JUDGMENT : The challenge in this application under Section 397/401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to the judgment and order dated 22-12-2007 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 2007 by the Learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, 8th Fast Track Court, Bichar Bhawan, Calcutta whereby and where under confirming the judgment and order dated 29-12-2006 passed by the Learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta in C/828 of 2001 convicting the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and sentencing him to suffer Simple Imprisonment for one month and to pay compensation of Rs.75,000/-. One Tapas Kumar Nandi, a partner of Ajay Fibre Glass Mouldings lodged one petition of complaint( hereinafter referred to as Opposite Party) in the court of Learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta alleging therein that his firm sold and delivered F.R.P Moulded Net and Air Intake Guard to Sumit Ranjan Chakraborty, sole proprietor of M/s. Acme Engineering Company( hereinafter referred as the petitioner) amounting to Rs.1, 63,355/- under Challan No. A.F.M 03/2001-2002 dated 30-04-2001. In part discharge of the said legal debt and liability arising out of that transaction, the petitioner issued one cheque of Rs.63,358/- dated 30-07-2001 being cheque no. 502086 drawn on State Bank of India, Mahatma Gandhi Road Branch, Calcutta in the name of M/s. Ajay Fibre Glass Mouldings. The Opposite Party presented the cheque for encashment to its banker U. B. I. College Street Branch. The cheque was returned dishonored with bank memo on 03-08-2001 indicating that the petitioner issued instruction to the bank to “stop payment”. Though the Opposite Party thereafter issued a demand notice through his advocate by registered post with A/D. discharged on 06-08-2001. The notice was returned back unserved on 20-08-2001 with postal remark “not claimed” dated 17-08-2001. So, the Opposite Party lodged the complaint on 06-09-2001 praying for prosecuting the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Upon receiving the petition of complaint, the Learned Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta examined the complainant on S/A, perused the materials placed before it and directed to issue process against the petitioner. The petitioner entered appearance and pleaded not guilty to the acquisition alleged while examined under Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, as a result, the trial commenced. The petitioner entered appearance and pleaded not guilty to the acquisition alleged while examined under Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, as a result, the trial commenced. 3 (three) witnesses were examined and cross-examined on behalf of the opposite party while the petitioner examined himself as solitary defence witness after his examination under Section 313 Cr. P. C. The challan dated 30-04-2001, cheque no. 502086 dated 30-01-2001, return memo, demand notice, authorization letter, statement of accounts etc. were admitted into evidence and marked exhibit on behalf of the opposite party. No document, whatsoever, was filed and admitted into evidence on behalf of the petitioner. The Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Calcutta upon consideration of the evidence, oral and documentary, found the petitioner guilty of offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act and passed the judgment and order mentioned earlier. The petitioner, not having satisfied with the judgment and order dated 29-12-2006 passed by the Ld. A. C. M. M, Calcutta, preferred an appeal before the Learned Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta which was ultimately converted into a criminal revision and was heard and disposed of by Learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, 8th Fast Track Court No – 8 on 22-12-2007 confirming thereby the judgment and order passed by the Ld. A. C. M. M., Calcutta. The said order dated 22-12-2007 has been impugned in this revisional application filed by the petitioner on the following grounds:- (a) That the Learned Appellate Court being First Appellate Court ought to have re appreciated the entire evidence independently, but that was not done ; (b) That the Learned Judge erred in not taking into notice that there was manifest irregularity and illegality in recording plea of the petitioner under Section 251 of Cr.P.C and, thus, the entire proceeding was void and nullity in the eye of law; (c) That under Section 143 of the N. I. Act has amended with effect from 06-02-2003 a proceeding under Section 138 of the N. I. Act to be conducted as a summary proceeding which is mandate of law. The Learned Judge was oblivious to the fact that owing to non-compliance with that mandatory provision of law, the entire proceeding became illegal and was liable to be set aside. The Learned Judge was oblivious to the fact that owing to non-compliance with that mandatory provision of law, the entire proceeding became illegal and was liable to be set aside. (d) That both the Trial Court and the Learned Judge did not give the petitioner any opportunity of being heard while awarding compensation which is utter violation of the mandate of the Apex Court in Mangilal -Vs- State of Madhya