Judgment (N.V. Ramana) This civil miscellaneous appeal is directed against the order dated 18.11.2010 passed in O.P. No. 1911 of 2010 by the learned II Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, dismissing the petition filed by the appellant herein, under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking to restrain the first respondent from invoking the bank guarantee vide BG 44/2009 issued by respondent No.2 on behalf of the appellant, pending resolution of dispute through arbitration. The appellant company claims that it is engaged in the business of providing services to power plants for erection, commissioning of STG sets up to 660 MW and GTS sets up to Fr 9 capacities, maintenance and other allied activities. While so, they claim to have entered into agreement dated 20.12.2008 with the first respondent company namely M/s. Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Company Limited, Raipur, Chattisgarh, for erection of 1#, 2#, 3#, 4#, 5# STG and auxiliary equipment and pipes dated 20.12.2008. Pursuant to the agreement, and as required by the terms and conditions thereof, the appellant furnished a bank guarantee towards advance payment vide BG No. 43/2009 dated 18.08.2009 for Rs. 62,39,595/-towards agreement for all five units and the said bank guarantee was valid till 14.01.2010. The appellant also furnished another bank guarantee for equal sum, vide BG. No. 44/2009 dated 18.08.2009, towards performance guarantee, and the same is valid up to 14.01.2011. The appellant states that the first respondent issued cheque for Rs. 10,78,006/-and another cheque for Rs. 56,48,315/-towards advance payment. Pursuant thereto, the appellant commenced the work and claims to have completed the total work in respect of two units, worth Rs. 2,95,10,496/-, out of which, an amount of Rs. 2,37,38,455/-was paid by the first respondent and thus there was a balance amount of Rs.68,51,891/-to be paid. While so, the appellant states that the first respondent, contrary to the terms and conditions of the agreement and original understanding between the parties, allotted only two units of work i.e. 1# and 2# as against the total five units of work under the agreement and withheld the work of the balance three units without any reason and issued a notice dated 29.08.2010 requesting the appellant to suspend the work. Thereupon, the appellant requested the first respondent to release ad hoc amount against its outstanding settlement for payment of wages to its workers, and the first respondent paid ad hoc amount of Rs.20,00,000/-against settlement Nos. 19 and 20, leaving an outstanding balance amount of Rs.40,51,891/-. The appellant, thereupon, suspended the work, as sought by the first respondent, due to which its equipment worth Rs. 49,00,000/- is lying at the construction site. The first respondent, having suspended the balance work without assigning any specific reasons, did not even clear the bills of the appellant in respect of two units of work already executed, and when the appellant requested to clear those dues, the first respondent started adopting coercive methods and forced the appellant to issue a letter admitting withholding of bank guarantee and because of pressure from labour for payment of wages and due to coercion of the first respondent, the appellant issued letter dated 01.09.2010, admitting withholding of bank guarantee, and on such issuance of letter, the first respondent released an amount of Rs. 20,00,000/- as ad hoc payment. The first respondent, thus, having induced the appellant to issue bank guarantee for five units of work, did not allot the remaining three units of work and pay the amounts for two units of work already executed, and thereby played fraud upon the appellant. The appellant, thus, contending that it is contemplating to invoke the arbitration clause and in the meanwhile as the first respondent is trying to invoke the bank guarantee, filed the present petition, under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act’), for grant of an order restraining the first respondent from invoking the bank guarantee vide BG 44/2009 issued by the second respondent-bank on behalf of the appellant. The first respondent resisted the petition, by filing counter, denying the allegations made by the appellant and inter alia contending that as per Article 10 of the agreement, the State of Orissa is designated as the place of arbitration and hence the Court below has no jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. It is further contended that if the Court below entertains the present petition, in view of the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, it alone has to adjudicate all subsequent arbitral proceedings and the Courts at Orissa, which have original jurisdiction as per the agreement, will lose the jurisdiction. It is further contended that if the Court below entertains the present petition, in view of the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, it alone has to adjudicate all subsequent arbitral proceedings and the Courts at Orissa, which have original jurisdiction as per the agreement, will lose the jurisdiction. The appellant miserably failed to honour the terms and conditions of the agreement and could not complete the work as per the schedule agreed to between the parties, and that there was shortage of construction machinery and tools and employees to meet the requirements of construction and thus the fist respondent provided all possible help/assistance to the appellant in completion of the project and incurred cost of Rs.18,09,888/-. There were lots of defects in the work executed and completed by the appellant