JUDGMENT : DEV DARSHAN SUD. J. 1. This application has been filed by the State u/s 5 of the Limitation Act praying for condonation of delay in filing review petition against the judgment of this Court dated 27th April, 2007 in CWP No. 569 of 2001, titled Ravinder Kumar v. State of H.P. and Ors. whereby the petition filed by the Respondent was allowed and this Court issued directions to the State to acquire the land, the subject matter of the writ petition on the allegations in the petition as also taking into consideration the admission of the State that the land was under its occupation without acquisition. The review petition is barred by 1157 days that is to say three years and sixty two days. The reason for instituting the review after such a long lapse of time is sought to be explained by advancing the following reasons: (a) That as per the directions issued by this Court on 27.4.2007 the proceedings of acquisition of land comprised Khasra Nos. 725 and 736 of village Nati (Chintpurni), Amb, District Una were initiated, for which purpose notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 22.7.2008, which was followed by notification under Sections 6 and 7 on 1.11.2008. The State pleads that on conclusion of the proceedings, the Deputy Commissioner had sent the draft award for this land for approval wherein compensation amount was worked out at Rs. 1,73,24,858/-. Since the amount involved was large, the Director of Elementary Education was requested to examine the case after ascertaining the factual position on the spot. (b) Letters have been purportedly written by this Director on 20.7.2009, 20.10.2009, 21.11.2009, 8.2.2010 and 30.7.2010 stating that 1/12th part of this land is owned and possessed by the State Government. In order to ascertain the factual position, with respect to the possession of land, it was got demarcated from the Revenue Department on 19.6.2009 and it was found that the school building is situated on Khasra No. 735 which is different land and does not belong to the Petitioner, but to the State Government and the land is sufficient to run the Government Primary School. It was also urged that the land comprising Khasra No. 725 and 736 which was the subject matter of the writ petition is vacant and barren and not in possession of the School Authorities. It was also urged that the land comprising Khasra No. 725 and 736 which was the subject matter of the writ petition is vacant and barren and not in possession of the School Authorities. The application details that during the process of acquisition of land, no damage/alteration has been done by the department nor possession of the same was taken over. It has specifically been pointed out by the Director that the land comprised in Khasra No. 725 and 736 is not required and may be de-notified, as Government Primary School Nari is situated in Khasra No. 735 which is a Government land. (c) Another reason advanced is that the factual position in respect of existence of school building over Khasra No. 735 and sufficiency of Government land for running a primary school came to the notice of the applicant only after receipt of complete record including demarcation report from the field office. It is in these circumstances, the review petition has been preferred after the period of limitation which is admittedly 30 days. The State urges that it is bonafide pursuing the review petition. 2. This application has been opposed by the Respondent on a number of grounds. The Respondent questions the bona-fides of the State more especially in view of the admissions made in the writ petition inter-alia that the State has been in adverse possession of this land. The entirety of the plea of the State is that the Respondent has been guilty of practising fraud/active misrepresentation of facts before the Court in order to obtain an unfair advantage. In these circumstances, it is urged that this Court can itself exercise powers of review to undo injustice and this exercise does not attract the provisions of the Limitation Act. 3. Learned Additional Advocate General relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, (1994) 1 SCC 1 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh and Others, (2000) 3 SCC 581 holding: 14. In Smt. Charanjit Kaur Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1994 SC 1491 the two Judges Bench of this Court held: Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh and Others, (2000) 3 SCC 581 holding: 14. In Smt. Charanjit Kaur Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1994 SC 1491 the two Judges Bench of this Court held: Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and nonest in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree by the first Court or by the highest Court has to be treated as a nullity by every Court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court even in collateral proceedings. 15. In Indian Bank Vs. M/s. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., another two Judges bench, after making reference to a number of earlier decisions rendered by different High Courts in India, stated the legal position thus: Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of Court, the Courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon that Court. Similarly, where the Court is misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order. 16. It is unrealistic to expect the Appellant company to resist a claim at the first instance on the basis of the fraud because Appellant company had at that stage no knowledge about the fraud allegedly played by the claimants. If the Insurance Company comes to know of any dubious concoction having been made with the sinister object of extracting a claim for compensation, and if by that time the award was already passed, it would not be possible for the company to file a statutory appeal against the award. Not only because of bar of limitation to file the appeal but the consideration of the appeal even if the delay could be condoned, would be limited to the issues formulated from the pleadings made till then. 17. Therefore, we have no doubt that the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in such a situation. 