Virender Singh, J.:- Vide im­pugned judgment dated December 15, 2005 of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Reasi, appellant Ghulam Qadir (accused for short) stands convicted under Sections 302 and 323 of Ranbir Penal Code (RFC) and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 6,000/- under Section 302, RPC, in de­fault thereof to further undergo imprisonment for six months and one year imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- under Section 323, RPC, in default thereof to undergo further imprisonment for one month. Both the sen­tences, however, have been ordered to run concurrently. Aggrieved of the said convic­tion/sentence, he is before us through Criminal Appeal No. 48/2009. The sentence slapped by the trial Court has been sent for confirmation under Section 374, Cr. P. C. vide Confirmation No. 10 of 2009. Hence, both have been clubbed together for disposal. 2. Let us advert to the prosecution case in brief. 3. Nazira Begum is the deceased in this case. She was widow of one Barkatullah Shah. After his death, she married the ac­cused and started living with him along with her two children, namely Hafiz and Tariq. Another son Yousuf was staying out. One Ghulam Qadir Jaral was instrumental in get­ting the deceased married to the accused. Accused was having the suspicion that a small child of 2½ months was, in fact, from the liaison of aforesaid Ghulam Qadir Jaral and after the marriage also, the deceased was a frequent visitor to his house. Even on the date of occurrence also, she had visited him. 4. Jamal Din (PW-1) happens to be the first informant to the Police, as he was in­formed by one Master Rehman about the oc­currence and thereafter both of them went to the Police Post to lodge the report. However, the entire prosecution case is unfolded by Mohd. Tariq (PW-3), aged 9 years, the son of the deceased, who along with Hafiz hap­pened to be in the house itself on the fateful day. 5. Prosecution relies upon the previous conduct of the accused also, as he was ear­lier convicted under Section 304, Part-I, RPC and sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years in case FIR No. 19/1995 at Police Station Gool for allegedly killing his first wife. He has been even charged for Section 75 of RPC on this count by the trial Court along with main charge of Sections 302/323, RPC. He has been even charged for Section 75 of RPC on this count by the trial Court along with main charge of Sections 302/323, RPC. How­ever, no finding is returned on this charge. 6. Although the prosecution has exam­ined as many as 14 witnesses in support of the charge against the accused, yet in our considered view, the entire case is virtually hinging upon the statement of aforesaid Mohd. Tariq. Therefore, we will be discuss­ing his evidence in detail and if need be, re­fer to other piece of evidence as well. 7. Mohd. Tariq (PW-3) was of the age of 9 (nine) years at the time of occurrence. He states that his mother had got married to ac­cused. His elder brother Yousuf had sent Rs. 150/- through Master Jaral who used to meet his mother also. Yousuf had also sent a letter to his mother which she had taken to Master Jaral for reading. He further states that when accused came back, he asked for reading. He further states that when accused came back, he asked his mother as to why she had gone to Jaral Master's house and from where afore­said amount had come to her, to which she replied that the money was sent by Yousuf, which explanation was not acceptable to the accused and he remarked that she had gone to aforesaid Jaral's house for immoral pur­pose. Upon this, his mother and the accused had a fight in which the accused had caught hold of his mother from his hands, pushed her on the ground and started beating her with 'stick' on her neck and hand. On account of the injuries, the right hand of his mother got fractured. He has further stated that the ac­cused also started beating his mother with 'chimta' (an iron instrument normally used in kitchen for picking up chapattis etc.), and she could not raise hue and cry as there was little life in her. This witness further discloses that the accused was telling his mother to catch hold both of her ears, but she could not do the same, as there was no strength left in her. In common parlance, he says, "Ma Ko Murga Bana Kar Kan Pakadne The". This witness further discloses that the accused was telling his mother to catch hold both of her ears, but she could not do the same, as there was no strength left in her. In common parlance, he says, "Ma Ko Murga Bana Kar Kan Pakadne The". He then submits that the accused continued beating her and when she started crying, he hit her on the thigh and back with stick where she sustained injuries but the accused kept on beating her. He further states that his mother was