Hon'ble SHARMA, J.—This misc. appeal has been filed by the appellant under Order 43 Rule 1(k) CPC against the order dated 5.8.2004 passed by Additional District Judge (Fast Track) Kishangarhbas (Alwar) in Civil Suit No. 73/2004 whereby the trial Court refused to set aside the abatement and has dismissed the application of the appellant under Order 22 Rule 4 C.P.C. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff-appellant had filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement dated 25.10.1993. The plaintiff's case is that the defendant is his father in law. He had agreed to sale the property described in paras 1 and 2 of the plaint for a consideration of Rs. 1,25,000/- out of which rupees one lac were paid to the defendant and an agreement was executed on 25.10.93 in which it was agreed that the balance amount of Rs. 25,000/- will be paid at the time of registration. During the pendency of the suit, Sohanlal sole defendant had expired. The appellant had engaged one Smt. Sushma Sharma Advocate who had submitted an application under Order 22 Rule 4 C.P.C. read with Section 151 C.P.C. on 10.11.1999 but this application was not available on the record. In such circumstances another application was submitted on 28.10.2002. The notices of this application were issued. The legal representatives of defendant contested the application. The trial Court without holding any enquiry dismissed the application of the appellant under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC read with Order 22 Rule 9 C.PC.. vide order dated 5.8.2004. 3. Mr. M.M. Ranjan, Senior Advocate has argued that the trial Court has not appreciated the fact that there was no fault of the appellant. He had engaged a counsel who had informed the appellant that application has been submitted on 10.11.1999. The appellant had disclosed the names of legal representatives. Under these circumstances if the application was not traceable on record then the appellant is not at fault. The trial Court should have been liberal for condoning the delay for substitution of legal representatives. The trial Court has also not appreciated the fact that the abatement could be set aside even on the basis of application dated 28.10.2002. The trial Court has seriously erred in not appreciating the fact that no information under Order 22 Rule 10-A C.P.C. was given by the defendant and the limitation has not yet commenced. The trial Court has also not appreciated the fact that the abatement could be set aside even on the basis of application dated 28.10.2002. The trial Court has seriously erred in not appreciating the fact that no information under Order 22 Rule 10-A C.P.C. was given by the defendant and the limitation has not yet commenced. The application should have been treated in limitation or delay should have been condoned for setting aside the abatement. The trial Court has dismissed the application only on the ground that there was no mention of submission of application on the order sheet. The application was submitted on 10.11.99 and on that day the case as not fixed and next date fixed was 9.9.2000. On the application itself, the Court had made an endorsement to place the application along with the case file. As such there was no question of mentioning it on the order-sheet since the case was not fixed on 10.11.99. Mr. Ranjan has placed reliance on the cases of Sharafat Hussain (dead) through LRs. and Others vs. Mohd. Shafiq and Others (1996) 10 SCC 253 , Narmada Shankar vs. Bajranglal and Another (2005) 3 DNJ (Raj.) 1382 = RLW 2005(4) Raj. 2557, Mewar Kalal Nyati Sangh vs. Jaivi and Others ( AIR 1999 Raj. 148 = RLW 1999(1) Raj. 609), Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Others vs. Gobardhan Sao and Others ( AIR 2002 SC 1201 ) and Ram Ratan Gupta vs. Sarju Narain and Others (1997(1) Western Law Cases (Raj.) 597). 4. Mr. R.K. Mathur, Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of Smt. Santra Devi daughter of late Sohan Lal, defendant respondent, Mr. Lokesh Sharma, appearing on behalf of Rama Prasad son of late Sohan Lal, defendant respondent, and M.I. Khan, appearing on behalf of Smt. Sudha Devi, daughter of defendant respondent, have submitted that the order dated 5.8.2004 rejecting the application of the appellant under Order 22 Rule 4 C.P.C. by the trial Court is just and proper and has been passed after considering the fact that the application has been filed by the appellant after a lapse of four years and no explanation has been given for such a delay. Mr. R.K. Mathur has placed reliance on Lanka Venkateshwarlu (dead) by LRs. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others (2001) 4 SCC 363. 5. Mr. R.K. Mathur has placed reliance on Lanka Venkateshwarlu (dead) by LRs. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others (2001) 4 SCC 363. 5. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and the case law cited by the counsel for both the parties. 