JUDGEMENT Dev Darshan Sud,J. This revision has been preferred by the petitioner against the order passed by the learned District Judge, Chamba, rejecting the appeal preferred by him against the order of the learned Senior Sub Judge, Chamba, dismissing the petition under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’ ) in execution proceedings instituted by the respondent Chuni Lal son of Amar Nath. 2. The facts necessary for determination of this petition are that Civil Suit No.181/63 was instituted in the Court of Senior Sub Judge, Chamba on 10.6.1963 by respondent Chuni Lal son of Amar Nath against Chuni Lal son of Haribhaj. A preliminary decree was passed by the learned Court on 9th September, 1963 directing partition of the suit property to be partitioned by a local Commissioner to be appointed. Thereafter, on 17.9.1964 the Court records:-“ Counsel freekan hazir hain. Freekan report Ex.X anusar bibhajan karne ko razi hain. Atah antim decree final decree anusar report Ex.X bhag har do freek di jave. Report Ex.X va naksha Ex.Y bhi part decree ka bhag schedule mana javega. Sunaya gaya. Misal dakhil daftar hove”.Transliteration:- “The counsel for the parties present. The parties agree that partition to be effected in accordance with the report Ex.X. Parties be granted land by final decree in accordance with the report Ex.X. Report Ex.X and plaint Ex.Y will form an part of the schedule. Announced. The petition be sent to the record room.” 3. Thereafter, a final decree was drawn up in terms of the order 17.9.1964. An application being CMA No.24 of 1992 was instituted by the respondent herein in which Chuni Lal son of Haribhaj was also a party praying that a final decree for partition be engrossed on stamp paper. This application was decided by the learned Senior Sub Judge, Chamba, holding:-“4 . ... ... An application being CMA No.24 of 1992 was instituted by the respondent herein in which Chuni Lal son of Haribhaj was also a party praying that a final decree for partition be engrossed on stamp paper. This application was decided by the learned Senior Sub Judge, Chamba, holding:-“4 . ... ... ...In this case the decree drawn on 17.9.1964 by the Court on a plain paper is no decree in the eye of law and thus it is to be treated as non-est and the proper and enforceable decree as contemplated by section 2(15) and section 35 of the Stamp Act would be in a non judicial paper of the requisite value and as and when this proper decree is drawn, it is to be treated as instrument of partition and enforceable decree.This being the case the application for engrossing the decree for partition, as prayed for, is allowed and as for the valuation of the property for determining the value of the stamp paper, there is no material on record so as to dispute the value of the share of the applicant in partition at the time of passing of the decree to the extent of Rs.2000/-, and by taking this value as it is the requisite value of stamps works out to be Rs.45/-. The applicant is directed to file the non-judicial stamp papers of the sum of Rs.45/- within a week, after which the final decree be drawn up according and after drawing the same, these papers be placed in the original file and be consigned to the record room.” Announced in the open Court This 19th day of September, 1992 Sd/-(J.L. Chauhan) Senior Sub Judge Chamba District Chamba, H.P.” 4. This decision was challenged in revision in this Court being CR No.211 of 1993. The Court held:- “8.4.1994. Present:- Shri Ashok Sharma for the petitioner Shri Chhabil Dass, for the respondent. Admit. To be heard today. In view of the decision reported in Bholanath Karmakar and Ors Vs. Madanmohan Karmakar and Ors. (AIR 1988 Calcutta 1), the view taken by the Court below is quite correct and does not call for any interference. The Civil Revision is dismissed. Sd/- (V. Ratnam) April 8, 1994Chief Justice” 5. This is one part of the litigation. In view of the decision reported in Bholanath Karmakar and Ors Vs. Madanmohan Karmakar and Ors. (AIR 1988 Calcutta 1), the view taken by the Court below is quite correct and does not call for any interference. The Civil Revision is dismissed. Sd/- (V. Ratnam) April 8, 1994Chief Justice” 5. This is one part of the litigation. In the meantime, the petitioner herein purchased a part of the suit property by a registered sale deed dated 23.3.1997 from Chuni Lal son of Haribhaj, resident of Mohalla Surara. The respondent filed an execution petition for execution of the decree of the suit of 1963. This petition was registered as Execution Petition No.14 of 1994 and what was sought to be executed is decree dated 10.9.1992 in Civ.Misc.App.No.24/92 which is the application filed by the respondent herein for engrossing the decree on stamp paper which was disposed of by the order supra. It is thereafter that objections No.45/98 and 46/98 under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC were instituted in the Court of learned Senior Sub Judge, Chamba by Leela Devi and Lekh Raj, the petitioner herein. The learned trial Court dismissed the application holding that the property was purchased lis pendence and the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act were attracted. This order was challenged in appeal which was dismissed by the learned District Judge taking recourse to the provisions of Section 52 supra. 6. The present revision has now been instituted against the decision of the two Courts below. I may also notice that vide Ex.DH, the learned Senior Sub Judge, Chamba again ordered on 11.8.1993 that a final decree be passed. A number of points have been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the parties in support of their contentions. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the decision of the two Courts below cannot be sustained, more especially, in view of the fact that the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bholanath Karmakar and Others vs. Madanmohan Karmakar and Others, AIR 1988 Cal.1, holding that a decree becomes executable only when it is engrossed on stamp papers. 