put on 'charpai' (cot). The blood had started oozing out from her nose and ear and she also passed the stool involuntarily. When the accused had put the mother on cot, she used to fall down from the cot, but ultimately the accused put her on bed and covered her with a woolen sheet. He thereafter collected blood stained soil and threw it outside and thereafter levelled the floor once again. He also put the earth in an envelope and threw it outside. Thereafter he washed the clothes of the deceased himself during that night and hung them outside for drying purpose. This witness further states that his mother had died and thereafter the accused picked up his younger brother, aged 2½ months, and put him by the side of his mother on the cot and went outside the house to some unknown place. In the morning, he picked up his younger brother, went to the house of the real brother of the accused and informed his wife about the occurrence, who went to the house of Master Rehman. 8. This witness has further stated that the accused while beating his mother was jump­ing on her chest and in this process, even cot had broken. He also talks of the accused caus­ing injuries to him and his sister Hafiza with a stick. He then states that the accused had taken the pieces of the 'stick' and 'chimta' along with him which were subsequently re­covered from Nullah in his presence and taken into possession by the Police. 9. The injuries found on the person of the deceased as per the post-mortem conducted on her dead body by Dr. G. R. Haider are thus : 1. Bruises over the lateral and posterior side of the both arms (Right & Left) cover­ing almost whole arm. Redish blue in colour. 2. 9. The injuries found on the person of the deceased as per the post-mortem conducted on her dead body by Dr. G. R. Haider are thus : 1. Bruises over the lateral and posterior side of the both arms (Right & Left) cover­ing almost whole arm. Redish blue in colour. 2. Bruises over the back covering whole back from upper border of scapulas up to the gluteal region, redish blue in colour. 3. Bruises over the both thighs on lateral and posterior side extending from gluteal region to knee joint posteriorly and from iliac crept to knee joint laterally gluteal region bruises also present. 4. Two parallel bruises over the anterior side of the right thigh oblique in direction about 4" x 1" redish blue in colour in centre. 5. Lacerated wound on the lateral side of right forearm ¼" x ¼" wrist joint. 6. Lacerated wound on the upper arm on the medial side 1" above elbow joint ¼" x ¼". Both the wounds were punctured type. 10. Dr. Haider states that 7th, 8th and 9th ribs of the deceased were fractured two inches from sternal joint and the fractured ribs had ruptured the pericardium. In his opinion, the deceased had died due to shock leading to cardiac arrest as a result of cumulative effect of extensive bruises and in­jury to pericardium by ribs fracture. He is also categorical in saying that injury Nos. 5 and 6 were caused by blunt tipped object, whereas other injuries were caused by blunt object. He further makes it clear that when the 'lathi' and 'chimta' were shown to him by the Police, he opined that injuries Nos. 1 to 4 were caused by the 'lathi' and injuries Nos. 5 & 6 caused by the tips of the 'chimta'. 11. This witness had also medically ex­amined Mst. Hafiza, daughter of Barkatullah Shah and PW Tariq. On the person of Mst. Hafiza, he noticed two injuries and on the person of PW Tariq bruises over the inferior lateral side of thigh in upper half of the size of 1½" x 1", which were in reddish blue colour. In his opinion, these bruises could be caused by blunt object in this regard he had also given his certificate. 12. Hafiza, he noticed two injuries and on the person of PW Tariq bruises over the inferior lateral side of thigh in upper half of the size of 1½" x 1", which were in reddish blue colour. In his opinion, these bruises could be caused by blunt object in this regard he had also given his certificate. 12. We would also refer to the investiga­tion conducted in this case by PW Abdul Rashid, who on 1-1-1997 was posted at Po­lice Post, Gool as IO and after receiving a written report from Chowkidar Abdul Rehman on 2-1-1997 entered the same in the Roznamcha of the Police, sent the same for formal registration of the FIR and went to spot, prepared the site plan, recorded the statement of children of the deceased, got the post-mortem conducted, recovered certain articles from the spot including woolen sheet, which was covered to the dead body. He also took into possession the blood stained clothes which were washed away by the accused. He talks of taking into possession 'chimta' from' the house of the accused on the identifica­tion of PW Tariq and thereafter 'stick' from the Nullah. As stated above, both these were shown to the doctor of autopsy. 