and therefore the first respondent had to spend a lot of money to rectify the same. Since the appellant committed default in payment of wages, the workers and labourers went on strike and thereupon, at the request of the appellant, the first respondent made ad hoc payment, though the payments that were already made have far exceeded the value of the wok completed by the appellant and the work completed by the appellant has not been accepted by the first respondent yet, and that the appellant in their letter categorically stated that the first respondent can recover the ad hoc amount from the performance bank guarantee. While so, the bank guarantee issued by the appellant towards advance payment had expired on 14.01.2010 and in spite of the first respondent requesting for extension of the bank guarantee, the appellant failed to extend the same. The appellant unilaterally calculated the amount of Rs. 2,95,10,496/- which was never approved by the first respondent and inflated the amount in invoice Nos. 19 to 22. As the appellant miserably failed to finish the work of first two units, which was entrusted to them, the first respondent withheld the work of three other units. It is further stated that the first respondent released an advance of 10% of the total agreement price and thereafter the petitioner submitted a bank guarantee to the same amount and thus there was no fraud played by the first respondent upon the appellant and in fact the appellant has to pay Rs. It is further stated that the first respondent released an advance of 10% of the total agreement price and thereafter the petitioner submitted a bank guarantee to the same amount and thus there was no fraud played by the first respondent upon the appellant and in fact the appellant has to pay Rs. 68,85,567/-to the first respondent on account of excess payments made by it, which the first respondent is entitled to recover. It is further contended that since unconditional bank guarantees were furnished by the appellant in course of commercial dealings, the first respondent is entitled to invoke the bank guarantee to recover the dues from the appellant and that the beneficiary is entitled to realize the bank guarantee in terms thereof, irrespective of any pending dispute. It is thus contended that there is no prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the appellant. The Court below, having considered the respective stand of the parties, held that it has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition under Section 9 of the Act and that there is no prima facie case in favour of the appellant and the appellant is, therefore, not entitled for injunction restraining the first respondent from invoking the bank guarantee, and accordingly dismissed the petition filed by the appellant. Aggrieved by the dismissal, the appellant filed the present civil miscellaneous appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant mainly contended that the Court below has failed to appreciate the scope of its jurisdiction in entertaining the application filed under Section 9 of the Act. He submitted that even a fraction of cause of auction is enough and sufficient to decide the territorial jurisdiction of a Court for entertaining the petition under the provisions of the Act, and that the seat of arbitration is not an essential condition, and that the totality of circumstances have to be looked into, to decide where the question of cause of action has arisen, as held by the Division Bench of this Court in INCOMM Tele Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. 2005 (6) ALT 642 (D.B.). The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the registered office of the appellant company is situated at Hyderabad, they submitted the tender documents under Ex. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the registered office of the appellant company is situated at Hyderabad, they submitted the tender documents under Ex. A11 from Hyderabad, agreement works are being monitored from Hyderabad and the bank guarantees have been drawn at the banks at Hyderabad, and that being so, part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court below, enabling it to entertain the application under Section 9 of the Act, but the Court below without considering those aspects, committed an error in dismissing the application holding that the Court has no jurisdiction. Relying upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance Ltd v. NEPC India Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 479 , he contended that the Court can pass interim orders before the commencement of arbitral proceedings, in order to protect the interests of the parties. He further contended that unless the agreement between the parties specifically excludes Section 9 of the Act, the parties may seek relief under Section 9 of the Act in any appropriate Court and that an application for interim measure can be made to the Courts in India, whether or not the arbitration takes place in India, before or during arbitral proceedings, as held by the Supreme Court in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. (2002) 4 SCC 105 . Since in the instant case, the agreement between the parties did not exclude the provisions of Section 9 of the Act, the appellant has got every right to seek an interim measure under Section 9 of the Court, and the Court below has very much got jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by the appellant. He further contended that the trial Court erred in placing reliance upon the decision in Paramita Constructions Pvt. Limited v. UE Development India (P) Ltd. 2008 (3) ALT 440 , the facts of which are