JUDGMENT A.N. Jindal, J 1. This judgment of mine shall dispose of two connected criminal appeal Nos. 876 and 1228-SB of 2003, filed against the judgment dated 9/10.4.2003, vide which the accused-appellants (herein referred as, 'the accused'), were convicted under Sections 304-B/34 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. 2. Accused Shakuntla is mother-in-law, Umed Singh husband (since deceased) and Joginder Singh is the son of maternal uncle of Umed Singh husband of Meena. Meena aged about twenty years resident of Dheerpur was married to Umed Singh about 5-½ years prior to the occurrence and she breathed her last on 2.7.1998, on account of the burn injuries suffered by her at the hands of the accused. The case is based on the dying declaration of Meena made by her on 28.6.1998, at about 1.00 p.m. before Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Rohtak, in Hindi, the English translation of which is as under : “Meena w/o Umed Singh aged 20 years, House Hold Lady resident of Dheerpur, Delhi on S.A. Q. When it happened? Ans. It happened yesterday evening. Time I do not remember. Q. What happened with you? Ans. I was burning a stove in my mother's house. Yesterday my in-laws, my mother-in-law Shakuntla, husband Umed and cousin brother Joginder came to my house. My mother had gone to the fields. The house of my mother is situated in village Atta. All the three had come to my mother's house. They mixed in medicine again said they gave me beatings and set me on fire with kerosene. All the three bolted the door from out side and started saying to go to their house. They again gave beatings to me and then set me on fire. None else was present in the house. The persons living in upper storey had seen me and by that time I had been burnt. Kala s/o Jogi, my neighbour had seen them. First of all my mother-in-law set me on fire. Then Kala told my mother that I had been burnt. Those persons were harassing me for `10,000/- and were demanding dowry. Q. Anything else you want to say? Ans. No, Sir. RO & AC Sd/- RTI Meena JMIC(I) Dt. 28.6.98 at 1.15 p.m. 3. First of all my mother-in-law set me on fire. Then Kala told my mother that I had been burnt. Those persons were harassing me for `10,000/- and were demanding dowry. Q. Anything else you want to say? Ans. No, Sir. RO & AC Sd/- RTI Meena JMIC(I) Dt. 28.6.98 at 1.15 p.m. 3. The Investigating Officer SI Dhoop Singh, received a copy of the said statement Ex.PK, on the basis of which FIR under Section 498-A/307 IPC was recorded against the accused. Thereafter, he recorded statement of Krishna mother of Meena under Section 161 Cr.P.C. On 2.7.1998, on receipt of the information regarding death of Meena, an entry Ex.PK/1 was made in this respect in the Daily Diary Report. On 3.7.1998, he conducted the inquest on the body of the deceased. On 4.7.1998, he visited the place of occurrence, took into possession the iron stove, plastic can containing little bit of kerosene vide recovery memo Ex.PJ, recorded the statements of the witnesses on 5.7.1998. He arrested the accused and on completion of the investigation, challan against the accused was presented in the court. 4. On commitment, the accused were charged for the offence under Section 304-B IPC and in the alternative under Section 302 IPC. 5. In order to bring home the charge against the accused, the prosecution examined PW-1 Dr. Hari Om Manchanda, General Hospital, Rohtak, who had conducted the autopsy on the body of Meena. He observed that there were about 95% burns, but all other organs were healthy. The death in his opinion was due to extensive burns and its complications. The burns were ante mortem in nature and sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The time between the death and the postmortem was 24 to 36 hours. During cross-examination he admitted that in case of deep burns there is absolutely no pain as the nerves system underneath are totally damaged. 6. PW-3 Dr. Y.P. Singh, Medical Officer, General Hospital, Panipat, who had initially attended Meena on 27.6.1998 at about 11.20 p.m. at General Hospital, Panipat, had observed as under :- “She had superficial to deep burns all over the body. Blisters were formed at places and ruptured at other places. Watery discharge was present all over the body. Wounds were reddish in colour. Singeing of hair was present all over the body. Burns were 100%. Blisters were formed at places and ruptured at other places. Watery discharge was present all over the body. Wounds were reddish in colour. Singeing of hair was present all over the body. Burns were 100%. Clothes were charred and burnt pieces were present at some places.” 7. The probable duration of injuries was within 8 hours. He had referred the injured to P.G.I.M.S. Rohtak on 28.6.1998 at 4.30 a.m. 8. During cross-examination he admitted that the injured was brought by her mother. He had sent the information to the police station at 11.20 p.m. about her arrival in the hospital. He also disclosed that at the time when the injured was medically examined, she was capable of making statement. 