Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the proposed party in I.A.No.71 of 2003 in O.S.No.82 of 1994 on the file of the Additional Sub Judge, Salem. The suit was filed by the first respondent/Plaintiff claiming damages of Rs.1,25,000/- from the respondents 1 to 4, alleging that, the second respondent had performed family planning operation, namely "Tubectomy Operation" on 21.08.1989 in the Salem Government Hospital, in spite of that she gave birth to a male child on 15.04.1990. The suit was decreed on 05.03.2001. Thereafter, the first respondent initiated execution proceedings in R.E.P.No.214 of 2001 for recovery of the decreed amount. The third respondent filed a memo in the said proceedings stating that the operation was conducted by Dr.Viruthambal, was working at Government Hospital, Gangeyam and residing at Salem. The second respondent filed a counter in the Execution Proceedings stating that Dr.Virudhambal had conducted the operation. Hence, the first respondent filed an application I.A.No.71 of 2003 in O.S.No.82 of 1994 under Order 1 Rule 10 Section 151 C.P.C. to implead the present petitioner as a party to the suit. In the affidavit, it is further stated that the sterilisation register maintained by Salem Government Hospital would also show that the proposed party had performed the "tubectomy operation" and hence she is a necessary party to the suit. 2. The proposed party filed a counter stating that she did not know about the suit which has been filed for relief of compensation and that she is a stranger and in no way connected to the case. The allegation made by the plaintiff has to be proved by documentary evidence, that neither the first respondent nor the second respondent had stated about the proposed party in the suit or after the receipt of summons, that it is a collusion between the plaintiff and the first defendant, that the proposed party is not a necessary party and that only to safeguard the first defendant from E.P., application has been filed. 3. After hearing both sides, the learned Additional Sub Judge allowed the application. He observed that without considering the fact, as to who had conducted the operation, an exparte decree was passed on 05.03.2001. The said order is challenged before this Court in this revision. 4. On 23.09.2010, this Court heard both the learned counsel and passed an order allowed the C.R.P. setting aside the impugned order. He observed that without considering the fact, as to who had conducted the operation, an exparte decree was passed on 05.03.2001. The said order is challenged before this Court in this revision. 4. On 23.09.2010, this Court heard both the learned counsel and passed an order allowed the C.R.P. setting aside the impugned order. It was informed at the time of disposal of CRP that the petition for impleadment was allowed by the trial Court when the exparte decree was in force and the suit was already disposed of. But after dictating the order by allowing the CRP and before signing the order, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent mentioned before this Court that the exparte decree passed in the suit was already set aside by the trial Court as early as on 5.11.2002 and the said fact was known to him only recently and hence both sides may be heard on the issue once again in the change of circumstances. Hence, the matter was posted under the caption "for being mentioned". 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr.P.Gopalan, would contend that on 21.08.1989, the cause of action had arisen and the suit was filed on 07.07.1992, and the petition to implead the party was allowed on 26.12.2002, about 12 years after the filing of suit, that the suit itself was barred by limitation under Article 72 of Limitation Act and the claim for impleading the proposed party is also barred by time and hence the application to implead the party deserves to be dismissed. 6. Repelling the contentions, Mr. P.Jagadeesan, learned counsel for the respondent, would submit that it is evident from the records that the proposed party conducted the operation but the said fact was known to the plaintiff only during the pendency of the execution proceedings, at the instance of first and second defendants in the suit that the plaintiff filed an application for impleadment of the petitioner, and the exparte decree was set aside on 05.11.2002 itself and that the suit is still pending for trial. The impleadment is prayed by the plaintiff in good faith as adumbrated under Section 22 of the Limitation Act and that the suit is not at all barred by time, it is further added. 7. The impleadment is prayed by the plaintiff in good faith as adumbrated under Section 22 of the Limitation Act and that the suit is not at all barred by time, it is further added. 7. The first defendant/second respondent filed an application before the trial Court in I.A.No. 531 of 2001 under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C., to set aside the exparte decree passed against her on 05.03.2001 and the petition was allowed on 29.11.2002.Hence, it is seen that the suit is pending. 8. In support of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placed much reliance upon two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court decided on the basis of "good faith" as contained in proviso to Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act,1963 which reads as follows: "Effect of substituting or addition new plaintiff or defendant:- (1) Where after the institution of a suit, new plaintiff or defendant is substituting or added, the suit shall as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party: Provided that where the Court is satisfied that the omission to include a new plaintiff or defendant was due to a mistake made in good faith it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date" 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in (1993) 4 SCC 41 [KARUPPASWAMY AND OTHERS VS. C.RAMAMURTHY] held that if it is found that the party who seeks to implead some more parties to the suit has to show that the mistake is in good