different from that of the present case. In the said case the petition was filed for appointment of arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act and the parties therein agreed to the place of arbitration at Bangalore, in such situation, the question that arose for consideration was with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court in entertaining the said application under Section 11 (6) of the Act, whereas the present application is moved seeking an interim measure under Section 9 of the Act. He further submitted that the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Salarjung Museum, Hyderabad vs. Design Team Consultants Pvt. Ltd. 2010 (1) ALT 435 (DB), on which the Court below placed reliance to hold that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain Section 9 application, is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as it is a case where the petition was filed seeking to set aside the award passed by the Arbitrator, but not for an interim measure. On merits of the case, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant has furnished two bank guarantees towards advance amount and performance guarantee, in respect of five units of work awarded, but after execution of two units of work, the first respondent requested the appellant to suspend the remaining work of three units, and thus acted in breach of terms of agreement and it even did not finalize the bills pertaining to the works already executed, and thereby it has played fraud upon them, but the Court below did not consider the same, and by refusing to entertain the application, refused to grant the relief sought by the appellant, restraining the first respondent from invoking the bank guarantee of the appellant. He, therefore, prayed to set aside the order under appeal. On the other hand, learned counsel for the first respondent supported the order under appeal and contended that in terms of Article 10 of the agreement entered into by the parties, the State of Orissa is designated as place of arbitration and as the parties have voluntarily agreed the place of arbitration as State of Orissa, the Courts in Andhra Pradesh, much less the Court below, have no jurisdiction, to entertain the present petition, and the theory of cause of action does not come into picture and the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure cannot be looked into in this regard. He further submitted that the Court below, relying upon the decisions in Paramita Constructions case (4 supra) and Salarjung Museum, Hyderabad case (5 supra), considered the aspects of place of arbitration and its jurisdiction to entertain the present petition and rightly held that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. He further submitted that the Court below, relying upon the decisions in Paramita Constructions case (4 supra) and Salarjung Museum, Hyderabad case (5 supra), considered the aspects of place of arbitration and its jurisdiction to entertain the present petition and rightly held that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. He further contended that the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in INCOMM Tele Ltd. (1 supra), relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention that seat of arbitration is not an essential condition to decide the territorial jurisdiction of Court, has been superceded by the judgment that was subsequently passed by another Division Bench of this Court in Salarjung Museam case (5 supra), and therefore no credence can be given to the same and that the other decision in Bhatia International case (3 supra), relied on by the appellant, is also not applicable to the facts of the present case, as it is a case pertaining to international arbitration, which falls under Part II of the Act, whereas the arbitration in the present case falls under Part I of the Act. He further contended that a plain reading of Section 2(1)(e) of the Act would make it clear that the Court which will have jurisdiction to try a petition under the Act, is the Court which has the jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject-matter of arbitration, if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, and it is only the Courts at Orissa which will have the jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject-matter of arbitration in the present case and it alone can grant any interim directions. Further, under Section 42 of the Act, any application made under Part I will give jurisdiction only to that Court and to no other Court for any subsequent applications arising out of the agreement, and in view of the same, if an application under Section 9 of the Act is entertained and adjudicated by the Court below, all subsequent arbitral proceedings have to be made in that Court and the jurisdiction of the Court at Orissa, which is having the original jurisdiction, as agreed to by the parties, will be ousted, which is contrary to Article 10 of the Agreement, whereat the parties have designated the State of Orissa as place of arbitration, and thus the Court mentioned in Section 9 can only be the Court which has been defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. In support this contention, he relied upon the decision of High Court of Delhi in D.L.F. Industries Ltd. Vs. Standard Chartered Bank AIR 1999 Delhi 11. Denying the allegation of fraud on the part of the first respondent, the learned counsel for the fist respondent contended that the appellant did not approach the Court with clean hands and it is the appellant, who neglected the works and requested the respondent to pay the amounts on ad hoc basis, and that already one of the bank guarantees furnished by the appellant expired and thus it has no bona fides in seeking injunction restraining the respondent from invoking the bank guarantee, and the Court below has rightly held that the appellant has no prima facie case to grant the relief. He, thus, prayed for dismissal of the present appeal. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the first respondent and perused the order under appeal and other material made available on record. There is no dispute that the appellant and the first respondent entered into an agreement, as per which the appellant has to execute five units of works as entrusted by the first respondent in terms of the said agreement. It is also not in dispute that, under the said agreement, the parties in Article 10 have designated the State of Orissa as the place of arbitration, for settlement of any disputes and differences arising out of the agreement. It is also not in dispute that, under the said agreement, the parties in Article 10 have designated the State of Orissa as the place of arbitration, for settlement of any disputes and differences arising out of the agreement. The said Article 10 reads as follows: The parties hereto shall endeavour to settle all disputes and differences relating to and/or arising out of the contract amicably. In the event of the parties fail to resolve any dispute amicably the same shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as is prevalent in India. Each party shall be entitled to nominate an Arbitrator and the two Arbitrators so nominated shall jointly nominate a third Arbitrator. The Arbitrators shall give a reasoned award. The place of arbitration shall be in the State of Orissa and the language of the arbitration shall be English. The parties agree that any arbitration award shall be final and binding upon the parties. The parties hereto agree that the contractor shall be obliged to carry out its obligations under the contract even in the event of a dispute is referred to arbitration. It is further clarified that the employer shall be entitled to retain any sum or portion of contract price which has become due and payable for any unfinished works or any subject matter under arbitration. While so, it seems, there arose some disputes between the parties in the execution of agreement between them and the appellant, contending that they intend to invoke arbitration clause under the agreement for resolution of the disputes between them, and apprehending that the first respondent may invoke the bank guarantee, approached the Court below i.e. the II Additional Chief Judge’s Court, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for an interim measure under Section 9 of the Act i.e. to restrain the first respondent from invoking the bank guarantee executed by them, pending initiation and resolution of dispute through arbitration. The Court below, having considered the stand of the parties and having referred to various case law and precedents, held that as the parties themselves have chosen the State of Orissa as the place of arbitration, under the agreement, it has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 9 of the Act. The Court below, having considered the stand of the parties and having referred to various case law and precedents, held that as the parties themselves have chosen the State of Orissa as the place of arbitration, under the agreement, it has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 9 of the Act. Having held so, the Court below has also gone into the merits of the case and held that the appellant failed to establish prima facie case in its favour for grant of interim measure as sought for, and accordingly dismissed the petition of the appellant. Having regard to the contentions of the respective counsel, the points that arise for consideration in the present appeal are: 1) Whether the Court below has jurisdiction to entertain the present application filed by the appellant under Section 9 of the Act, for an interim measure, when the parties have designated the State of Orissa, as the place of arbitration? 2) Whether the Court below is justified in going into the merits of the matter and giving a finding that there is no prima facie case in favour the appellant, having held that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the present petition? In Re Point No.1: The learned counsel for the appellant submits that even a fraction of cause of action is enough and sufficient to decide the territorial jurisdiction of a Court for entertaining the petition under Section 9 of the Act. According to him, the registered office of the appellant company is situated at Hyderabad, the tender documents under Ex.A11 have been submitted from Hyderabad, agreement works are being monitored from Hyderabad and the bank guarantees have been drawn at the banks at Hyderabad, and thus cause of action having arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court below, in view of the provisions of Section 20 C.P.C., the Court below had the jurisdiction to entertain application under Section 9 of the Act. In support of this contention, he relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in INCOMM Tele Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd (1 supra). In support of this contention, he relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in INCOMM Tele Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd (1 supra). On the other hand, the contention of respondent is that in view of the specific clause in Article 10 in the agreement that the seat of Arbitration is at Orissa, and the parties having agreed to that effect, the Courts at Hyderabad