Hon'ble CHAUHAN, J.—This second application for suspension of sentence has been moved ostensibly on the ground that the appellant was convicted for offence under Section 304 Part II IPC and was sentence to seven years of rigorous imprisonment. Out of these seven years, the appellant has completed three years and eleven months. Thus, he has completed slightly more than 50% of the sentence. 2. Mr. Vinay Pal Yadav, the learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that since the appellant has completed more that 50% of the sentence, and since it is unlikely that the appeal would be decided within next three years, the benefit of bail should be granted to the appellant. In order to buttress this contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the cases of Salim Javed vs. State of Rajasthan ((2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 354), Kiran Kumar vs. State of M.P. ( (2001) 9 SCC 211 ), Shailendra Kumar vs. State of Delhi (2000 (3) Crimes 67 (SC)), Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat ( (1999) 4 SCC 421 ), Dinesh vs. State of Rajasthan (2006 (1) RCC 46), Hemraj vs. State of Rajasthan (1999 (2) RCC 1125). 3. On the other hand, Ms. Alka Bhatnagar, the learned Public Prosecutor, has contended that in none of the cases cited, the Hon'ble Supreme Court or this Court has laid down a strait jacket formula that after the completion of 50% of the sentence, the accused-person is entitled to be released on bail ipso facto. In fact, each case has to be decide on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. In the present case, the appellant happens to be the main accused as according to the witnesses, it is he who had assaulted Dhannanath with an iron rod. Because of the injuries suffered by Dhannanath, eventually he expired. Moreover, the first application of the present appellant was also dismissed by this Court vide order dated 16.9.2008. The said application was heard on merit. Therefore, no change of circumstances has occurred from 16.9.2008 till present. 4. Heard the learned counsel and perused the case law cited at the Bar. 5. Moreover, the first application of the present appellant was also dismissed by this Court vide order dated 16.9.2008. The said application was heard on merit. Therefore, no change of circumstances has occurred from 16.9.2008 till present. 4. Heard the learned counsel and perused the case law cited at the Bar. 5. In the case of Surinder Singh @ Shingara Singh vs. State of Punjab ( (2005) 7 SCC 387 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that "none of the decisions of the Apex Court lay down any invariable rule for grant of bail on completion of a specified period of detention in custody. Indeed in a discretionary matter, like grant or refusal of bail it would be impossible to lay down an invariable rule or evolve a strait jacket formula. The court must exercise its discretion having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstan-ces. What the relevant facts and circumstances are, which the court must keep in mind, has been laid down over the years by the courts in this country in large number of decisions which are well known. It is, therefore, futile attempt to lay down any invariable rule or formula in such matter." 6. In case of Rabindra Nath Singh vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav & Anr ( (2010) 6 SCC 417 ), the Apex Court was of the opinion that the gravity and seriousness of the offence and the manner in which the incident had taken place, is certainly a factor which deserves attention while considering the application for suspension of sentence. 7. Similarly in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Anand Chintaman Dighe ( (1990) 1 SCC 397 ), the Apex Court had observed at para 7 as under : "There are no hard and fast rules regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has to be considered on its own merits. The matter always calls for judicious exercise of discretion by the Court. The matter always calls for judicious exercise of discretion by the Court. Where the offence is of serious nature the court has to decide the question of grant of bail in the light of such considerations as the nature and seriousness of offence, character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of presence of the accused not being secured at the trial and the reasonable apprehension of witness being tampered with, the larger interest of the public or such similar other consideration." 8. Likewise in the case of Ramji Prasad vs. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal & Anr. ( (2002) 9 SCC 366 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed as under : "Absolutely no reason is shown by the learned Single Judge for adopting this exceptional course in a case where an accused was found guilty by the trial court under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The normal practice in such cases is not to suspend the sentence and it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted." 9. Similarly, in the case of Bakshish Ram & Anr. vs. State of Punjab ( (2009) 6 SCC 561 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed as under : "It is clear from the various decisions of this court as stated above that, cases where a serious offence had been committed and the accused had been held guilty for the said offence, then his application for grant of bail should not be decided leniently during the pendency of the appeal. The seriousness and gravity of the offence must be looked into before granting the bail. In the instant case, accused are convicted by the trial court for harassing, torturing and compelling the deceased to end her life by committing suicide, and the said conviction is confirmed by the High Court." 10. Although many times a contention is raised before this Court that the pendency of an appeal for an inordinate long time violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India, however, this contention is misplaced. For, Article 21 of the Constitution of India does permit the State to deprive the personal liberty of a person by a procedure established by law. Conviction is recorded, and sentence imposed by a procedure established by law. For, Article 21 of the Constitution of India does permit the State to deprive the personal liberty of a person by a procedure established by law. Conviction is recorded, and sentence imposed by a procedure established by law. It is, indeed, trite to state that conviction and sentence automatically deprive a convicted prisoner of some of his fundamental rights, especially of freedom of movement. Therefore, the law permits the deprivation of certain fundamental right, including the right of personal liberty. Hence, the convicted prisoner would not be justified in claiming that while he serves a sentence, his fundamental right under Article 21 of the constitution of India is being violated. 11. One of the principles for punishing an accused-person is "retribution". It is the punishment which the society imposes upon a person for having violated the norms of the society. Moreover, under the doctrine of "just deserts" an accused deserves to be punished for his crime / offence. Under this doctrine punishments have been justified since time immemorial. Therefore, in the present case, if the appellant is undergoing a sentence, he serves a sentence as a consequence of the alleged offence committed by him. Therefore, the appellant is not justified in claiming that his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is being violated. 12. A bare perusal of the impugned judgment clearly reveals that the appellant had gone to the house of the deceased armed with a lethal weapon and had wielded the same. Consequently, Dhannanath had expired. Although the appellant may have been convicted for offence under Section 304 Part II IPC, but it does not dilute the gravity of his offence. 13. Without going into the merits and demerits of the case, but taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, this Court is not inclined to suspend the sentence of the accused-appellant. 14. Therefore, the second application for suspension of sentence is, hereby, dismissed.