JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—This writ petition is directed against the orders dated 29.4.1980 passed by Consolidation Officer, dated 6.9.1980 passed by Settlement Officer (Consolidation) rejecting appeal and dated 31.12.1980 passed by Assistant Director (Consolidation) rejecting revision. 2. Petitioners have also challenged validity of Section 11-C of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act of 1954 (Act No. 5 of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as “Act”) as amended from time to time. 3. This matter was heard and judgment was reserved on 9.12.2010 when the petitioner also filed written submissions. However, since then I was regularly sitting at Allahabad and therefore though the judgment was ready, but could not be delivered due to non sitting at Lucknow. Hence, there is some delay in pronouncement of judgment. 4. The land in dispute is khasra No. 33, 34, 35 and 36 situated at village Ghaila, Pargana, Tehsil and District Lucknow. It is said that in the basic year, these plots were recorded as banjar Khata. When consolidation proceedings commenced in the area, Sri Sartaj Ali, father of respondent No. 3 and other petitioners filed an objection before Assistant Consolidation Officer (respondent No. 1), claiming that they are in possession over the disputed plots from before the abolition of zamindari, and, after abolition of zamindari, they have become Sirdar and subsequently bhumidhar. The plots have wrongly been entered in khata as banjar on abolition of zamindari and Gaon Sabha has no claim or title over it. 5. One Kali Charan also claimed rights over the plots in dispute on the basis of long standing possession. A third objection was filed by Shamshad Ali etc. claiming rights over khasra plot No. 36 alleging that it was their old grove and entry to this effect be allowed to continue in khata. 6. The matter was referred to Consolidation Officer, who framed three issues, one relating to the title of Kali Charan, second relating to title of Shamshad Ali qua plot No. 36 and third relating to title of petitioners in the land in dispute. 7. Petitioners supported their claim filing certified copies of khatauni of 1356 and 1359 fasalis. It is said that in 1356 fasali, the plots in question were recorded in the name of petitioners’ predecessors in interest in khata No. 75/1 with a duration of four years. It also mentions annual rent of Rs. 53 and anna 5. 7. Petitioners supported their claim filing certified copies of khatauni of 1356 and 1359 fasalis. It is said that in 1356 fasali, the plots in question were recorded in the name of petitioners’ predecessors in interest in khata No. 75/1 with a duration of four years. It also mentions annual rent of Rs. 53 and anna 5. In khata khatauni No. 78/1, the plots in dispute were entered in the name of petitioner’s predecessors in interest. Besides, petitioner No. 4 Puttan Ali also deposed his statement which remained unchallenged by respondent No. 4. It is alleged that Kali Charan and Shamshad Ali could not give any credible evidence. The Consolidation Officer summoned original khatauni of 1359 fasali and recorded his observations of manipulation and forgery therein whereafter passed order dated 29.4.1980 rejecting claim of all the parties including petitioners. 8. Petitioners preferred appeal under Section 11 (1) of the Act which was dismissed vide order dated 6.9.1980 and revision under Section 48 of the Act was also dismissed by respondent No. 1 vide order dated 31.12.1980. 9. Counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 4 wherein basically it has supported the orders impugned in the writ petition on the basis of findings and observations made therein. 10. Petitioner No. 1, Abdul Karim, petitioner No. 2, Rafiq Ali, petitioner No. 3, Abdul Qayum, petitioner No. 4, Puttan Ali, petitioner No. 8, Irshad and petitioner No. 11, Hakeem Uddin died during pendency of writ petition and, their legal representatives have been brought on record as petitioners. 11. In rejoinder-affidavit filed by the petitioners, facts stated in the writ petition have been reiterated besides placing on record copy of the statement of Puttan Ali. 12. A supplementary affidavit has been filed by petitioners stating that original record of 1356 fasali and 1359 fasali was summoned. It was directed to be produced on 11.7.1980 but actually not produced on the said date. Thereafter, matter was adjourned and continued so on 25.7.1980, 5.9.1980 and 6.9.1980. Order sheet does not show when the said record was produced. It is contended that Consolidation Officer in stating that he has perused original record has recorded a false statement inasmuch original khatauni was never produced and in any case the petitioners were never confronted thereto. 13. Thereafter, matter was adjourned and continued so on 25.7.1980, 5.9.1980 and 6.9.1980. Order sheet does not show when the said record was produced. It is contended that Consolidation Officer in stating that he has perused original record has recorded a false statement inasmuch original khatauni was never produced and in any case the petitioners were never confronted thereto. 13. Sri Qamar Ahmad, learned counsel for petitioners besides advancing his oral submission, has also filed written statement wherein largely he has reproduced the contents of the writ petition as well as supplementary affidavit. The submission advanced by him broadly are : (a) Section 44 of U.P. Land Revenue Act, reads as under : “44. All entries in the annual register shall, until contrary is proved be presumed to be true.” Section 20 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951) provides the manner in which the question as to the person who is entitled to take or retain possession of the land shall be determined. It provides that the entry in Khasra or Khatauni of the fasali shall determined. It is no doubt true, if the entry is fictitious, spurious or is found to have been made surreptitiously, it would not be an entry in the eyes of law and shall have no legal consequences. In appropriate proceeding in accordance with law such spurious entry may be ignored but otherwise once an entry is in existence of Khasra or Khatauni of fasali year 1356, that would govern the question, who is the person entitled to take or retain possession of the land to which the entry relates. U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1951”) has been placed at entry No. 11 of 9th Schedule of the Constitution and is protected in the manner provided under Article 31B of the Constitution. (b) Order VI Rule 13 C.P.C. talks of a presumption of law stating that neither party needs to plead any fact which law presumes in his favour or as to which burden of proof lies upon the other side unless the same has first been specifically denied. (c) Order VIII Rule 3 C.P.C. requires denial to be specific and not evasive. Rule 5 says that denial if not specific, would mean that the statement is admitted. (c) Order VIII Rule 3 C.P.C. requires denial to be specific and not evasive. Rule 5 says that denial if not specific, would mean that the statement is admitted. (d) The Courts below have failed to consider all these principles of law in recording findings against petitioners ignoring the entry in revenue record alleging the same manipulated. (e) The Principles of Evidence Act have also been ignored. Section 3 defines “Facts in issues”, Section 4 provides what facts “may presume”, what facts “shall presume” and what is “conclusive proof”; Section 5 provides as to what evidence may be given; Section 35 provides for relevancy of entry in public record being in performance of duties; Section 58 deals with the facts which need not be proved; Section 61 deals with proof of contents of documents; Section 63 deals with “secondary evidence”; Section 65 deals with the “cases when secondary evidence relating to documents may be given”. Section 76 deals with “certified copy of public documents”; Section 77 provides for “proof of documents by production of certified copies”; 79 deals with “presumption as to genuineness of certified copies”; and Section 90 deals with “presumption as to documents thirty years old” Besides, Section 81, Part II Chapter VI deals with the “exclusion of oral by documentary evidence, but all these principles of Evidence Act have been ignored by Courts below. (f) The binding precedents and various authorities have been ignored i.e. Hurpurshad and others, Ram Sahoy and Balmokund v. Sheo Dyal and others (1876) 3 Indian Appeals 259; Seth Maniklal Mansukhbai v. Raja Bijoy Singh Dudhoria and others, (1921) PC 69; Bhagwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 214 ; Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 ; Amba Prasad v. Mohaboob Ali Shah, AIR 1965 SC 54 (para 12). (g) This Court repeatedly held that Clause b-(1) and II of Section 20 do not require proof of actual possession in 1356 fasali and require mere entry