6. Before proceeding further it is necessary to have a look at the rulings cited by both the learned counsel. In Sharafat Hussain vs. Mohd. Shafiq and others (supra), sole appellant died on 1.12.1990 in first appeal before the High Court. Intimation of the death given by counsel for respondents on 5.8.1991 but application for substitution of LR having not been made, appeal abated and dismissed on 18.11.1991. Appli-cation filed on 4.5.1992 seeking setting aside the abatement, condonation of delay in filing the application and bringing the LRs of the deceased appellant on record. Affidavit was filed by counsel for the deceased appellant stating that delay occurred since he could communicate to the LRs the information issued by the respondents about death of the appellant only on 4.5.92 and that the LRs were unaware of the appeal filed by their father. In this case in view of the statement of the counsel for the deceased appellant, the Apex Court condoned the delay in bringing LRs on record and abatement was set aside. In Narmada Shankar vs. Bajrang Lal and Anr. (supra) the application filed by LRs of deceased respondent No.1 praying for dismissal of appeal as having abated. Application for substitution was filed within 90 days from date of communication of death of deceased. It was held by this court that the appeal cannot be held to have abated. In Mewar Kalal Nyati Sangh vs. Jaivi and Others (supra) the plaintiff came to know about death of defendant 15 days before filing application. No information about death of defendant given to plaintiff by Court. the counsel of plaintiff was informed about death of defendant, there could be delay in rea-ching his letter to plaintiff. The cause of delay cannot be said to be untrue or false. Application under Order 22 Rule 9 was allowed to meet ends of justice. In Ram Ratan Gupta vs. Sarju Narain and Ors. (supra), death of one of several defendants. LRs of deceased defendant not brought on record within time. Suit can abate only against deceased defendant more so when deceased was mere formal party. Application under Order 22 Rule 9 was allowed to meet ends of justice. In Ram Ratan Gupta vs. Sarju Narain and Ors. (supra), death of one of several defendants. LRs of deceased defendant not brought on record within time. Suit can abate only against deceased defendant more so when deceased was mere formal party. The case of N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy ( AIR 1998 SC 3222 = RLW 1999(1) SC 107) was considered in Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and Ors. vs. Gobardhan Sao and others (supra). In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P. (2011) 4 SCC 363 , the Apex court observed that it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in Collector (L.A.) vs. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 ). In N. Balakrishnan (supra) the Apex Court again reiterated the principle that : 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that [the] parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly." In Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra ( (2003) 3 SCC 272 ) the Apex Court again emphasized that provisions contained in Order 22 CPC were devised to ensure continuation and culmination in an effective adjudication and not to retard further progress of the proceedings. The provisions contained in Order 22 are not to be construed as a rigid matter of principle, but must ever be viewed as a flexible tool of convenience in the administration of justice. It was observed in Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra ( (2003) 3 SCC 272 ) as under : "26. Laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even an adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizen under personal, property and other laws." In Mithailal Dalsangar Singh vs. Annabai Devram Kini ( (2003) 10 SCC 691 ) the Apex Court again reiterated that : "8. Inasmuch as the abatement results in denial of hearing on the merits of the case, the provision of [an] abatement has to be construed strictly. Inasmuch as the abatement results in denial of hearing on the merits of the case, the provision of [an] abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other hand, eh prayer of setting aside an abatement and the dismissal consequent upon an abatement, [had] to be considered liberally. "9. The courts have to adopt a justice oriented approach dictated by the uppermost consideration that ordinarily a litigant ought not to be denied an opportunity of having a lis determined on merits unless he has, by gross negligence, deliberate inaction or something akin to mis-conduct, disentitled himself from seeking the indulgence of the Court." The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by the Apex court in Balwant Singh ( (2010) 8 SCC 685 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 537 paras 25-26) as under : "25. We may state that even if the term ‘sufficient cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of ‘reasonableness’ as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise (sic a lis). These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly." The Apex Court in Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P. (2011) 4 SCC 363 , held as under : "24. Let us now examine as to whether the High Court was justified in condoning the delay in the peculiar facts of the present case. The High Court in its judgment records the following conclusions : (1) The Government Pleader having filed the appeal on 18.2.1983 has taken three long years to get the appeal numbered. (2) The sole respondent died in 1990. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that he served a letter on the learned Government Pleader bringing to his notice about the death of his client in 1990 itself. Since the letter is not traced we are not giving much importance to that fact. But at the same time this fact was brought to the notice of the Government Pleader on 24.2.1997 when the appeal was listed for hearing. (3) Even though the Court gave sufficient time the Government Pleader has not taken any steps to bring LRs on record. (4) After one year the Court passed a conditional order on 6.2.1998 and the appeal was dismissed for not bringing the LRs on record. (5) After two more years the officials concerned of the Government and the Government Pleader in office at the relevant point of time, filed some applications, which are not in order. (6) Even then the have not bestowed any attention either to comply with the defects in filing the application or in getting the orders passed on these applications. But at the same time they went on taking time without knowing for what purpose they were taking time." In the result an appeal which would have been disposed of in 1997 remained pending all these years mainly due to the negligence on the part of the Government Pleader in office. 