JUDGMENT: Dev Darshan Sud,J. These petitions have been listed before this Court exercising its sue motu powers under Section 397and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The cases pertain to grant of bail to both the respondents herein by the learned trial Court. Notices of these petitions were issued to the respondents on 1.6.2011. The Court was closed for Summer Vacation from 5th June, 2011 and such notices were made returnable for 16th June, 2011. On that date the learned Advocate General submitted that two Revision Petitions No.26-S/10 of 2011 and 27-S/10 of 2011, titled: State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Haresh Sood and State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Kuldip Rao have been preferred by the State before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Shimla, pertaining to the same order of admitting both the respondents on bail. The record of those cases was, therefore, summoned to this Court. On 24.6.2011, the case was heard on its merit, both on these petitions as also on the revision petitions preferred by the State before the learned Fast Track Court, Shimla, which are not different from the grounds which have been raised there. 3. Both the respondents were arrested in connection with FIR No.60/11, dated 24.5.2011, registered with Police Station, East Shimla, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC on the allegations that the respondents and some other persons herein had entered into a criminal conspiracy to procure a forged and fabricated judgment/order of this Court for being used/was used for the purposes of obtaining benefits of the purported directions issued in that order, including acquittal in some pending criminal cases. The case is at the investigation stage. The respondents were arrested on 25.5.2011. On that day, the police produced both the respondents before the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class-(I), Shimla, praying for police remand. Applications under Section 437 Cr.P.C. were made on behalf of both the respondents and have been dealt with separately in the case of each of the respondents. Police remand, as prayed, was granted. 4. On that day, the police produced both the respondents before the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class-(I), Shimla, praying for police remand. Applications under Section 437 Cr.P.C. were made on behalf of both the respondents and have been dealt with separately in the case of each of the respondents. Police remand, as prayed, was granted. 4. Adverting to the case of Haresh Sood, who is inter alia practicing in this Court as an Advocate, the learned Court, took note of the submissions, (a) that he was a practicing advocate before this Court andthere is no likelihood of his absconding from justice; (b) that he would join investigation as and when called for, (c) his detention in custody would adversely mar his career and destroy his reputation. The Court then continues:- “After going through the record I am convinced that a prima facie case is made out against accused Haresh Sood and custodial interrogation of the accused is necessary to bring out all the facts connected with this case the recoveries are yet to be made in this case at the instance of the accused for which custodial interrogation of accused is required. After going through the entire record of the police file, as well as in view of the rival contentions raised by Ld.APP and Ld.counsel for the accused I am of the considered view that custodial interrogation of the accused Haresh Sood is necessary to bring out all the facts connected with this case. There are serious allegations against the accused that they have prepared a false judgment of Hon’ble High Court. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case I am convinced with the submissions of Ld.APP that the custodial interrogation of the accused is required to bringing on record the entire facts as well as evidence connected with the case. The custodial interrogation of the accused is also required to effect the recovery at the instance of the accused. Though the police has prayed for seven days police remand of the accused Haresh Sood but keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case the prayer of the police is partly accepted and accused Haresh is remanded to police custody till 28.5.2011.” 5. Though the police has prayed for seven days police remand of the accused Haresh Sood but keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case the prayer of the police is partly accepted and accused Haresh is remanded to police custody till 28.5.2011.” 5. In the same order, the learned Magistrate notices that an application has been presented by Shri Paras Doger, Advocate on behalf of the accused Haresh Sood that a direction be issued to the police that he should be interrogated in the presence of this advocate. 6. On 28.5.2011, when the respondent was produced before the learned Magistrate, another application under Section 437 Cr.P.C. was filed on behalf of Shri Haresh Sood. The allegation is of his non-involvement in the case. The applicant further states that nothing is required to be recovered from him and if he is released on bail there would be no likelihood of his absconding from justice. In reply filed on behalf of the State, it was alleged that the accused was not cooperating with the investigation and the presence of the advocate is hampering further progress of the investigation. The tenor of the reply is that the advocate is passing on the questions asked by the police to some other advocate present and the answers are not those of the accused, but of the advocate. The reply then continues that no recovery has been made as he is not co-operating with the investigation and