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2011 DIGILAW 2169 (HP)

Roshan Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2011-05-19

RAJIV SHARMA

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Judgment Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge (oral). Petitioner was appointed Shastri in the respondent-department on 18.10.1976. He subsequently acquired the qualification of Sahityacharya in December, 1990 and postgraduation in the subject of Sanskrit in July, 1992. Case of the petitioner, in a nutshell, is that respondent No.3 though junior to him has been considered for promotion to the post of Pandit and thereafter Head Pandit. 2. Mr. Dilip Sharma has vehemently argued on the basis of Annexures A-4 and A-5 that his client was placed higher in the seniority list vis-à-vis respondent No.3. He then contended that his client was required to be considered for promotion to the post of Pandit and Head Pandit before considering the case of respondent No.3. 3. Mr. Vikas Rathore, learned Deputy Advocate General and Mr. D.P. Gupta have supported the promotion of respondent No.3 to the post of Pandit made vide Annexure A-7 on 16.7.1996 and Head Pandit on 2.12.1999. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the pleadings meticulously. 5. It is true that the name of petitioner figures at Sr. No. 30 in the seniority list Annexure A-4, as it stood on 31.5.1995 and name of respondent No.3 is at Sr. No. 33. Thereafter seniority list of Shastris with Acharya, as it stood on 31.7.1996, was also published. In this seniority list, name of respondent No.3 does not figure. 6. Mr. Vikas Rathore has strenuously argued that in fact the seniority list issued vide Annexure A-4 was quashed and set aside by the erstwhile Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal and thereafter the promotions have been made on the basis of earlier seniority list issued vide Annexure R-3/1 dated 2.3.1993 whereby the name of respondent No.3 was mentioned at Sr. No.40 and the name of the petitioner did not figure in that seniority list. Respondent No.3 has been promoted to the post of Pandit on 16.7.1996 and the seniority list of Shastris with Acharya has subsequently been issued on 24.8.1996. Respondent No.3 has further been promoted on 2.12.1999 to the post of Head Pandit on the basis of earlier promotion granted to him on 16.7.1996. Petitioner has made representation to respondent No.2 vide Annexure A-8 on 26.11.1999. Vide Annexure A-10, Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Education) has called upon respondent No.2 to look into the matter. Respondent No.3 has further been promoted on 2.12.1999 to the post of Head Pandit on the basis of earlier promotion granted to him on 16.7.1996. Petitioner has made representation to respondent No.2 vide Annexure A-8 on 26.11.1999. Vide Annexure A-10, Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Education) has called upon respondent No.2 to look into the matter. It has also come in the reply filed by respondent No.3 that the earlier seniority list issued vide Annexure A-4 had been quashed and set aside by the erstwhile Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. No rejoinder has been filed to the reply filed by respondent No.3. It is in these circumstances that respondent No.3 has been promoted to the post of Pandit on the basis of seniority list prepared and circulated vide Annexure R-3/1 dated 2.3.1993. In the earlier tentative seniority list of Shastris possessing Acharya qualification, name of respondent No.3 was at Sr. No. 45, vide Annexure R-3/2. In view of this, there is no illegality in the promotion of respondent No.3 to the post of Pandit and subsequent promotion to the post of Head Pandit. Respondent No.3 has been promoted as Pandit on 16.7.1996 and this order has been assailed only in the year 2000. 7. It is settled law by now that the promotion orders are required to be challenged within a period of 6 months to 1 year. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy versus State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 2271 have held as under: “2. The main grievance of the appellant is that the 2nd respondent who was junior to him as Assistant Engineer was promoted as Divisional Engineer in 1957 by relaxing the relevant rules regarding the length of service necessary for promotion as Divisional Engineer and that his claim for a similar relaxation was not considered at that time. The learned Judge of the Madras High Court who heard the writ petition was of the view that the relaxation of the rules in favour of the 2nd respondent without considering the appellant's case was arbitrary. In view of the statement on behalf of the Government that such relaxation was given only in the case of overseas scholars, which statement was not controverted, it is not possible to agree with the view of the learned Judge. In view of the statement on behalf of the Government that such relaxation was given only in the case of overseas scholars, which statement was not controverted, it is not possible to agree with the view of the learned Judge. Be that as it may, if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the court in the year 1957 after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. There is the further fact that even after respondents 3 and 4 were promoted as Divisional Engineers over the head of the appellant he did not come to the Court questioning it. There was a third opportunity for him to have come to the Court when respondents 2 to 4 were again promoted as Superintending Engineers over the head of the appellant. After fourteen long years because of the tempting prospect of the chief Engineership he has come to the Court. In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957 cannot be reproduced now. In any case as the Government had decided as a matter of policy, as they were entitled to do, not to relax the rules in favour of any except overseas scholars it will be wholly pointless to direct them to consider the appellant's case as if nothing had happened after 1957. Not only respondent 2 but also respondents 3 and 4 who were the appellant's juniors became Divisional Engineers in 1957 apparently on the ground that their merits deserved their promotion over the head of the appellant. He did not question it. Nor did he question the promotion of his juniors as Superintending Engineers over his head, he could have come to the Court on every one of these three occasions. A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. Nor did he question the promotion of his juniors as Superintending Engineers over his head, he could have come to the Court on every one of these three occasions. A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal.” 8. Accordingly, in view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed. No costs.