Order Heard Shri Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Sri A.K. Sinha, Sr. Advocate, assisted by Mr. Saurav Arun and Ms. Neha Prashant, Advocates for the contesting respondent-M/s Bharat Firebricks and Pottery Works (P) Ltd. 2. The instant writ petition is preferred challenging the order dated 26.11.2009 passed by the District Judge, Dhanbad in Misc. Appeal No. 29 of 2009 (Annexure-3) dismissing the appeal under the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the P.P. Act) and confirming the order dated 10.3.2009 passed by the Estate Officer, in Eviction Case No. 97 of 2006. 3. The petitioner is a Government Company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act and the claim is that the coal bearing land situated in Plot Nos. 50, 51 and 53 of Khata No. 26, Mouza-Fatehpur, Revenue Thana No. 130, measuring 10.71 acres are "Public Premises" within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the P.P. Act. 4. The petitioner further submits that in the Cadastral Survey Record of Rights, the aforesaid land was recorded in the name of M/s Jharia Firebricks & Pottery Works Limited. This land was transferred by one Ramjash Agrawalla for carrying out underground coal mining operation and also for carrying out business of manufacturing and sale of firebricks pottery works. 5. The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that by virtue of Act No. 64 of 1971, Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 for Nationalization of such mines and plans, was enacted by the Parliament. On perusal of the Schedule appended to the aforesaid Act, the name of Fatehpur Colliery is shown at Serial No. 135 and the name and address of the owners of the mines is recorded as Bharat Firebricks and Pottery Works (P), Jharia. The Parliament enacted the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1972, with an object to acquire and transfer the right, title and interest of the owners of the Coking Coal Mines specified in Schedule-I and the right, title and interest of the owners of such Coke Oven Plants and to reorganise and reconstruct with a view to conserve and promote scientific development of the resources of the coking coal. 6. 6. It is further pointed out that the name of Fahehpur Colliery was recorded at Serial No. 153 to the Schedule appended to the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1972. The name and address of the owners of the mine has been recorded as G.K. Dossa & Co., P.O.-Jharia, Dhabad as owners. Thus, the claim of the petitioner is that the entire area of 10.71 acres of land recorded in C.S. Record of Rights vested absolutely and free from all encumbrances with the petitioner Company and, therefore, the said area comes within the purview of definition of 'Public Premises' within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the P.P. Act, 1971. The petitioner submitted encroachment report in the Court of Estate Officer, E.J. Area, BCCL, in respect of 10.71 acres of land' of Village-Fatehpur, Revenue P.S.-Jharia, Revenue Thana No. 130, Khata No. 26, Plot Nos. 50, 51, 52 and 53, which was in occupation of the contesting respondent. It was alleged that the respondent has encroached upon the public land belonging to the petitioner. Notices were issued under Section 4(i) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. The petitioner appeared and filed his show-cause. The Estate Officer held that the land measuring 10.71 acres on Plot Nos. 50, 51, 53 under Mouza-Fatehpur, Jharia, Thana No. 130, District-Dhanbad, is not a 'Public Premises', but it is a private land belonging to the 2nd party i.e. the respondent and the proceedings were dropped. The petitioners were not able to file a single documents in support of their contention that the land in question vested as mine under the provisions of the "Coking Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1972". On the contrary, it was held that the respondent's factory is standing for last 50 years. After the enactment of the Nationalization Act, 1972, the factory continues in possession of the respondent for more than 35 years without any interruption from the petitioner-BCCL. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Dhanbad and the appeal also stood dismissed and the order of the Estate Officer was confirmed. While dismissing the appeal, the District Judge relied on certain documents detailed of which is in para-4 of the said judgment. A certificate issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad, dated 31.5.1960 showing non-encumbrance certificate in favour of the respondent, was relied upon. 7. While dismissing the appeal, the District Judge relied on certain documents detailed of which is in para-4 of the said judgment. A certificate issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad, dated 31.5.1960 showing non-encumbrance certificate in favour of the respondent, was relied upon. 7. Shri A.K. Mehta, placed a decision of the Apex Court in Bharat Caking Coal Ltd. VS. Madanlal Agrawal, reported in (1997)1 SCC 177 . In the said case, the dispute was in respect of certain properties, one Madanlal Agrawal claimed to be the owner 6f the Company which he had purchased with structures thereon. By means of a registered sale deed, his Company was United Mining Company Private Limited and the structures were utilized