchased as admittedly they are not the purchasers during the pendency of the list. 13. In view of the above settled principle of law, in my opinion, this is a fit case where the subsequent purchasers should be specifically restrained from transferring or making any construction over the suit property which they have purchased as admittedly they are not the purchasers during the pendency of the list. I, therefore, restrained the respondent No.3 to 25 from transferring and / or making any construction whatsoever on the suit property. 14. In view of the nature of the order passed above, it is desirable that the appeal be heard and disposed of at an early date. In such view of the matter, the office is directed to make the appeal ready so that the same may be heard as early as possible. Thus, the interlocutory application is allowed in terms of the order indicated above.