of a person named as ‘occupant’ in the khasra or khatauni of 1356 fasali. Reliance is placed on Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Khalil-ul-Rahman, AIR 1961 SC 143 ; Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukh Ram, AIR 1964 All 498 ; Nanak Chand v. Board of Revenue, 1955 All LJ 408; L. Bhal Singh v. Bhop and another, 1963 (61) ALJ 288. Reliance is placed on Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Khalil-ul-Rahman, AIR 1961 SC 143 ; Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukh Ram, AIR 1964 All 498 ; Nanak Chand v. Board of Revenue, 1955 All LJ 408; L. Bhal Singh v. Bhop and another, 1963 (61) ALJ 288. (h) Finding with respect to manipulation cannot be recorded and could not have been treated to be final unless expert opinion is obtained and parties are given opportunity. Reliance is placed on Fakhruddin v. State of M.P., AIR 1967 SC 1326 (para 8); Ram Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 381 (page 388); Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529 ; State of Gujarat v. Vinaya Chandra Chhota Lal Pathi, AIR 1967 SC 778 ; Rudra Gouda Venkangouda v. Basajgouda Danappagouda, AIR 1938 Bom. 257; State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram, AIR 1979 SC 14 (Para 29-30); Sodhi Transport Co., M/s. v. State of U.P., AIR 1986 SC 1099 ; Pt. Dukharam Nath Zutshi v. Messrs. Commercial Credit Corporation Ltd., AIR 1940 Oudh 35; Kedar and another v. Emperor, AIR 1944 All 94; Brij Bhushan Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1946 PC 38; Modi Nathubhai Motilal v. Chhotubhai Manibhai Desai, AIR 1962 Guj 68 ; Sita Ram v. State, AIR 1968 All 207 (para 35). (i) Relying on Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2451 , it is contended that effect of a legal document cannot be brushed aside by the consolidation authorities unless declaration to this effect is made by a Court of law. 14. Assailing vires of Section 11-C, Sri Ahmad contended that consolidation authorities cannot act as a State representative since it would make provision arbitrary and illegal rendering adjudicatory authorities indulged in their own cause and therefore illegal and arbitrary being in violation of basic principles of judicial review and independent judiciary. In this regard, reliance is placed on Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 ; Cantonment Board v. Taramani Devi, 1992 (2) Suppl. SCC 501; Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425 ; Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and others v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another, AIR 1959 SC 308 (para 29-31); Vandana Banerjee v. Chandra Singh and others, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 133 and Fakruddin v. Principal, Consolidation Training Institute and others, 1995 (4) SCC 538. SCC 501; Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425 ; Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and others v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another, AIR 1959 SC 308 (para 29-31); Vandana Banerjee v. Chandra Singh and others, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 133 and Fakruddin v. Principal, Consolidation Training Institute and others, 1995 (4) SCC 538. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents per contra supports the impugned orders for the reasons stated therein and contended that no interference is called for. The learned Standing Counsel vehemently contended that Consolidation Officer found manipulations etc. in 1359 Fasli revenue record and has recorded a finding of fact which warrants no interference. 16. The arguments are two fold. One, pure legal; involving validity of Section 11-C of the Act. Another deals with merits of the matter in the light of provisions, procedural in nature, under Code of Civil Procedure and Evidence Act. 17. I propose to consider the legal issue first, whether Section 11-C is ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution. 18. Section 11-C was inserted by U.P. Act No. 34 of 1974 and reads as under: “11-C. In the course of hearing of an objection under Section 9-A or an appeal under Section 11 or in proceedings under Section 48, the Consolidation Officer, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) or the Director of Consolidation, as the case may be, may direct that any land which vests in the State Government or the Gaon Sabha or any other local body or authority may be recorded in its name, even through no objection, appeal or revision has been filed by such Government, Gaon Sabha, body or authority.” 19. A perusal of Section 11-C would show that in effect it is an exception to Section 11-A. Section 9 talks of the steps to be observed after preparation of record and statement mentioned in Section 8 and 8-A. Till the stage of Section 8-A, the proceeding and the action of consolidation authorities, like revision of village map under Section -7, determination of valuations and shares in joint holdings, revision of field book and current annual register, chakbandi in Khasra 1, CH Form 2-A etc. under Section 8, preparation of statement of principle under Section 8-A of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder in this regard are all proceedings unilateral and non judicial. These proceedings are not final in the eyes of law. under Section 8, preparation of statement of principle under Section 8-A of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder in this regard are all proceedings unilateral and non judicial. These proceedings are not final in the eyes of law. These are executive proceedings by concerned authorities, to give a shape to the consolidation proceedings. From the stage of Section 9, proceedings partake the nature of judicial or quasi judicial. The principles of natural justice is to be complied with. Notice is issued to concerned persons and opportunity of hearing has to be afforded. 20. However, before sending notice to the tenure holders, the Assistant Consolidation Officer can make correction of clerical errors/ mistakes, if any, in the record prepared under Section 8 and 8-A of the Act. Sub-section 2 of Section 9 entitles a person to whom notice under Sub-section 1 has been sent or any other person, interested to file objection before the Consolidation Officer disputing the correction or nature of entry in the record of, in the extract furnished therefrom or in the statement of principles or the need for partition. Gaon Sabha or the State Government are also entitled to file their objections under Section 9 of the Act. 21. In Gangotri v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1972 UPRC 285, this Court took a view that Gaon Sabha if has not filed objections under Section 9, the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot hold that the property has vested in Gaon Sabha and any view taken otherwise would be manifestly erroneous and illegal. The said view was followed and taken in Gram Sabha Kudra v. Noor Mohd. Khan, 1974 RD 350. This decision was approved later on by a Full Bench in Amir Hussain v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 RD 204 while overruling Gram Sabha Kudra v. Noor Mohd. Khan (supra). 22. In another matter, i.e., Gaon Sabha Kaneri v. Sanman Singh, 1973 RD 411, a Division Bench of this Court took a view, that, where both the claimants had failed to prove their title, necessary consequence would be that the land would have vested in State and Gaon Sabha. 23. Khan (supra). 22. In another matter, i.e., Gaon Sabha Kaneri v. Sanman Singh, 1973 RD 411, a Division Bench of this Court took a view, that, where both the claimants had failed to prove their title, necessary consequence would be that the land would have vested in State and Gaon Sabha. 23. The amendment made in the Act by inserting Section 11-C in effect gave recognition to the view taken in Gaon Sabha Kaneri (Supra) and the effect is that despite there being no objection filed by State Government or Gaon Sabha or local authority under Section 9 of the Act, still their claim or title will not be barred by Section 11-A of the Act. Where the Consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer (Consolidation) or Director of Consolidation find so expedient, they may direct that any land vest in State Government or Gaon Sabha or any other local authority, if they form this opinion during the course of hearing of an objection under Section 9-A or an appeal under Section 11 or a proceeding under Section 48 of the Act,. Even if no objection was filed by the State Government or Gaon Sabha or local authority etc. 24. The Full Bench in Amir Hussain (supra) took exactly the above view as it observed : “But, in a case where in proceedings under Section 9, the consolidator authorities reached at the conclusion that both the claimants had failed to prove their title, the necessary consequence of the finding was that the land had to be recognised as having vested in the State and in the Gaon Sabha. ...To require a Gaon Sabha to file a claim at the commencement of the consolidation proceedings would be placing an impossible burden upon the Gaon Sabha because at that stage the Gaon Sabha could not possibly be in a position to know that the claim of the contending parties would be negatived and the land would be deemed to have vested in the State. In our opinion, the proper course in these cases is that if the authorities find that both the parties have failed to prove their title, and that in law the land has vested in the State under the Rule of escheat, they, in order to give effect to their findings, should direct the land to be recorded in the name of the Gaon Sabha.” 