the seals used/affixed on the forged order/judgment have not been recovered. The respondent is not disclosing the source of the seals etc. and as to in whose handwriting the blanks in the attestation seals etc. have been filled in. Reply asserts that if he is released on bail he will obstruct the smooth progress of the trial. Adverting to this argument, the Court continues that since he has been in the custody of the police from 24.5.2011 and there was sufficient time for the police to complete investigation, the presence of the counsel was only directed “to be present as far as is possible”. There is nothing on the record to suggest or indicate that either the respondents or the advocate are hampering the investigation. Merely because the police has not been able to effect any recovery from the accused is no ground to deny bail. There is nothing on the record to suggest or indicate that either the respondents or the advocate are hampering the investigation. Merely because the police has not been able to effect any recovery from the accused is no ground to deny bail. The Judge then takes of on a sermon of protecting personal liberty etc. and directed the release of the petitioner on bail. I need not remind the learned Judge as to the nature of the offence which has to be dealt with and the duty of the respondent herein. In Hargovind Dayal Srivastava and Another vs. G.N. Verma and Others, (1977)1 SCC 744, the Supreme Court holds: “13. It is the duty of lawyers to protect the dignity and decorum of the judiciary. If lawyers fail in their duty the faith of the people in the judiciary will be undermined to a large extent. It is said that lawyers are the custodians of civilisation. Lawyers have to discharge their duty with dignity, decorum and discipline.” (p.746) 7. Surely, the learned Court should have been alive to the noble duty required to be discharged by this respondent. To say that the order is conjectural and every line of it is judgmental not disclosing the principle on which it is based and the reasons for invoking the principles applicable would be stating the obvious. 8. The second accused in this case, Kuldip Rao, was sent to police custody by an order dated 25.5.2011 when he was admitted in the Indira Gandhi Medical College and Hospital, Shimla. The learned Judge visited the hospital to meet him on that day on the request made by the police and in view of her report appended to the police zimini by one Dr.Santosh Dhir stating according to the learned Court that this person cannot be shifted to Court. He was admitted in Ward “Old CCU” Medical Unit No.2 in bed No.3 under the treatment of Dr.Vijay and Dr.Swatantar. He was in the custody of C.Santosh Kumar. The Magistrate notes that this respondent was admitted in Hospital as he was complaining of chest pain and was suffering with unstable angina and the police remand was ordered till 28.5.2011. He was admitted in Ward “Old CCU” Medical Unit No.2 in bed No.3 under the treatment of Dr.Vijay and Dr.Swatantar. He was in the custody of C.Santosh Kumar. The Magistrate notes that this respondent was admitted in Hospital as he was complaining of chest pain and was suffering with unstable angina and the police remand was ordered till 28.5.2011. On that date, an application under Section 437 Cr.P.C. was made on behalf of the respondent praying for release on bail and a prayer on behalf of the prosecution for judicial remand as he had been in hospital till that time and could not be interrogated. The Court holds that the trial of the case will take sometime and no useful purpose will be served by remanding the respondents to judicial custody. It is in these circumstances that the legality of the order has come up in challenge before this Court. 9. Submissions have been made on behalf of both the State as also each of the respondents herein. The case pleaded on behalf of the respondents is one of the cancellation of bail and the powers of this Court or the trial Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C. governing the recall/cancellation of bail orders and the principles applicable. This point need not detain this Court any further. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents then urged that recalling of the order at this stage tantamounts to exercise of powers under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that no intervening/supervening events after the grant of bail has been brought on record of the case to show that the bail order deserves to be recalled. (See: The State through the Delhi Administration vs. Sanjay Gandhi, AIR 1978 SC 961, Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 267, 1984 Sim.L.C.11, State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Nand Lal, 1989(2) Sim.L.C.197, Aslam Babalal Desai vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1993 SC 1, Daulat Ram and Others vs. State of Haryana, (1995)1 SCC 349, State of U.P. through CBI vs. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005)8 SCC 21, Nityanand Rai vs. State of Bihar and another, (2005)4 SCC 178 in support of this proposition). 11. 11. There is no denying the fact that bail once granted by a reasoned judgment cannot be recalled unless the necessary ingredients of Section 439(2) of the Code are satisfied, but at the same time, this Court has jurisdiction to look into the legality, propriety and regularity of an order passed by the learned trial Court to satisfy itself that the order conforms to and is in concord with the established principles of law. 12. What is being determined in the present case is whether the order is within the confines of the jurisdiction of the learned trial Court. What cancellation of bail envisages is that the order granting bail has been abused by the person set at liberty and therefore the powers under Section 439(2) are exercised by the Court. 