7. In Hameed Joharan (Dead) and Others vs. Abdul Salam (Dead) by LRs and Others, (2001) 7 SCC 573, the Supreme Court, specifically over ruling Bholanath Karmakar’s case, holds:-“1. 7. In Hameed Joharan (Dead) and Others vs. Abdul Salam (Dead) by LRs and Others, (2001) 7 SCC 573, the Supreme Court, specifically over ruling Bholanath Karmakar’s case, holds:-“1. Availability of the plea of the limitation in the matter of execution of decree has been the key issue in this appeal. The word ‘execution’ stands derived from the Latin ‘ex seque’ meaning, to follow out follow to the end, or perform and equivalent to the French ‘executor’, so that when used in their proper sense, all three convey the meaning of carrying out some act or course of conduct to its completion (vide vol.33 — Corpus Juris Secundum). (p-579) 3.Before, adverting to the factual aspect of the matter, a brief re­capitulation of the various periods of limitation as prescribed under the Limitation Act as engrafted in the Statute Book from time to time would be convenient. Law of Limitation in India, as a matter of fact, was introduced for the first time in 1859 being revised in 1871, 1877 and it is only thereafter, the Limitation Act of 1908 was enacted and was in force for more than half a century till replaced by the present Act of 1963 (see in this context B.B.Mitra: the Limitation Act 20th Ed.) 4. Presently, Article 136 of the Limitation Act 1963, prescribes a period of twelve years for the execution of a decree other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction or order of any civil Court. As regards the time from which the period of twelve years ought to commence, the statute has been rather specific in recording that the period would commence from the date of the decree or order when the same becomes enforceable. We need not go into the other situations as envisaged in the statute for the present purpose, save what is noticed above. To put it shortly, it therefore, appears that a twelve year period certain has been the legislative choice in the matter of execution of a decree. Be it noted that corresponding provisions in the Act of 1908 were in Article 182 and 183 and as regards the statute of 1871 and 1877, the corresponding provisions were contained in Articles 167, 168, 169 and 179 , 180 respectively. Significantly, Article 182 of the Limitation Act of 1908 provided a period of three years for the execution of decree. Significantly, Article 182 of the Limitation Act of 1908 provided a period of three years for the execution of decree. Be it clarified that since the reference to the 1908 Act would be merely academic, we refrain ourselves from recording the details pertaining to Article 182 save what is noted hereinbefore. It is in this context, however the Report of the Law Commission on the Act of 1963 assumes some importance, as regards the question of limitation and true purport of Article 136. Before elaborating any further, it would be convenient to note the Report of the Law Commission which reads as below : “170. Article 182 has been a very fruitful source of litigation and is a weapon in the hand of both the dishonest decree holder and the dishonest judgment debtor. It has given rise to innumerable decisions. The commentary in Rustomji’s Limitation Act (5th Edn.) on this Article itself covers nearly 200 pages. In our opinion the maximum period of limitation for the execution of a decree or order of any civil Court should be 12 years from the date when the decree or order became enforceable (which is usually the date of the decree) or where the decree or subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree. There is therefore no need for a provision compelling the decree holder to keep the decree alive by making an application every three years. There exists a provision already in Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code that a decree ceases to be enforceable after a period of 12 years. In England also, the time fixed for enforcing a judgment is 12 years. Either the decree holder succeeds in realising his decree within this period or he fails and there should be no provision enabling the execution of a decree after that period. In England also, the time fixed for enforcing a judgment is 12 years. Either the decree holder succeeds in realising his decree within this period or he fails and there should be no provision enabling the execution of a decree after that period. To this provision an exception will have to be made to the effect that the Court may order the execution of a decree upon an application presented after the expiration of the period of 12 years, where the judgment debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of the decree at some time within the twelve years immediately preceding the date of the application. Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code may be deleted and its provisions may be incorporated in this Act. Article 183 should be deleted....”In pursuance of the aforesaid recommendation, the present Article has enacted in place of Articles 182 and 183 of the 1908 Act, Section 48, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 has been repealed.” 