have no jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 9 of the Act. He further contended that in view of Section 42 of the Act, if application under Section 9 is entertained by the Court below, then all subsequent applications, arising out of the present agreement, shall be made in that Court only. He further submitted that the Court mentioned in Section 9 can only be the Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. Since the parties agreed the place of arbitration as State of Orissa, having regard to the provisions of Section 2(1)(e) read with Section 42 of the Act, the Courts in the State of Andhra Pradesh have no jurisdiction to entertain application under Section 9 of the Act. In case, it is held that the civil Court at Hyderabad has jurisdiction, then the same would run contrary to the terms of agreement entered into by the parties and frustrate the very agreement itself. To consider the rival contentions, it would be appropriate, if a reference is made to the provisions of Section 9 of the Act, so as to consider the scope and power of the Court to entertain an application filed thereunder. Section 9, which deals with interim measures, reads as follows: Interim measures, etc. To consider the rival contentions, it would be appropriate, if a reference is made to the provisions of Section 9 of the Act, so as to consider the scope and power of the Court to entertain an application filed thereunder. Section 9, which deals with interim measures, reads as follows: Interim measures, etc. by Court: - A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a Court – (i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely – (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorizing for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorizing any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence; (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient; and the Court shall have the power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it. From a bare perusal of the above provision, it becomes clear that it is a substantive provision, which enables a party to approach the Court before or during the arbitral proceedings or at any time after passing of the award, but before it is enforced under Section 36 of the Act, and seek reliefs, by way of interim measure, for the preservation of the subject matter and keep the same alive. Interim relief in terms of this provision can be sought even in cases where the parties by themselves have initiated the arbitration proceedings without intervention of the Court. Interim relief in terms of this provision can be sought even in cases where the parties by themselves have initiated the arbitration proceedings without intervention of the Court. This provision can be invoked, only for obtaining reliefs as an interim measure, for the preservation of the subject matter of dispute, because if such reliefs are not obtained, then the arbitration proceedings would stand frustrated. This provision, however, does not take away the right of the parties to resort to arbitration proceedings, for resolution of the disputes arising out of and under an agreement entered into by and between them. Further, while passing an order under this provision, as an interim measure, the Court will not disable the opposite party to put up his claim in the main arbitration proceedings before arbitrator. Though under the old Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1940, the Legislature made applicable the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in their entirety to the arbitral proceedings, but under the new 1996 Act, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, have not been made applicable to proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal. As can be understood from the provisions of Section 9, the intention of the Legislature was to make the Act a self-contained and self-operative Code with regard to the subject-matter of arbitration and conciliation. If the intention of the Legislature was to apply the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, to arbitration under the Act, then there was no reason for the Legislature to specifically enact Section 9, dealing with interim measures, as otherwise, all the said powers would have been available in different Orders in the Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, it is clear that the intention of the Legislature was not to make applicable the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure in their entirety to arbitral proceedings, and the arbitral tribunals are required to be guided by the principles of natural justice or by their own rules framed or as framed and agreed to by the parties themselves. Thus, it is clear that the intention of the Legislature was not to make applicable the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure in their entirety to arbitral proceedings, and the arbitral tribunals are required to be guided by the principles of natural justice or by their own rules framed or as framed and agreed to by the parties themselves. Since it is the case of the first respondent that the “Court” mentioned in Section 9 would be the “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, and not any other, it would be appropriate, if a reference is made to the definition of “Court” as defined in Section 2(1) (e) of the Act, which reads thus: ‘Court’ means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, including the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes. From a reading of the above definition of “Court”, it becomes clear that the jurisdiction of the Court to decide the questions forming