9. PW-7 Dr. Jagdeep, Final Years Student, Medical Hospital, Rohtak, has stated that at the time of recording the statement of Meena by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Rohtak, at about 1.15 a.m. the injured was able to make the statement. He vide report Ex.PG/5 had certified about her fitness to make the statement. However, he had also opined regarding her fitness to make the statement on 28.6.1998 at about 11.00 a.m. vide report Ex.PH/1. He has also disclosed during cross examination that Magistrate had arrived in the hospital at about 1.00 a.m. None of the attendant of the injured were allowed to stay by the side of the patient during the recording of her statement and her statement was recorded in his presence. She remained fit during the period she made the statement. 10. C. Jagbir Singh (PW2), ASI Mohinder Singh (PW4), ASI Shamsher Singh (PW5) and SI Rameshwar Dass (PW8) are formal witnesses. 11. Smt. Shalini Singh, JMIC, Kaithal (PW6) has proved her request to record the statement Ex.PG/3, statement of Meena Ex.PG/5 and her certificate over the statement Ex.PG/6. She has categorically stated that she recorded the statement of Meena without any addition or alteration and further that it contained full and true account of what she stated and further that she made the statement voluntarily, freely without any fear, pressure or undue influence. She has proved the endorsements Ex.PG, Ex.PG/1, Ex.PG/3, Ex.PG/4 and Ex.PG/6, as referred to above. She was not cross examined at all. 12. She has proved the endorsements Ex.PG, Ex.PG/1, Ex.PG/3, Ex.PG/4 and Ex.PG/6, as referred to above. She was not cross examined at all. 12. Krishna Devi, mother of the deceased Meena, while appearing as PW-9 testified that Meena was married to Umed Singh about 5-½ years prior to the occurrence and two children were born out of their wedlock but they could not survive. She further disclosed that the accused persons being dissatisfied with the articles of dowry given in the marriage, were demanding more dowry, about which Meena used to complain to her time to time. Having fed up with the behaviour of the accused, Meena was turned out 8-9 months prior to the occurrence. On 27.6.1998, when she as well as both her sons were away to the fields and the deceased was all alone in the house, the accused came there beat her badly and then set her ablaze. Thereafter, she shifted Meena to the hospital at Panipat from where she was referred to P.G.I.M.S. Rohtak, where she died on 2.7.1998. She also proved the recovery memo with regard to taking of the stove, plastic can containing some quantity of kerosene. During cross examination she has stated that her elder son Vinod is separate from them and is residing at the back of the house whereas, Younger son Sunil, who is running a shop in front of their house was not there in the house and he had married after the incident. 13. She appears to be very poor, illiterate and rustic lady. She as per her rustic nature could not give the minute details of the dowry which she had delivered to the accused. She is a widow and her husband had died prior to the marriage of Meena. However, she stated that at the time of marriage, she had given sufficient dowry and spent about `3 lacs on the marriage. The accused were demanding more dowry. She has also testified that she (Meena) alone came from her in-laws' house as she had been turned out by them about 8-9 months prior to the occurrence. The accused Umed Singh and others used to come to their house in order to pick up quarrels. Shakuntla had just come 2-3 days prior to the occurrence to their house and had threatened them. The accused Umed Singh and others used to come to their house in order to pick up quarrels. Shakuntla had just come 2-3 days prior to the occurrence to their house and had threatened them. Earlier also she had come 2-3 times during the period of stay of Meena at her parental house. SI Dhoop Singh (PW10) is the Investigating Officer. 14. When examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused denied all the allegations and pleaded their false implication in the case. The deceased used to live with her parents and Krishna mother of the deceased used to extract money from them. They never raised any demand of dowry. In defence, they examined Baljinder Singh (PW1), Phool Kumar (DW2), Jai Bhagwan (DW3), Raj Singh (DW4), Devender Singh (DW5), Ravinder Sharma (DW6) and Bhim Singh (DW7). 15. Since the occurrence had taken place at the house of Krishna Devi in the evening time, therefore, statement of Baljinder Singh resident of Dhirpur is of no consequence. He being hailing from the village of the accused was supposed to support them. Phool Kumar (DW2) hails from different village i.e. Halapur. He could not be acquainted with the facts and happenings within four walls of the house of Shakuntla and Umed Singh. Similar is the statement of Jai Bhagwan (DW3). He is also not an independent witness to the occurrence. Raj Singh (DW4) has stated that Joginder Singh had married in the village Dheerpur in the house of Ishwar Singh. Devender Kumar (DW5) resident of village Atta is not the resident of the same Mohalla and he does not disclose as to on the basis of which information he is disclosing that Meena Kumari had set herself on fire. Ravinder Sharma (DW6) states that Umed Singh is a dull headed person and Joginder Singh is brother-in-law of Umed Singh. Bhim Singh (DW7) has stated that Meena was residing at her parental house for the last 5-7 months. However, he has stated Meena had told him that she was being harassed by her mother-in-law, but he did not intervene to solve the dispute. Actually, he admits that he is not residing near the house of the complainant. Thus, being not the neighbourer remotely related to the deceased, could not be supposed to be acquainted with the nature of the dispute. 