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2011 DIGILAW 2139 (PNJ)

Sadhu Singh (deceased) through his legal heirs v. Jang Singh

2011-11-30

A.N.JINDAL

body2011
JUDGMENT Mr. A.N. Jindal, J.: (Oral) - The Additional District Judge, Sangrur, vide judgment dated 24.05.2008 accepted the appeal filed by the defendant- respondent (herein referred as the defendant’) and while reversing the judgment & decree dated 17.08.2007 passed by the trial Court, .dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-appellant (herein referred as ‘the plaintiff’) for recovery of Rs. 1,40,625/-. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that Sadhu Singh plaintiff had filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 1,40,625/- by claiming that on 08.11.2002. Jang Singh-defendant after receiving the sum of Rs. 1.25.000/-. had executed a pronote and receipt in his favour Though the stipulated rate of interest was 2% per month, yet he claimed interest at the rate of 12.5% per annum. 3. The defendant contested the cause, wherein he denied the execution of the promissory note and receipt. He further alleged that no consideration was passed to him and he never agreed to pay in­terest., as alleged by the plaintiff. While claiming no connections with the plaintiff,. it was alleged that the promissory note and receipt are fabri­cated documents. He further stated that actually, he used to sell his agricultural produce at the shop of Nasib Chand, Commission Agent, Dhuri and had dealings with him. Said Nasib Chand used to get thumb impressions/signatures of the agricul­turists on the blank papers/pronotes in routine. The plaintiff was in close association with the said Nasib Chand and -he is a money lender. Said Commission Agent got filed different recovery suits, including the suit for recovery of Rs. 40,000/- against one Mithu Singh and another suit for recovery of Rs. 1,50,000/- against Bal­want Singh, which are pending in the Courts. The plaintiff was not in a position to advance Rs. 3,15,000/- to the above said persons, including the defendant. 4. From the pleadings of the parties, following is­sues were framed by the trial Court: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount of Rs. 1,40,625/-? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest, if so, at what rate and to what extent? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action or locus standi to file the present suit? OPD 3-A. Whether the pronote and receipt are forged and fabricated documents and without consideration? OPD 4. Relief. 5. 1,40,625/-? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest, if so, at what rate and to what extent? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action or locus standi to file the present suit? OPD 3-A. Whether the pronote and receipt are forged and fabricated documents and without consideration? OPD 4. Relief. 5. The plaintiff, in order to prove his case, exam­ined Major Singh (PW-1), an attesting witness of pronote and receipt, Ex.P1 and Ex.P2. He himself appeared in the witness box as PW -2. 6. On the other hand, the defendant examined Navdeep Gupta, Handwriting and Fingerprints Expert (DW-1), who proved his report, Ex.D1, photographic charts Ex.D2 & EX.D3 and their negatives EX.D4 to EX.D7 and opined that the words ‘Sadhu Singh son of Bakhtaur Singh’ in the pronote and receipt had been written later on. Amarjit Singh (DW-2) has proved documents Ex.D9 to EX.D 13. The defendant himself ap­peared as DW-3. 7. The trial Court decreed the suit, which was reversed in appeal. 8. Arguments heard. Records perused. 9. The following substantial questions of law have arisen for determination by this Court: “1. Whether the case, as set up by the plaintiff, stands proved and whether the defendant executed the pronote and receipt in favour of the plaintiff for consideration.” 2. Whether the promissory note and receipt are fabricated and materially altered documents.” 10. As far as the evidence is concerned, it is apparent from the statement of Navdeep Gupta, Handwriting and Fingerprints Expert (DW -1)., who has opined from the photographic charts EX.D2 & EX.D3 and their negatives EX.D4 to Ex.D7j that the name of the plaintiff on the promissory note and receipt was written later than the other writing on the said pronote and is in different inky. This fact supports the story, set up by the defendant. Navdeep Gupta (DW-1) is a document expert of repute, who appears in various Courts and his report could not be condemned, though he was subjected to lengthy cross-examination. Even,. no expert to counter his opinion, has been examined. Thus, the plea set up by the defendant that he never executed promissory note in favour of the plaintiff, stands established by the fact that the said pronote was blank, which was to misused and name of the defendant was inserted later on. 11. Even,. no expert to counter his opinion, has been examined. Thus, the plea set up by the defendant that he never executed promissory note in favour of the plaintiff, stands established by the fact that the said