subject matter of the arbitration, if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, is fundamental, for conferring jurisdiction upon a Court. As already noticed supra, the parties, in the instant case, in Article 10 of the agreement, have agreed to the place of arbitration as State of Orissa, and considering the definition of “Court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, the Courts in the State of Orissa, alone will have the jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of arbitration, but not the Courts in Andhra Pradesh, much less the Court below, irrespective of whether cause of action has arisen wholly or in part. This apart, if application under Section 9 of the Act, with respect to the arbitration agreement, is entertained by a Court other than the Court defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, then all subsequent applications, having regard to the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, will have to be entertained only by that Court. This apart, if application under Section 9 of the Act, with respect to the arbitration agreement, is entertained by a Court other than the Court defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, then all subsequent applications, having regard to the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, will have to be entertained only by that Court. As the parties in Article 10 of the agreement, have agreed to the place of arbitration as State of Orissa, only the Courts in the State of Orissa, as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, will have jurisdiction to entertain all applications with respect to the arbitration agreement, including application under Section 9 of the Act, and if the Courts in Andhra Pradesh entertain the application under Section 9 of the Act, then all subsequent application arising out of the arbitration agreement shall have to be made in the Courts in Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, which is not the intendment of the parties under Article 10 of the Agreement. In Salarjung Museum’s case (5 supra), the parties to the agreement, have agreed to a particular place of arbitration, and considering the said fact, a Division Bench of this Court held that if the place of arbitration is indicated in the agreement, the Principal Civil Court situated at the agreed place of arbitration shall be the Court for the purpose of filing any application under Section 9 of the Act or application or petition under Section 34 of the Act, and that the place of arbitration therefore assumes significance. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in INCOMM Tele Limited case (1 supra), in support of his argument of theory of cause of action, would not assist him in any manner, because in the said judgment, the parties did not specify the seat of arbitration, and in the absence of any exclusionary clause in the General Terms and Conditions of the Contract ousting the jurisdiction of the Courts at Hyderabad and conferring the exclusive jurisdiction on the Courts at Delhi by virtue of the fact that the Head Office of BSNL is located at Delhi, it was held that the Courts at Hyderabad, had jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the appellant therein under Section 9 of the Act. In Paramita Constructions case (4 supra) also, a learned Single Judge of this Court, considering the fact that the parties therein have chosen Benguluru as place of arbitration, held that when the parties agreed Benguluru as a place of arbitration, impliedly parties also agreed Principal Civil Court of Benguluru as ‘the Court’ for the purpose of Section 9 and Section 34 read with Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, and thus the Hon’ble Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for appointment of arbitrator to adjudicate claims and disputes between the parties. Though the learned counsel for the appellant contended that decisions of this Court in Salarjung Museum case and Paramita Constructions case, cannot be made applicable to the facts of the case on hand because the former dealt with an application filed under Section 34 of the Act, for setting aside the award passed by the Arbitrator, and the latter dealt with an application filed under Section 11 of the Act for appointment of Arbitrator, and not an application under Section 9 of the Act, but the fact remains, in the said two decisions, the Courts, though not directly, but incidentally, while considering the provisions of the law, held that when the parties have chosen a particular State/City, as the place of arbitration, the “Court” appearing in Sections 9 and 34 shall be the Courts situated in the said State/City alone, and not any other. In the case on hand, as noted supra, the parties have specifically, in Article 10 of the agreement, have agreed to the place of arbitration as the State of Orissa. That being so, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant cannot be permitted to invoke the theory of cause of action by application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, so as to confer jurisdiction upon the Court at Hyderabad, for entertaining application under Section 9 of the Act, and if such argument of the appellant is accepted, then the very purpose of the parties agreeing to the place of arbitration as State of Orissa in Article 10 of the agreement, would be defeated. The learned counsel for the appellant alternatively relying on the judgment of the apex Court in Bhatia International case (3 supra), contended that unless the agreement between the parties specifically excludes Section 9 of the Act, the parties may seek relief under Section 