25. Thereafter at the two stages, the High Court records that : "In the normal course we would have thrown out these applications without having second thought in the matter... We have already observed that in the normal course we would have dismissed the applications for severe laches on the part of the appellants and their counsel." 26. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our opinion, such a course was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the respondents in the application seeking condonation of delay. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our opinion, such a course was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the respondents in the application seeking condonation of delay. This is especially so in view of the remarks made by the High Court about the delay being caused by the inefficiency and ineptitude of the Government Pleaders. 27. The displeasure of the Court is patently apparent from the impugned order itself. In the opening paragraph of the impugned order the High Court has, rather sarcastically, dubbed the Government Pleaders as without merit and ability. Such an insinuation is clearly discernable from the observation that, "This is a classic case, how the learned Government Pleaders appointed on the basis of merit and ability (emphasis supplied) are discharging their function protecting the interest of their clients." Having said so, the High Court, graphically narrated the clear dereliction of duty by the Government Pleaders concerned in not pursuing the appeal before the High Court diligently. The High Court has set out the different stages at which the Government Pleaders had exhibited almost culpable negligence in performance of their duties. The High court found the justification given by the Government Pleaders to be unacceptable. Twice in the impugned order, it was recorded that in the normal course, the applications would second thought in the matter. Having recorded such conclusions, inexplicably, the High Court proceeds to condone the unconscionable delay. 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such a "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases there the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reasons. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. 30. The order of the High Court, in our opinion, is based purely on the personal perceptions and predilections of the Judges on the Bench. The latent anger and hostility ingrained in the expressions employed in the judgment have denuded the judgment of impartiality. In its desire to castigate the Government Pleaders and the Court staff, the High Court has sacrificed the "justice oriented approach", the bedrock of which is fairness and impartiality. 31. Judges at all levels in this country subscribe to an oath when entering upon office of Judgeship, to do justice without fear or favour, ill will or malice. This commitment in form of a solemn oath is to ensure that Judges base their opinions on objectivity and impartiality. The first casualty of prejudice is objectivity and impartiality. It is also well known that anger deprives a human being of his ability to reason, Judges being human are not immune to such disability. It is of utmost importance that in expressing their opinions, Judges and Magistrates be guided only by the considerations of doing justice. 32. We may notice here the observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Naim6, which are of some relevance in the present context. In AIR para 10 of the judgment, it was observed as follows : (AIR p. 707) "10. ... If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by this Court. ... If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by this Court. At the same it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognized that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the Curt or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct, justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognized that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve." 33. We are of the considered opinion that the caustic remarks made by the High Court, against the Government Pleaders and the Court staff clearly exhibits a departure from the principles quoted above. 34. We are of the considered opinion that the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable either in law or in equity. Consequently, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside with no order as to costs. In the above case, the Government Pleader filed the appeal on 18.2.1983. The sole respondent died in 1990. The learned counsel for the respondent served a letter on the learned Government Pleader bringing to his notice about the death of his client in 1990 itself. The letter was not traced. This fact was brought to the notice of the Government Pleader on 24.2.1997 when the appeal was listed for hearing. The Court gave sufficient time but the Government. Pleader has not taken any steps to bring LRs on record. After one year the Court passed a conditional order on 6.2.1998 and the appeal was dismissed for not bringing the LRs on record. The Court gave sufficient time but the Government. Pleader has not taken any steps to bring LRs on record. After one year the Court passed a conditional order on 6.2.1998 and the appeal was dismissed for not bringing the LRs on record. After two more