for office premises. Eviction was sought for non-payment of monthly rent for several years. A suit was preferred for eviction and the 1st Additional Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit of Madanlal. The judgment was challenged before the Division Bench of the Patna High Court and the said appeal was allowed. The High Court was of the view that the right, title and interest had not vested in the Central Government and it was held that Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. was a tenant of Madanlal Agrawal and the suit was decreed. The judgment was challenged in the Apex Court which was allowed. Shri Mehta relied on paragraphs 20, 28, 29, 31, 37 and 38, which are quoted below: "20. By virtue of Section 3, the right, title and interest of owners in relation to the coal mines specified in the Schedule stood transferred to and vested absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances from the appointed day, 1.5.1973. The idea behind the Nationalisation Act appears to be that the Government wanted to take over and run the coal mines so as to ensure rational, co-ordinated and scientific development and ulitisation of coal resources. The object of the Act was to subserve the common good and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Act should not be construed in a way to frustrate the working of the coal mines altogether and thereby stop or bring down production of coal by the nationalisation of coal mines. The extended meaning given to 'mine' was to ensure that the activity of mining of coal could be carried on in an uninterrupted fashion. The Act should not be construed in a way to frustrate the working of the coal mines altogether and thereby stop or bring down production of coal by the nationalisation of coal mines. The extended meaning given to 'mine' was to ensure that the activity of mining of coal could be carried on in an uninterrupted fashion. Not only the lands, buildings and equipment belonging to the owners of the mine but other lands and buildings which were solely used for the purposes of office or residence of the officers and staff of the mine also vested in the Central Government. The words of sub-clause (xi) are very clear and there is no ambiguity in them. 28. In this context, therefore, Section 3 refers to the acquisition of the rights of owners in respect of all the properties which are covered by the definition of a 'mine'. 29. Regarding those properties which are not of the ownership of the coal mine, it is clear from the definition of 'mine' that only properties which are required for a proper functioning of the mine and which are covered by the definition would be acquired. Any and every property belonging to another person which happens to be on the surface of the mine or adjacent to it is not taken away. Only those properties of another person which fall within the definition of a mine and which are necessary for a proper functioning of the mine are to be taken away. The definition itself takes care of this aspect by stipulating wherever necessary that such properties must be used for the purpose of the mine, whether the purpose is specified or general. 31. In the light of the definition of an 'owner' which also includes a lessee or an occupier apart from the immediate proprietor, and the definition of 'mine', one can conclude that even assets of which the mine or the mining company may not be the proprietor, but which are leased by the mine or which are in the possession of a mine over a period of time, are also acquired. A temporary acquisition, or a short-term lease, or even some special additional amenities which the mine may provide but which are not required for the purposes of the mine may not be covered. It will depend upon the facts of each case. A temporary acquisition, or a short-term lease, or even some special additional amenities which the mine may provide but which are not required for the purposes of the mine may not be covered. It will depend upon the facts of each case. In the M.P. Case for example, the equipment in question was only temporarily in the possession of the mine to meet certain exigencies. This was held to be not covered by the definition of mine. In the Calcutta case however, the weighbridge which was leased by the company was a necessary equipment for the proper functioning of the mine and was installed in the mine for a period of time. It was held as falling, within the definition of a 'mine'. Thus, it is quite possible that property which is temporarily in or adjacent to a mine, and which does not belong to the mine, or certain machinery and equipment which does not belong to the mining company but may be temporarily leased to meet some special temporary requirements, would not be covered by the definition of a 'mine'. But the present case is not such a case. 37. That means that things which did not belong to the mine owners mentioned in column 4 of the Schedule but fall within sub-clauses (i) to (xii) of Section 2(h) of the Nationalisation Act will vest in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. If the mine owner had located staff quarters and' offices on rented buildings, these will also vest in the Central Government. 