10. The language used by the legislature in Article 136 if read in its proper perspective to wit : ‘when the decree or order becomes enforceable’ must have been to clear up any confusion that might have arisen by reason of the user of the expression ‘the date of the decree or order which was used in the earlier Act. The intention of the legislature stands clearly exposed by the language used there viz. to permit twelve year certain period from the date of the decree or order. It is in this context that a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Biswapati Dev v. Kennsington Stores, AIR 1972 Cal 172 wherein the learned Single Judge in no uncertain terms expressed his opinion that there cannot be any ambiguity in the language used in the third column and the words used therein to wit : ‘when the decree or order becomes enforceable should be read in their literal sense. We do feel it expedient to lend our concurrence to such an observation of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court. We do feel it expedient to lend our concurrence to such an observation of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court. The requirement of the Limitation Act in the matter of enforcement of a decree is the date on which the decree becomes enforceable or capable of being enforced — what is required is to assess the legislative intent and if the intent appears to be otherwise clear and unambiguous, question of attributing a different meaning other than the literal meaning of the words used would not arise. It is in this context, we also do feel it inclined to record our concurrence to the observations of the full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Subhash Ganpartrao Buty v. Maroti, AIR 1975 Bom 244. The Full Bench in the decision observed: (AIR p.250, para 7): “It is the duty of the Court to interpret the language actually employed and to determine the intention of the legislature from such language and since there is no ambiguity about the language actually employed, neither the recommendation of the Law Commission nor the aims and object as set out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons can be brought in aid or can be allowed to influence the natural and grammatical meaning of the Explanation as enacted by Parliament.”(p-582-583)13.“... ... ... ... ... ... ...Furnishing of stamped paperwas an act entirely within the domain and control of the appellant and any delay in the matter of furnishing of the same cannot possibly be said to be putting a stop to the period of limitation being run — no one can take advantage of this own wrong : As a matter of fact, in the contextual facts no stamp paper was filed until 2 6-3- 1984 - Does that mean and imply that the period of limitation as prescribed under Article 136 stands extended for a period of twelve years from 26th March, 1984 ? The answer if it be stated to be in the affirmative, would lead to an utter absurdity and a mockery of the provisions of the statute. Suspension of the period of limitation by reason of one’s own failure cannot but be said to be a fallacious argument... ... ... ... ... ...”(pp-583-584) 14. The answer if it be stated to be in the affirmative, would lead to an utter absurdity and a mockery of the provisions of the statute. Suspension of the period of limitation by reason of one’s own failure cannot but be said to be a fallacious argument... ... ... ... ... ...”(pp-583-584) 14. Needless to record that engrossment of stamped paper would undoubtedly render the decree executable but that does not mean and imply however, that the enforceability of the decree would remain suspended until furnishing of the stamped paper — this is opposed to the fundamental principle of which the statutes of limitation are founded. It cannot, but be the general policy of our law to use the legal diligence and this has been the consistent legal theory from the ancient times. ... ... “ (p-584)16. The observations thus in W.B. Essential Commodities Supply Corpn. (1999)8 SCC 315) lend concurrence to the view expressed above pertaining to the question of enforceability of the decree as laid down in Article 136 of the Limitation Act.(p-585) 35. “On the next count Mr. Mani in support of the appeal very strongly contended that question as to when a decree for partition becomes enforceable cannot be decided in any event without reference to relevant provisions of the Stamp Act. ... ... ... ... ...”(p-592)36.“... ... ... ... ... ... ...Mr. Mani in continuation of his submission however contended that a plain reading of the Section 35 would depict that the same creates a three fold bar in respect of unstamped or insufficiently stamped document viz: I.That it shall not be received in evidence. II. That it shall not be acted upon; III. That it shall not be registered or authenticated. And it is on this score, it has been contended that the partition decree thus even though already passed cannot be acted upon neither becomes enforceable unless drawn up and engrossed on stamp papers. The period of limitation, it has been contended in respect of the partition decree cannot begin to run till it is engrossed on requisite stamp paper. There is thus, it has been contended a legislative bar under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act for enforceability of partition decree. Mr. The period of limitation, it has been contended in respect of the partition decree cannot begin to run till it is engrossed on requisite stamp paper. There is thus, it has been contended a legislative bar under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act for enforceability of partition decree. Mr. Mani contended that enforcement includes the whole process of getting an award as well as execution since execution otherwise means due performance of all formalities necessary to give validity to a document. We are however unable to record our concurrence therewith prescription of a twelve year certain period cannot possibly be obliterated by an enactment wholly unconnected therewith. Legislative mandate as sanctioned under Article 136 cannot be kept in abeyance unless the self same legislation makes a provision therefore. It may also be noticed that by the passing of a final decree, the rights stand crystallized and it is only thereafter its enforceability can be had, though not otherwise” (p-593) 37. As noticed above, the submissions of Mr. Mani apparently seemed to be very attractive specially in view of the decision in Lokhande ‘s case8. In Lokhande ‘s case8 as noted above, this Court was not called upon to decide the true perspective of Article 136 of the Act of 1963 rather decided the issue in the peculiar fact situation of the matter on the basis of the Limitation Act of 1908 and in particular, Article 182. This Court was rather specific on that score and it is on that score only that the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s judgment in Smt. Koipalli Mahalakhsmamma v. Kotipalli Ganeswara Rao, AIR 1960 A.P. 54 was said to be the correct exposition of law. Article 136 however has a special significance and a very wide ramification as noted above and as such we need not dilate therefore any further.” (pp-593-594) 39. “... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... the Special Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Bholanath Karmakar v. Madanmohan Karmakar, AIR 1988 Calcutta 1, in our view has completely misread and misapplied the law for the reasons noted above and thus cannot but be said to be not correctly decided and thus stands overruled. ... ... ...”(p-595) 8.One other decision relied upon by learned counsel is Dr.Chiranji Lal (D) by LRs vs. Hari Das (D) by LRs, (2005)10 SCC 746 which reiterates the same principle. ... ... ...”(p-595) 8.One other decision relied upon by learned counsel is Dr.Chiranji Lal (D) by LRs vs. Hari Das (D) by LRs, (2005)10 SCC 746 which reiterates the same principle. The Court holds:- 9. Therefore, Lokhande ‘s case1 cannot be said to have laid down the proposition that the period of limitation would commence only on engrossment of final decree of partition on stamp paper. 10. In W.B. Essential Commodities Supply Corporation’s case2, the High Court decreed the suit filed for recovery of money on 8.3.1982. However, the decree was actually drawn up and signed by the judge on 9.8.1983. Application for execution of decree was filed by the decree holder on 5.6.1995. The executing court ordered execution of the decree. But, on appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order and held that the execution petition was barred by limitation under Article 136 of the Act. The question before this Court was whether the period of limitation begins to run from the date the suit is decreed or from the date when the decree is actually drawn up and signed by the judge. 11. The Court held that a decree is said to be enforceable when it is executable. For a decree to be executable, it must be in existence. A decree would be deemed to come into existence immediately on the pronouncement of the judgment and the decree becomes enforceable the moment the judgment is delivered and merely because there will be delay in drawing up of the decree, it cannot be said that the decree is not enforceable till it is prepared because an enforceable decree in one form or the other is available to a decree holder from the date of the judgment till the expiry of the period of limitation under Article 136 of the Act. 12. In arriving at the abovenoted conclusion, the Court placed reliance on Order 20 Rule 6-A of Civil Procedure Code which provided that the last paragraph of the judgment should state in precise terms the relief which has been granted by such judgment. It fixed the outer time limit of 15 days from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment within which the decree must be drawn up. It fixed the outer time limit of 15 days from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment within which the decree must be drawn up. In the event of the decree not so drawn up, clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 6-A enabled a party to make an appeal under Rule 1 of Order 41 CPC without filing a copy of the decree appealed against and for that purpose the last paragraph of the judgment shall be treated as a decree. For the purpose of execution also, provision is made in clause (b) of the said sub-rule which says that so long as the decree is not drawn up, the last paragraph of the judgment shall be deemed to be a decree. Clause (b) has thus enabled the party interested in executing the decree before it is drawn up to apply for a copy of the last paragraph only, without being required to apply for a copy of the whole of the judgment. 13. After holding that decree becomes enforceable the moment the judgment is delivered, which ultimately decided the question that arose for consideration in the case, the Court went further and observed that there may, however, be situations in which a decree may not be enforceable on the date it is passed. The Court gave three situations by way of illustrations to demonstrate when a decree may not be enforceable on the date it is passed. The third illustration is more pertinent to the present discussion, which is as follows: (SCC p.322, para-12) “Thirdly, in a suit for partition of immovable properties after passing of preliminary decree when, in final decree proceedings, an order is passed by the court declaring the rights of the parties in the suit properties, it is not executable till final decree is engrossed on non- judicial stamp paper supplied by the parties within the time specified by the court and the same is signed by the Judge and sealed. It is in this context that the observations of this Court in Shankar Balwant Lokhande v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande [(1995) 3 SCC 413] have to be understood. These observations do not apply to a money decree and, therefore, the appellant can derive no benefit from them.” 14. This illustration according to the Court was necessitated because of the observations in Lokhande’s case1. These observations do not apply to a money decree and, therefore, the appellant can derive no benefit from them.” 14. This illustration according to the Court was necessitated because of the observations in Lokhande’s case1. Since these observations have already been held to be obiter, this illustration is not of much significance in deciding the present matter and it cannot be said to be exposition of law. In addition to this, the decree involved in the case was a decree passed in a suit for recovery of money and not a decree passed in a suit for partition, hence the question of engrossing of the decree on stamp paper does not arise.”