JUDGMENT By the Court.—We have heard learned counsel for parties at length on their appearance towards the notice dated 7.9.2011 issued by this Court. The said order on reproduction reads as under: “Heard learned Senior Counsel for petitioner and perused the pleadings of writ petition. Learned Senior Counsel referred to Schedule X Para 2(1)(a) of the Constitution to argue that by holding a press-conference with the leader of Samajwadi Party before resigning his membership of the Bahujan Samaj Party, the petitioner had in fact disclosed his intention to resign. Therefore, the proceedings initiated under the Members of Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on grounds of defection) Rules, 1987, before the Speaker, U.P. Legislative Assembly, would not be maintainable without a decision on the issue of resignation. Issue notice to respondents. Dasti as well. List the matter tomorrow at 10.15 A.M. for hearing. “ 2. Shri Umesh Chandra, learned senior Advocate, submitted that on 9.5.2011, the petitioner, a Member of Ruling Party called Bahujan Samaj Party, made an announcement in Lucknow in a press conference that he would resign from the membership of U.P. Legislative Assembly from Masauli Constituency situated in District Barabanki. Thereafter, he went to his Constituency and from there addressed his resignation letter to the Speaker, U.P. Legislative Assembly, on the same day, through a courier service called ‘Blue Dart Courier’ vide shipment No. 60105567970. However, that letter could not be delivered and as such it was returned to the petitioner on 11.5.2011. Thereafter, on 12.5.2011, the petitioner again sent the same letter of resignation through courier vide shipment No. 13136565794 from Barabanki. However, the courier again could not be delivered as the office of the Speaker is said to be situated in No Entry Zone and thus it was returned to the petitioner on 17.5.2011. In the meantime, the petitioner also sent a copy of his resignation through fax on 12.5.2011. Thereafter, the petitioner came to know through some newspapers (Lucknow Edition) of 12.5.2011 and 13.5.2011 that a petition for declaring him disqualified from the membership of U.P. Legislative Assembly was filed before the Speaker on 11.5.2011 by opposite party No. 2. 3. In the meantime, the petitioner also sent a copy of his resignation through fax on 12.5.2011. Thereafter, the petitioner came to know through some newspapers (Lucknow Edition) of 12.5.2011 and 13.5.2011 that a petition for declaring him disqualified from the membership of U.P. Legislative Assembly was filed before the Speaker on 11.5.2011 by opposite party No. 2. 3. Now, the one and only issue raised by learned senior counsel before us is that since the resignation letter and application declaring for disqualification of the petitioner are pending before the Speaker it would be appropriate in the light of the Rules of Allocation of Business of House that the Speaker may be directed to decide the issue of acceptance of resignation before he takes up the application for declaration of disqualification of the petitioner. Learned senior counsel submitted that the seat of petitioner in the present facts and circumstances of the case shall stand vacated only under Article 190(3)(a) & (b) and Article 191(2) of the Constitution, which on reproduction read as: “190. Vacation of seats.—(1) ................ (2) ................... (3) If a member of a House of the Legislature of a State - (a) becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1) [or clause (2)] of Article 191; or [(b) resigns his seat by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, and his resignation is accepted by the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be,] his seat shall thereupon become vacant: [Provided that in the case of any resignation referred to in sub-clause (b), if from information received or otherwise and after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, is satisfied that such resignation is not voluntary or genuine, he shall not accept such resignation.” “191. Disqualifications for membership.—(1) .............. (2) A person shall be disqualified for being a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State if he is so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule.” 4. Thus, according to learned senior counsel, the Speaker has a very limited role in the case of resignation if it is found that the resignation is voluntary and genuine. (2) A person shall be disqualified for being a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State if he is so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule.” 4. Thus, according to learned senior counsel, the Speaker has a very limited role in the case of resignation if it is found that the resignation is voluntary and genuine. Learned senior counsel further submitted that there is no dispute whatsoever on the nature of resignation as the petitioner admits that it is a voluntary and genuine typed resignation signed by him. Learned senior counsel also submitted that if the resignation in question is a voluntary resignation then the Speaker is supposed to pass only a mechanical order as there is no scope for discussion of evidence connected with the resignation. Learned senior counsel referred to a decision of Hon’ble the Apex Court in Consumer Education & Research Society v. Union of India and others, AIR 2009 SC (Supp.) 1680. Learned senior counsel, in particular, read out to us paragraphs 27 and 28 of the aforesaid judgment to argue that till the Speaker decides on resignation, there shall be no vacancy of seat as it is not an automatic consequence