9 of the Act, in any appropriate Court, and that an application for interim measure can be made to the Courts in India, whether or not the arbitration takes place in India, before or during arbitral proceedings. This decision does not help the case of the appellant in any manner, because the said case relates to and arises out of an international arbitration, which falls under Part II of the Act, whereas the arbitration in the present case falls under Part I of the Act. Admittedly, Section 9 is in Part I of the Act. Here it would be appropriate, if a reference is made to the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, which deals with jurisdiction. The said provision reads as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent proceedings arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court. On a plain reading of the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, it is clear that this provision of law starts with non-obstante clause. In that it states that notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or any other law for the time being in force, where an application with respect to an arbitration agreement under this Part has been made in a Court, then that Court alone will have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent proceedings arising out of that agreement. The said provision is mandatory. If the application under Section 9 of the Act is allowed to be adjudicated by the Court at Hyderabad, then having regard to the provisions of Section 42 of the Act and the bar contained therein, all the subsequent arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court alone. The said provision is mandatory. If the application under Section 9 of the Act is allowed to be adjudicated by the Court at Hyderabad, then having regard to the provisions of Section 42 of the Act and the bar contained therein, all the subsequent arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court alone. The phrase employed in Section 42 of the Act, namely “with respect to an arbitration agreement”, has wide meaning and it includes the proceedings under Section 9 of the Act. In view of the fact that the agreement contains a clause in Article 10, whereunder the parties have agreed to “the place of arbitration shall be in the State of Orissa”, if the present application is entertained by the Courts in the State of Andhra Pradesh, then it would have an impact on the subsequent arbitral proceedings, for all the subsequent applications, will have to be filed in the Courts in the State of Andhra Pradesh, i.e. the civil Court at Hyderabad, upon which, the parties have not conferred any jurisdiction. Having regard to the above discussion, and considering the fact that the parties have voluntarily and in unequivocal terms agreed the State of Orissa as the place of arbitration, at Article 10 of the agreement, we are of the considered opinion that the Court below is not conferred with the jurisdiction to entertain the present petition, for grant of interim measure under Section 9 of the Act, de hors the terms of the agreement. Thus, no exception can be taken to the order of the Court below, insofar as it holds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. The point is accordingly answered. In Re Point No.2: The application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act cannot be equated with that of a regular suit. Thus, no exception can be taken to the order of the Court below, insofar as it holds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. The point is accordingly answered. In Re Point No.2: The application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act cannot be equated with that of a regular suit. As the remedy under Section 9 of the Act is in the nature of interim measure, so as to protect the property which is subject matter of arbitration, until the award is given effect to, what the Court has to see is whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the application or not, and once it comes to conclusion that it has no jurisdiction, it need not go into the merits of the case, even though under Order XIV Rules 1 and 2 of C.P.C., the Court may go into and deal with the merits of the matter while determining the issue relating to jurisdiction. Since the present application is filed under Section 9 of the Act, the Court having come to the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction to entertain that application, the only course open to it is to reject the application to enable the parties go before the competent Court instead of giving decision on merits, because if it proceeds and records findings on merits, it would affect the proceedings before the competent court, which has jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 9 of the Act. Further, the law is well settled that any findings or observations made by a Court, which has no jurisdiction, to entertain a suit or application, would be coram non judice (A Court which has no jurisdiction to decide a matter). In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the Court below, that the appellant has no prima facie case in its favour for grant of interim order under Section 9 of the Act, and other findings recorded on merits, cannot be sustained. This point is accordingly answered. In view of the reasons recorded above, the order under appeal to the extent of the findings recorded on the merits of the matter is set aside, while the rest of the order, holding that the Court below has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition, stands confirmed. The civil miscellaneous appeal is accordingly allowed in part. No order as to costs.