25. Apparently, Section 11-C appeared to be based on principle of escheat and bona vacantia. The doctrine of bona vacantia covers a situation where there was no owner of the property and escheat literally means ‘to revert to the State’. These two principles have been considered by a Full Bench of this Court in majority judgment of myself in Sunni Cental Waqf Board and others v. Gopal Singh Visharad, 2010 ADJ 2834 (Special F.B.) (paragraphs 4439 to 4452) reads as under : “4439. The learned counsel for the parties in this aspect referred to the doctrine of Escheat/bona vacantia. We find that the right of the King to take property by escheat or as bona vacantia was recognized by common law of England. Escheat property was the lord’s right of re-entry on real property held by a tenant dying intestate without lawful heirs. It was an incident, of feudal tenure and based on the want of a tenant to perform the feudal services. On the tenant dying intestate without leaving any lawful heirs, his estate came to an end and the lord was in by his own right and not by way of succession or inheritance from the tenant to re-enter the real property as owner. In most of the cases the land escheated to the Crown as the lord paramount, in view of the gradual elimination of intermediate or mesne lords since 1290 AD. The Crown takes as bona vacantia goods in which no one else can claim property. In Dyke v. Walford 5 Moore, PC 434 = 496-13 ER 557 (580) it was said “it is the right of the Crown to bona vacantia to property which has no other owner.” The right of the Crown to take as bona vacantia extends to personal property of every kind. Giving a notice at this stage that the escheat of real property of an intestate dying without heirs was abolished in 1925 and the Crown cannot take its property as bona vacantia. The principle of acquisition of property by escheat i.e right of the Government to take on property by escheat or bona vacantia for want of a rightful owner was enforced in the Indian territory during the period of East India Company by virtue of statute 16 and 17 Victoriae, C. 95, Section 27. 4440. The principle of acquisition of property by escheat i.e right of the Government to take on property by escheat or bona vacantia for want of a rightful owner was enforced in the Indian territory during the period of East India Company by virtue of statute 16 and 17 Victoriae, C. 95, Section 27. 4440. We may recollect having gone through the history that several estates were taken over by British Company by applying the doctrine of lapse like Jhansi which was another kind of the above two principles. The above provisions had continued by virtue of Section 54 of Government of India Act, 1858, Section 20(3)(iii) of Government of India Act, 1915 and Section 174 of the Government of India Act, 1935. After the enactment of the Constitution of independent India, Article 296 now provides : “Subject as hereinafter provided, any property in the territory of India which, if this Constitution had not come into operation, would have accrued to His Majesty or, as the case may be, to the Ruler of an Indian State by escheat or lapse, or as bona vacantia for want of a rightful owner, shall if it is property situate in a State, vest in such State, and shall, in any other case, vest in the Union.” 4441. The Apex Court in Pierce Leslie and Co. Ltd. (supra) has considered the above principles in the context of sovereign India as it stands under its constitution after independence and has observed that “in this country the Government takes by escheat immoveable as well as moveable property for want of an heir or successor. In this country escheat is not based on artificial Rules of common law and is not an incident of feudal tenure. It is an incident of sovereignty and rests on the principle of ultimate ownership by the State of all property within its jurisdiction.” 4442. The Apex Court placed reliance on Collector of Masulipatam v. C. Vencata Narainapah, 8 MIA 500, 525; Ranee Sonet Kowar v. Mirza Himmut Bahadoor, (2) LR 3 IA 92, 101; Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Bombay, (1958) SCR 1122, 1146; Legal Remembrancer v. Corporation of Calcutta, (1967) 2 SCR 170 , 204. 4443. The Apex Court placed reliance on Collector of Masulipatam v. C. Vencata Narainapah, 8 MIA 500, 525; Ranee Sonet Kowar v. Mirza Himmut Bahadoor, (2) LR 3 IA 92, 101; Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Bombay, (1958) SCR 1122, 1146; Legal Remembrancer v. Corporation of Calcutta, (1967) 2 SCR 170 , 204. 4443. The Judicial Committee in Cook v. Sprigg, 1899 AC 572 discussing what is an act of state, observed : The taking possession by Her Majesty, whether by cession or by any other means by which sovereignty can be acquired, was an act of State.” 4444. This decision has been followed in Raja Rajinder Chand v. Mst. Sukhi and others, AIR 1957 SC 286 . 4445. In Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State, AIR 1924 PC 216, Lord Dunedin said : “When a territory is acquired by a sovereign State for the first time, that is an act of State. It matters not how the acquisition has been brought about. It may be by conquest, it may be by cession following on treaty, it may be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognised ruler. In all cases the result is the same. Any inhabitant of the territory can make good in the municipal Courts established by the new sovereign only such rights as that sovereign has, through his officers, recognised. Such rights as he had under the Rule of predecessors avail him nothing.” 4446. In Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, AIR 1958 SC 816 , the Court said : “The expression ‘act of State’ is, it is scarcely necessary to say, not limited to hostile action between rulers resulting in the occupation of territories. It includes all acquisitions of territory by a sovereign State for the first time, whether it be by conquest or cession.” 4447. In Promod Chandra Deb v. State of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1288 , the Court said, “ ‘Act of State’ is the taking over of sovereign powers by a State in respect of territory which was not till then a part of its territory, either by conquest, treaty or cession, or otherwise.” 4448. In Promod Chandra Deb v. State of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1288 , the Court said, “ ‘Act of State’ is the taking over of sovereign powers by a State in respect of territory which was not till then a part of its territory, either by conquest, treaty or cession, or otherwise.” 4448. To the same effect was the view taken by the Constitution Bench in Amarsarjit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1305 in para 12 as under: “It is settled law that conquest is not the only mode by which one State can acquire sovereignty over the territories belonging to another State, and that the same result can be achieved in any other mode which has the effect of establishing its sovereignty.” 4449. In Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 504 , in para 40, the Court said : “The status of a person must be either that of a sovereign or a subject. There is no tertium quid. The law does not recognise an intermediate status of a person being partly a sovereign and partly a subject and when once it is admitted that the Bhomicharas had acknowledged the sovereignty of Jodhpur their status can only be that of a subject. A subject might occupy an exalted position and enjoy special privileges, but he is none the less a subject ...” 4450. In State of Rajasthan and others v. Sajjanlal Panjawat and others, AIR 1975 SC 706 it was held that the Rules of the erstwhile Indian States exercised sovereign powers,legislative, executive and judicial. Their firmans were laws which could not be challenged prior to the Constitution. The Court relied on its earlier two decisions in Director of Endowments, Govt. of Hyderabad v. Akram Ali, AIR 1956 SC 60 and Sarwarlal v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1960 SC 862 . 4451. In Promod Chandra Deb v. State of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1288 “act of the State” was explained in the following words : “an “act of State” may be the taking over of sovereign powers either by conquest or by treaty or by cession or otherwise. 