13. The powers of High Court under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been subject matter by the decision of the Supreme Court in a number of cases. Only a few illustrative cases may be noticed. In Nadir Khan Vs. State (Delhi Administration),AIR 1976 SC 2205, the Court holds:- “4. It is well known and has been ever recognised that the High Court is not required to act in revision merely through a conduit application at the instance of an aggrieved party. The High Court, as an effective instrument for administration of criminal justice, keeps a constant vigil, and wherever it finds that justice has suffered, it takes upon itself as its bounden duty to suo motu act where there is flagrant abuse of the law. The character of the offence and the nature of disposal of a particular case by the subordinate court prompt remedial action on the part of the High Court for the ultimate social good of the community, even though the State may be slow or silent in preferring an appeal provided for under the new Code. The High Court in a given case of public importance e.g. in now too familiar cases of food adulteration, reacts to public concern over the problem and may act suo motu on perusal of newspaper reports disclosing imposition of grossly inadequate sentence upon such offenders. This position was true and extant in the old Code of 1898 and this salutary power has not been denied by Parliament under the new Code by rearrangement of the sections. This position was true and extant in the old Code of 1898 and this salutary power has not been denied by Parliament under the new Code by rearrangement of the sections. It is true, the new Code has expressly given a right to the State under Section 377, Cr. P. C. to appeal against inadequacy of sentence which was not there under the old Code. That however does not exclude revisional jurisdiction of the high Court to act suo motu for enhancement of sentence in appropriate cases. What is an appropriate case has to be left to the discretion of the High Court. This Court will be slow to interfere with exercise of such discretion under Art. 136 of the Constitution.” (p-2205) 14. To similar effect is the judgment of Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Girdharilal Sapuru & others, (1981) 2 SCC 758 that such powers cannot be fettered by limitation and Sahab Singh Vs. State of Haryana (1990) 2 SCC 385 holding that Section 397 confers the revisional powers of the High Court as also the Court of Sessions and provide that High Court as well as the Court of Sessions may call for and examine the record in any proceeding before any inferior criminal Court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding etc. as provided. Section 401 further confers the powers of the High Court to exercise any of the powers under Sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 of the Code. This judgment was considering the question for enhancement of sentence by the Court in its revisional jurisdiction. 15. Under the revisional powers of this Court under Sections 397 and 401, this Court can call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any Criminal Court inferior to it for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order or the regularity of any proceeding etc. Similarly, under Section 401, this Court in any proceeding, the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise constitutes knowledge, the High Court may in its discretion exercise any of the powers which has been conferred upon a Court of appeal. Similarly, under Section 401, this Court in any proceeding, the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise constitutes knowledge, the High Court may in its discretion exercise any of the powers which has been conferred upon a Court of appeal. I need not reiterate that cognizance of the order in this case had been taken by this Court on its own motion and record called for and it is in this jurisdiction that the order of the learned trial Court is being examined. 16. In Purshottam Vijay and etc. vs. The State and others, 1982 Crl.L.J. 243, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pratap vs.State of U.P., 1973 Cri.L.J. 565 at page 575 holds:- “10. … … … … … … From the nature of these powers, it follows that the High Court can act either of its own motion or on the motion of even a stranger, who may be instrumental in bringing to the knowledge of the High Court a matter which otherwise the High Court may not have known. Of course, the normal course for the High Court to be seized of a matter is either at the instance of the prosecutor or the accused or the High Court itself but in some rare cases information may be received by the High Court even from a stranger. Thus, the High Court can interfere on information contained even in the newspaper or a placard on a wall or on an anonymous postcard, provided it considers that sufficient ground has been established to justify its so doing. At the same time the High Court has to be loath to take action on an application for revision presented by a third party on its own responsibility and without authority from either of the parties. It becomes the duty of the High Court to see that a stranger to the proceedings does not employ his information as an instrument of vengeance on the accused or attempt to serve his own private end. An application by a third party, therefore, merely serves the function of bringing the matter to the knowledge of the Court and in such a proceeding his counsel should not expect to be heard. (See Shailabala v. Emperor (AIR 1933 All 678) : (1933-34 Cri LJ 1115) (FB)).” (pp-248-249) 17. An application by a third party, therefore, merely serves the function of bringing