17. Therefore, we have no doubt that the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in such a situation. No Court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim. (at p. 1167-1168) 4. The submission is that even if there is no power of review, the concealment of facts is so blatant that the Court can exercise its powers suo motu for recalling the order passed by it. Three more decisions on which reliance has been placed may be noticed. In N. Khosla Vs. Rajlakshmi (dead) and Others, AIR 2006 SC 1249 the Court again reiterated this basic principle that fraud avoids all judicial acts, a decree obtained by playing fraud is a nullity and it can be challenged in any proceedings. In Hamza Haji Vs. State of Kerala and Another, AIR 2006 SC 3028 the Court considered in extenso the meaning of what constitutes fraud. It held: 10. It is true, as observed by De Grey, C.J., in R. v. Duchess of Kingston 2 Smith LC 687 that 'Fraud' is an intrinsic, collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Lord Coke says it avoids all judicial acts ecclesiastical and temporal. 11. In Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, it is stated that: in applying this rule, it matters not whether the judgment impugned has been pronounced by an inferior or by the highest Court of judicature in the realm, but in all cases alike it is competent for every Court, whether superior or inferior, to treat as a nullity any judgment which can be clearly shown to have been obtained by manifest fraud. 12. It is also clear as indicated in Kinch v. Walcott 1929 AC 482 that it would be in the power of a party to a decree vitiated by fraud to apply directly to the Court which pronounced it to vacate it. 12. It is also clear as indicated in Kinch v. Walcott 1929 AC 482 that it would be in the power of a party to a decree vitiated by fraud to apply directly to the Court which pronounced it to vacate it. According to Kerr, "In order to sustain an action to impeach a judgment, actual fraud must be shown; mere constructive fraud is not, at all events after long delay, sufficient but such a judgment will not be set aside upon mere proof that the judgment was obtained by perjury." (See 7th Edn, pp 416-417) 13. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 49, paragraph 265, it is acknowledged that: Courts of record or of general jurisdiction have inherent power to vacate or set aside their own judgments. In paragraph 269, it is further stated, Fraud or collusion in obtaining judgment is a sufficient ground for opening or vacating it, even after the term at which it was rendered, provided the fraud was extrinsic and collateral to the matter tried and not a matter actually or potentially in issue in the action. It is also stated: Fraud practiced on the court is always ground for vacating the judgment, as where the court is deceived or misled as to material circumstances, or its process is abused, resulting in the rendition of a judgment which would not have been given if the whole conduct of the case had been fair.... 14. In American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, Volume 46, paragraph 825, it is stated: Indeed, the connection of fraud with a judgment constitutes one of the chief causes for interference by a court of equity with the operation of a judgment. The power of courts of equity in granting such relief is inherent, and frequent applications for equitable relief against judgments on this ground were made in equity before the practice of awarding new trials was introduced into the courts of common law. Where fraud is involved, it has been held, in some cases, that a remedy at law by appeal, error, or certiorari does not preclude relief in equity from the judgment. Nor, it has been said, is there any reason why a judgment obtained by fraud cannot be the subject of a direct attack by an action in equity even though the judgment has been satisfied. 15. The law in India is not different. Nor, it has been said, is there any reason why a judgment obtained by fraud cannot be the subject of a direct attack by an action in equity even though the judgment has been satisfied. 15. The law in India is not different. Section 44 of the Evidence Act enables a party otherwise bound by a previous adjudication to show that it was not final or binding because it is vitiated by fraud. The provision therefore gives jurisdiction and authority to a Court to consider and decide the question whether a prior adjudication is vitiated by fraud. In Paranjpe v. Kanade ILR (1882) 6 Bom 148, it was held that: It is always competent to any court to vacate any judgment or order, if it be proved that such judgment or order was obtained by manifest fraud.... 24. This Court in Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 2005 SC 3330 held that: (SCC p. 607) Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the court. Although, negligence is not fraud but it can be evidence on fraud. (at Pp. 424-425, 427) To similar effect, is the decision in A.V. Papayya Sastry and Others Vs. Government of A.P. and Others, AIR 2007 SC 1546 holding: 21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed: Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal. 22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fruad on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order-by the first court or by the final court-has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. 25. It has been said: fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent). 