16. The trial resulted into conviction. Arguments heard. Record perused. 17. Actually, he admits that he is not residing near the house of the complainant. Thus, being not the neighbourer remotely related to the deceased, could not be supposed to be acquainted with the nature of the dispute. 16. The trial resulted into conviction. Arguments heard. Record perused. 17. The prime and main contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the prosecution has badly failed to prove if there was any demand of dowry or the harassment of Meena at the hands of the accused in connection with the demand of dowry. It is argued that the prosecution has failed to establish as to when such demand was raised. In any case, even as per prosecution, there was demand 8-9 months prior to the occurrence as Meena had come from the house of the accused 8-9 months prior to the occurrence and was residing at her parental house at the time of occurrence, therefore, the same cannot be said to be harassment 'soon before the death'. The dying declaration allegedly made by Meena is not acceptable as the same may be the result of tutoring and got recorded in consultations with her mother Krishna as well as other relatives, therefore, no reliance could be placed on the alleged dying declaration. 18. Before, I take up the issue with regard to dowry death, I need to discuss if dying declaration made by Meena on 28.6.1998 at about 1.15 a.m. before the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Rohtak, is acceptable or not. It is not in dispute that Meena died within 5-½ years of her marriage. The evidence has come that she was turned out of the house by the accused after giving beatings. Krishna (PW8) mother of Meena has further stated that having fed up with the behaviour of the accused, Meena had started living with her. 19. As regards demand of dowry, she is not definite regarding such demand. She has stated that she had given sufficient dowry beyond her capacity and the accused were demanding more dowry. She has not specifically stated that as to what articles of dowry were given by her at the time of marriage and what was being demanded by them. The statement made by her in this regard is very vague. She has admitted that the accused Umed Singh is dull headed person. She has not specifically stated that as to what articles of dowry were given by her at the time of marriage and what was being demanded by them. The statement made by her in this regard is very vague. She has admitted that the accused Umed Singh is dull headed person. Then in that situation, to level allegations regarding the demand of dowry would be quite absurd and improbable. Similarly, Joginder Singh is the son of the maternal uncle of Umed Singh. He is a resident of different village, therefore, he had nothing to do with the dowry. The parties also appear to be hailing from poor strata but the allegations of dowry levelled against the accused appear to be conventional just in order to implicate the accused for a heinous crime. At one stage, during her cross-examination, Krishna Devi (PW9) admits that she does not know the reason of the death of her daughter. 20. While taking the case from another angle, the deceased was staying at the house of her parents, Krishna Devi (PW9) has no where stated that the accused ever came to their house to set up the demand but she says that they had come and picked up the quarrel with them. From this part of her statement, the inference may be drawn that the accused had visited their house to take Meena back. Now in order to find out if there was actually any demand of dowry, I am left with no other evidence except the dying declaration made by Meena on 27.6.1998. 21. Since the law has recognized the dying declaration as a good piece of evidence for placing reliance while recording conviction of the accused, therefore, it discouraged the suspicious dying declarations and imposed an obligation on the courts to take extra caution while evaluating the dying declaration. It is also worth while to note that the statement made by the deceased, when he/she is on the verge of death, is to be believed though the accused had no opportunity to cross-examine him/her, for the reasons that the person on the verge of death would be having a truth on his/her tongue and would not falsely implicate any person while leaving this world. At the same time, when the accused is being deprived of the power to cross examine such witness, the court should insist that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness and it should not smell of tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The court also should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. The rule of corroboration is merely a rule of