38. In view of the aforesaid, we hold that the suit premises fall within the ambit of the definition of 'mine' in Section 2(h) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 and as such had vested in the Central Government on the appointed day by virtue of the provision of Section 3 of the Act, even though these premises might not have been in the ownership of the United Mining Company." 8. The petitioner claimed that the land in question is being used as mines, is also on the basis of the Cadastral Survey Record of Rights. The evidence of existence of shafts, Dhowras for Miners as also Air shafts showing working of the mines, is sufficient to establish that the mine was being operated on the land in question and after the advent of Nationalization Act, 1972, it vested in the Government. The evidence of existence of shafts, Dhowras for Miners as also Air shafts showing working of the mines, is sufficient to establish that the mine was being operated on the land in question and after the advent of Nationalization Act, 1972, it vested in the Government. On the basis of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the emphatic submission of the petitioner's counsel is that the land vests in the Government and the judgment and order of the Estate Officer as well as the District Judge suffers from a manifest error of law and is liable to be quashed. Besides, learned counsel further placed Section 4. of the Nationalization Act, 1972. On its basis, submission is that it stands concluded that the land in question was being used for mining purposes and it vests in the Central Government and, therefore, the claim of the respondent is baseless and liable to be ignored. 9. The respondent has emphatically disputed the petitioner's contention. They have filed counter affidavit. The foremost submission is that the respondent Company is functioning since 1946 and it is functioning in full knowledge of the petitioner's Company which used to make purchases and place orders for grant of linkage supply of coal and various purchase order has been brought on record alongwith the counter affidavit to substantiate that the respondent is non-core sector coal consumer under M/s Coal India Limited. 10. The respondent's counsel further submits that the subject matter of dispute belonging to M/s Jharia Firebrick & Potteries Works Ltd., Managing Agent, Ramjash Agrawalla was the holder of Khewat NO.2 and was entitled to receive rent. A permanent settlement was made of 31 Bighas of coal land in Mouza-Fatehpur, from Raja Sri Durga Prasad Singh of Jharia Raj Estate by means of registered Patta conferring heritable and transferable interest in favour of the settlee. Ramjash Agrawalla morgaged the property with the Central Bank of India, but on account of non-payment of rent, a mortgage suit was preferred by the Central Bank of India Ltd. vide suit no. 133 of 1932 which was decreed and put to execution. The Central Bank of India Ltd. was the auction purchaser. Ramjash Agrawalla morgaged the property with the Central Bank of India, but on account of non-payment of rent, a mortgage suit was preferred by the Central Bank of India Ltd. vide suit no. 133 of 1932 which was decreed and put to execution. The Central Bank of India Ltd. was the auction purchaser. Subsequently, it was sold by the Bank to one Reva Shankar Jagani and others by means of a sale deed dated 12.12.1942, which was subsequently transferred to M/s Bharat Firebricks and Pottery Works Ltd. by means of registered Deed No. 1455 dated 11.2.1946. The rent was paid under Jamabandi No. 381 which is still continuing in the name of M/s Bharat Firebricks and Pottery Works (P) Ltd. A rent receipt has also been annexed with the counter affidavit to support the contention. Since then, the respondent has been in continuous possession. Even after 37 years of vesting i.e. 1.5.1972, the respondent is in possession as owners irrespective of the aforesaid Act. It is on the basis of all these documentary evidence, the Estate Officer held that the land claimed by the petitioner will not come within the purview of 'Public Premises'. In support of this contention, it has also been brought to my notice that the B.C.C.L. has now filed a petition before the Revenue Authority for cancellation of Jamabandi after having lost under the provisions of the Public Premises Act. 11. The respondent's counsel has brought yet another circumstance to my notice that the petitioner had made an offer for purchase of the -said land which the respondent had agreed but somehow or the other, the transaction could not be completed. Certain payment vouchers have also been brought on record along with the counter affidavit in support of the contention that the petitioner's Company were purchasing material from the respondent and receipts were issued. It is also stated that wrong entry made in the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency) Provisions Act, 1971, was rectified in the schedule of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1972. It is further emphasised that the petitioner has admitted that Fatehpur Coal Mines was owned by one M/s G.K. Dossa & Company. 12. The learned Senior Advocate has cited and placed reliance on the decision Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (supra). It is further emphasised that the petitioner has admitted that Fatehpur Coal Mines was owned by one M/s G.K. Dossa & Company. 