Pradesh ; (e) That neither the Trial Court nor the Learned Revisional Court assigned any reason for not invoking the provisions of Section 360 read with Section 361 of the Code ; (f) That the Learned Trial Court as well as the Learned Revisional Court failed to appreciate evidence on record on its proper perspective. Mr. Ayan Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner advances manifold contentions. The main thrust of his contention is (1) The Ld. Trial Court did not examine the petitioner under Section 251 of Cr. P.C in accordance with law ; (2) That the Learned Trial Court and Learned Revisional Court failed to take notice that the opposite party has no locus standi to initiate the criminal action in view of Section 142(b) of the N. I. Act because the opposite party instituted the case in his personal capacity not as an authorized partner of the firm ; (3) That the Trial Court as well as the Learned Revisional Court failed to afford the petitioner any opportunity of being heard while awarding compensation under Section 357(3) of the Code and lastly (4) That no reason was assigned by the Learned Trial Court and Learned Revisional Court under Section 361 of the Code for not extending the benefits of Section 360 of the Code to the petitioner. Mr. Sandipan Ganguly, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party submits that this second revisional application is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 397 (3) read with Section 399(3) of the Code. He submits further when the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the acquisition in course of examination under Section 251 of Cr.P. C, participating full-flegedly in the trial, had given the definite and specific answers to the incriminating evidence of the prosecution witnesses against him in course of the his examination of the 313 Cr. He submits further when the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the acquisition in course of examination under Section 251 of Cr.P. C, participating full-flegedly in the trial, had given the definite and specific answers to the incriminating evidence of the prosecution witnesses against him in course of the his examination of the 313 Cr. P. C and examined himself as a defence witness, it is clear that he understood the acquisition put forth by the opposite party as well as the very purpose of the trial. So, he was not at all prejudiced by the way his plea under Section 251 Cr. P. C was recorded by the Learned Trial Court. Mr. Ganguly submits that this Court while exercising its power of revision may pass necessary order under Section 360(4) and under Section 357(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in a proper case, without remitting the case for reconsideration of the Trial Court so far as the issues of non-examination of the petitioner while awarding compensation u/s. 357(3) and not extending benefit of Section 360 of the Cr. P.C are concerned. Since the question of maintainability of this second revisional application has been raised by Mr. Ganguly, it appears necessary to discuss over the issue first of all. It is true that the petitioner being dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 29-12-2006 passed by the Ld. A. C. M. M., Calcutta preferred an appeal before the Learned Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta, which was, however, converted into a criminal revision by the Order No. 5 dated 28-08-2007. That revisional application was dismissed on 20-12-2007 by the Learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, 8th Fast Track Court, Bichar Bhavan, Calcutta. The petitioner has taken out the instant application under Section 397/401 of Cr. P. C read with Section 482 of the Code challenging the legality, validity and propriety of that order. The language of Section 397(3) and Section 399(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure altogether makes it abundantly clear that a second revision is not maintainable under Section 397(3) as well as Section 399(3) of the Code. The position of law is settled in Asgar Khan –Vs- State of U. P. ( A.I.R 1981 SC 1169). The language of Section 397(3) and Section 399(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure altogether makes it abundantly clear that a second revision is not maintainable under Section 397(3) as well as Section 399(3) of the Code. The position of law is settled in Asgar Khan –Vs- State of U. P. ( A.I.R 1981 SC 1169). However, in the instant case, the petitioner has taken out an application under Section 397/401 read with Section 482 of the Code and sought interference of this Court by exercising its extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Code mainly on the ground that there is manifest illegality and irregularity causing serious miscarriage of justice necessitating interference of this Court. In the case in hand, to be stated precisely, the manner in which the sentence is passed, has been challenged. It is the case of the petitioner that he was not given opportunity to be heard at the time of awarding compensation and was not provided with the benefit of Section 360 of the law without assigning any reason. If so, no doubt, there was patent illegality on the part of the Trial court as well as the first revisional