(pp-751 -752) 9. The Court thereafter, referred to the decision in Hameed Joharan’s case and after noting the provisions of the Stamp Act held:- “24. A decree in a suit for partition declares the rights of the parties in the immovable properties and divides the shares by metes and bounds. Since a decree in a suit for partition creates rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to the immovable properties, it is considered as an instrument liable for the payment of stamp duty under the Indian Stamp Act. The object of the Stamp Act being securing the revenue for the State, the scheme of the Stamp Act provides that a decree of partition not duly stamped can be impounded and once the requisite stamp duty along with penalty, if any, is paid the decree can be acted upon. 25. The engrossment of the final decree in a suit for partition would relate back to the date of the decree. The beginning of the period of limitation for executing such a decree cannot be made to depend upon date of the engrossment of such a decree on the stamp paper. The date of furnishing of stamp paper is an uncertain act, within the domain, purview and control of a party. No date or period is fixed for furnishing stamp papers. No rule has been shown to us requiring the court to call upon or give any time for furnishing of stamp paper. A party by his own act of not furnishing stamp paper cannot stop the running of period of limitation. None can take advantage of his own wrong. No date or period is fixed for furnishing stamp papers. No rule has been shown to us requiring the court to call upon or give any time for furnishing of stamp paper. A party by his own act of not furnishing stamp paper cannot stop the running of period of limitation. None can take advantage of his own wrong. The proposition that period of limitation would remain suspended till stamp paper is furnished and decree engrossed thereupon and only thereafter the period of twelve years will begin to run would lead to absurdity. In Yeshwant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari [1950 SCR 852] it was said that the payment of court fee on the amount found due was entirely in the power of the decree holder and there was nothing to prevent him from paying it then and there; it was a decree capable of execution from the very date it was passed.26. Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. As above noted, there is no statutory provision prescribing a time limit for furnishing of the stamp paper for engrossing the decree ... ... ... .. The starting of period of limitation for execution of a partition decree cannot be made contingent upon the engrossment of the decree on the stamp paper. ... ... ... ... ... ... ....”(pp. 755-756)10. These decisions put the principle of law applicable beyond any pale of doubt. Based on the rights of these judgments, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the execution has been filed beyond 12 years from the date when final decree was first passed i.e. in the year 1964, as such the execution petition was itself not maintainable. There is no doubt in my mind that limitation cannot be reckoned from the period when the decree was engrossed on the stamp paper, when application for engrossment was filed, in view of the decision of Hameed Joharan and Dr.Chiranji Lal’s case, the execution was clearly barred by limitation. 11. There is no doubt in my mind that limitation cannot be reckoned from the period when the decree was engrossed on the stamp paper, when application for engrossment was filed, in view of the decision of Hameed Joharan and Dr.Chiranji Lal’s case, the execution was clearly barred by limitation. 11. The order of the learned Senior Sub Judge, Chamba, Ex.DH, passed on 19th September, 1992, reproduced supra, is only a surplusage as final decree has been drawn up on 1964 as disclosed by the record directing that the property be partitioned in terms of the report of the Local Commissioner appointed pursuant to the passing of a preliminary decree dated 9.9.1963. In any event engrossing will not stop limitation from running. In these circumstances, the adjudication that the property was purchased pedente lite, cannot be accepted and both the Courts below are totally wrong in invoking this principle. The Courts acted under the mistaken impression that till the decree is engrossed, it does not become final and in these circumstances litigation was always pending. The execution itself being barred by limitation, there is no question of invoking any other principle to disentitle the petitioner herein from claiming legitimate title to the property. 12. I must note that at this juncture the objection raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that is that an application under Order 21 Rule 97 is not maintainable as the petitioner herein is a stranger to this decree.13.This question need not detain this Court any further. In Brahmdeo Chaudhary vs. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and another, (1997) 3 SCC 694, the Supreme Court decided the issue as to whether a stranger occupying the premises in his own right can call upon the executing Court to adjudicate its claim. The Court holds:- “1 . ... ... ....The High Court agreeing with the Executing Court has negatived the aforesaid request of the appellant by holding that such stranger to the decree who has put forward his obstruction in the execution proceedings has the only remedy under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC after his obstruction is first removed and he is dispossessed of the premises. ... ... ... ... ...” The Court after considering the provisions of Order 21 Rules, 97, 98, 99 and 101 held:- “9. ... ... ... ... ...” The Court after considering the provisions of Order 21 Rules, 97, 98, 99 and 101 held:- “9. In short theaforesaid statutory provisions of Order 21 lay down a complete code for resolving all disputes pertaining to execution of decree for possession obtained by a decree-holder and whose attempts at executing the said decree meet with rough weather ... ... ... ... ... Once such an obstruction is on the record of the Executing Court it is difficult to appreciate how the Executing Court can tell such obstructionist that he must first lose possession and then only his remedy is to move an application under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC and pray for restoration of possession. The High Court by the impugned order and judgment has taken the view that the only remedy available to a stranger to the decree who claims any independent right, title or interest in the decretal property is to go by Order XXI, Rule 99. This view of the High Court on the aforesaid statutory scheme is clearly unsustainable. It is easy to visualise that a stranger to the decree who claims an independent right, title and interest in the decretal property can offer his resistance before getting actually dispossessed. He can equally agitate his grievance and claim for adjudication of his independent right, title and interest in the decretal property even after losing possession as per Order 21, Rule 99. ... ... ... ... ... ...”10. In this connection we may also profitably refer to a judgment of a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in the case of Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain, (1995) 1 SCC 6: ... ... ...”(pp702- 703) 14. Similarly in Shreenath and another vs. Rajesh and others, (1998) 4 SCC 543 the Court held:- “5. The question raised is, whether the third party in possession of a property claiming independent right as a tenant not party to a decree under execution could resist such decree by seeking adjudication of his objections under Order 21, Rule 97 of the Civil Procedure Code ? 6. ... ... ... ... ... ...The appellant’s case is they were not parties to those proceedings. However, this objection of the decree- holder was rejected in the first round by the Executing Court and the Revisional Court holding that the person resisting viz. 6. ... ... ... ... ... ...The appellant’s case is they were not parties to those proceedings. However, this objection of the decree- holder was rejected in the first round by the Executing Court and the Revisional Court holding that the person resisting viz. the present appellants were not parties to the suit nor there is any decree against them. It seems subsequently. The decree-holder again moved another application in the aforesaid execution case No. 1A of 1970-81 for delivery of vacant possession. The present appellants also moved an application/objections under Order 21, Rule 97, C.P.C. resisting that they cannot be dispossessed in terms of the said decree, as they were not parties to the said suit nor they are deriving any right and title through the Judgment debtor. They claim separate and independent legal right, not affected either by the mortgage or redemption of the mortgage. It is not clear as under what circumstances the second application for actual possession was made by the decree-holder after the matter was earlier disposed of. ... ... ... ... ...”(p.546) 16. In Noorduddin v.Dr. K. L. Anand, (1995) 1 SCC 242 : it is held: (SCC p.249, para-8) “Para 8 : Thus the scheme of the Code clearly adumbrates that when an application has been made under Order 21, Rule 97, the Court is enjoined to adjudicate upon the right, title and interest claimed in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding or between the decree- holder and the person claiming independent right, title or interest in the immovable property and an order in that behalf be made. The determination shall be conclusive between the parties as if it was a decree subject to right of appeal and not a matter to be agitated by a separate suit. In other words, no other proceedings were allowed to be taken. It has to be remembered that preceding Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1976, right of suit under Order 21, Rule 103 of 1908 Code was available which has been now taken away. By necessary implication, the legislature relegated the parties to an adjudication of right, title or interest in the immovable property under execution and finality has been accorded to it. By necessary implication, the legislature relegated the parties to an adjudication of right, title or interest in the immovable property under execution and finality has been accorded to it. Thus, the scheme of the Code appears to be to put an end to the protraction of the execution and to shorten the litigation between the parties or persons claiming right, title and interest in the immovable property in execution.” 17. In Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, (1997) 3 SCC 694 : the question raised was whether a stranger occupying the premises on his own right when offered resistance to the execution of the decree obtained by the decree holder can or cannot request the Executing Court to adjudicate his claim without being insisted upon the first he must handover the possession and then move an application under Order 21, Rule 97. It is held in para 9 : (SCC p. 702) “Para 9 : In short the aforesaid statutory provisions of Order 21 lay down a complete code for resolving all disputes pertaining to execution of the decree for possession obtained by a decree- holder and whose attempts at executing the said decree meet with rough weather. Once resistance is offered by a purported stranger to the decree and which comes to be noted by the executing court as well as by the decree-holder the remedy available to the decree-holder against such an obstructionist is only under Order 21, Rule 97, sub-rule (1) and he cannot bypass such obstruction and insist on reissuance of warrant for possession under Order 21, Rule 35 with the help of police force, as that course would amount to bypassing and circumventing the procedure laid down under Order 21, Rule 97 . . . . . . . . . . . “ 18. In view of the aforesaid finding and the law being well settled the interpretation given by the aforesaid Full Bench of the M. P. High Court in the case of Usha Jain v. Manmohan Bajaj, (AIR 1980 M.P. 146) cannot be held to be a good law. ... ... ... ... ... “... ... ... ... ...