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2011 DIGILAW 2150 (PNJ)

Satwinder Singh v. Indian Oil Corporation

2011-12-02

K.KANNAN

body2011
JUDGMENT K. KANNAN, J. - CM No.16449 of 2011 in CWP No.11052 of 1988 & CM No.16011 of 2011 in CWP No.676 of 1989. 1. Applications in both the cases for recalling the orders are allowed and both the cases are disposed of as under. Civil Writ Petition Nos.11052 of 1988 and 676 of 1989 2. Both the writ petitions challenge the selection of the private respondents for dealership of Indian Gas Agency. The principal grounds of attack at the instance of the respective petitioners, who were shortlisted along with the selected candidate, are that: (i) The terms & conditions set out in the advertisement specifying the eligibility criteria included inter alia, a condition that the candidate must be unemployed; and (ii) He should be a resident of the District where the Agency is sought to be set up. According to the petitioners, the selected candidate lacked both these essential qualifications. 3. In support of the respective contentions made by the petitioners, it is sought to be shown that the petitioner was not unemployed as claimed but he had done his bachelor's degree in law and had been enrolled as a practitioner with the Bar Association at Patiala. He had been also an Oath Commissioner and he did not fulfill the qualification as an unemployed graduate. It is contended that there was a requirement to place also an affidavit testifying to the correctness of the particulars given in the application. The petitioner would contend that the respondent could not have given the affidavit without actually setting out the truth about his own self-employment status. 4. As regards the residential qualification, the contention is that if he was not resident at the same district, he could not have been treated as eligible for making the application. Since the voter's list as well as his place of practice as a lawyer showed that he was carrying on his profession in the district at Patiala, the allotment for Agency at Sangrur could not have been made in favour of the respondent. 5. The contention of the respondent was that the expression “unemployed graduate” could not include the status as self-employment. I cannot accept this as a proper understanding but I am prepared to accede to the contention that the term “unemployed graduate” did not necessarily a man without any means. 5. The contention of the respondent was that the expression “unemployed graduate” could not include the status as self-employment. I cannot accept this as a proper understanding but I am prepared to accede to the contention that the term “unemployed graduate” did not necessarily a man without any means. After all the purpose was to promote self-employment from amongst the class of persons, who in spite of graduation had not secured employment, but by the very nature of things, for a person, who was to run a business with the substantial assistance from Government, it could not be expected that the person must be one who was in a state of penury. Even apart from the requirement that he should be unemployed, there was also a provision in the advertisement itself setting out an income qualification for such unemployed graduate. It referred to condition No.6 that eligibility criteria for award of dealership as follows:- “6. Income: The candidate should not have income more than Rs.24,000/-per annum. The income for this purpose would include income of the candidate, his/her spouse, dependent children put together. In case the candidate happens to be dependent on his/her parents, his/her parents income will also be taken into consideration for computing the total income.” The above clause clearly showed that every form of employment did not necessarily disqualify a person from applying. If such an interpretation were to be given, then even a provision for income itself could not have been made. The learned counsel for the petitioner would, however, state that in the notice issued on 07.12.1984, the eligibility merely spelt out a case of a family income of not more than Rs.24,000/-annually. What seems like patent inconsistency through a reference to 'family income' in one place and 'income' of the candidate in another place, but this can also be reconciled with what was required to be stated in an affidavit of the candidate that income referred to shall not exceed Rs.24,000/-of the parents, parents-in-law, spouse and dependent children all put together. I cannot take, therefore, the objection that the very fact that he was a lawyer or that he was an Oath Commissioner could disqualify him. What was required to be elicited was that the family income was not more than Rs.24,000/-. I cannot take, therefore, the objection that the very fact that he was a lawyer or that he was an Oath Commissioner could disqualify him. What was required to be elicited was that the family income was not more than Rs.24,000/-. There had been a declaration of such income by the respondent's family that it was less than Rs.24,000/-and I have not any materials placed before me that the annual income of either of himself or all the members of the family was in excess of Rs.24,000/-. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that it was necessary to give affidavit of declaration of correctness of particulars that included also an affirmation that the person was neither employed nor self-employed. As I have already explained that such employment or self-employment must be one that did not secure to a candidate more than Rs.24,000/-. Otherwise the provision for stipulation of income being not above Rs.24,000/-had no meaning. The affirmation in the affidavit, if it was to be treated harmoniously with the requirement of the income to be less than Rs.24,000/-, then it did not rule out a case of self-employment so long as such self-employment still secured only less than Rs.24,000/-to a candidate. 7. As regards the residence status, the requirement of proof was a certification from the SDO of that particular district. It is claimed by the respondent that such a certificate had also been given that he was a resident of Sangrur and even apart from such certificate, the respondent had adduced proof of his school and college leaving certificates showing his address as in Sangrur district and further even the ration card for the year proximate to the date of application showed his place of residence only at Sangrur. The senior counsel for the respondent would contend that the documents relied on by the petitioner were seriously disputed, for instance, the petitioner's reliance on voter's list for the year 1984 was contested by the respondent by pointing out that the father's name given there was one Harjit Singh whereas his father's name was Bhagwan Dass. The voter list for the year 1988 produced by the petitioner was also contested by the respondents contending that it related to the period of 1988, while the relevant date at the time of application was for the period 1984. The voter list for the year 1988 produced by the petitioner was also contested by the respondents contending that it related to the period of 1988, while the relevant date at the time of application was for the period 1984. The learned counsel for the respondent would rely on the voter list issued in the year 1986 for the assembly elections that showed his place of residence as Sangrur. These are certainly issues of facts but if the requirement in the application was that a certificate from SDO was necessary to prove the residence status and such a certificate had also been given, that ought to conclude the issue so far as the selection was concerned. The counsel for the petitioner states that the certificate was cancelled but again this is an area of controversy for the learned senior counsel for the respondents would point out that this cancellation had been made behind his back and he had set out his objections and had carried out the corrections later. We are considering the issue of selection of a public authority to examine whether there was any serious error that could fall foul of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Indian Oil Corporation in its objection has stated that the private respondents had produced a residence certificate issued by the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) Sangrur, Upmandal Officer, Sangrur on 24.10.1984 that the respondent had been a resident of Sangrur and the address given was Kishan Bagh outside Nabha Gate, Sangrur-148001. If the authorities were acting on documents which they themselves had stipulated as the basis that were be applied for such selection, the selection procedure adopted by the Corporation could not be faulted. 8. Even apart from these facts, the question is whether it would be exigent to make a cancellation of the allotment made more than 2 decades earlier. It is a case where even the allottee himself had died in the year 1998 and after his death, his wife and mother as legal heirs appear to have substituted by the order of the Indian Oil Commission on 28.08.1998. The case is pending all along without a full adjudication but I cannot ignore what has taken place during the pendency of the proceedings. It would be grossly inequitable to upset the allotment made to the deceased respondent whose allotment has subsequently survived to the widow and mother. The case is pending all along without a full adjudication but I cannot ignore what has taken place during the pendency of the proceedings. It would be grossly inequitable to upset the allotment made to the deceased respondent whose allotment has subsequently survived to the widow and mother. Under these circumstances, even apart from the objection which the petitioner has taken on the ground of equity, the impugned selection cannot be assailed. 9. Both the writ petitions are, consequently, dismissed. Petition dismissed.