court, which, requires verification by this Court and that can possibly be done by exercising its extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Code. This appears to be an exceptional case where interests of justice require interference for the correction of such a manifest illegality. In this context, the decision in Rajani Goswami –Vs-Anil Ch. Halui (2010 (1) E. C. N, Guwahati 64 and Purtipati (AIR 1979 A.P (FB) 146) 146 can well be referred to. So, on the face of it, the application taken out by the petitioner is not liable to be thrown away as proposed by Mr. Ganguly, rather the matter is required to be inquired into, first of all, as to see whether, in fact, any such serious irregularity or illegality was caused and in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or miscarriage of justice or to correct such illegality or irregularity committed, the extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Code is required to be invoked. Mr. Banerjee contends that the petitioner was not examined under Section 251 of the Cr. P. C in accordance with law, and, as such, serious prejudice is caused to the petitioner. To draw support of his contention, Mr. Mr. Banerjee contends that the petitioner was not examined under Section 251 of the Cr. P. C in accordance with law, and, as such, serious prejudice is caused to the petitioner. To draw support of his contention, Mr. Banerjee refers to the decisions of this Court in Dilip Kumar Das -Vs- State of W. B., 2000 C. Cr. L. R(Cal) 460, Harisankar Pal -Vs- State of West Bengal, 2001 C. Cr. L. R(Cal) 315, Narendra Nath Giri -Vs- State of West Bengal, 2001 C. Cr. L. R (Cal) 32 and Om Prakash Modi -Vs- State, 2004(1) E Cr N (Cal) 1385. No question was raised by the petitioner regarding inadequacy and irregularity in recording plea under Section 251 of Cr. P. C in the Learned Trial Court. On the contrary, upon his plea of “not guilty”, the trial proceeded and concluded. He cross-examined all the prosecution witnesses. He made out a specific case while examined under Section 313 of the Code and perfectly answered to all the questions put to him in course of his examination under Section 313 Cr. P. C. He admitted that he received the goods from opposite party’s firm, issued cheque as alleged, directed the bank to stop payment and received the demand notice in time. There is no obscurity in the entire matter and there is nothing on record to show far less indicate that he did not understand the acquisition put forth against him and why he was arrayed to face the trial. Not only that, he examined himself as a defence witness to substantiate his specific stand. The petitioner raised the point of inadequacy in recording his plea in the court of Learned First Revisional Judge for the first time and the Learned Judge discussed the matter elaborately. In second revision, the scope of this Court is not only limited, but also restricted. When a mixed question of law and fact was not raised at the initial stage, but in revision, and that too was duly considered by the first revisional court assigning sufficient reasons, this Court is of the view that there is virtually no scope for this Court to exercise its extraordinary power/jurisdiction merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view or taken a wrong decision. The decision in Bansilal 1986 Cr. L. J. 1603 can well be referred to in this context. The decision in Bansilal 1986 Cr. L. J. 1603 can well be referred to in this context. Again in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy –Vs- State of A.P (A. I. R 1963 SC 1788), Stephens, ( 1951 SCR 284 ) and Logendra (A.I.R SC 1951), the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down that it could be (revisional jurisdiction by the High Court) exercised in exceptional cases where the interests of justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice and this jurisdiction is not ordinarily be invoked merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view or mis-appreciated evidence. In the case in hand, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the petitioner was prejudiced by the manner in which his plea under Section 251 Cr. P. C was recorded. In Dilip Kumar Das (Supra) this Court found that in a case under Section 7(1)(a)(I) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the Learned Special Judge did not explain the particulars of offence he was to be tried and, as such, there was prejudice caused to the accused which is not curable. In that case, there was no revisional application other than the application taken out in the High Court and the question was not raised and discussed by in any earlier revision. The offence alleged was in fact violation of essential commodity’s order which was punishable under Section 7(1) (a) (I) by the Act. Therefore, what was violated by the accused required to be explained to him. In the case in hand, the offence itself is under 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The petitioner had no scope to misunderstand. He, in fact, did not. The way he cross-examined the witnesses of the opposite party, answered the questions put to him in course of his examination under Section 313 Cr. P. C, and examined himself as solitary defence witness, altogether shows unequivocally that he was not at all prejudiced by the way his plea was recorded by the court. The decision in Dilip Kumar Das –Vs- State of W. B.