the matter to the knowledge of the Court and in such a proceeding his counsel should not expect to be heard. (See Shailabala v. Emperor (AIR 1933 All 678) : (1933-34 Cri LJ 1115) (FB)).” (pp-248-249) 17. The difference between an application for cancellation of bail and a revision reviewing that order has been brought out by the High Court of Bombay in R.Shakuntala vs. Roshanlal Agarwal, 1985 Cri.L.J.68 at page 76 holding:- “13. … … …When an order is passed by the trial Court and the High Court is later on approached for the purpose of the cancellation of the bail, the basic postulate is that the order was valid when it was passed, but that on account of supervening circumstances it needed to be varied or modified or cancelled. When you file a revision application against the order granting bail, your grievance is that the order was bad from its inception. … … … … … …” (P.76 -emphasis supplied) 18. Sections 397 and 401 are complete in themselves providing for the grounds on the basis of which jurisdiction may be exercised. 19. Precedent need not be multiplied the revisional and inherent powers of the High Court which are considered by the Supreme Court in Janta Dal Vs. H.S.Chowdhary and others (1992) 4 SCC 305, the Court held:- “128. Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the new Code are analogous to Sections 435, 439 and 561-A of the old Code of 1898 except for certain substitutions, omissions and modifications. Under Section 397, the High Court possesses the general power of superintendence over the actions of courts subordinate to its which discretionary power when administered on administration side, is known as the power of superintendence and on the judicial side as the power of revision. In exercise of the discretionary powers conferred on the High Court under the provisions of this section, the High Court can, at any state, on its own motion, if it so desires and certainly when illegalities and irregularities resulting in injustice are brought to its notice, call for the records and examine them. In exercise of the discretionary powers conferred on the High Court under the provisions of this section, the High Court can, at any state, on its own motion, if it so desires and certainly when illegalities and irregularities resulting in injustice are brought to its notice, call for the records and examine them. The words in Section 435 are, however, very general and they empower the High Court to call for the record of a case not only when it intends to satisfy itself about the correctness of any finding, sentence or order but also as to the regularity of any proceeding of any subordinate court. 129. ………………………………………………………………. 130 ……………………………………………………………….. 131 ………………………………………………………………. 132. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles.” (pp.354-355) 20. To put the entire controversy at rest this Court can even exercise powers under Section 482 as held by the Supreme Court in Puran vs. Rambilas AIR 2001 SC 2023, the Supreme Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court under Section 482 and for cancellation of bail bonds. The Court holds:- “10. Further, it is to be kept in mind that the concept of setting aside the unjustified, illegal or perverse order is totally different from the concept of cancelling the bail on the ground that accused has misconducted himself or because of some new facts requiring such cancellation. This position is made clear by this Court in Gurucharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), reported in AIR 1978 SC 179 : (1978 Cri LJ 129). In that case the Court observed as under (Para 16) : "If, however, a Court of Session had admitted an accused person to bail, the State has two options. This position is made clear by this Court in Gurucharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), reported in AIR 1978 SC 179 : (1978 Cri LJ 129). In that case the Court observed as under (Para 16) : "If, however, a Court of Session had admitted an accused person to bail, the State has two options. It may move the Sessions Judge if certain new circumstances have arise which were not earlier known to the State and necessarily, therefore, to that Court. The State may as well approach the High Court being the superior Court under S. 439 (2) to commit the accused to custody. When, however, the State is aggrieved by the order of the Sessions Judge granting bail and there are no new circumstances that have cropped up except those already existed, it is futile for the State to move the Sessions Judge again and it is competent in law to move the High Court for cancellation of the bail. This position follows from the subordinate position of the Court of Session vis-a-vis the High Court. 1. 11. It must be mentioned that in support of the above submission Mr. Lalit had also relied upon the authorities in the cases of Subhendu Mishra v. Subrat Kumar Mishra, reported in 1999 Cri LJ 4063 : (1999 AIR SCW 2955 : AIR 1999 SC 3026), State (Delhi Administration) v. Sanjay Gandhi, reported in (1978) 2 SCC 411 : (AIR 1978 SC 961 : 1978 Cri LJ 952) and Bhagirathsinh Mahipat Singh Judeja v. State of Gujarat, reported in (1984) 1 SCC 284 : (AIR 1984 SC 372 : 1984 Cri LJ 160). These need not be dealt with separately as they are of no assistance in a case of this nature where bail has been cancelled for very cogent and correct reasons. 2. 