caution, but when once the court reaches the conclusion that the dying declaration is quite voluntary without any outward influence, could proceed to place reliance. The Apex Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing the dying declaration which could be summed up as under as incorporated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, 1992 (3) RCR (Crl.) 552 (SC) : (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. [See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 2 SCR 764] (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. [See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram agar Yadav and Ors., 1985 (1) RCR (Crl.) 600 (SC) : (AIR 1985 SC 416) and Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 164)]. (iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor (AIR 1976 SC 1994)] (iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. [See Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1974 (4) SCC 264)] (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [See Kake Singh v. State of M.P. (AIR 1982 SC 1021)]. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. [See Ram Manorath and Ors. [See Kake Singh v. State of M.P. (AIR 1982 SC 1021)]. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. [See Ram Manorath and Ors. v. State of U.P. (1981 (2) SCC 654)] (vii) Mere because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu (AIR 1981 SC 617)] (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1505)]. (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. [See Nanahau Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1988 SC 912)] (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan and Ors. (AIR 1989 SC 1519)] (xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, they have to be accepted. [See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1982 SC 839)]. 22. The aforesaid principles were approved by the Apex Court in cases Mohan Lal and others vs. State of Haryana, 2007 (2) RCR (Criminal) 88 and Varikuppal Srinivas vs. State of A.P. 2009 (4) RCR (Criminal) 869. 23. The Apex Court in case Puran Chand vs. State of Haryana, 2010 (3) RCR (Criminal) 223, while approving the aforesaid judgment and discussing the various other judgments observed as under :- “11. The Courts below have to be extremely careful when they deal with a dying declaration as the maker thereof is not available for the cross-examination which poses a great difficulty to the accused person. A mechanical approach in relying upon a dying declaration just because it is there extremely dangerous. The Courts below have to be extremely careful when they deal with a dying declaration as the maker thereof is not available for the cross-examination which poses a great difficulty to the accused person. A mechanical approach in relying upon a dying declaration just because it is there extremely dangerous. The Court has to examine a dying declaration scrupulously with a microscopic eye to find out whether the dying declaration is voluntary, truthful, made in a conscious state of mind and without being influenced by the relatives present or by the investigating agency who may be interested in the success of investigation or which may be negligent while recording the dying declaration. Number of times, a young girl or a wife who makes the dying declaration could be under the impression that she would lead a peaceful, congenial happy and blissful married life only with her husband and, therefore, has tendency to implicate the inconvenient parents-in-law or other relatives. Number of times the relatives influence the investigating agency and bring about a dying declaration. The dying declaration recorded by the investigating agencies have to be very scrupulously examined and the Court must remain alive to all the attendant circumstances at the time when the dying declaration comes into being. When there are more than one dying declarations, the intrinsic contradictions in those dying declarations are extremely important. It cannot be that a dying declaration which supports the prosecution alone can be accepted while the other innocuous dying declarations have to be rejected. Such trend will be extremely dangerous. However, the Courts below are fully entitled to act on the dying declarations and make them the basis of conviction, where the dying declarations pass all the above tests.” 24. Similarly, the Apex Court in case Dayal Singh vs. State of Maharashtra 2007 (2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 909, even stressed that the dying declaration should normally be in question answer form. 25. In the instant case, if, keeping in view the medical evidence, the close scrutiny to the dying declaration is made, then that creates many doubts which stand unexplained. It also indicates of tutoring and product of imagination. 