4451. In Promod Chandra Deb v. State of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1288 “act of the State” was explained in the following words : “an “act of State” may be the taking over of sovereign powers either by conquest or by treaty or by cession or otherwise. It may have happened on a particular date by a public declaration or proclamation, or it may have been the result of a historical process spread over many years, and sovereign powers including the right to legislate in that territory and to administer it may be acquired without the territory itself merging in the new State.” 4452. This decision has been followed later on in Biswambhar Singh and another v. The State of Orissa and others, 1964(1) SCJ 364.” 26. Thus the Rule of escheat denotes falling of an estate into the general property of the State because the owner or the tenant has died inter state without lawful heirs to take his estate by succession or because of some disability to take or hold the property imposed by law. 27. In Collector of Massulipatnam v. Cavali Venata Narrainapeli, 8 MIR 500 the Privy Council observed : “There can be, legally speaking, no unowned property, the law of escheat intervenes and prevails, and is adopted generally in all Courts of the Country alike. Private ownership not existing, the State must be owner as ultimate Lord.” 28. In Amir Hussain (supra), the Court said : “All important systems of Law provide for escheat to the Crown or Government of the property of a deceased person in the absence or failure of heirs.” 29. In other words the preferable right of the State to an estate left vacant, and without there being anyone in existence able to make claim thereto. 30. Recently the principle of escheat has been considered and explained in Sheonand and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2000 RD 213. 31. Thus the basic purpose of the aforesaid provision besides recognising the Rule of escheat is also that the land of the State or the statutory bodies be not usurped illegally by individuals for any procedural or otherwise lapse on the part of the State Authorities since the individuals can take care of their own property in more diligence manner which is not so in respect to public property, may be due to lack of accountability or otherwise. 32. 32. Construing Section 11-C of the Act, Apex Court in Sheo Nand v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, JT 2000 (2) SC 332 held that it is statutory duty of all the authorities functioning under the Act to give effect to the provisions of Section 11-C to record that property has vested in Gaon Sabha even if no claim was filed by Gaon Sabha nor any petition was filed by it if the conditions prescribed therefore are satisfied. Where on determination of the rights of claimants before the consolidation authorities, it is found that none of the claimants could be held tenure holder of the property in question, which admittedly belong to a third person, who was not heard for more than seven years and, therefore treated as having died as civil death leaving no heir, the property would vest in Gaon Sabha. Similarly, in respect to the plots which are recorded as pond or pasture land, a similar statutory obligation cast on the consolidation authorities to protect the interest of the Gaon Sabha vide Section 11-C. 33. In Ram Murat v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2000 RD 531, it was held that the authorities while acting under Section 11-C do not involve themselves in the lis but simply discharge statutory functions and suppose to pass orders in accordance with law. 34. Merely for the reason that the consolidation authorities though discharge statutory functions are holders of civil post appointed by State Government, it cannot be said that here is a case where a judge is deciding a matter in which he himself is a party. This, in my view, is not a correct notion on the part of petitioners so as to challenge the validity of Section 11-C on the ground that it amounts to permitting a person to be a judge in his own cause. 35. Before appreciating this concept, one can visualize that in our Country, it is the written Constitution which holds the field, govern every aspect of the Society and the people residing therein. There is an inbuilt check and balance system in the Constitution since ultimate authority would comes down from a common point. At the Central level, the President of India holds the key while in State, except of certain other aspects it is the Governor. The Indian Constitution apparently has recognized three main wings, namely, Legislature, Executive and Judicial. There is an inbuilt check and balance system in the Constitution since ultimate authority would comes down from a common point. At the Central level, the President of India holds the key while in State, except of certain other aspects it is the Governor. The Indian Constitution apparently has recognized three main wings, namely, Legislature, Executive and Judicial. The three wings in one sense are independent but simultaneously on some aspects they may be, on one or the other focal points, overlap each other. Broadly, the Legislature frames law and lay down policy, Executive gives effect to it and the Judiciary interprets the law and adjudicate correctness of execution by Executive. All the wings are independent but in one or the other sense, it may be said that there is some overlapping, for example, the Executive derives its power to hold office from the central point, namely President or Governor, as the case may be and the initial orders of appointment are also issued by the President or Governor, as the case may be. That is so in respect to Judiciary also, but then once the initial exercise completed, the holders of the office are entitled to exercise their power independently without being influenced by any other wing in the matter. 36. The Consolidation authorities, therefore, merely for the reason that they are appointees of State Government and holders of Civil Post, it does not mean that while hearing cases wherein the Gaon Sabha or the State Government or any other local body has filed its objection, or where no such objection is filed, that would amount to hearing a matter in which they themselves are parties. 37. On a specific query, learned counsel for petitioners could not dispute that if an objection is filed by Gaon Sabha or the State Government or any other local body under Section 9 of the Act, the matter can be and shall be heard by the Consolidation authorities and he has no objection to such procedure. If that be so, Section 11-C in effect recognizes a situation where even if no objection has been filed by State Government or the Gaon Sabha etc. yet the consolidation authorities if come to the conclusion that the claimants have no right to the tenure concerned and land has vested in Gaon Sabha or the State Government or the local body etc. yet the consolidation authorities if come to the conclusion that the claimants have no right to the tenure concerned and land has vested in Gaon Sabha or the State Government or the local body etc. and then they have to make a formal declaration to that effect. Only this is the scope of Section 11-C. It takes away nobody’s rights but makes it obligatory upon consolidation authorities to keep in mind the principles of escheat and bona vacantia and whenever find that claimants are not entitled to the tenure holding they would declare the land having vested in the Government or Gaon Sabha or local body etc. instead of leaving the matter enlarge as that may create further complications and employ more litigations. It is in this context if we read Section 11-C, find no occasion of any infirmity therein, what to talk of ultra vires of the Constitution. Despite repeated query, learned counsel for petitioners could not point out which part of the constitution would be attracted to hold Section 11-C ultra vires. He simply contended that no one can be Judge in his own cause which is a well recognized principle of administrative law. The principles of natural justices are now integrally embodied into the process of judicial review and, therefore, the judicial review being a basic feature of Constitution, Section 11-C going contrary thereto is violative of basic features of the Constitution. The submission is not only misconceived but is wholly unfounded. The doctrine of basic feature of the Constitution are not to be employed for judging validity of statutory provisions. An Act made by Parliament or State legislature can be challenged on the ground of legislative competence which may be regarding relevant entry in Schedule VII of the Constitution, or any other provision in the Constitution is infringed. Other then these principles, a Parliamentary or Provincial Legislature cannot be held ultra vires of something which otherwise has no application to it. 38. Other then these principles, a Parliamentary or Provincial Legislature cannot be held ultra vires of something which otherwise has no application to it. 38. The doctrine of basic feature of the Constitution is applicable to consider validity of an amendment made in the Constitution itself for the reason that the Parliament has wide powers of amendment of Constitution but the only restriction which has been recognized by the majority view of Apex Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. The State of Kerala and others, AIR 1973 SC 1461 is that amending power of the Constitution does not go to the extent that it can change the basic features of the Constitution. This doctrine is totally inapplicable and has nothing to do with the legislative enactments made by the Parliament or the State legislature in furtherance of principal legislative function. 