(Supra), Harisankar Pal-Vs- State of W. B.(Supra), Narendra Nath Giri –Vs- State (Supra) and Om Prakash Modi -Vs- State(Supra) are distinguishable both in facts and law with the case in hand. The decision in Dilip Kumar Das –Vs- State of W. B.(Supra), Harisankar Pal-Vs- State of W. B.(Supra), Narendra Nath Giri –Vs- State (Supra) and Om Prakash Modi -Vs- State(Supra) are distinguishable both in facts and law with the case in hand. In Bharat Kumar Gupta ( 2001 SCC (Crime) 1517), the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the Magistrate under Section 251 of Cr. P. C is required to incorporate subsistence of acquisition but not in detail. In Prasanta Kr. Basu -Vs- Nagendra Kr. Anchalia reported in 2007(1) C H N 761, this Court observed that error, omission, irregularity etc. in compliance with Section 251 Cr.P. C can be cured unless failure of justice is occasioned. Referring to the decision of the Division Bench of Patna High Court in A I R 1949 323, and the Division Bench of Assam High Court in A. I. R 1956 Assam 127, Justice S. K. Gupta (As His Lordship then was) observed in Prasanta Kumar Basu (supra) that both the decisions delivered by the Division Bench are to be relied on. The decision of the Division Benches above, made it clear that simply because the subsistence of acquisition was not properly read over and explained to the accused that cannot be a ground for his acquittal unless it shows that it caused prejudice to the accused in defending the case. Mr. Ganguly refers to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Priya Nath Basuri & Ors. reported in (2006) 1 C Cr L R (Cal) 120 and submits that the defect of charge does not cause failure of trial unless prejudice of the accused proved and inadequate examination of the accused by the Court does not vitiate the trial. The principal of law on this issue appears to be well settled. In the ultimate analysis, the issue is prejudice caused to the accused and any failure of justice resulting therefrom. At the cost of reiteration, I would like to state that in the instant case, the petitioner had no reason whatsoever to be prejudiced by the manner in which his plea was recorded by the Trial Court. In the ultimate analysis, the issue is prejudice caused to the accused and any failure of justice resulting therefrom. At the cost of reiteration, I would like to state that in the instant case, the petitioner had no reason whatsoever to be prejudiced by the manner in which his plea was recorded by the Trial Court. The matter was adequately dealt with by the first revisional court and, in my estimate, in second revisional application, this Court should refrain from interfering into findings of the first revisional court by invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when it is not proved that inadequacy in examination under Section 257 Cr. P. C caused prejudice to the petitioner. Next point raised by Mr. Bhattacharjee is that the opposite party was not competent to lodge the petition of complaint under Section 138 of the N. I. Act as he was neither the payee nor the holder of the cheque and not an authorized person as contemplated under Section 142 of the Act. This mixed point of fact and law was not taken by the petitioner either in the Learned Trial Court or in the first Learned revisional court nor even in the petition filed in this revisional court. This point appears to be a completely new one arising for the first time abruptly at the time Mr. Banerjee advances his contention. In course of cross-examination, no question as to competency to file the petition of complaint was put to the opposite party (P. W. 1). The petition of complaint was filed by the opposite party as a partner of the firm and not in his personal capacity, the cheque in question was issued by the petitioner in the name of the firm, the demand notice was sent in the name of the firm. That being the factual aspect, I am afraid when no such specific ground is taken in the Trial Court and in the first revisional court as well as in the second revisional application in this court, the petitioner is precluded from raising such a new point, especially when there is no change in law or change in fact. Therefore, I am not at all inclined to take notice of this new point raised by Mr. Bhattacharjee at this stage of the hearing of this petition. Mr. Therefore, I am not at all inclined to take notice of this new point raised by Mr. Bhattacharjee at this stage of the hearing of this petition. Mr. Bhattacharjee contends that the petitioner was not given any opportunity of being heard while the Learned Trial Court awarded compensation under Section 357(3) of the Code. Both the Learned Trial Court as well as the Learned first revisional court, Mr. Banerjee contends, erred in not following the mandate of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mangilal -Vs- State of M. P. ( 2004 C Cr L R (SC) 188). Mr. Ganguly, on the other hand, submits that under sub-section (4) of Section 357 of the Code, this Court can well pass an order of compensation while giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. In Mangilal -Vs- State of M. P.