13. It is a case of total denial by the ac­cused as borne out from his statement re­corded under Section 342, Cr. P. C. He has produced one Rakesh Kumar in defence, who deposed that accused used to come to his house in winter for work and in the winter of year 1997, he had come to his house and af­ter staying there for about half month, went to his house on 1-1-1997. He, however, stated that he has no knowledge about the case registered against the accused. 14. Heard Mr. Khajuria, learned counsel for the accused and Mrs. Neem Goswami, learned Deputy Advocate General represent­ing the State. Trial Court record also perused. 15. Mr. Khajuria mainly launches his at­tack on the statement of PW Tariq submit­ting that he being a child witness cannot be safely relied upon for the purpose of holding the conviction of the accused, as being of very tender age, could be tutored by the complainant side. Trial Court record also perused. 15. Mr. Khajuria mainly launches his at­tack on the statement of PW Tariq submit­ting that he being a child witness cannot be safely relied upon for the purpose of holding the conviction of the accused, as being of very tender age, could be tutored by the complainant side. He then submits that may be certain questions were put to this witness by the Court for satisfying itself for the purpose of declaring him a competent witness, that would not make any difference if his evi­dence is otherwise unreliable. According to learned counsel, this witness has exaggerated the prosecution version on certain very ma­terial points, which would go to show that either he was not a witness to the occurrence or is toeing the line of the prosecution. There­fore, it would not be safe to rely upon the solitary evidence of PW Tariq, without there being any corroboration to it. 16. While pointing out certain contradic­tions/exaggerations in the statement of the aforesaid child witness, Mr. Khajuria has also drawn attention of the Court to the statements of other witnesses as well, but primarily his attempt was to dub PW Tariq as an unreli­able witness to the occurrence. 17. Mr. Khajuria then submits that even if the statement of Tariq is believed by this Court for the purpose of holding the convic­tion, although not admitted as he has joined issue on his reliability, still the present case does not fall within the mischief of Section 302, RPC at least and it calls diluting the main charge. Dwelling upon his arguments on this aspect, he submits that it was a sudden quar­rel which had arisen between the husband and the wife over a trivial issue as the de­ceased could not account for Rs. 150/- which were lying extra in her box and this created suspicion in the mind of the accused who asked for the explanation, the same when not found to be trustworthy in the perception of the accused, he started beating the deceased. Learned counsel submits that it is not the case that the accused left the spot and came back with some weapon after some time and then assaulted her. Rather he picked up the stick lying there in the room itself and opened assault. Learned counsel submits that it is not the case that the accused left the spot and came back with some weapon after some time and then assaulted her. Rather he picked up the stick lying there in the room itself and opened assault. He then submits that may be, at one stage, he had picked 'chimta' also for caus­ing injury to the deceased, that would not change the basic complexion of the case, as his entire action is required to be appreci­ated as one incident only, when out of sheer anger, he continued beating his wife. From all these circumstances, it can be comfort­ably said that the accused, in fact, had not acted in cruel manner so as to bring his act within the mischief of Section 302, RPC and it would rather fall within the mischief of Section 304, Part I or Part II, RPC only. 18. In support of his submissions, Mr. Khajuria relied upon the following two judg­ments handed down by Hon'ble Supreme Court : i) Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh reported in AIR 1989 SC 1094 : (1989 CriLJ 883). ii) State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh re­ported in AIR 2004 SC 1264 : (2004 Cri LJ 931). 19. Repudiating the submissions ad­vanced by Mr. Khajuria, Mrs. Goswami sub­mits that there appears to be no reason for not believing PW Tariq, who is the son of the deceased and received injuries in this oc­currence. His presence, in any case, cannot be doubted at the time of the occurrence and, therefore, even if certain discrepancies have occurred in his statement with regard to the exact manner of occurrence, that would not demolish the basic case of the prosecution. 