26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. 25. It has been said: fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent). 26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fruad one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collatoral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilised as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants. (at p. 231-232) The decision also takes note of the principles settled in Indian Bank Vs. M/s. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 2592 holding that 22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially u/s 151 Code of Civil Procedure, to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the constitution of the tribunals or courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseembly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the court's business. (at p.562-563)(emphasis supplied) 6. In order to establish this plea, learned Advocate General refers to the pleadings of the parties in the writ petition. The plea as advanced by the State on the principles urged is unimpeachable. Fraud can never be accepted as a tool/means for manipulating the judicial process to obtain a favourable order. What is required to be considered in the present case is as to whether there has been any fraud or active concealment of facts/misrepresentation. I find it extremely difficult to subscribe to this proposition on the pleadings as advanced in this Court in the writ petition. 7. What is required to be considered in the present case is as to whether there has been any fraud or active concealment of facts/misrepresentation. I find it extremely difficult to subscribe to this proposition on the pleadings as advanced in this Court in the writ petition. 7. The State has pleaded possession and ownership of the land by stating that it has become owner by way of adverse possession on two counts i.e. by long occupation and also since the notification for acquisition of land was issued in the year 1972, which notification lapsed, the possession of the State had matured into the adverse possession. In this behalf, reply of the State may be reproduced: 2. That in reply to this para it is submitted that the land as entered against Khasra No. 931, 937 and 940 measuring 0-18-54 Hectres situated at village Nari as per the jamabandi for the year 1985-86 is recorded in the ownership of the Badi Devi, Petitioner and Smt. Sumitra Devi to the extent of 11/12 share and the remaining 1/12 share in the ownership of the Respondent/State of H.P. and the whole land is recorded in the possession of State of H.P. recorded as Gairmumkin School. Even counting the possession since 1986 the replying Respondents are in open, peaceful, hostile, uninterupted, continuous and hostile possession of the land in question which was very much in the knowledge of the Petitioner and his predecessor. Rest of the para is not admitted for want of knowledge. However, it is submitted that as per the Jamabndi for the year 1973-74 and 1979-80 the land in question is recorded in the name of Sh. Nihal Chand to the extent of 55 shares and the remaining 5 shares is recorded in the ownership of Gram Panchayat. The copy of the jamabandi for the year 1973-74 and 1979-80 are Annexed and the same are makred as Annexures R-1 and R-II and its English translation are R-I/T and R-II/T respectively. And vide mutation No. 1247 the land to the extent of 1/12 shares has been entered in the name of Himachal Pradesh Govt. which is clear from the note of Jamabandi Annexure R-II and R-II/T. It is further submitted that in the year 1972 the Govt. And vide mutation No. 1247 the land to the extent of 1/12 shares has been entered in the name of Himachal Pradesh Govt. which is clear from the note of Jamabandi Annexure R-II and R-II/T. It is further submitted that in the year 1972 the Govt. has issued a notification u/s 4 of Land Acquisition Act to acquire the land which is clear from the copy of notification as issued by the Joint Secretary (Panchayat) to the Govt. of H.P. The copy of the notification showing this facts is also annexed and the same is marked as Annexure R-III. However, after the lapse of statutory period the Respondents are in uninterrupted, well known, continuous, hostile possession of the land since more than 12 years and as such the replying Respondents reserves right of claiming ownership by way of adverse possession before appropriate forum/court. The Petitioner first time represented to the court in October, 2000 which is evident from Annexure P-3. So much so even the revenue record which is annexed with the petition/reply shows the possession of the State. In these circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the Respondent herein (Petitioner in the writ petition) has in any manner been privy to concealment or misrepresentation of facts much less fraud. 8. The plea set up by the State was one of adverse possession over the land which was sought to be acquired. The plea was clear and unmistakenable. Acquisition of proprietory rights by the State by way of adverse possession was rejected by this Court. Not only this, the communication dated 7th April, 2007 addressed by the Director Elementary Education to the Principal Secretary (Elementary) Education was placed on the record and considered. There was a clear and unmistakenable recommendation for acquisition of this land. The revenue record, as filed with the writ petition, also shows the possession of the State. 9. In these circumstances, how could it be said that it was the Respondent (Petitioner in the writ petition) who misled the Court into passing the judgment when it was the State which admitted that land was in the possession of the State. The revenue record, as filed with the writ petition, also shows the possession of the State. 