years the officials concerned of the Government and the Government Pleader in office at the relevant point of time, filed some applications. They have not bestowed any attention either to comply with the defects in filing the application or in getting the orders passed on these applications. Thereafter they went on taking time without knowing for what purpose they were taking time. The appeal which would have been disposed of in 1997 remained pending all these years mainly due to the negligence on the part of the Government Pleader in office. Thereafter at the two stages, the High Court recorded that "In the normal course we would have thrown out these application without having second thought in the matter..." ...We have already observed that in the normal course we would have dismissed the applications for severe laches on the part of the appellants and their counsel." Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High Court proceeded to condone the delay. The Apex Court after considering all these facts quashed the order of the High Court in condoning the delay in filing the application under Order 22 Rule 4 & 9. 7. It is an admitted fact that after filing of the written statement by the defendant, the counsel for the defendant in the Court of Additional District Judge No.1 Kishangarhbas informed the counsel for the appellant on 28.10.1998 that the defendant Sohan Lal died. Inspite of this the appellant did not take any steps to bring the legal representatives on record. It was stated by the appellant that earlier his client filed an application for bringing the legal representative on record on 10.11.99. It was stated that in the order sheet it was not mentioned that any such application was filed by the appellant for taking the legal representatives on record. It is stated that a carbon copy of the application which was submitted by his client in the court was available with him. It was further stated that inspite of that another application under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed on 28.10.2002. It is stated that a carbon copy of the application which was submitted by his client in the court was available with him. It was further stated that inspite of that another application under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed on 28.10.2002. In the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act it was stated by the appellant that his wife was not well and as operated hence he could not file the application in time and requested for condonation of delay. The Addl. In the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act it was stated by the appellant that his wife was not well and as operated hence he could not file the application in time and requested for condonation of delay. The Addl. District Judge Fast Track Court Kishangarhbas in the order dated 5.8.2004 observed as under : ^^¼7½ tgka rd fo}ku vf/koäk izkFkhZ ds bl dFku dk iz'u gS fd ejEer loky dh nj[okLr fnukad 10-11-99 dks gh izLrqr dj nh xbZ Fkh] og dgus ;ksX; ugha gS] D;ksafd ,slk dksbZ bUnzkt QnZ vgdke esa o i=koyh esa ugha gS] dsoy dkjcu dkih oknh ds odhy ds ikl gksus ls ;g ugha ekuk tk ldrk fd bl rjg dk dksbZ vkosnu fnukad 10-11-99 dks U;k;ky; esa mudh vksj ls izLrqr fd;k x;k gksA mijksä izdj.k esa izfroknh ds fo}ku vf/koäk us ;g tkfgj dj fn;k Fkk fd izfroknh lksguyky dh e`R;q gks pqdh gS] blds mijkUr Hkh izkFkhZ oknh dh vksj ls ;g vkosnu yxHkx pkj o"kZckn fnukad 28-10-2002 dks U;k;ky; esa izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA fo}ku vf/koäk izkFkhZ dh vksj ls tks U;kf;d n`"VkUr izLrqr gqk gS mldk esjs }kjk lknj voyksdu fd;k x;kA ml U;kf;d n`"VkUr esa oknh ds }kjk izfroknh ds vf/koäk ls okfjlku ds uke o irs dh lwpuk ekaxh xbZ Fkh] ysfdu mlds mijkUr Hkh okfjlku ds lEcU/k esa izfroknh ds vf/koäk }kjk dksbZ lwpuk ugha nh xbZA bl vk/kkj ij ekuuh; jkt- mPp U;k;ky; us bl U;kf;d n`"VkUr esa i;kZIr lwpuk gksuk ugha ekuk gSA tcfd bl izdj.k esa oknh ;k oknh ds vf/koäk dh vksj ls okfjlku ds uke o irs dh ckcr~ dksbZ iz'u ugha iwNk x;k gSA bl dkj.k izkFkhZ oknh }kjk izLrqr U;kf;d n`"VkUr izkFkhZ oknh dh dksbZ lgk;rk ugha djrkA ¼8½ bl izdj.k esa oknh dh vksj ls pkj o"kZdh nwjh ls vkosnu izLrqr gqvk gS] ml nsjh dk dksbZ i;kZIr Li"Vhdj.k i=koyh ij ugha gS] vr% mijksä foospu ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ oknh ds vkosnu ckcr~ ejEer loky o /kkjk 5 Hkkjrh; fe;kn vf/kfu;e esa dksbZ cy ugha gS vkSj ;s [kkfjt fd;s tkus ;ksX; ik;s tkrs gSA ifj.kker% oknh }kjk izLrqr mi;qZä nksuksa vkosnu [kkfjt fd;s tkrs gSA ¼9½ pwafd fu/kkZfjr le; vof/k esa izfroknh ds okfjlku dks jsdkMZ ij ugha fy;k x;k gS vkSj izkFkhZ oknh }kjk bl lEcU/k esa izLrqr fd;k x;k vkosnu Hkh [kkfjt fd;k tk pqdk gS vr% oknh dk ;g okn fo:) izfroknh pyus ;ksX; ugha gSA tks vcsV fd;k tkrk gS** 8. I am in agreement with the findings arrived at by the trial Court rejecting the application of the appellant for taking the legal representatives on the record and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The suit filed by the appellant was rightly abated as the counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has not taken any steps for taking the legal representatives on record for more than four years. This finding of the trial Court cannot be said to be perverse or illegal. The Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P. (supra) ruling cited by the counsel for the legal representative of Sohan Lal defendant is applicable to the facts of this case. The cases cited by the counsel for the appellant are not applicable to the facts of this case. 9. For the reasons mentioned above, this misc. appeal filed by the appellant stands rejected. The stay applications also stand rejected. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.