39. Though none of the authorities cited by petitioners’ counsel on the question of ultra vires of Section 11-C has any application at all but to demonstrate the same, I may refer those authorities in brief. 40. In Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi (supra) the question was whether the Tribunal constituted by Hon’ble Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court to enquire into alleged misconduct of Manak Lal was improperly constituted. One of the members of Tribunal was Dr. Chhangani, who in fact was made Chairman of the Tribunal. He had filed earlier his Vakalat-nama on behalf of Dr. Prem Chand in a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and has argued the case on his behalf. It was contended that Sri Chhangani appeared in criminal proceedings for the opponent hence was disqualified for acting as Member of the President on the principle of bias. The Apex Court recognised the principle of bias observing that every Member of a Tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially; and it is of essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the Tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the Tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. Justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. The Court referred to observations of Viscount Cave L. C. in Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices, (1926) AC 586, at page 590 “this Rule has been asserted not only in the case of Courts of Justices and other judicial tribunals but in the case of authorities which, though in no sense to be called Courts, have to act as judges of the rights of other”. 41. The Court also pointed out the distinction between pecuniary interest and prejudice attracted to the Members of Tribunal in order to judge a case alleging bias of the Members. The pecuniary interest, however small it may be in a subject-matter of the proceedings, would wholly disqualify a member from acting as a judge. But where pecuniary interest is not attributed but instead a bias is suggested, it often becomes necessary to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming possibility of a bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigant or the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of administration of justice. The Court said it would always be a question of fact to be decided in each case. “The principle”, says Halsbury, “nemo debet esse judex in causa propria sua” precludes a justice, who is interested in the subject-matter of a dispute, from acting as a justice therein. The principle regarding bias recognized by the Apex Court admits no exception but that, in my view, would not help the petitioners for judging the vires of a statute. Before the Apex Court also, the validity of statutory provision was not under challenge but it is the action taken pursuant to a statutory provision which was challenged being not consistent with the spirit of the statute. The judgment, therefore, has no application on the question it has been relied by Sri Ahmad. 42. Next is Gullapalli Nageswara Rao (supra). Here also it was the case of bias. The judgment, therefore, has no application on the question it has been relied by Sri Ahmad. 42. Next is Gullapalli Nageswara Rao (supra). Here also it was the case of bias. It would be interesting to note that while following the principle of natural justice, the Court clearly observed that the same has to be considered in the light of statutory provisions since the principle of administrative law cannot override the specific provisions of the statute. Referring to its earlier decision in New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. v. New Swarna Transport Co. Ltd., AIR 1957 SC 232 , the Apex Court observed, “... the Rules of natural justice vary with varying constitutions of statutory bodies, and the Rules prescribed by the legislature under which they have to act, and the question whether in a particular case they have been contravened must be judged not by any preconceived notion of what they may be but in the light of the provisions of the relevant Act.” There also it was not a case of judging vires of any statutory provision on the anvil of the doctrine of bias but the Court considered the question of bias in the performance of the authorities concerned hearing a matter, as to, whether there was any element of bias in the said authority in hearing the case or not. It is in this context the Apex Court in para 30 of the judgment said : “The aforesaid decisions accept the fundamental principle of natural justice that in the case of quasi-judicial proceedings, the authority empowered to decide the dispute between opposing parties must be one without bias towards one side or other in the dispute. It is also a matter fundamental importance that a person interested in one party or the other should not, even formally, take part in the proceedings though in fact he does not influence the mind of the person, who finally decides the case. This is on the principle that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." 43. The Apex Court, however, recognized the implications of statutory provisions and the obligations of the judicial or quasi judicial body to observe statutory provisions. It is evident from what is said in para 31 of the judgment, which reads as under: “31. The Apex Court, however, recognized the implications of statutory provisions and the obligations of the judicial or quasi judicial body to observe statutory provisions. It is evident from what is said in para 31 of the judgment, which reads as under: “31. The second objection is that while the Act and the Rules framed thereunder impose a duty on the State Government to give a personal hearing, the procedure prescribed by the Rules impose a duty on the Secretary to hear and the Chief Minister to decide. This divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing. Personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear-up his doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned argument to accept his point of view. If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality. We therefore hold that the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basic principle of judicial procedure. 44. This judgment, therefore, also lend no credence to the petitioners. 45. Next is the famous decision of Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (supra). Here the American concept of due process to some extent was entrusted in the Indian Constitutional scheme also for the first time. Therein also the Apex Court with approval quoted the following passage from A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 (page 156) : “The aim of the Rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These Rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it ...” 46. The Court also quoted with approval the observations made in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, AIR 1969 SC 198 observing, “the Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular Rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the Constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. What particular Rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the Constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principles of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that Rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case.” 47. The Court also considered the validity of Section 10 (3) (c) of Passport Act, 1967 and in that context observed that the direct and immediate effect have to be considered and not a pure and simple hypothetical one. The Court termed it as the “doctrine of intended and real effect”. It is the substance and the practical result of the act of the State that should be considered rather than its purely legal aspect and the correct approach in such cases should be to enquire as to what in substance is the loss or injury caused to the citizen and not merely what manner and method has been adopted by the State in placing the restriction. While considering question of validity of Section 10 (3) (c) with reference to Article 19 (1) (a) and (g), the Apex Court in para 81 observed : “We cannot, therefore, accept the theory that a peripheral or concomitant right which facilitates the exercise of a named fundamental right or gives it meaning and substance or makes its exercise effective, is itself a guaranteed right included within the named fundamental right. This much is clear as a matter of plain construction, but apart from that, there is a decision of this Court which clearly and in so many terms supports this conclusion.” 