9. In these circumstances, how could it be said that it was the Respondent (Petitioner in the writ petition) who misled the Court into passing the judgment when it was the State which admitted that land was in the possession of the State. In fact, if the pleading of the State in the writ petition is considered, proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act had been initiated for this very land in 1972 which notification dated 4.10.1972 lapsed (Annexure R-3 of the writ petition) and on this count also, adverse possession was claimed. In these circumstances how could there have been any misrepresentation of facts by the Petitioner? The genesis of the entire case for review seems to be that considering the amount of compensation involved in the acquisition proceedings, the State would now want to withdraw after having utilised the land of Respondents continuously (Petitioner in the writ petition) prior to 1972. What I find is that the State has set up a plea which is not only untenable but unacceptable. If the land is vacant and unutilized by the State what was the necessity to plead in the writ petition that the State had become owner of this land by way of adverse possession when this land is not required by the State? There was no logic to claim ownership of this land and deny the Petitioner's right to exercise their ownership rights thereon. So much so, after decision of the writ petition, proceedings were undertaken by the State for which purpose notification u/s 4 and 17(iv) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 22.7.2008, followed by notification u/s 17(1) on 1st November, 2008 and draft award was also prepared. Where was the State sleeping at that time? It is now the so called demarcation of the Patwari which purportedly brought these facts to the notice of State and which otherwise should have been within its knowledge. Reasons set out for condonation of delay do not fall within the forecorners of the law justifying the invocation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. On the question of fraud, I have already held that there has been no misrepresentation of facts by the Petitioner. Reasons set out for condonation of delay do not fall within the forecorners of the law justifying the invocation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. On the question of fraud, I have already held that there has been no misrepresentation of facts by the Petitioner. If 1/12th portion of the land is owned by the State Government then it is obvious that this part of land cannot be acquired. Which part of land was owned by the State Government is not decided in the writ petition as no partition has been effected. 10. I may note the decision relied upon by the Respondent in Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Others, AIR 2010 SC 3043 on the question of the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court held: 18. In Union of India (UOI) Vs. Ram Charan and Others, AIR 1964 SC 215 a three-Judge Bench of this Court was concerned with an application filed under Order 22 Rule 9 CPC for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased on record beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The Court expressed the view that mere allegations about belated knowledge of death of the opposite party would not be sufficient. The Court applied the principle of "reasonable time" even to such situations. While stating that the Court was not to invoke its inherent powers u/s 151 CPC it expressed the view that the provisions of Order 22, Rule 9 CPC should be applied. The Court held as under: (Ram Charan case AIR pp. 219-20, paras 8, 10 and 12) 8. There is no question of construing the expression 'sufficient cause' liberally either because the party in default is the Government or because the question arises in connection with the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased Respondent. The provisions of the Code are with a view to advance the cause of justice. 219-20, paras 8, 10 and 12) 8. There is no question of construing the expression 'sufficient cause' liberally either because the party in default is the Government or because the question arises in connection with the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased Respondent. The provisions of the Code are with a view to advance the cause of justice. Of course, the court, in considering whether the Appellant has established sufficient cause for his not continuing the suit in time or for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time, need not be overstrict in expecting such proof of the suggested cause as it would accept for holding certain fact established, both because the question does not relate to the merits of the dispute between the parties and because if the abatement is set aside, the merits of the dispute can be determined while, if the abatement is not set aside, the Appellant is deprived of his proving his claim on account of his culpable negligence or lack of vigilance. This, however, does not mean that the court should readily accept whatever the Appellant alleges to explain away his default. It has to scrutinise it and would be fully justified in considering the merits of the evidence led to establish the cause for the Appellant's default in applying within time for the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased or for setting aside the abatement.... 19. In P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and Another, AIR 1998 SC 2276 where there was delay of 565 days in filing the first appeal by the State, the High Court had observed, "taking into consideration the averments contained in the affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone the delay, we are inclined to allow the petition." While setting aside this order, this Court found that the explanation rendered for condonation of delay was neither reasonable nor satisfactory and held as under: (SCC pp. 557-58, paras 3-6) 3. It would be noticed from a persual of the impugned order that the court has not recorded any satisfaction that the explanation for the delay was either reasonable or satisfactory, which is an essential prerequisite to condonation of delay. 