12. Our view is supported by the principles laid down in the case of Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), reported in (1978) 1 SCC 118 : (AIR 1978 SC 179 : 1978 Cri LJ 129). In this case it has been held, by this Court, that under Section 439 (2), the approach should be whether the order granting bail was vitiated by any serious infirmity for which it was right and proper for the High Court, in the interest of justice, to interfere.” The Court then holds:- “16. In this case it has been held, by this Court, that under Section 439 (2), the approach should be whether the order granting bail was vitiated by any serious infirmity for which it was right and proper for the High Court, in the interest of justice, to interfere.” The Court then holds:- “16. Further, even if it is an interlocutory order, the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 is not affected by the provisions of Section 397 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That the High Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 on the basis of self-imposed restriction is a different aspect. It cannot be denied that for securing the ends of justice, the High Court can interfere with the order which causes miscarriage of justice or is palpably illegal or is unjustified. (Re. Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : (AIR 1978 SC 47 : 1978 Cri LJ 165) and Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, (1997) 4 SCC 241 : (1997 AIR SCW 950 : AIR 1997 SC 987 : 1997 Cri LJ 1519).” (pp-2026-2028 – emphasis supplied) 21. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the trial Court was well advised to have at least turned to the principles in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav and another, AIR 2004 SC 1866, laying down the parameters of the principles applicable for grant of bail. The Supreme Court holds:- “11.… … … … … … … … … .(a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence; .(b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant; .(c) Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge. See Ram Govind Upadhyay vs. Sudarshan Singh and Others [2002 (3) SCC 598] and Puran v. Rambilas and another [2001 (6) SCC 338]. 1. 14. … … … … … … In the impugned order it is noticed that the High Court has given the period of incarceration already undergone by the accused and the unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near future as grounds sufficient to enlarge the accused on bail, in spite of the fact that the accused stands charged of offences punishable with life imprisonment or even death penalty. In such cases, in our opinion, the mere fact that the accused has undergone certain period of incarceration (three years in this case) by itself would not entitle the accused to being enlarged on bail, nor the fact that the trial is not likely to be concluded in the near future either by itself or coupled with the period of incarceration would be sufficient for enlarging the appellant on bail when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe and there are allegations of tampering with the witnesses by the accused during the period he was on bail 2. 18. We agree that a conclusive finding in regard to the points urged by both the sides is not expected of the court considering a bail application. Still one should not forget as observed by this Court in the case Puran v. Rambilas and another (supra) "Giving reasons is different from discussing merits or demerits. At the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case has not to be undertaken.. That did not mean that whilst granting bail some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted did not have to be indicated." We respectfully agree with above dictum … … … … … … … … 1. 20. Before concluding, we must note though an accused has a right to make successive applications for grant of bail the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record what are the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications. In the impugned order we do not see any such fresh ground recorded by the High Court while granting bail. It also failed to take into consideration that at least on four occasions order refusing bail has been affirmed by this Court … … … … … … Such approach of the High Court, in our opinion, is violative of the principle of binding nature of judgments of superior court rendered in a lis between the same parties, and in effect tends to ignore and thereby render ineffective the principles enunciated therein which have a binding character. 2. 21. 2. 21. For the reasons stated above, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in granting bail to the first respondent on the ground that he has been in custody for a period of 3- 1/2 years or that there is no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, without taking into consideration the other factors referred to hereinabove in this judgment of ours.” (pp-1871-1874) 22. I also notice the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. through CBI vs. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005)8 SCC 21, reiterating the same principles. 23. Learned Advocate General places reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in Satish Jaggi vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, 2007 Crl.L.J.2766, to urge that the evidence cannot be considered in detail at the stage of consideration of grant of bail. This exercise according to him is impermissible. The Supreme Court in Satish Jaggi’s case supra, after considering the judgment of the Chhattisgarh High Court, held:- “6. It appears that learned Chief Justice did not consider the nature and the gravity of the offence while considering the bail application of the accused. On the contrary, while considering for bail, the learned Chief Justice appears to have decided the case pending trial on merit after scrutinising the evidence. To say the least, it is against all canons of law and judicial propriety. 