following the submission of resignation by the Member of the Legislative Assembly. Paragraphs 27 and 28 of the judgment (supra) on reproduction read as: “27. It can be seen from the above-mentioned permutations that there are several possibilities that may lead to a seat becoming vacant. It is also clear that a seat becomes vacant only on after an adjudication in cases falling under Article 101(3)(a), whereas, the seats become vacant without any adjudication on the happening of specified events in respect of vacancies arising under Articles 101(2), 101(3)(b) and 101(4). A vacancy under Article 101(3)(a) would occur in the case of disqualifications enumerated under Article 102(1) only after there has been a decision on the subject of such disqualification by the President. The exception to this proposition would of course arise when there is a voluntary admission of the disqualification by a particular Member to the Speaker/Chairman of the House, as the case may be. The vacancy under Article 101(3)(a) will occur in the case of the disqualification mentioned under Article 102(2), only after a decision has been made on the subject of such disqualification by the Chairman or the Speaker of such House as the case may be. The vacancy under Article 101(3)(a) will occur in the case of the disqualification mentioned under Article 102(2), only after a decision has been made on the subject of such disqualification by the Chairman or the Speaker of such House as the case may be. Thus, Para. 6(1) of Tenth Schedule of the Constitution is analogous to Article 103(1) of the Constitution and both contemplate adjudication by an authority on the subject of disqualification, albeit with respect to distinct grounds. On the other hand, in case of a person who resigns, the vacancy occurs [as per Article 103(3)(b)] when the resignation is accepted by the Chairman or the Speaker and in such case, the Constitution does not contemplate any adjudication on the subject of disqualification. Similarly, in the case of a Member being absent without permission for a period of 60 days the vacancy arises when the House declares his seat vacant and there is no provision for adjudication about such disqualification. In the case of a person having a dual membership of Parliament and a State Legislature, on the expiration of 15 days (provided by the Prohibition of Simultaneous Membership Rules 1950), the person’s seat in Parliament becomes vacant without any further adjudication. 28. Thus we find that for a vacancy to occur under Article 101(4), there should be a declaration by the House, for a vacancy to occur under Article 101(3)(b) there should be acceptance of resignation by the Chairman or the Speaker of the House and under Article 101(2) the vacancy arises automatically on the expiry of 15 days after the point of time that the particular MP became a Member of the State Legislature. However, the vacancies contemplated in Article 101(3)(a) will arise only when the disqualification is decided upon and declared by the President under Article 103(1) or declared by the Chairman or the Speaker of the House under Para. 6(1) of Tenth Schedule. Therefore in the case of vacancy under Article 101(3)(a), the vacancy of the seat is not automatic consequent upon incurring the disqualification but would occur only upon a declaration of the disqualification by the designated authority. For example, if a Member gives up membership of a political party or votes or abstains from voting in the House in a manner that is contrary to the directions issued by his/her political party, Para. For example, if a Member gives up membership of a political party or votes or abstains from voting in the House in a manner that is contrary to the directions issued by his/her political party, Para. 2 of Tenth Schedule provides that the said Member of the House shall be disqualified. However, the vacancy of his/her seat does not become operative on the day he/she gives up membership of the political party or when he/she votes or abstains from voting in a manner that is contrary to the directions issued by his/her political party. With regard to disqualification on the ground of defection, the vacancy of the seat would become operative only when a decision is rendered by the Chairman or the Speaker of the House as the case may be declaring his disqualification. Similarly in respect of the disqualification on the ground of holding an office of profit, the vacancy of the seat would become operative only when the President decides the issue on the subject of the alleged disqualification and declares that a particular Member has incurred the same. Such a decision may be made either on the basis of an adjudication where the question is disputed, or on the basis of an admission by the Member concerned.” 5. Learned senior counsel in order to further fortify his argument also cited a judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Vikram Singh v. Shri Ram Ballabhji Kasat and others, AIR 1995 MP 140 . He took us, in particular, to paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the judgment wherein there is a detailed discussion about submission of resignation in hand and finally it has been held that it will also include a typed written letter of resignation duly signed by the person tendering his resignation particularly in the context of the fact that some illiterate persons may also get elected as the representatives of people. Paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the said judgment are reproduced as under : “10. Article 190 occurs in Chapter III of Part VI of the Constitution. Part VI deals with States. Chapter