pronote was blank, which was to misused and name of the defendant was inserted later on. 11. Even otherwise, the execution of the promissory note and passing of the consideration do not stand proved from the evidence led by the plaintiff. Two witnesses, namely Major Singh (PW-1) and Jagdeep Dass are alleged attesting witnesses to the promissory note, out of them Jagdeep Dass did not affix his signatures on the said document (Ex.P2). Had Jagdeep Dass been present at the time of .execution of the receipt Ex.P2, then he must have signed the same. The other inference, which could be drawn, is that since the promis­sory note was not executed for consideration, therefore, Jagdeep Dass might have not agreed to sign the same. Similarly, Major Singh, other at­testing witness (PW-1), has not supported the case of the plaintiff with regard to passing of the consideration. Major Singh, while appearing in the witness box does not state that the plaintiff had paid the amount to the defendant in his pres­ence. He also admits during cross examination that no amount was paid in his presence. This ad­mission also goes a long way to prove that no con­sideration had passed in the presence of Major Singh as well as Jagdeep Dass. 12. Now we are left with the solitary statement of the plaintiff. Could that be believed in the light of the statement of Navdeep Gupta, Handwriting and Fingerprints Expert (DW-1). The answer from the mouth of a prudent man would be cer­tainly in “negative” mode. Had Sadhu Singh paid the amount to Jang Singh, then there was no dif­ficulty for recording the name of Sadhu Singh in the column of the lender. The leaving of the col­umn meant for mentioning the name of the lender, as vacant, falsifies the story of the plain­tiff that he had lent the amount of Rs. 1,25,000/-­to the defendant. The insertion of name of Sadhu Singh son of Bakhtaur Singh in the column of lender much later to the execution of the promissory note, not only proves that no consideration had been passed, but it also proves that the document is fabricated one. 1,25,000/-­to the defendant. The insertion of name of Sadhu Singh son of Bakhtaur Singh in the column of lender much later to the execution of the promissory note, not only proves that no consideration had been passed, but it also proves that the document is fabricated one. Had there been the case of the plaintiff that the promissory note was executed in favour of some one and it was sold, as­signed or transferred to him, therefore, he being the holder of the promissory note added his name, then some force could be found in such assertion. But, no such plea has been set up by the plaintiff. Therefore, the insertion of the name of the plain­tiff later- on with a different ink leads the Court to infer that the said document is fabricated one. 13. Furthermore, the plea set up by the defendant appears to be having some merit. The present promissory note is dated 08.11.2002, whereas the t documents Ex.D8, Ex. D 10 and EX.D13 support the plea of the defendant that he (plaintiff) had also filed similar suits against Balbir Singh, Gurdial Singh and Piara Singh in the month of November, 2002. The first Appellate Court has rightly made observations regarding the conduct of the plaintiff, which are as under :- “The pronote is of November, 2002 and as per documents Ex.D8, EX.D 10 and EX.D 13 the plaintiff has filed suit against Balbir Singh, Gurdial Singh and Piara Singh and all those promotes are of the month of November, 2002 like the present pronote in question. Without making any comments regarding the validity of those pronotes and in view of the report of expert there being no corrobora­tion by the attesting witness regarding payment by Sadhu Singh to Jang Singh, due exe­cution of pronote and receipt cannot be proved. Under the circumstances when due execution of the pronote and receipt is not proved and it is proved to be result of fabri­cation and without consideration the find­ings of the lower Court on issues No.1, 2, 3­A are reversed holding these issues in favour of defendant appellant and against the plaintiff/respondent.” 14. The aforesaid findings of fact cannot be easily set aside, rather it would have to be held that the defendant as been able to shift the onus -that the promissory note was without consideration. The aforesaid findings of fact cannot be easily set aside, rather it would have to be held that the defendant as been able to shift the onus -that the promissory note was without consideration. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case Kundan Lal Ralaram v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay, 1961 AIR (SC) 1316, observed as under :- As soon as the execution of the promissory note is proved the rule of presumption laid down in Section 118 of the Negotiable In­struments Act helps him to shift the burden to the other side. The burden of proof as a question of law rests, therefore, on the plain­tiff: but as soon as the execution is proved, Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act’ imposes a duty on the Court to raise a presumption in his favour that the said instrument was made for consideration. This presumption shifts the burden of proof in the second sense, that is, the burden of establishing a case shifts to the defendant. The defendant may adduce direct evidence to prove that the promissory note was not supported by consideration, and if he adduced acceptable evidence, the burden again shifts to the plaintiff, and so on. The defendant may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and, if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again to the plaintiff. He may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance those mentioned in Section 114 and other sections of the Evidence Act. Under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. “The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened regard being had to the com­mon course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.” Il­lustration (g) to that section shows that the Court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if pro­duced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. A plaintiff, who says that he had sold certain goods to the defendant and that a promissory note was executed as con­sideration for the goods and that he is in pos­session of the relevant account books to show that he was in possession of the goods sold and that the sale was effected for a par­ticular consideration, should produce the said account books, for he is in possession of the same and the defendant certainly cannot be expected to produce his documents. In those circumstances, if such a relevant evi­dence is withheld by the plaintiff, Section 114 enables the Court to draw a presumption to the effect that, if produced, the said ac­counts would be unfavourable to the plain­tiff. This presumption, if raised by a Court, can under certain circumstances rebut the presumption of law raised under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Briefly stated, the burden of proof may be shifted by presumptions of law or fact, and presump­tions of law or presumptions of fact may be rebutted not only by direct or circumstantial evidence, but also by presumptions of law or fact. We are not concerned here with irrebut­table presumptions of law.” 15. In this case, the plaintiff has failed to prove the due execution of the promissory note and re­ceipt) EX.P1 & Ex.P2, and passing of the consid­eration thereunder. Therefore, the defendant, by leading evidence himself, as well as from the evi­dence led by the plaintiff has been able to prove that the promissory note is a fabricated document and no consideration had passed thereunder. 16. While pressing about the alterations and the fabrications, it has been urged, that it was the plaintiff who was to explain about the additions and alterations and non-explanation of the same invites adverse inference. I agree with the afore­said contention. Similar view was taken in case Amarjit Singh v. Nazar Singh [2009(1) Law Herald (P&H) 655] : 2009 (3) RCR (Civil) 246, wherein it has been observed as un­der:- “9. Adverting to Arie facts of the instant case the plaintiff In is seeking the enforcement of the promissory note has not explained as to when and how the stated alteration was made in the absence of such explanation, he must fail as onus is upon him to show that the material alteration was made either with consent of parties or in order to effectuate common intention of parties. In absence of such plea, presumption is that the material alteration was made subsequently. Sequelly, the disputed pronote is void under Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 1881. The second substantial question of law is deter­mined accordingly.” 17. Similarly, as regards the limited scope of disturbing the findings of fact at the stage of second appeal, this Court in case Allahabad Bank Ltd. Vs Kul Bhushan and others, AIR 1961 Punjab 571, has observed as under:- (3) Mr. Bahri, the learned counsel for the appellant Bank has, in the first instance, attacked the finding of the learned District Judge regarding the forged signatures on the cheques. The counsel has argued that the lower appellate Court has rejected the finding of the trial Judge without even discussing the reasons embodied in the judgment of the first Court: In my opinion the finding of the lower appellate Court is not open challenge in second appeal as it is on evidence of the expert witness together with the other evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs. The ground on which the finding of the lower appellate Court has been assailed is tenuous and I have no hesitation in rejecting it. 18. Thus, while examining the case from all the angles, the plaintiff has failed to seek the finding with regard to substantial question of law, in his favour. As such, same are decided against him. 19. Consequently, the impugned judgment being quite valid and legal, passed on proper appreciation of evidence, does not require any interference. 20. Resultantly, finding no merit in the present appeal, the same is hereby dismissed.