faith. In this case, the suit on a promisory note was filed against the defendant for recovery of a sum of Rs.20,000/-, apparently, on the last date of limitation. The defendant Marriappa Gounder was impleaded as the sole defendant, but he, however, had died about six weeks earlier to the filing of the suit. The summons were returned on the date of first hearing of the suit with the remarks that the defendant was dead. The suit was filed on 05.10.1994. The plaintiff took steps on 07.02.1975 by impleading the son, daughter and widow of the deceased as his heirs and legal representatives as defendants 2 to 4. They filed counter stating that the suit was non est on account of the death of Marriappa Gounder and another application was filed for change of provision. The suit was filed on 05.10.1994. The plaintiff took steps on 07.02.1975 by impleading the son, daughter and widow of the deceased as his heirs and legal representatives as defendants 2 to 4. They filed counter stating that the suit was non est on account of the death of Marriappa Gounder and another application was filed for change of provision. The trial court dismissed both the applications by observing that the suit on the basis of pro note had become barred by time against the Legal Representatives. The matter was taken up before the High Court where the plaintiff emerged successful. The High Court has observed that the plaintiff, had acted in "good faith" and thus in view of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), it was just to direct that the date of filing of the suit against the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased defendant shall date back to the original presentation of the plaint. The Hon'ble Supreme Court confirmed the order passed by the High Court and appeals filed by the Legal Representatives of the deceased were dismissed. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to the earlier decision of the Apex Court in [MUNSHI RAM V. NARSI RAM reported in (1983) 2 SCC 8 : AIR 1983 SC 271 which is to the point. In the instant case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that in the absence of any evidence to show that on the date of suit, the plaintiff knew by any other means that there was any other vendee also, it must be held that the omission to implead the third vendee as a defendant was due to a mistake made in good faith. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: "There is no evidence to show that on the date of the suit the appellant knew by any other means that there was any other vendee who had purchased the land along with respondents 1 and 2. In the written statement which was cleverly drafted, the name of Munni Devi was not mentioned. It merely stated that all the vendees had not been impleaded as defendants. The original sale deed which was with the respondents 1 and 2 was not produced in Court along with the written statement. In the written statement which was cleverly drafted, the name of Munni Devi was not mentioned. It merely stated that all the vendees had not been impleaded as defendants. The original sale deed which was with the respondents 1 and 2 was not produced in Court along with the written statement. The appellant who had looked into the certified copy of the sale deed asserted that the plea that the suit should be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties was untenable as all the persons who were shown as vendees in the certified copy had been impleaded. He had no reason to suspect that there was an error in the certified copy until the original sale deed was read out in the trial court by the counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 on June 14, 1978. It cannot be presumed that the appellant must have known that Munni Devi was also a vendee because the vendor was his father. In fact the appellant had nothing to gain by not impleading Munni Devi also as a defendant when he filed the suit and there could be no motive for doing so. It must, therefore, be held that the omission to implead her as a defendant was due to a mistake. If such mistake is made in good faith, the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act, would be attracted. The meaning of the expression 'good faith' is explained in Section 2(h) of the Act thus: "(h) 'good faith' –nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention;" In view of the above said proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it has to be held that when the Court is dealing with Section 21(1) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 it has to ascertain the "good faith" in the party seeking to implead the third party. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner garnered support from a Division Bench decision reported in A.I.R.1929 Calcutta 591 [GIRIS CHANDRA KIT V. RAM SARAN MAJUMDAR AND OTHERS], wherein it is held as follows: "If a necessary party is left out and is not impleaded till limitation had run out, suit must be considered to be one which is barred by limitation". "If a necessary party is left out and is not impleaded till limitation had run out, the suit must be considered to be one which is barred by limitation: see in this connexion the case of Debi Prasad Sahi v. Dharmajit Narayan Singh (1) where the identical question arose. In my view, therefore, the addition of defendants 5 to 8 on a date subsequent to the expiry of limitation as parties defendants to the suit had not the effect of making the plaintiff's suit which was an incompetent one on the institution thereof a competent one on the date when the parties in question were added. That being so, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation .. " It is quintessence of the learned counsel for the petitioner that as far as the facts of the present case are concerned, even the original suit was filed after prescribed period, against the defendants and after about 12 years, the proposed party is sought to be impleaded and the claim for impleadment of the proposed party is clearly barred by time and hence the petition for impleading the proposed party cannot be allowed. He also relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in 2005 (4) MLJ 4 [MANONMANIAMMAL AND AOTHERS V. DR.DURAIKANNY AND OTHERS], wherein it is observed :- "Under Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act, while adding or substituting a plaintiff or defendant, the suit as regards him shall be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party. Claim for damages ought to have been made within three years from the time of the treatment. Liability is sought to be fixed in 2003. It would not be proper or legal to implead a person as a defendant in a suit against whom the claim has become barred by limitation." 