(pp-551 -552) This should put the controversy at rest. 15. Another objection urged is that no revision is maintainable and it is only an appeal which can be filed. ... ... ... ... ... “... ... ... ... ...(pp-551 -552) This should put the controversy at rest. 15. Another objection urged is that no revision is maintainable and it is only an appeal which can be filed. Learned Senior counsel for the respondent refers to a decision of the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gurram Seetharam Reddy vs. Smt.Gunti Yashoda and Another, AIR 2005 AP 95. Speaking for a Full Bench of the Court Hon’ ble Devender Gupta, C.J. held:- “35. When Section 96 CPC specifically provides for appeals against decrees, and sub-rule (4) of Rule 58 of Order 21 directs that the order passed under sub-rule (3) thereof shall have the force of a decree, there hardly exists any basis to deny such characteristics to such an order. An interpretation to the contrary would have the effect of setting at naught, the intention of the Parliament in attributing characteristics of a decree to an order. In view of a clear mandate under sub-rule (4) of Rule 58, an order passed under sub- rule (3) thereof, partakes a character of a decree for all practical purposes, more so, in the context of availing the remedy of appeals. Same reasoning holds good for the orders passed under Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21, CPC Hence, there does not exist any justification to treat the same as different, in any way from decrees, at least in the context of deciding the forum and provision for appeal. The question as to what nomenclature is to be given to the appeals, needs to be dealt with by the High Court or the District Courts, on administrative side. Hence, we are of the view that the judgment of this Court in Nookaraju’s case (supra) does not lay the correct proposition of law. Once it is held that orders passed under Rule 58(3) and Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21, CPC are appealable under Section 96, CPC, it is axiomatic that a second appeal is maintainable against the order passed in such appeals. Though this question is not referred to this Full Bench, it is dealt with, to put an end to the controversy and uncertainty. 42. Though this question is not referred to this Full Bench, it is dealt with, to put an end to the controversy and uncertainty. 42. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that: (a) Against the orders passed under Rule 58(3) and Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21, CPC regular appeals under Section 96 and not miscellaneous appeals under Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1, CPC are maintainable and that the judgment of this Court in Nookaraju’s case (supra) does not represent the correct position of law. (b) ... ... ...(c) A second appeal under Section 100, CPC is maintainable against an order passed in an appeal, arising out of order passed under Rule 58 (3) or Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21, CPC.”(pp-1 04-1 06) 16. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that it is not a ‘Regular Appeal’ under Section 96 of the Code nor is an appeal under Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code but a special appeal in execution proceedings. He places reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka in M.S. Khalid and another vs. K.R. Rangaswamy and another, AIR 2003 Karnataka 174, holding:- “10. There is no gainsaying in the fact that an appeal preferred as against an order on an application under Rule 97 CPC is an appeal whether it is termed as a `Regular Appeal’ or by any other name and is governed by the provisions of Rule 103 of Order 21 CPC. On adjudicating an application under Rule 97 CPC, the resultant order is given the status of a decree and as against every decree, appeal is provided for under the Code. It is under such circumstances the provisions of Rule 103 CPC have been incorporated by the Amending Act 104 of 1976 indicating the manner in which such appeals are to be dealt with. Even if the appeal is styled as a Regular Appeal, the scope is again to be looked into from the provisions of Order 21 CPC. However, describing that as an execution appeal which was an expression in vogue earlier, is not an accurate description of an appeal of this nature.” (p-175) 17. I have given my careful consideration to this aspect. There is no dispute that the revision petition has been entertained on an important point of law. However, describing that as an execution appeal which was an expression in vogue earlier, is not an accurate description of an appeal of this nature.” (p-175) 17. I have given my careful consideration to this aspect. There is no dispute that the revision petition has been entertained on an important point of law. It has been held that the Court has ample power to convert a revision into an appeal and vice versa. In Om Prakash and others vs. Dwarka Prasad and another, AIR 2005 MP 40, a Division Bench of the High Court holds:- “15. However, in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) it is held that in view of the amendment in S. 102 of the Code second appeal was not maintainable being the suit valued less than Rs.25000/-. Though the appeal was filed before 1-7- 2002, it is held that second appeal was not maintainable. Further it is held that appeal cannot be converted into revision as the scope