4. 557-58, paras 3-6) 3. It would be noticed from a persual of the impugned order that the court has not recorded any satisfaction that the explanation for the delay was either reasonable or satisfactory, which is an essential prerequisite to condonation of delay. 4. That apart, we find that in the application filed by the Respondent seeking condonation of delay, the thrust in explaining the delay after 12-5-1995, is: ...at that time the Advocate General's office was fed up with so many arbitration matter (sic) equally important to this case were pending for consideration as per the directions of the Advocate General on 2-9-1995. 5. This can hardly be said to be a reasonable, satisfactory or even a proper explanation for seeking condonation of delay.... 6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grunds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the miscellaneous first appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs. (emphasis in original) 21. Another Bench of this Court in a recent judgment of Katari Suryanarayana and Others Vs. Koppisetti Subba Rao and Others, (2009) 11 SCC 183 again had an occasion to construe the ambit, scope and application of the expression "sufficient cause". The application for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal heirs of the deceased on record was filed in that case after a considerable delay. The explanation rendered regarding the delay 2381 days in filing the application for condonation of delay and 2601 days in bringing the legal representatives on record was not found to be satisfactory. Declining the application for condonation of delay, the Court, while discussing the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village Vs. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs. and Others, in its para 13 held as under: (SCC pp. Declining the application for condonation of delay, the Court, while discussing the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village Vs. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs. and Others, in its para 13 held as under: (SCC pp. 329-30) (i) The words 'sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation' should be understood and applied in a reasonable, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the Appellant. 25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cuase and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties euqally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. 27. The application filed by the applicants lacks in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex facie lack bona fide. 27. The application filed by the applicants lacks in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex facie lack bona fide. The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible, so as to persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true, but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. If it does not specify any of the enunciated ingredients of judicial pronouncements, then the application should be dismissed. On the other hand, if the application is bona fide and based upon true and plausible explanations, as well as reflects normal behaviour of a common prudent person on the part of the applicant, the Court would normally tilt the judicial discretion in favour of such an applicant. Liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to the other party. 28. In State of Bihar and Others Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Another, AIR 2000 SC 2306 this Court had taken a liberal approach for condoning the delay in cases of the Government to do substantial justice. Facts of that case were entirely different as that was the case of fixation of seniority of400 officers and the facts were required to be verified. But what we are impressing upon is that delay should be condoned to do substantial justice without resulting in injustice to the other party. This balance has to be kept in mind by the Court while deciding such applications. 29. In Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 this Court took the view: (AIR p.p. 363-65, paras 7 and 12) 7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan ILR (1890) Mad 269: 12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration. 30. In Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. (1988) 38 ELT 739 (SC) this Court while granting some latitude to the Government in relation to condonation of delay, still held that there must be some way or attempt to explain the cause for such delay and as there was no whisper to explain the cause for such delay the special leave petition, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed. 31. Similarly, in Collector of Central Excise, Madras Vs. A. Md. Bilal and Co., (2000) 10 SCC 63 the Supreme Court declined to condone the delay of502 days in filing the appeal because there was no satisfactory or reasonable, explanation rendered for condonation of delay. The provisions of Order 22 Rule 9 CPC have been the subject-matter of judicial scrutiny for considerable time now. Sometimes the courts have taken a view that delay should be condoned with a liberal attitude, while on certain occasions the courts have taken a stricter view and wherever the explanation was not satisfactory, have dismissed the application for condonation of delay. Sometimes the courts have taken a view that delay should be condoned with a liberal attitude, while on certain occasions the courts have taken a stricter view and wherever the explanation was not satisfactory, have dismissed the application for condonation of delay. Thus, it