12. The learned Senior Advocate has cited and placed reliance on the decision Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (supra). His submission is that by virtue of Section 3 of the Nationalization Act, only those land would vest which are covered by the definition of 'Mines', but the properties which are not coal mines, will not be taken away. Extract of paras-29 and 31 are quoted below: 29. ".....Any and every property belonging to another person which happens to be on the surface of the mine or adjacent to it is not taken away. Only those properties of another person which fall within the definition of a mine and which are necessary for a proper functioning of the mine are to be taken away. The definition itself takes care of this aspect by stipulating wherever necessary that such properties must be used for the purpose of the mine, whether the purpose is specified or general". The under noted paragraph of the aforesaid judgment states: "31. In the light of the definition of an 'owner' which also includes a lessee or an occupier apart from the immediate proprietor, and the definition of 'mine', one can conclude that even as-sets of which the mine or the mining company may not be the proprietor, but which are leased by the mine or which are in the possession of a mine over a period of time, are also acquired. A temporary acquisition, or a short-term lease, or even some special additional amenities which the mine may provide but which are not required for the purposes of the mine may not be covered. It will depend upon the facts of each case”. 12 Another decision relied upon by the respondent is Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. VS. Karam Chand Thapar & Bros. Pvt. Ltd. and Others, reported in (2003)1 SCC 6 [ : 2003(1) JLJR (SC)280]. Learned counsel relied on paragraphs-11 and 14, which are quoted below: "11. The short question which falls for consideration presently before this Court is as to whether the buildings and structures said to be belonging to the appellant can be termed to be a mine within the meaning of Section 3(j)(vi) of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1972. Learned counsel relied on paragraphs-11 and 14, which are quoted below: "11. The short question which falls for consideration presently before this Court is as to whether the buildings and structures said to be belonging to the appellant can be termed to be a mine within the meaning of Section 3(j)(vi) of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1972. The said statutory provision reads as below: "3(j)(vi) all lands, buildings, works, adits, levels, planes, machinery and equipment, vehicles, railways, tramways and sidings belonging to, or in or about, a mine. 14. Incidentally, whereas presently we are concerned with the Nationalization Act of 1972, Madanlal (supra) was dealing with the Act of 1973 though, however, the provisions are in pari materia to each other. It is on this backdrop, •this Court observed: (SCC pp.189-90, paras 26-27) "26. The two key words for the purpose of interpreting Section 3 are 'mine' and 'owners'. If we look at the definition of a 'mine' under Section 2(h), the definition is designed to cover: (1) All properties 'belonging to the mine' whatever be the nature of these properties, as also specified properties 'belonging to the owner of the mine'. Thus, for example, Section 2(h)(xii) is an omnibus clause which covers all fixed assets, movable and immovabl8i belonging to the owner of a mine wherever situate and current assets belonging to a mine whether in its premises or outside. Section 2(h)(viii) covers all coal belonging to the owner of the mine. Section 2(h)(x) covers all lands, buildings and equipment belonging to the owners of a mine, and in, adjacent to or situated on the surface of the mine, where washing of coal or manufacture of coke is carried on. (2) In addition, the definition of 'mine' also covers all those assets which are required for a proper functioning of the mine irrespective of whether these assets 'belong' to a mine or not.• Thus, for example, Section 2(h)(vi) covers all lands, buildings, machinery and equipment, instruments, stores, vehicles, railways, tramways etc. adjacent to a mine and used for the purposes of the mine. Therefore, all these assets if they are lying adjacent to a mine and are required for the proper functioning of the mine would be acquired irrespective of whether they belong to the 'owner of a mine' or not. adjacent to a mine and used for the purposes of the mine. Therefore, all these assets if they are lying adjacent to a mine and are required for the proper functioning of the mine would be acquired irrespective of whether they belong to the 'owner of a mine' or not. Similarly under Section 2(h)(ix) all power stations in a mine operated primarily for supplying electricity for the purposes of working the mine or a number of mines under the same management will be acquired irrespective of whether the power stations belonged to the mine or owner of the mine, or not. Sub-clause (xi) of Section 2(h) provides that all other [other than those in sub-clause (x)] lands and buildings wherever situated, if solely used for the location of the management, sale or liaison offices or for the' residence of officers and staff of the mine are also acquired. Unlike sub-clause (x), sub-clause (xi) does not contain the words 