12. In 2008 (3) LW 858 [M.KANDASAMY AND 12 OTHERS VS. Liability is sought to be fixed in 2003. It would not be proper or legal to implead a person as a defendant in a suit against whom the claim has become barred by limitation." 12. In 2008 (3) LW 858 [M.KANDASAMY AND 12 OTHERS VS. A.RAJENDRAN & 23 OTHERS], this Court, after referring to various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court held as under: "there was no order by the Court to the effect that the impleadment shall take effect from the date of suit, the respondent is not entitled to invoke proviso to Section 21 of the Limitation act, If so the suit with regard to these appellants who are subsequently impleaded defendants, the is barred by time" In the instant case, this court has also followed the findings of the proposition in KARUPPASWAMY's case (supra) which will not come to the aid of the first respondent. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon a decision of mine reported in 2011 (1) MWN (CIVIL) 571 [PANCHALAI AMMAL REP. BY HER POWER OF ATTORNEY AGENT, PONNAMMAL VS. RAMAN], wherein it is held that the amendment petition filed in 2009, in which the suit was filed in 1998, is barred by limitation and that the amendment petition filed after a long time has to be dismissed. But, the petitioner could not take recourse to this decision, since there was no scope for invocation of Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act. 13. The learned counsel also relied upon AIR 1995 ALLA HABAD 19 [M/S.C.DOCTOR AND COMPANY LTD., AND ANOTHER V. M/S.BELWAL SPINNING MILLS LTD.,], wherein it has been held that : "a person shall not be impleaded or any amendment adding some defendant or some claim in a plaint which has become barred by limitation". Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court, to the provision in Article 72 of the Limitation Act, which provides as under: ----------------------------------------------------------------------Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 72. For compensation One year When the act or for doing or for omitt- omission taking to do an act alleged place. to be in pursuance of any enactment in force for the time being in the territo-ries to which this Act extends 14. For compensation One year When the act or for doing or for omitt- omission taking to do an act alleged place. to be in pursuance of any enactment in force for the time being in the territo-ries to which this Act extends 14. As contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the suit has to be filed within one year from from the date of alleged omission on the part of the defendant and if the suit is filed beyond one year or when a party is sought to be impleaded after such prescribed period of limitation, the suit ought to have been held to be barred by limitation. He further made a submission that in view of the decisions which he referred to, if the first respondent seeks to implead the proposed party after the expiry of period of limitation of the claim projected by her against the said party, she has to be non-suited for the relief prayed for. 15. Even though, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is acceptable in other respects as regards the matter of impleading the proposed party to the suit, when the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act is considered, the Court is bound to ascertain whether there is any "good faith" on the part of the party who seeks to implead another party. In this case, it is evident from the application in I.A.No.71 of 2003 filed by the first respondent/plaintiff for impleading of the proposed party that only in the course of execution proceedings she came to know that the proposed party had performed tubectomy operation and immediately after knowing the same, without any loss of time she has preferred an application to implead her. There is no evidence nor material to show that the first respondent/plaintiff had knowledge of performance of operation on her earlier to the filing of the memo by the third respondent and the counter filed by the second respondent in the execution proceedings. Following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, in the absence of any material, that the first respondent/plaintiff was aware of the fact that the proposed party conducted surgery on her at an earlier point of time, it has to be necessarily held that the petitioner had acted in "good faith". Following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, in the absence of any material, that the first respondent/plaintiff was aware of the fact that the proposed party conducted surgery on her at an earlier point of time, it has to be necessarily held that the petitioner had acted in "good faith". The necessary corollary would be that the petitioner can very well invoke the proviso under Section 21(1) of the Act and that the impleadment of the proposed party shall take effect from the date of filing of the original suit. In such view of the matter, the order passed by the learned Additional Sub-Judge has to be confirmed. The unsigned order dictated by me on 23.09.2010 is recalled. 15. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed without costs and the order passed by the learned Additional Subordinate Court, Salem in I.A.No.71 of 2003 in O.S.No.82 of 1994 dated 24.02.2004 is confirmed. The impleadment of proposed party shall take effect from the date of filing of the original suit.