is evident that it is difficult to state any straitjacket formula which can uniformly be applied to all cases without reference to the peculiar facts and circumstances of a given case. 32. It must be kept in mind that whenever a law is enacted by the legislature, it is intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly. 33. Furthermore, it is also a well-settled canon of interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an interpretation to the provisions which would render the provision ineffective or odious. Once the legislature has enacted the provisions of Order 22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and the provisions of the Limitation Act are applied to the entertainment of such an application, all these provisions have to be given their true and correct meaning and must be applied wherever called for. If we accept the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach and interpret these provisions (Order 22 Rule 9 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law. 34. Liberal construction of the expression "sufficient cause" is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect "sufficient cause" as understood in law. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edn., 1997) 35. There can be instances where the court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect "sufficient cause" as understood in law. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edn., 1997) 35. The expression "sufficient cause" implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word "sufficient" means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. 37. We feel that it would be useful to make a reference to the judgment of this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village Vs. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs. and Others, (2008) 8 SCC 321 In this case, the Court, after discussing a number of judgments of this Court as well as that of the High Courts, enunciated the principles which need to be kept in mind while dealing with applications filed under the provisions of Order 22 CPC along with an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the application for bringing the legal representatives on record. In SCC para 13 of the judgment, the Court held as under: (SCC pp 329-30) (i) The words 'sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation' should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appelant. The words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appelant. (ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of delay, the Courts are more liberal with reference to applications for setting aside abatement, than other cases. While the court will have to keep in view that a valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased Respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an Appellant with foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement. (iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. (iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, court view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant's lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in refiling the appeal after rectification of defects. (v) Want of 'diligence' or 'inaction' can be attributed to an Appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the Appellant to be diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not expected to be listed for final hearing for a few years, an Appellant is not expected to visit the court or his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain the position nor keep checking whether the contesting Respondent is alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his counsel about the listing of the appeal. (emphasis in original) We may also notice here that this judgment had been followed with approval by an equi-Bench of this Court in Katari Suryanarayana and Others Vs. Koppisetti Subba Rao and Others, (at pp. 692, 693, 695-700) 11. He merely awaits the call or information from his counsel about the listing of the appeal. (emphasis in original) We may also notice here that this judgment had been followed with approval by an equi-Bench of this Court in Katari Suryanarayana and Others Vs. Koppisetti Subba Rao and Others, (at pp. 692, 693, 695-700) 11. This, in substance, is the law as settled by the Supreme Court. What requires to be considered is not merely the length of delay, but also the reasons putforth by the applicant disclosing the reasons, which caused this delay. In fact, it is the bonafides of the applicant which have to be considered. I have extracted the pleadings in the writ petition (supra) as also the reasons advanced in the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. On the facts, I hold that there has been no fraud, active concealment of facts or misrepresentation practised by the Respondent herein to obtain any favourable order. In fact, what I find is that the facts urged by the State were all through within the knowledge of its Officers. To repeat, the plea of adverse possession was set up with vigour and pursued in the pleadings supported by affidavit. The fact that the land was got demarcated and it is only then that the State came to know about the existence of a particular state of facts/state of affairs cannot be accepted. In fact, the judgment follows the plea/admission of the State in the writ petition. The revenue record filed by the State was also to substantiate its plea of adverse possesion. The State now goes against its own revenue record, which depicts its possession on the land. Demarcation is the genesis for invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act, cannot, in the circumstances, be accepted. I find no merit in this application. It is accordingly dismissed. Civil Review No. 98 of 2010 Dismissed as being time barred.