48. From the entire judgment, I do not find anything to support the contention of learned counsel for petitioner regarding his challenge to vires of Section 11-C and this judgment does not help him at all. 49. In Cantonment Board v. Taramani Devi (supra), a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court observed that Audi alteram partem is a part of Article 14 of the Constitution. 49. In Cantonment Board v. Taramani Devi (supra), a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court observed that Audi alteram partem is a part of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Apex Court was considering the question of validity of an executive order having adverse effect upon the respondents and said that such an executive order should be passed consistent with principles of natural justice i.e. after giving opportunity to the persons likely to be affected. The Court relied on its earlier decision in State of Orissa v. Beenapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 observing that Article 14 has been expanded to the administrative orders holding that no order shall be passed at the back of a person, prejudicial in nature to him, when it entails civil consequences. 50. In Vandana Banerjee v. Chandra Singh (supra) counsel for one party was elevated to the Bench. He heard on judicial side a case of a party to whom he had represented. The Court held that he ought not to have decided the case, particularly, when he had appeared in the same proceeding before the Court below. The Court observed : “The learned Single Judge who dealt with the matter should not have dealt with it having regard to the fact that he had appeared in the said proceedings on behalf of the Management while he was at the Bar. The Management was supporting the case of Respondent 1 in the said proceedings. The Management did not succeed. Hence the contention that the learned Judge who had argued the matter supporting the case of respondent No. 1 should not have heard the case and done exactly what he had canvassed for. The dicta that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done, required him to abstain from taking up the matter. We agree.” 51. Fakruddin v. Principal, Consolidation Training Institute (supra), was a case similar to Vandana Banerjee (supra) and the Court held that the Judge who had already appeared in the proceeding for a party should not have heard such matter. 52. None of these judgments, in my view, help the petitioner. 53. In view of above discussion, I do not find any substance in the submission that Section 11-C of the Act is ultra vires. The issue is decided accordingly against the petitioners. 54. Now I come to the second question. 52. None of these judgments, in my view, help the petitioner. 53. In view of above discussion, I do not find any substance in the submission that Section 11-C of the Act is ultra vires. The issue is decided accordingly against the petitioners. 54. Now I come to the second question. The facts as evident from the record are that the petitioners placed on record revenue entry of 1356 and 1359 fasali in which their names find mention. It has been discredited and disbelieved by the Consolidation authorities by observing that the entries are forged and fictitious inasmuch it contains some manipulation and forgery etc. 55. First question is the legal status of entry made in 1356 fasali. 56. In Nanak Chand v. Board of Revenue (supra), this Court held, “It seems to us that clauses (b) (i) and (b) (ii) of Section 20 do not require the proof of actual possession in the year 1356 F. What they require merely is the entry of a persons’ name as an occupant in the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356 F. The words of the Section are clear.” 57. The Court further said : The words are not ‘every person who was an occupant in 1356 F :’ not are the words “every person who was recorded as an occupant in the year 1356F. and who was also in possession in the year.’ There is no warrant for introducing words in the Section which are not there. This conclusion is reinforced by what is stated in Explanation II. 58. In L. Bhal Singh (supra), the Division Bench expressed its full agreement with the view taken in Nanak Chand (surpa). The above passage has been affirmed by a Full Bench in Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukh Ram (supra). 59. Apex Court had occasion to consider Section 20 (b) in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Khalil-ul-Rahman, AIR 1961 SC 143 but there the real question was what is meaning of the word ‘occupant’ in Section 20 (b) of Act, 1951. In para 7 of the judgment, the Court observed as under : “The word ‘occupant’ used in this part of the Act is not a term of art and has not been defined anywhere in the Act or in the U.P. Tenancy Act or in the Land Revenue Act. In para 7 of the judgment, the Court observed as under : “The word ‘occupant’ used in this part of the Act is not a term of art and has not been defined anywhere in the Act or in the U.P. Tenancy Act or in the Land Revenue Act. It must therefore be given its ordinary dictionary meaning which is “a person in occupation”. In order therefore that the Company can take the benefit of S. 20 it should have been recorded in occupation of the Land in dispute in the year 1356F. The only limitation that has been placed by judicial decisions on this meaning of the word “occupant” is that the person should be in occupation in his own right and not on behalf of someone else. (See Swami Prasad v. Board of Revenue, U.P. 1960 All LF 241 (FB). So long therefore a person has been in occupation in the relevant year in his own right (and not on behalf of some else) he will be entitled to the rights conferred under S. 20 of the Act.” 60. The decision in Nanak Chand (surpa) was relied and considered by the Court but the Court did not express any view on the correctness of the decision observing that the issue engaging attention of the Apex Court was not involved in Nanak Chand (supra). The Court, however, held that Section 20 (b) (i) only speaks of a person being recorded as occupant and there is nothing in that Section as to the nature of occupant, namely, whether it is the person on behalf of person recorded or on behalf of someone else. That is the matter which the Court said must always be decided on other evidence for the entry does not contemplate the nature of possession in the sense of its being on behalf of person recorded or on behalf of some else. 61. Again Section 20 (b) (i) came to be considered by the Apex Court in Amba Prasad v. Mohaboob Ali Shah, AIR 1965 SC 54 , and the Court expressed the scheme of the Section as under : “(16) The scheme of the Section may now be noticed. 61. Again Section 20 (b) (i) came to be considered by the Apex Court in Amba Prasad v. Mohaboob Ali Shah, AIR 1965 SC 54 , and the Court expressed the scheme of the Section as under : “(16) The scheme of the Section may now be noticed. The Section, speaking generally, says that certain persons “recorded” as “occupants” of lands (other than grove lands or lands to which Section 16 applies) shall be known as adhivasis and shall be entitled to retain or to regain possession of them, after the date of vesting which was July 1, 1952. Such persons do not include an intermediary (Explanation IV). Such persons must be recorded as occupants in the khasra or khatauni for 1356F (1-7-48 to 30-6-49). If such a person is in possession be continues in possession. If he is evicted after June 30, 1948 he is to be put back in possession notwithistanding anything in any order or decree. By fiction such persons are deemed to be entitled to regain possession (Explanation I). The emphasis has been laid on the record of khasra or khatauni of 1356F and June 30, 1948 is the datum line. The importance of an entry in these two documents is further apparent from explanations II and III. Under the former, if the entry is corrected before the date of vesting (1-7-52), the corrected entry is to prevail and under the latter the entry is deemed to be corrected (even though not actually corrected) if an order or decree of a competent Court ordering the correction had been made before the date of vesting and the order or decree had become final. There are thus two date lines. They are June 30, 1948 and July 1, 1952, and the title