20. Mrs. Goswami then submits that from the facts of the present case and there being no dearth of injuries on the person of the deceased, it can be comfortably held that the accused had the intention to murder his wife. May be the accused had no plan to commit murder, but the brutal manner adopted by the accused for killing his wife by itself is sufficient to bring his case within the mischief of Section 302, RPC and, as such, he does not deserve any leniency with regard to the quan­tum of sentence as well. 21. The Evidence Act does not describe any particular age as determining factor to treat a witness to be competent one. 21. The Evidence Act does not describe any particular age as determining factor to treat a witness to be competent one. On the contrary, it envisages that all the persons shall be competent to testify unless the Court con­siders that they are prevented from understanding the questions because of tender age, extreme old age, disease whether of mind or any other kind. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify, if he or she has intellec­tual capacity to understand questions and give rationale answers. 22. It is well settled that the evidence of a child witness is not to be rejected per se, but the Court as a rule of prudence is supposed to test the evidence of a child witness with care and caution, as the child witness may mix up what he has actually seen with what he likes to imagine. If the Court is ultimately convinced about the quality and the reliabil­ity of the evidence, conviction can be re­corded on the statement of a child witness. Reference in this regard can be made to a case titled Suryanarayan v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2001 (1) Recent Criminal Reporter (Cri) 602 : ( AIR 2001 SC 482 ). 23. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1997 (3) RCR (Criminal) 227, the Apex Court held that a child witness, if proved competent to depose to the facts and found reliable one, his evi­dence can be made the basis of conviction. 24. Let us now re-scan the evidence of PW Tariq in its right perspective. 25. One factual aspect is clear before us that before recording the statement of PW Tariq, the trial Court has put as many as nine questions to this witness for satisfying itself about the capability of understanding of this witness. Although no note is prepared by the trial Court in this regard in so many words, but the perusal of the questions put to the witness and the answers tendered thereto, make it very clear that this witness was ca­pable of understanding. It would have cer­tainly been better, had the Court recorded its satisfaction before directing the Public Pros­ecutor to examine him with regard to the main occurrence. It is sheer an irregularity, which cannot be seen so seriously so as to dub this witness as an incompetent witness. 26. It would have cer­tainly been better, had the Court recorded its satisfaction before directing the Public Pros­ecutor to examine him with regard to the main occurrence. It is sheer an irregularity, which cannot be seen so seriously so as to dub this witness as an incompetent witness. 26. The next question now would be, whether he is a reliable witness or not. For that purpose, we are applying the rule of pru­dence and caution. As has come out from the evidence of Dr. G. R. Haider, this witness has also received injuries along with his sis­ter Mst. Hafiza. The injuries described by him in the Court find mention in the state­ment of the doctor also. He, accordingly, becomes a stamped witness to the occurrence and gets a special status, as his presence at the scene of crime cannot be doubted. 27. We are cautious that in a case of child witness, little tutoring is inevitable, but still the touchstone would be the reliability of the evidence. It is not a case of blind murder. After all a son is deposing against his father. He was not inimical to his father at all. He is the person who informs PW Rafeeqa, the wife of real brother of the accused about the occurrence and ultimately the information is supplied to the Police by PW Rehman, the Chowkidar. But for this witness, no other witness could be present at the time of the occurrence in the house. The other witness was Mst. Hafiza, younger real sister of PW Tariq, who too has received injuries. The prosecution, however, has not produced her considering that she was not a competent witness to unfold the prosecution case. So these are the only two witnesses who had the occasion to witness the occurrence and rightly so. All these facts have to be kept into consideration by us for arriving at the just conclusion. 28. Weighing the evidence of PW Tariq in the light of the aforesaid discussion, in our considered view, certain contradictions or exaggerations, as pointed out by Mr. Khajuria, will not brittle his basic evidence so as to dub him as an unreliable witness. All these facts have to be kept into consideration by us for arriving at the just conclusion. 