(Supra), the Apex Court has made it mandatory that while awarding compensation under Section 357 (3) & (4) of the Code, the accused should be given an opportunity of hearing before imposition of compensation and compliance of such natural justice is a mandatory even the statute is silent in this regard. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed ---- “Even if a statute is silent and there are no positive words in the Act or Rules made thereunder there could not nothing wrong in spelling out the need to hear the parties whose rights and interest are likely to be affected, by the orders that may be passed, and making it a requirement to follow a fair procedure before taking a decision, unless the statute provides otherwise. The principles of natural justice must be read into unoccupied interstices of the statute, unless there is clear mandate to the contrary. No form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant’s defence or stand. Even in the absence of a provision in procedural laws, power inheres in every tribunal/Court of a judicial or quasi-judicial character, to adopt modalities necessary to achieve requirements of natural justice and fair play to ensure better and proper discharge of their duties. Procedure is mainly grounded on principles of natural justice irrespective of the extent of its application by express provision in that regard in given situation. It has always been a cherished principle. Procedure is mainly grounded on principles of natural justice irrespective of the extent of its application by express provision in that regard in given situation. It has always been a cherished principle. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice where substantial rights of parties are considerably affected. The application of natural justice becomes presumptive, unless found excluded by express words of statute or necessary intendment. (See Swadesi Cotton Mills etc. etc. V. Union of India etc. etc., AIR 1961 SC 818. Its aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. Principles of natural justice do not supplant the law, but supplement it. These rules operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They are means to an end and not an end in themselves. The principles of natural justice have many facts. Two of them are: notice of the case to be met, and opportunity to explain”. That being the mandate of the Apex Court, I accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee and I am of the opinion that the Learned Trial Court as well as the Learned First Revisional Court were oblivious of this mandate and, as such, failed to comply with the same which they ought to have. This omission is not aberration simplicitor, but violation of natural justice. The unequivocal languages of Section 361 Cr. P. C leaves no room of doubt that the court shall record reason for not dealing with the convict under Section 360 of the Code. Mr. Bhattacharjee submits that the Learned Trial Court as well as the Learned First Revisional Court ought to have followed the mandatory provision laid down in the Code and failure on their part to do so obviously has caused prejudice to the petitioner and violated the rule of natural justice. Mr. Ganguly submits that this Court is not bound to deal with a convict under Section 360 of the Code in an economic offence like 138 of the N. I. Act. The provisions of Section 360 of the Code says --- S.360 – Order to release on probation of good conduct or after admonition. Mr. Ganguly submits that this Court is not bound to deal with a convict under Section 360 of the Code in an economic offence like 138 of the N. I. Act. The provisions of Section 360 of the Code says --- S.360 – Order to release on probation of good conduct or after admonition. --(1) when any person not under twenty-one years of age is convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, or when any person under twenty-one years of age or any woman is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and no previous conviction is proved against the offender, if it appears to the Court before which he is convicted, regard being had to the age, character or antecedents of the offender, and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be released on probation of good conduct, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period( not exceeding three years) as the Court may direct and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour : ……………………………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………. (4) An order under this section may be made by any Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session when exercising its powers of revision. (5) When an order has been made under this section in respect of any offender, the High Court or Court of Session may, on appeal when there is a right of appeal to such Court, or when exercising its powers of revision, set aside such order, and in lieu thereof pass sentence on such offender according to law : Provided that the High court or Court of Session shall not under this sub-section inflict a greater than might have been inflicted by the /court by which the offender was convicted. ………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………… (6) The provisions of sections 121, 124 and 373 shall, so