25. In the instant case, if, keeping in view the medical evidence, the close scrutiny to the dying declaration is made, then that creates many doubts which stand unexplained. It also indicates of tutoring and product of imagination. When she was asked as to what happened with her, she first stated that the accused mixed some medicine, again said, they gave her beating and set her ablaze, which indicates that the statement of Meena was not smooth, coming naturally from her mouth but it was due to some promptness from the outer side. There is nothing in the medical evidence about the administering of any poisonous substance to her. The case given by her is that the accused were present to take her to her house. At that time she did not state that they were demanding anything from her and that she was given beatings on account of demand of dowry. It is only at the end of the statement that the accused were harassing her for `10,000/-and were demanding dowry. But this part of her statement is not inconsonance with the statement of Krishna Devi (PW9). She has no where stated that the accused were demanding `10,000/-and harassed her daughter on that account. Actually from the tenor of the statement of Meena under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, it could easily be concluded that the accused had come to take her to their house and bed her on that account. So many other questions which remained un-answered by the prosecution also create huge shadow of doubt. The accused are the residents of village Dheerpur, Delhi whereas the deceased was residing with her mother at village Atta i.e. a distant place from her matrimonial house. The accused never knew that she would be present alone at the house and they could do any such overt act at such time. The accused had not brought any kerosene and match stick or any other burning material setting her ablaze. The deceased herself disclosed in her statement under Section 32 of the Evidence Act that she was working on a stove at that time. Had there been any intention on the part of the accused to set her ablaze, then they would have come prepared with burning material. There is no evidence that some kerosene was lying in the can which was used by the accused. Had there been any intention on the part of the accused to set her ablaze, then they would have come prepared with burning material. There is no evidence that some kerosene was lying in the can which was used by the accused. The deceased and Krishna Devi (PW9) had not given any time as to when the accused had come to their house. Had the accused burnt Meena during the day and Kaka Singh had seen the accused burning her, then he would have informed Krishna Devi or her sons at the place of their work in the field, but it has come in evidence that Kaka Singh informed them as soon as Krishna along with her sons came in the street at about 7/8.00 p.m. It also further remains a mystery that since the intention of the accused was to demand dowry and the deceased was not residing at the house of the accused, then why they would kill her instead of getting their demands fulfilled. It is also in evidence that Krishna Devi and her other relatives were present by the side of the deceased before they were sent out side, then there are all chances of their promptness to the deceased to make a suitable statement as they knew that Magistrate was likely to reach the hospital for her examination. 26. In the similar circumstances, the Apex Court in Mohan Lal's case (supra), had refused to accept the dying declaration made by the deceased while observing as under :- “11. In the instant case, it is to be noted that the evidence of PW-3 and doctor clearly show that before the dying declaration was recorded the relatives of the deceased including P Ws 7 and 8 were present with her and were subsequently asked to leave the room where the dying declaration was recorded. Though much was made of the dowry demand by the courts below there is only a vague reference to it in the dying declaration. The statement of P.Ws 7 and 8 that they had told the Investigating Officer about the dowry demand is not correct. They had not said so before the Investigating Officer. It is also significant that prior to the death, neither the deceased nor her parents had complained to the police or told anyone else about any alleged dowry demand. The statement of P.Ws 7 and 8 that they had told the Investigating Officer about the dowry demand is not correct. They had not said so before the Investigating Officer. It is also significant that prior to the death, neither the deceased nor her parents had complained to the police or told anyone else about any alleged dowry demand. In the circumstances, the dying declaration itself was clearly the result of tutoring and was not a free and voluntary one.” 27. In the instant case also, there is a vague reference to the demand of dowry in the dying declaration. Krishna Devi (PW9) had also not made any such statement as to what was the specific demand of dowry made by the accused. In the normal course, the deceased did not make any such statement that she was harassed on account of demand of dowry, but the crux of the statement is that the accused wanted to take her to their house. In such circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the dying declaration was voluntary and free from any influence. 