28. Weighing the evidence of PW Tariq in the light of the aforesaid discussion, in our considered view, certain contradictions or exaggerations, as pointed out by Mr. Khajuria, will not brittle his basic evidence so as to dub him as an unreliable witness. We do find some contradictions as to the con­dition of the cot on which the deceased was lying vis-a-vis the evidence of this child wit­ness and the other witnesses produced by the prosecution who had assembled at the spot after the occurrence. We have ourselves no­ticed a fact that IO had not taken the cot into possession and for that matter, he has also not properly investigated the case on certain other aspects as well, but all these weaknesses in the prosecution case, in our con­sidered view, are not of that serious nature which would make the statement of this star witness to the occurrence weak. He, in fact, is unfolding the true account of occurrence in a very original and natural manner and there appears to be no tinge of tutoring at all in his statement to make him unreliable one. We, therefore, cannot doubt his statemenl with regard to occurrence simply because he was a child witness and hold that the same is sufficient to record the conviction of the ac­cused. 29. Let us now examine the other aspect of the case with regard to the nature of the offence, as an attempt made by Mr. Khajuria for diluting it from S. 302 to S. 304, Part I or II RPC. 30. No doubt, when the accused entered the house, he had no weapon in his hand. It is only when he asked his wife, the deceased herein, about the unaccounted amount of Rs. 150/- for which she gave the explanation that her son Yousuf had sent it along with a letter for which she had gone to Master Jaral for reading, the tiff started as he was already having suspicion in his mind that she was carrying on with aforesaid Jaral. This is also stated by her son PW Tariq on oath. To that extent, picking up a quarrel by the accused could be said to be a natural reaction of a particular situation. This is also stated by her son PW Tariq on oath. To that extent, picking up a quarrel by the accused could be said to be a natural reaction of a particular situation. But to bring the present case within the exception 4 of Section 300 RPC which deals with culpable homicide not amounting to murder, it is for the accused to show the applicability of that exception, where the following four conditions must be satisfied : i) It was a sudden fight; ii) There was no motive; iii) The act was done in the heat of pas­sion; and iv) The assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. 31. A subtle line of distinction has been drawn between the intention and the knowl­edge. Knowledge may be presumed from the intent, but intent cannot be inferred from the knowledge. RPC (IPC as per Central Code) recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide; the first degree and the gravest form is defined as murder; second may be termed as culpable homicide of second degree within the mischief of Section 304, Part I RPC and culpable homicide of third degree falls within the mischief of Section 304, Part II. Apex Court, in case Rajpal and others v. State of Haryana, reported in 2003 Vol. 3 RCC 209, while drawing the distinction between Sec­tion 299 and Section 300, I.P.C., has given the broad guidelines to appreciate such type of situation. In the aforesaid judgment, their Lordships have observed that in the scheme of IPC, 'culpable homicide' is the genus and 'murder' its species. It is further observed that the academic distinction between 'mur­der' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if the Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, al­low themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way for approaching to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be, to keep in focus the key words used by various clauses of sec­tions 299 and 300. While depicting compara­tive table of Sections 299 and 300, their Lord­ships have further held that the same is only broad guidelines and not cast iron impera­tive, as it will facilitate the task of the Court. While depicting compara­tive table of Sections 299 and 300, their Lord­ships have further held that the same is only broad guidelines and not cast iron impera­tive, as it will facilitate the task of the Court. Ultimately, it had been observed that some­times the facts are so intertwined and the sec­ond and the third stages so telescoped into each other, that it cannot be convenient to give a separate and clear cut treatment to the mattes involved in the second and third stages and, therefore, each case has to be seen on its own facts. 