12. Normally in the offence of non-bailable also, bail can be granted if the facts and circumstances so demand. We have already observed that in granting bail in non- bailable offence, the primary consideration is the gravity and the nature of the offence. A reading of the order of the learned Chief Justice shows that the nature and the gravity of the offence and its impact on the democratic fabric of the society was not at all considered. We are more concerned with the observations and findings recorded by the learned Chief Justice on the credibility and the evidential value of the witnesses at the stage of granting bail. By making such observations and findings, the learned Chief Justice has virtually acquitted the accused of all the criminal charges levelled against him even before the trial. The trial is in progress and if such findings are allowed to stand it would seriously prejudice the prosecution case. By making such observations and findings, the learned Chief Justice has virtually acquitted the accused of all the criminal charges levelled against him even before the trial. The trial is in progress and if such findings are allowed to stand it would seriously prejudice the prosecution case. At the stage of granting of bail, the Court can only go into the question of the prima facie case established for granting bail. It cannot go into the question of credibility and reliability of the witnesses put up by the prosecution. The question of credibility and reliability of prosecution witnesses can only be tested during the trial. 2. 13. In the present case, the findings recorded by the learned Chief Justice, as referred to above, virtually amounts to the regular trial pointing out the deficiency and reliability/credibility of prosecution evidence. Such findings recorded at the stage of consideration of bail, in our view, cannot be allowed to sustain. 3. 14. For the reasons afore stated, the order of the learned Chief Justice granting the bail is not sustainable in law. It is accordingly, set aside. The bail bonds and sureties of the respondent No. 3 stand cancelled. He is directed to be taken back to the custody forthwith.” (pp 2767-2768) 24. These principles, which have been expressed in a number of decisions and reiterated, are required to be applied in cases where bail is granted. What I find from the record is that the learned trial Court has given a complete go bye and adverted to conjectures and surmises in disposing of the case. Was the Court not aware about the fact of the seriousness of the allegations? Was the Court oblivious on the facts that reasons were required for rejecting the prayer made by the State asking for the custody of the accused so much so, even the direction issued for having a lawyer present during interrogation seems to have been issued without adverting to any principles of law forgetting the basic law applicable. True that in Nandini Satpathy vs. P.L. Dani and Another, (1978)2 SCC 424, the Court at one point of time directed the presence of lawyer during interrogation but at the same time the Court holds:- “63. True that in Nandini Satpathy vs. P.L. Dani and Another, (1978)2 SCC 424, the Court at one point of time directed the presence of lawyer during interrogation but at the same time the Court holds:- “63. Lawyer's presence is a constitutional claim in some circumstances in our country also, and, in the context of Article 20(3), is an assurance of awareness and observance of the right to silence. The Miranda decision has insisted that if an accused person asks for lawyer's assistance, at the stage of interrogation, it shall be granted before commencing or continuing with the questioning. We think that Article 20(3) and Article 22(1) may, in a way, be telescoped by making it prudent for the Police to permit the advocate of the accused, if there be one, to be present at the time he is examined. Over-reaching Article 20(3) and Section 161(2) will be obviated by this requirement. We do not lay down that the Police must secure the services of a lawyer. That will lead to 'police-station-lawyer' system, an abuse which breeds other vices. But all that we mean is that if an accused person expresses the wish to have his lawyer by his side when his examination goes on, this facility shall not be denied, without being exposed to the serious reproof that involuntary self-crimination secured in secrecy and by coercing the will, was the project. 64. Not that a lawyer's presence is a panacea for all problems of involuntary self-crimination, for he cannot supply answers or whisper hints or otherwise interfere with the course of questioning except to intercept where intimidatory tactics are tried, caution his client where incrimination is attempted and insist on questions and answers being noted where objections are not otherwise fully appreciated. He cannot harangue the police but may help his client and complain on his behalf, although his very presence will ordinarily remove the implicit menace of a police station.” (pp.455-456) 25. In D.K. Basu vs. State of W.B., (1997)1 SCC 416, one of the directions issued by the Supreme Court is:- “35. He cannot harangue the police but may help his client and complain on his behalf, although his very presence will ordinarily remove the implicit menace of a police station.” (pp.455-456) 25. In D.K. Basu vs. State of W.B., (1997)1 SCC 416, one of the directions issued by the Supreme Court is:- “35. We, therefore, consider it appropriate to issue the following requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf as preventive measures : .(1) … … … … … … … … … … … .(2) … … … … … … … … … … … .(3) … … … … … … … … … … … .(4) … … … … … … … … … … … .(5) … … … … … … … … … … … .(6) … … … … … … … … … … … .(7) … … … … … … … … … … … .(8) … … … … … … … … … … … .(9) … … … … … … … … … … … .