to possession as adhivasi depends on the entries in the khasra or khatauni for the year 1356F.” 62. Then it proceeded to consider that to attract Section 20 (b) (i) what will be the meaning of words ‘occupant’ and ‘recorded’ and in para 17 of the judgment held as under : “(17) Before we proceed to decide whether the answering respondents satisfy the above tests we must consider what is meant by the terms ‘occupant’ and ‘recorded’. The word ‘occupant’ is not defined in the Act. The word ‘occupant’ is not defined in the Act. Since khasra records possession and enjoyment the word ‘occupant’ must mean a person holding the land in possession or actual enjoyment. The khasra, however, may mention the proprietor, the tenant, the sub-tenant and other person in actual possession, as the case may be. If by occupant is meant the person in actual possession it is clear that between a proprietor and a tenant the tenant, and between a tenant and the sub-tenant the latter and between him and person recorded in the remarks column as “Dawedar qabiz” the dawedar qabiz are the occupants. This is the only logical way to interpret the Section which does away with all intermediaries. If rights are not to be determined except in the manner laid down by the Section, the entries must be construed as explained by the four explanations. Once we find out the right person in the light of the explanations, that person continues as an adhivasi after July 1, 1952, provided he is in possession or was evicted after June 30, 1948. If he was evicted after June 30, 1948 he is entitled to regain possession inspite of any order or decree to the contrary. The word ‘occupant’ thus signifies occupancy and enjoyment. Mediate possession, (except where the immediate possessor holds on behalf of the mediate possessor) is of no consequence. In this way even persons who got into occupation when lands were abandoned get recognition. The Section eliminates inquiries into disputed possession by accepting the records in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F, or its correction before July 1, 1952. It was perhaps thought that all such disputes would have solved themselves in the four years between June 30, 1948 and June 30, 1952.” 63. The Apex Court then referred to Full Bench judgment in Ram Dular Singh (supra), L. Bhal Singh (supra) and Nanak Chand (surpa) and the above quoted passage from Nanak Chand (surpa) was approved. 64. In Wali Mohammad (deceased) v. Ram Surat, 1989 RD 403 the Court said that it is possible to set aside spurious, surreptitious and fraudulent entry, but so long as the same is not shown so, once an entry is in existence of Khasra or Khatauni of Fasali year 1356 that would govern the question as to the person entitled to take or retain possession of the land. The distinction is that the correctness of the entry cannot be challenged but if it is fraudulent, spurious or surreptitious, that is one ground available to attack the very entry itself. 65. In Udai v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Varanasi, AIR 1990 SC 471 , it was held that Section 20 (b) (i) eliminates inquiries into disputed possession by accepting the records in the Khasra or Khatauni for the year 1356 Fasli or its correction prior to July 1, 1952. 66. A learned Judge, however, in Sri Kishun v. C.R. Yadav, 1975 RD 183 cautioned by taken note of some ground realities and said : “It is well known and judicial notice of the fact may be taken that large scale forgeries are being done in Government records at district level. Organized gangs are operating and by manipulations and forgeries government property is being grabbed and in this process even the revenue staff is in collusion with such gangs. This menace has presently taken in its grip almost the whose State. Considering this aspect of the matter this Court has to be very cautious in interfering in such matters where allegations are with regard to forgeries of revenue records.” 67. It is in these circumstances, the Full Bench in Amir Hussain (supra) also said : “The basic year entry is a document which can be altered or modified in accordance with the findings reached in proceedings arising on an objection under Section 9(2).” 68. The revenue authorities in this case have disbelieved and declined to accept entries made in Khatauni of 1356 fasali and 1359 fasali observing that in 1359 fasali, there is some manipulation by a different pen and, therefore, the entries becoming suspicious and spurious are not reliable. In fact, while deciding issue 3, the Consolidation Officer on the one hand has said that the claimants have produced documentary evidence of copies of khatauni 1356 and 1359 fasali but thereafter has proceeded to observe that entries made in Khatauni 1359 fasali are manipulated and spurious, hence not reliable. But on this aspect, he has not said anything about the Khatauni of 1356 fasaly. But on this aspect, he has not said anything about the Khatauni of 1356 fasaly. If there was no discrepancy in the Khatauni of 1356 fasali, the discrepancies in subsequent khatauni of 1359 could have made no difference for the reason that Section 20 contemplates and recognizes entry made in Khatauni of 1356 Fasali and there being no discrepancy noticed therein the same ought to have been relied on. The Officer concerned has not at all adverted to the Khatauni of 1356 Fasali though admittedly it was relied and certified copy was produced by the plaintiffs before him. 69. The appellate and revisional authorities though have observed that the discrepancy was noticed by the Consolidation Officer in respect to Khatauni of 1359 Fasali, but therewith have related an assumed manipulation with respect the Khatauni of 1356 Fasali also for the purpose of rejecting appeal and revision. Apparently, the approach of the authorities below cannot be said to be valid and in accordance with law. Even for the observation made by authorities with respect to Khatauni of 1359 Fasali allegedly produced before Consolidation Officer has not been accepted, but a challenge has been made by petitioners that original record was not examined at all and in any case in the presence of the parties. The petitioners were not confronted with alleged manipulation noticed in the original revenue record of 1359 Fasali. At no point of time, petitioners were given any opportunity to contradict the finding of Courts below. 70. Learned counsel for petitioner has gone to the extent that though an order was passed by the Consolidation Officer for summoning record, but on the date fixed, the record was never produced and thereafter also when the matter was adjourned, on the adjourned dates also, no record was produced. However, in the impugned order dated 29.4.1980 the Consolidation Officer has mentioned his observations alleging manipulation in the Khatauni of 1359 Fasali without confronting petitioners on this aspect and, therefore, the observations are vitiated being in violation of principles of natural justice and also otherwise contrary to law. In this regard, he has referred to various provisions relating to procedure. 71. It appears that alongwith the objections filed by petitioners’ predecessors before the Consolidation Officer, the certified copy of Khatauni of 1356 Fasali and 1359 Fasali were filed. The Gaon Sabha did not file any objection. In this regard, he has referred to various provisions relating to procedure. 71. It appears that alongwith the objections filed by petitioners’ predecessors before the Consolidation Officer, the certified copy of Khatauni of 1356 Fasali and 1359 Fasali were filed. The Gaon Sabha did not file any objection. The Officer (Consolidation) summoned the record of 1356 Fasali and 1359 Fasali fixing 11.7.1980 by its order dated 2.7.1980. This order was passed on the application filed by petitioners predecessors in interest. There is no mention in the order sheet dated 11.7.1980 that the record of Khatauni of 1359 Fasali or 1356 Fasali was produced and perused by the concerned Officer. Again he fixed 25.7.1980 but there is no mention in the proceedings that the said record was produced and perused by him. The order sheet of 2.7.1980, 11.7.1980 and 25.7.1980 is reproduced as under : 2&7&80] vkt i=koyh is’k gqbZ vihykUV dh rjQ ls [krkSuh 1356 Qlyh o 1359 Qlyh ryc djus gsrq izkFkZuk i= fn;k x;kA tks Lohdkj dh tkrh gSA fnukad 11&7&1980 dks is’k gksA 11&7&1980] i=koyh cgkftj odhy is’k gqbZA [krkSuh 1359 Qlyh vHkh izLrqr ugh gqbZ gSA iqu% i= [krkSuh ryc gsrq Hkstk tk;A fnukad 25&7&1980 dks is’k gksA 25&7&1980] vkt i=koyh is’k gqbZA vihykUV dh rjQ ls ekSdk fy;k x;kA vr% okLrs cgl 5&9&1980 dks is’k gksA 72. The fact that the aforesaid Khataunies were ever examined by the Consolidation Officer has been seriously disputed and contested before this Court. Even if I may not go on the question whether the said record was actually examined by the authorities concerned or not, but one thing is clear from the record that the said original record was not examined by the Court below in the presence of the petitioners. There is nothing on record to pursue this Court to take a different view. The presumption that an entry made in the revenue record would be treated to be correct unless proved otherwise is a rebuttable presumption. If the authorities having perused the same, found that the entry is spurious, surreptitious or fraudulent, the presumption stand dispelled but the question is what would be the procedure to hold that an entry made in revenue record is spurious. Can a quasi judicial authority take such a view ex parte without confronting his observations to the party concerned i.e. in the present of the parties. 