far as may be apply in the case of sureties offered in pursuance of the provisions of this section. ………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………… (6) The provisions of sections 121, 124 and 373 shall, so far as may be apply in the case of sureties offered in pursuance of the provisions of this section. ……………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………… (8) If the Court which convicted the offender, or a Court which could have dealt with the offender in respect of his original offence, is satisfied that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of his recognizance, it may issue a warrant for his apprehension. (9) An offender, when apprehended on any such warrant, shall be brought forthwith before the Court issuing the warrant, and such Court may either remand him in custody until the case is heard or admit him to bail with a sufficient surety conditioned on his appearing for sentence and such Court may after hearing the case, pass sentence. (10) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958(20 of 1958), or the Children Act, 1960(60 of 1960), or any other law for the time being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders. The provision of Section 361 of the Code is set out below: S. 361 Special reasons to be recorded in certain cases. –Wherein any case the Court could have dealt with – (a) an accused person under Section 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958(20 of 1958), or (b) a youthful offender under the Children Act, 1960(60 of 1960), or any other law for the time being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders, but has not done so, it shall record in its judgment the special reasons for not having done so. There cannot be any debate on the point that it is a mandate of law to assign reason when the Court does not deal a convict with under Section 360 of the Code. Whether a court opts or not to opt to deal a convict with under Section 360 of the Code is immaterial. The proposition of Mr. Ganguly that in an economic offence like an offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act, the court is not supposed to extend benefit of provisions of Section 360 of the Code, does not appear to be convincing and appropriate at all. The proposition of Mr. Ganguly that in an economic offence like an offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act, the court is not supposed to extend benefit of provisions of Section 360 of the Code, does not appear to be convincing and appropriate at all. Even in that case also, the court is bound to assign reason, which is mandatory in view of Section 361 of the Code. In Eliamma & Anr-Vs- State of Karnataka reported in 2009(2) R A J 22, the Apex Court while relying on another decision in Chandreshwar Sharma – VS- State of Bihar reported in 2009(9) SCC 245, made it clear that overlooking of the provisions of Section 360 or Section 361 of the Code by the Trial Court being violation of mandatory provision of law, the matter should be remitted to the Trial Court for that purpose. The discussion above leads to the only conclusion that the petitioner has to be given an opportunity to be heard regarding awarding of compensation and that the Learned Trial Court has to look into the matter of extending benefit of Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the petitioner. In the case, the Learned Court finds that no such benefit can be extended, it is duty bound to assign reasons. Mr. Banerjee as well as Mr. Ganguly submit that the order of sentence to the extent that the petitioner is to suffer S. I. for one month be waived inasmuch as the Court has ample power to sentence to pay fine, double the cheque amount. This apart the parties to the case still have business transaction and relation, which they want to continue. In view of the submission above, this case should revisit the Ld. Trial Court for the purpose specified below : The criminal revision is allowed in part. As far as the order of conviction is concerned, the same is affirmed. The order of sentence is modified to the extent that the simple imprisonment for one month be replaced by a fine amount which is deem proper and adequate by the Ld. Trial Court or compensation in addition to what has been granted. The Learned Court should give the petitioner an opportunity to be heard in the matter of fixing the compensation amount. Trial Court or compensation in addition to what has been granted. The Learned Court should give the petitioner an opportunity to be heard in the matter of fixing the compensation amount. The Magistrate is not required to look into the scope of extending benefit under Section 360 of the Code to the petitioner since the order of undergoing simple imprisonment for one month has been set aside and modified as stated earlier. For the limited purpose mentioned above, the case be remitted to the Learned Trial Court with a direction to dispose of the same within a month from the date of the communication of this order. In view of the disposal of the main criminal revision, the subsequent C. R. A. N Application being C. R. A. N 1433 of 2008 is also disposed of accordingly. Criminal Section is directed to supply urgent photostat copy of this order, if applied for, to the parties with usual undertaking.