of both the sections is different. It may be mentioned that the Apex Court while considering the question of conversion of revision into second appeal has considered the question that revision can be converted into second appeal, if substantial question of law arise in the case. However, while converting appeal into revision, question of substantial question of law will not arise. It is true that scope of appeal and revision is different, but the Courts have been permitting conversion of appeal into revision and revision into appeal. Therefore, rigid view that appeal cannot be converted into revision or vice versa will not be in the interest of justice. A litigant cannot be penalized on account of technical error or mistake committed by the counsel. To meet the ends of justice, revision can be converted into appeal or appeal can be converted into revision while exercising the discretion and if the following norms are fulfilled, then normally order of conversion of revision into appeal or appeal into revision should be passed: (i) When revision converted intosecond appeal, then before passing the order of conversion, it is to be considered whether substantial question of law arises in the said case, if no substantial question of law arises in the case, revision cannot be converted into second appeal. (ii) Revision can be converted into appeal if same is filed within time and there is no impediment of limitation. (ii) Revision can be converted into appeal if same is filed within time and there is no impediment of limitation. Limitation must be construed from the date of filing of the revision petition or appeal. If the revision or appeal so filed was within limitation, for conversion into appeal or revision, it is to be examined that the appeal or revision, as the case may be, so filed, on the date of institution, was within the limitation and if so, said permission can be granted.(iii) There is no period of limitation for applying such conversion, but while exercising the powers of conversion, the Court would keep in mind whether appeal or revision, as the case many be, had been instituted within the period prescribed for such proceedings.” 18. The Court inter alia relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co.Ltd vs. Collector of Central Excise, (1998)3 SCC540, where objection had been taken by the Revenue that no appeal was maintainable. Though the objection was up-held by the Supreme Court, it did not dismiss it holding:- “13. ... ... ... ...We are not disposed to dismiss this appeal on that technical ground at this stage because the appellant could in that situation have sought for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. With all the papers available for deciding the question involved in this appeal, we do not think it proper to drive the appellant to file another special leave petition for that purpose, particularly because of the lapse of almost nine years since the filing of this appeal. We, therefore, treat this appeal as one filed by special leave.” (p-44) 19. This is a complete answer to the objection raised. Adverting to the question requiring adjudication as to whether they are substantial questions of law, the answer is in the affirmative. 20. The important questions which would arise is as to whether execution petition could have been entertained by the Court after the statutory period prescribed. This is the main question requiring consideration and it is in this background that two questions are being prepared:- “1. Whether the execution petition was maintainable having been filed beyond the statutory period of 12 years? 2. Whether it can be held that the suit property was brought pendente lite ? 21. Both these questions are substantial discussion supra. This is the main question requiring consideration and it is in this background that two questions are being prepared:- “1. Whether the execution petition was maintainable having been filed beyond the statutory period of 12 years? 2. Whether it can be held that the suit property was brought pendente lite ? 21. Both these questions are substantial discussion supra. It is in these circumstances that I am treating this Revision as Second Appeal. The first question is squarely covered by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Hameed Joharan and Dr.Chiranji Lal’ s case. All the proceedings in this Court as also the Courts below were based on the decision of Bholanath Karmakar’s case cannot be sustained in view of the fact that this decision now has been overruled by the Supreme Court in Hameed Joharan’s case. I hold that the execution petition itself was barred by time. An application under Order 21 Rule 97 as instituted by the petitioner herein could not have been dismissed in the preemptory manner in which it was done by the two Courts below. On the second question that the property having been brought pendente lite, I hold that there was no lis pending as a final decree has been passed as far back as in the year 1964. 22. Before parting, I may note that if the petitioner is driven to file a second appeal on technical grounds, where of course he can claim the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act for pursuing wrong remedy bona fide thereby putting the clock back and forgetting the fact that the genesis of the entire dispute is in the year 1964. It is for this reason also that I have treated this revision to be an appeal. 23. The Registry is accordingly directed to register this revision as an appeal. 24. This appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment of both the Courts below is quashed and set aside. I hold that the execution of the decree is barred by limitation and the execution petition is dismissed accordingly. The property has not been purchased pendente lite. Objections filed by the appellant herein are allowed. No order as to costs. ********************************************************************************