28. The other contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the demand of dowry as set out by the accused can be said to be remote in time as to disturb the mental equilibrium of the deceased so as to take her life by committing suicide. The deceased in this case was not residing in her matrimonial house. She had come 8-9 months back to her parental house. The demand, if any, was there, then it should be 8-9 months prior to the occurrence. No such cruelty which may disturb the equilibrium of the deceased caused by the accused could be imputed to them so as to bring the same within the words that such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death. The words “such cruelty” connotes the cruelty in connection with the demand of dowry. The words “Soon before” have been elaborated in number of judgments by the Apex Court. While discussing the words “soon before”, it was observed by the Apex Court in case M. Srinivasulu vs. State of A.P. 2007 (4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 146 as under :- “10. The words “such cruelty” connotes the cruelty in connection with the demand of dowry. The words “Soon before” have been elaborated in number of judgments by the Apex Court. While discussing the words “soon before”, it was observed by the Apex Court in case M. Srinivasulu vs. State of A.P. 2007 (4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 146 as under :- “10. A conjoint reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expression 'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113B of the Evidence Act and 304B IPC are pressed into service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304B IPC and Section 113 B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to expression 'soon before' used in Section 114 (illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression 'soon before' normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.” 29. Again the Apex Court in case State of Rajasthan vs. Jaggu Ram 2008 (1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 659 while taking into consideration the judgment delivered in cases State of A.P. v. Raj Gopal Asawa 2004 (2) RCR (Criminal) 330 and Ram Badan Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2006 (4) RCR (Criminal) 104 observed that the words 'soon before her death' are not defined either in the Dowry Prohibition Act or the Indian Penal Code, but the court has to examine the facts of each case and then observe if there as any proximate connection between the demand of dowry and the act of cruelty or harassment and death. In other words, the Apex Court in this case preferred to give stress on proximity test. 30. Similarly, the Apex Court again had the occasion to discuss the words 'soon before' in case Baldev Singh vs. State of Punjab 2008 (3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 902 and concluded as under : 1. The expression soon before is very relevant where Section 113 B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. 2. There must be material to show that soon before her death, the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. 3. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of death occurring otherwise in a normal circumstances. 4. The presumption under Section 113 B of the Evidence Act would operate only if the prosecution proves that the cruelty or harassment, in connection with demand of dowry was soon before the occurrence. 5. 4. The presumption under Section 113 B of the Evidence Act would operate only if the prosecution proves that the cruelty or harassment, in connection with demand of dowry was soon before the occurrence. 5. The words 'soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula could be laid down as to what would constitute the period of soon before the occurrence. 6. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period and that brings in the importance of proximity test, both for proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. 7. No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined . A reference to expression 'soon before' used in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods 'soon after the theft', is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.” 31. Similar observations were made by the Bombay High Court in case Sunil Bhiku Yadav vs. State of Maharashtra 2010 (7) RCR (Criminal) 205. 32. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.” 31. Similar observations were made by the Bombay High Court in case Sunil Bhiku Yadav vs. State of Maharashtra 2010 (7) RCR (Criminal) 205. 32. In another case Uday Chakraborty and others vs. State of West Bengal 2010 (3) RCR (Criminal) 611, the Apex Court while further explaining the words 'soon before her death' observed as under : “The expression 'soon before her death' has to be given its due meaning as the legislature has not specified any time which would be the period prior to death, that would attract the provisions of section 304 B of IPC. The concept of reasonable time would be applicable, which would primary depend upon the facts of a given case, the conduct of the parties and the impact of cruelty and harassment inflicted upon the deceased in relation to demand of dowry to the cause of unnatural death of the deceased. In our considered view, the marriage itself has not survived even for a period of two years, the entire period would be relevant factor in determining such an issue.” 