73. Can a quasi judicial authority take such a view ex parte without confronting his observations to the party concerned i.e. in the present of the parties. 73. In Sonawati v. Ram, AIR 1968 SC 466 the Court said, “The Civil Court in adjudging a claim of a person to the rights of an adhivasi is not called upon to make an enquiry whether the claimant was actually in possession of the land or held the right as an occupant, cases of fraud apart, the entry in the record alone is relevant.” 74. Explaining the aforesaid observations in Vishwa Vijay Bharti v. Fakhrul Hassan and others, (1976) SCC 642, the Apex Court said that normal presumption of the correctness attaching to entries in the revenue record, which by law constitute evidence of a legal title, is displaced by proof of fraud. The procedure for preparing the revenue entries is that Khasra or Khatauni of 1356 Fasali is to be prepared under Section 28 and 33 of U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 (hereinafter referred to as “Act,1901”). The manner in which Khasra or the field book showing possession is to be prepared by Patwari in the areas to which Act 1951 applies is provided in paragraphs A-55 to A-67 Chapter A-V of U.P. Land Reforms Manual. Detail instructions about the manner in which enquiry should be carried out about actual possession, change in possession and correction in the map and the field book and the form in which Khasra is to be prepared is given therein. The form of Khasra is given in Para A-80. Lekhapl has to prepare a consolidated list of entries for partial or proper investigation. Paras A-70 to A-73 show how the entries have to be made in Khatauni every year showing the nature of tenure of each holder. Khatauni is made to be a record of the tenure holder. The manner of changes to be made therein is laid down in para A-82 to A-83. Entries are to be checked, extract has to be sent to Chairman, Land Management Committee as contemplated in para A-82 (iii). The Apex Court in Bachan and another v. Kankar and others, AIR 1972 SC 2157 held that it is in this context Section 20 (b) (i) of Act, 1951 speaks of the record as occupant in Khasra or Khatauni of 1356 Fasali. The Apex Court in Bachan and another v. Kankar and others, AIR 1972 SC 2157 held that it is in this context Section 20 (b) (i) of Act, 1951 speaks of the record as occupant in Khasra or Khatauni of 1356 Fasali. It refers to the Khasra or Khatauni being prepared in accordance with the provisions of Act, 1901. Khasra is field book provided by Section 28 of Act, 1901 and Khatauni is annual registered prepared under Section 32 of the said Act. In order to enable a person to obtain adhivasi rights vide Section 20 (b) (i) of Act, 1951, an entry under the provisions of law must exist to support such a claim. The entries which are not genuine would not confer such rights. It is said that an entry which is incorrectly introduced by the Patwari into the record by reason of ill-will or hostility would not entitle anyone to claim adhivasi rights. The law, therefore, is well settled and admits no exception. But then the question comes about the application of law in a given set of circumstances of a case. It is said that before the Court below, there was no pleading or averment by any person that the entries in record of 1356 fasali are forged, fictitious or surreptitious. It is in this context, counsel for petitioner has referred to certain procedural statutory provisions in C.P.C. and Evidence Act, which I may notice at this stage. 75. Learned counsel for petitioner has referred to Order VI Rule 13; Order VIII Rule 3 and Order XV Rule 5 C.P.C. 76. A Full Bench of this Court in B.N. Sinha v. State of U.P., AIR 1970 All 241 held that the authorities constituted under the Act can neither be held to be the Courts of civil jurisdiction nor are they governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. This is what has been reiterated by a Division Bench of the Court in Pritam Singh and others v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, 1978 AWC 137. This is what has been reiterated by a Division Bench of the Court in Pritam Singh and others v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, 1978 AWC 137. The Consolidation Authorities therefore are not bound by the strict procedural technicalities of the Code of Civil Procedure but in order to do justice to the parties, it is always open to them, subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, to seek guidance from different provisions of C.P.C. The aforesaid reliance, therefore, placed by the petitioners on certain provisions of C.P.C. is misplaced to the extent the Revenue Authorities decision as such can be challenged for violation of strict procedure of C.P.C. but the principles based on natural justice can be read if not stand excluded specifically or by necessary implication. 77. The Apex Court in Mohammad Shakoor Mian v. Raj Mangal Mishra and others, 1999 (7) SCC 461 held that the Consolidation authorities cannot be equated with the regular Courts. Hence, they are not bound by the strict principles or provisions of the Evidence Act but general principles may be applied by the said authorities. Various statutory provisions of Evidence Act, therefore, referred to by learned Counsel for petitioner are not necessary to be adverted in this case for the reason, if this Court is satisfied that the consolidation authorities have considered the documents on record according to the well established principles regarding determination of rights of the parties consistent with the principles of natural justice, the Court may not interfere with the finding recorded by them but in case it finds otherwise, it will be a serious infraction on the part of consolidation authorities justifying interference. 78. As I have already observed, the Settlement Officer did not speak anything about the Khatauni of 1356 Fasali that was the basic document for the issue in question. In Amir Husain (supra) a full Bench observed, as already said, that the basic year entry is a document which can be altered or modified in accordance with the finding reached in proceeding arising out an objection under Section 9 (2). In order to arrive at such a finding, it is evident that the procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice will have to be observed. 79. The original record despite orders was also no produced before this Court. In order to arrive at such a finding, it is evident that the procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice will have to be observed. 79. The original record despite orders was also no produced before this Court. It is also seriously disputed whether it was seen by the Courts below or not. In the circumstances, particularly, considering the fact that nothing has been said by the Court of first instance, namely, the Consolidation Officer about Khatauni of 1356 Fasali, it is difficult to uphold the conclusion drawn by him founded on subsequent Khatauni of 1359 Fasali so as to extend to Khatauni of 1356 Fasali. Moreover, it does not appear that these findings have been recorded by the Courts below by confronting petitioners also with the original record. In the above circumstances, in my view, the orders impugned in this writ petition cannot sustain and this matter require to be remanded to the Court below, i.e. Court of first instance to re-consider the matter after perusing the original revenue record of 1356 fasali and 1359 fasali, giving opportunity to petitioners and thereafter pass a fresh order in accordance with law. 80. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Impugned orders dated 29.4.1980 passed by Consolidation Officer, 6.9.1980 passed by Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and 31.12.1980 passed by Assistant Director (Consolidation) (Annexures 4, 5 and 6 respectively to the writ petition) are hereby quashed. Matter is remanded to Consolidation Officer to re-consider the matter in the light of the above observations and in accordance with law. He shall pass a fresh order after giving opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties expeditiously preferably within three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. 81. No costs. —————