32. On the basis of the facts before us, in our view, the present case neither falls in Section 304, Part I nor 304, Part II of RPC. Rather it attracts the offence punishable un­der Section 302, RPC simpliciter. No doubt, there was no premeditation in this incident, but what we have noticed is that it was a uni­lateral act on the part of the accused, who after not being satisfied with the explanation tendered by the deceased for going to the house of Master Jaral, started mercilessly beating her. The deceased was virtually helpless. It was a case of complete surrender by her before the accused, who was not only beating her but wanted to punish her also. The deceased was at his command. PW Tariq in common parlance has said, 'Murga Ba­nana Chahta Tha'. 33. Another disturbing feature is that ini­tially accused started beating his wife with the 'stick' and when it got broken, lifted 'chimta' and gave injuries with 'chimta' also. This is proved on file from the evidence of doctor of autopsy. Merciless beating on the person of deceased resulted into fracturing of certain ribs which entered into pericar­dium, and in turn death at the scene of crime itself cannot lose sight of. The deceased was made so helpless that involuntarily she passed stool and in order to screen away the evidence, the accused even washed her clothes and hung them outside for drying. He went to the extent of causing injuries to helpless children (PW Tariq and Mst. Hafiza) also, who were present there. It has come in the evidence of certain witnesses that when they reached the spot, they saw the deceased lying on the cot in a naked condition and woolen sheet (chadder) was laid on her. He went to the extent of causing injuries to helpless children (PW Tariq and Mst. Hafiza) also, who were present there. It has come in the evidence of certain witnesses that when they reached the spot, they saw the deceased lying on the cot in a naked condition and woolen sheet (chadder) was laid on her. It is a clear case where the accused has taken the undue advantage of his position being the husband and continued beating his wife mer­cilessly initially with 'stick' and then 'chimta' till she died at the spot itself. 34. We are conscious of the well settled legal position that the number of injuries caused in such like case cannot be held to be conclusive in determining the nature of the offence. In the present case, the most dis­turbing feature is the manner in which the accused has acted cruelly and beastly. There­fore, the present case would not fall within exception 4 of Section 300, RPC for diluting the offence as prayed for. It falls within the mischief of 302, RPC only. 35. The judgments cited by Mr. Khajuria to strengthen his case for the purpose of di­luting the offence are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In Surinder Kumar's case ( AIR 1989 SC 1094 ) (supra), while tak­ing into account the facts of that particular case, their Lordships observed that it is es­tablished that the PW and the deceased entered the room of the appellant and uttered filthy abuses in the presence of latter's sis­ter, upon which the accused picked up knife from the kitchen, ran away towards the PW and inflicted a simple injury on his neck. It was further observed that it would be rea­sonable to infer that the deceased must have intervened on the side of his brother PW and in the course of scuffle, he received injuries, one of which proved fatal. Their Lordships did not find that the accused acted in a cruel manner and taking an overall view of the in­cident, the appellant/accused therein was held to be entitled to the benefit of the exception of Section 300. 36. Their Lordships did not find that the accused acted in a cruel manner and taking an overall view of the in­cident, the appellant/accused therein was held to be entitled to the benefit of the exception of Section 300. 36. Judgment rendered in Dhool Singh's case ( AIR 2004 SC 1264 ) (supra) is again not applicable to the facts of the present case, as in the said case while appreciating the case of single injury on the neck caused by sharp edged weapon, their Lordships observed that number of injuries are irrelevant as it is not always the determining factor in ascertain­ing the intention and rather it is the nature of the injury, the part of body where it is caused, the weapon used in causing such injury, which are the indicators of the fact that the accused caused the death of deceased with an intention of causing death or not. In this case, their Lordships disturbed the findings of the High Court where the appellant/ac­cused was convicted for 304, Part-II, IPC and the appeal of the State was allowed. 37. As a sequel to the aforesaid discus­sion, we uphold the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 302/323, RPC as already recorded by the learned trial Court. Resultantly, the instant appeal is dismissed. 38. Confirmation No. 10/2009 is also an­swered accordingly. Appeal dismissed.