III deals with the Legislature. This Chapter is divided into several sub-parts, namely general, Officers of the State Legislature, conduct, of business, disqualifications of members, legislative procedure, procedure in financial matters and procedure generally. Article 190 no doubt occurs below the sub-heading ‘disqualifications of members’. Part VI deals with States. Chapter III deals with the Legislature. This Chapter is divided into several sub-parts, namely general, Officers of the State Legislature, conduct, of business, disqualifications of members, legislative procedure, procedure in financial matters and procedure generally. Article 190 no doubt occurs below the sub-heading ‘disqualifications of members’. The sub-heading itself is not of much importance in view of the heading of the Articles itself which is given as ‘Vacation of Seats.’ It is clear that Article 190 deals with vacation of seats, i.e. contingencies in which seats become vacant. Sub-section (1) deals with seats being vacated by a person elected and chosen as member of two Houses of the Legislature. Sub-section (2) deals with seats being vacated where a person is chosen as a member of the Legislatures of two or more States. His seat in all the Legislatures shall become vacant unless there is a previous resignation. Neither sub-section (1), nor sub-section (2) can be said to relate to disqualification of members. Sub-section (3) relates to a seat becoming vacant, either on account of disqualification or on account of resignation which is accepted. The disqualification referred to in clause (a) is one contemplated in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Article 191 of the Constitution. Provisions in Article 191 have nothing to do with the contingencies contemplated in sub-section (1), (2) or (3) (b) of Article 190. Sub-section 3(b) is an independent provision providing for a seat becoming vacant on the acceptance of resignation of a members. The resignation which may be tendered to escape the consequences of sub-Section(1) or (2), has to be given and accepted in the manner provided in sub-section 3(b), but this provision is not limited to the situations contemplated under sub-sections (1) and (2). There is nothing in the language of sub-section 3(b) which indicates any such limitation regarding the amplitude of its scope. There is no principle of democracy which compels an elected member to continue to be a member even if he no longer desires to continue as such or which inhibits him from resigning his seat. It cannot be that the electorate has the right to compel an unwilling member to continue or to be consulted before resignation. We are inclined to hold that an elected member can resign his seat independently of the circumstances contemplated in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Article 190. It cannot be that the electorate has the right to compel an unwilling member to continue or to be consulted before resignation. We are inclined to hold that an elected member can resign his seat independently of the circumstances contemplated in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Article 190. He may resign for any reason which weighs with him, and the tenability of the reason cannot be subjected to scrutiny either by the Speaker or any other authority. The resignation by second respondent, though not one contemplated by sub-section (1) or (2) of Article 190 is permitted by sub-section (3)(b) of Section 190. 11. Point No. (ii): Article 190(3)(b) contemplates a situation where a member “resigns his seat by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker or the chairman as the case may be.” There is no dispute about the genuineness of second respondent’s resignation, copies of which are Annexures A and R-1. It is type written and bears the signature of the second respondent. It was addressed to the Speaker. Second respondent stated therein that he was voluntarily resigning from his seat. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, since the resignation must be “by writing and under his hand”, it must be actually written by hand and cannot be typed. Section 3(65) of the General Clauses Act 1897, states thus: “Expressions referring to ‘writing’ shall be constructed as including references to printing, lithography, photography and other modes of representing or reproducing words in a visible form.” Undoubtedly, a paper which is typed or type written, is a writing according to the above definition. We are supported in this conclusion by a decision of a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in Vice-Chairman, Maranbeed Village Panchayat v. Channabassappa B. Gaddi, AIR 1985 Kant 252. The provision under consideration in that case required that the Vice-Chairman may “resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Chairman” a language similar to that used in Article 190(3)(b). The Court, after noticing the definition in the Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899, which is on par with the definition in the Central Act, the absence of definition of the word ‘hand’ in the particular statutes or in the General Clauses Act, the variety of meanings attributed to the word ‘hand’ in the dictionaries and permanent edition Vol. The Court, after noticing the definition in the Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899, which is on par with the definition in the Central Act, the absence of definition of the word ‘hand’ in the particular statutes or in the General Clauses Act, the variety of meanings attributed to the word ‘hand’ in the dictionaries and permanent edition Vol. 43 of permanent edition of Words and Phrases, came to the following conclusion (at p 256 of AIR): It is, therefore, clear that the phrase ‘under his hand’ ordinarily means that it is a writing signed by the person concerned. The question for consideration is as to whether there is any good reason why we should not interpret the expression ‘writing under his hand’ as including within its ambit a type-written letter of resignation duly signed by the person tendering his resignation. If an illiterate person becomes Chairman of a Panchayat, it is important for him to write his resignation in his own hand. There may also be a case of a person without any hand becoming Chairman of the Panchayat.” The Court held that the letter of resignation, the contents of which are typed and which bear the signature of the Vice-Chairman, satisfied the requirements of law. 12. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the Karnataka High Court did not pay any attention to the word ‘by’ occurring before the word ‘writing’. The Supreme Court, in State of Gajarat v. Jamnadas G.Pabri, AIR 1974 SC 2233 , interpreting the words “by reason of disturbances,” held that the expression “by reason of” “indicates that” “disturbances” and “situation” must be proximately connected as cause and effect. It is, therefore, argued that the use of the word “by” would indicate that “hand” and “working” should have proximate connection as cause and effect. We do not think the principle discussed by the Supreme Court can have any application in the present context. The phrase “by writing” cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be considered as requiring the person resigning to write, the resignation in his own hand. Such an interpretation will assume that the founding fathers of the Constitution were unaware that the majority of electors and a few of those elected would be illiterate and some of them may not be in a position to hold a pen with the hand and write anything, or even put the signature. Such an interpretation will assume that the founding fathers of the Constitution were unaware that the majority of electors and a few of those elected would be illiterate and some of them may not be in a position to hold a pen with the hand and write anything, or even put the signature. “Sign”, as indicated in Section 3(56) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, with reference to a person who is unable to writ his name, includes ‘mark’. An illiterate can sign by putting any mark.. We are unable to accept the interpretation sought to be placed on the provision by learned counsel for the petitioner. The phrase “by writing under his hand” is used to indicate that the resignation cannot be oral and it must be in writing and must be by hand, i.e. it must bear his signature. If these two elements are present, the resignation satisfies the requirement of law. Undoubtedly, the resignation letter in question is typed or typewritten and bare the signature of the second respondent. There is no infirmity in the same. The point is answered accordingly.” 6. On the other hand, Shri J.N. Mathur, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for Speaker submitted that the office of Speaker commands the highest respect for its absolute and unvarying impartiality, and the incumbent of this office discharges the functions only in keeping with the great tradition of the high office. Therefore, Shri Mathur submitted that the scope of exercise of judicial review by this Court as well as by Hon’ble the Apex Court would be available or would arise only on passing of some order by the Speaker on the pending resignation and the application for declaration of disqualification of the petitioner as a Member of the Legislative Assembly in terms of the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment of Hon’ble the Apex Court whereby vires of Schedule X Para 7 was called in question and the Hon’ble Bench unanimously declared the provisions of Schedule X Para 7 as ultra vires insofar as they completely excluded the powers of judicial review of Hon’ble the Apex Court as well as the High Courts. Shri Mathur also submitted that the Speaker (opposite party No. 1) has the highest regard for this highest Court of the State and expects that in respect of the proceedings in House, there should be no interference till some orders are passed which of course would be subject to judicial review by this High Court as well as Hon’ble the Apex Court. 7. Shri P.N. Gupta, learned counsel, appearing for opposite party No. 2 while supplementing the arguments of Shri Mathur contended that if the disposal of the matters has been delayed, it is only because of the conduct of the petitioner who has sought adjournments on several dates in past. 8. On a careful consideration of the aforesaid submissions, we find that it would be open for the Speaker to decide the issues of resignation and disqualification together or individually, for, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, these two issues appear to be inextricably interwoven, and now since the matter is pending before the Speaker, he would be the best Judge to decide as to how the matter is to be decided in keeping with the best tradition of his office namely the absolute and unvarying impartiality as observed in the Constitution Bench judgment of Hon’ble the Apex Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651. However, it need not be clarified that he can even ask the parties to adduce evidence to reach the right conclusion. 9. In view of all the aforesaid, we are not inclined to grant the relief(s) as prayed for. 10. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed. ——————