33. Again, the Apex Court in case Ashok Kumar vs. State of Haryana, 2010 (3) RCR (Criminal) 900, observed as under :- “15. We are of the considered view that the concept of reasonable time is the best criteria to be applied for appreciation and examination of such cases. This Court in the case of Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab, 2009 (1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 573 : 2009 (1) R.A.J. 268 : AIR 2009 SC 1454, held that the legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing the words 'soon before her death' is to emphasize the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, has been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a reasonable, if not direct, nexus between her death and the dowry related cruelty or harassment inflicted on her. In other words, there should be a reasonable, if not direct, nexus between her death and the dowry related cruelty or harassment inflicted on her. Similar view was expressed by this Court in the case of Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2004 (1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 850 : 2004 (2) Apex Criminal 424 : (2004) 3 SCC 98, where this Court stated that determination of the period would depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case. However, the expression would normally imply that there has to be reasonable time gap between the cruelty inflicted and the death in question. If this is so, the legislature in its wisdom would have specified any period which would attract the provisions of this Section. However, there must be existence of proximate link between the acts of cruelty along with the demand of dowry and the death of the victim. For want of any specific period, the concept of reasonable period would be applicable. Thus, the cruelty, harassment and demand of dowry should not be so ancient whereafter, the couple and the family members have lived happily and that it would result in abuse of the said protection. Such demand or harassment may not strictly and squarely fall within the scope of these provisions unless definite evidence was led to show to the contrary. These matters, of course, will have to be examined on the facts and circumstances of a given case.” 34. It may further be observed that keeping in view the principles that graver the punishment, the stricter the proof, the Apex Court in case Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and others, 2000 (2) RCR (Criminal) 695, cautioned that in cases where accusations of dowry deaths are made, the overt acts attributed to persons other than the husband are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and by mere conjectures and implications such relations cannot be held guilty for the offence relating to dowry deaths. 35. In the instant case, the marriage between the parties had taken place 5-½ years back and the deceased may be upset for the reason that she had given birth to two children but they could not survive. No evidence has come on the record as to what actual dowry was given at the time of marriage. 35. In the instant case, the marriage between the parties had taken place 5-½ years back and the deceased may be upset for the reason that she had given birth to two children but they could not survive. No evidence has come on the record as to what actual dowry was given at the time of marriage. The only statement made by Krishna Devi (PW9) does not indicate as to what sort of demand was being set up by the accused which became the cause of quarrel. In any case, there is no evidence that after coming to the parental house, Meena was still tortured on account of demand of dowry, rather the dying declaration speaks that the accused wanted to take her back. Umed Singh since deceased has been established to be dull headed, therefore, he could not be expected to make any such demand. Joginder Singh, a relative could not be said to be beneficiary for any demand made by the accused, there are no specific allegations against Shakuntla if she had raised any demand, no part has been attributed to her while she (Meena) was set ablaze. Kaka Singh or the persons living on the first floor as per alleged dying declaration were the eye witnesses but none of them has come forward to support the prosecution case and state that the accused were demanding dowry or they had set her ablaze. They being the material witnesses appear to have intentionally withheld by the prosecution. The ingredients of soon before have also not been duly established. The dying declaration is shrouded by suspicion. 36. Resultantly, the impugned judgment cannot be said to be well founded and appears to be based on mis-appreciation of evidence calling for interference by this Court. 37. Consequently, the appeal No. 876-SB of 2003 is accepted, impugned judgment is set aside and the accused Joginder Singh is acquitted of the charges framed against him. 38. The appeal No.1228-SB of 2003 is accepted and the impugned judgment is set aside qua accused Shakuntla and she is acquitted of the charges framed against her. However, the appeal No.1228-SB of 2003, qua accused-appellant Umed Singh stands abated. 39. Accused-appellants Joginder Singh and Shakuntla Devi are ordered to be set at liberty forthwith.