'belonging to the owners of the mine'. Therefore, the definition clause of 'mine' covers at least two different kinds of property: (i) properties which belong to the mine, and (ii) properties which are used by the mine for a proper functioning of the mine. The first category of properties would be properties which are of the ownership of the mining company. The second category of properties need not necessarily be of the ownership of the mining company. These could also be properties, which are leased by the mining company or in possession of the mining company and used by it. 27. That is why under Sections 2(n) and 2(o) read together, the term 'owner' would carry a wider meaning assigned to that term under the Mines Act of 1952 which would cover, depending on the context, even the rights of a lessee or occupier of the mine or any part thereof. Thus, the entire interest in the properties which are covered under the definition of a mine is to be acquired so that the mines can be reorganised and run efficiently." 14 The third decision cited by the respondent is in the case of Govt. of Andhra Pradesh vs. Thummala Krishna Rao and Another, reported in AIR 1982 Supreme Court 1081. 15. of Andhra Pradesh vs. Thummala Krishna Rao and Another, reported in AIR 1982 Supreme Court 1081. 15. On a close scrutiny of the respective claims by the rival parties, it is evident that the petitioner's claim to the land is the provisions of the Nationalization Act and that the disputed land was being used as mines. The conclusion that it was used as mine is based on an assumption that there was some Mining Plan and existence of shaft, Air shaft, Dhowras and Chinkothi was a pointer and indicative of the fact that the land was used as a mine. There is not a chit of document in support of their contention. It is basically that Section 4 of the Nationalization Act intended to acquire all those lands being used as a mine and, therefore, the vesting of such land in the Government was a foregone conclusion. On the contrary, the respondent has come up with a number of documents including payment of Jamabandi etc. as well as certain registered deed to substantiate their claims that they have been in possession of the said land since a very long time. There is no nexus established. 16. In the instant case, the proceedings initiated under the Public Premises Act are challenged only on the basis of the aforesaid assumptions and conclusions. The Estate Officer has held that the disputed land does not vest in the Central Government and has relied on the pleadings of the respondent. In fact, Reva Shankar Jagani and others transferred the land which runs of 31 Bighas of land in the name of Fatehpur Colliery, on 11.2.1946. The finding against the petitioner is based on the reasoning that there is not a single paper that the land in question was being used for mining purpose and thereby vested in the State under the Nationalization Act. The extract of Schedule-I of the aforesaid Act, Fatehpur Colliery was shown to belonging to G.K. Dossa & Company. There is no' paper to substantiate that any compensation was ever paid to M/s Bharat Firebricks & Pottery Works (P) Ltd. If the argument of the petitioner is to be accepted then, there has to be evidence to support the said contention. The assertion that the respondent has encroached upon the property is without any substance. There is no' paper to substantiate that any compensation was ever paid to M/s Bharat Firebricks & Pottery Works (P) Ltd. If the argument of the petitioner is to be accepted then, there has to be evidence to support the said contention. The assertion that the respondent has encroached upon the property is without any substance. On the contrary, Raiyati Clearance Certificate vide Memo No. 3790(R) dated 11.8.2007 in respect of the disputed plots are sufficient evidence in respondent's favour. Besides, since the year 1946 till date, rent of Rs.385.56 is paid to under Jamabandi No. 381 which was opened in the name of previous owner, Ramjash Agrawalla, which is at present M/s Bharat Firebricks & Pottery Works (P) Ltd. The appellate court has also confirmed the order and appeal. The submission on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted in exercise of writ jurisdiction, finding of fact as well as reappraisal of the document or any other evidence cannot be looked into at this stage. There is yet another strong circumstance which cannot be overlooked, shortly before the proceedings under the Public Premises Act was initiated. There was certain negotiations for purchase of the land by the Government and the offer made by the owners which has clearly been admitted by the counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. 17. Taking into consideration all these facts and circumstances, I am of the considered view that there is no substance worth which could lead to the conclusion that the two judgments impugned in the instant writ petition suffers from any manifest errors of law or any error apparent on the face of the record and thereby jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could be exercised and the judgments could be quashed. The petitioner has not been able to make out any case calling an interference in the two impugned judgments and orders. The writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.