(10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation. (11) … … … … … … … … … … …” (pp.435-436) 26. A combined reading of the directions issued by the Supreme Court and the guarantee given to the accused was that though ordering the presence of a lawyer an interrogation could not be equated with the lawyer himself answering the question put to the accused. The directions of the Supreme Court are clear; the answers not to be suggested by the lawyer nor his intervention called for till the tactics become intimidatory nor his presence required throughout interrogation. 27. Learned Advocate General submits that it requires custodial interrogation. In State Rep.by the C.B.I. vs. Anil Sharma, (1997)7 SCC 187, wherein the Court held:- “6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation oriented than questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this effective interrogation of suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful informations and also materials which would have been concealed. In a case like this effective interrogation of suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful informations and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre- arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third degree methods need not be countenanced, for, such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible Police Officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offenders. 7. The High Court has approached the issue as though it was considering a prayer for granting regular bail after arrest. Learned single Judge of the High Court reminded himself of the principle that "it is well-settled that bail and not jail is a normal Rule" and then observed thus : "Unless exceptional circumstances are brought to the notice of the Court which may defeat the proper investigation and fair trial, the Court will not decline bail to a person who is not accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. In the present case, no such exceptional circumstances have been brought to the notice of this Court which may defeat proper investigation to decline bail to the applicant." 2. 8. The above observations are more germane while considering an application for post-arrest bail. Consideration which should weigh with the Court while dealing with a request for anticipatory bail need not be the same as for an application to release on bail after arrest. At any rate learned single Judge ought not have sidestepped the apprehension expressed by the CBI (that respondent would influence the witnesses) as one which can be made against all accused persons in all cases. The apprehension was quite reasonable when considering the high position which respondent held and in the nature of accusation relating to a period during which he held such office.” (pp.189-190) 28. The apprehension was quite reasonable when considering the high position which respondent held and in the nature of accusation relating to a period during which he held such office.” (pp.189-190) 28. The principle laid down in State of A.P. vs. Bimal Krishna Kundu and Another, (1997)8 SCC 104, though dealing with the order of anticipatory bail, applies with equal force to custodial interrogation. The Court holds:- “12. … … … … … … … … It is disquieting that implications of arming respondents, when they are pitted against this sort of allegations involving well orchestrated conspiracy, with a pre- arrest bail order, though subject to some conditions, have not been taken into account by the learned single Judge. We have absolutely no doubt that if respondents are equipped with such an order before they are interrogated by the police it would greatly harm the investigation and would impede the prospects of unearthing all the ramifications involved in the conspiracy. Public interest also would suffer as a consequence. … … … … …” (pp.107-108) 29. In Directorate of Enforcement and Another vs. P.V. Prabhakar Rao, (1997)6 SCC 647, the Supreme Court holds:- “11. Learned Single Judge has taken into account the fact that all other accused arrested in connection with this case have been released on bail. But they were released on bail only on the failure of the investigating agency to complete the investigation within the time prescribed in the proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code. How could this respondent take advantage of that fact? We cannot overlook that the respondent too has contributed to the non-completion of the investigation. Completion of investigation could be achieved only by interrogating all the persons involved as well as acquainted with the matter and after collecting all material evidence procurable. So the learned Single Judge should never have counted this point in favour of granting anticipatory bail to the respondent. 1. 12. The most glaring feature which even the respondent did not repudiate is the magnitude of the criminal conspiracy hatched, the ingenuity with which the cabal was orchestrated and the meticulousness with which it was implemented and the colossal amount of foreign exchange siphoned off from the country. It is not disputed that whomsoever perpetrated this grave economic offence deserves to be dealt with sternly under law. It is not disputed that whomsoever perpetrated this grave economic offence deserves to be dealt with sternly under law. When the learned Single Judge himself felt, after going through the records in this case, that the materials already collected were capable of stretching an accusing finger towards the respondent, it was not at all a proper exercise of the discretion by favouring him with an order of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code. (p.650) 30. The decision in Anil Sharma’s case has been reiterated in Dukhishyam Benupani, Asstt.Director, Enforcement Directorate (FERA) vs. Arun Kumar Bajoria, (1998)1 SCC 52. In a nutshell the Court holds that custodial interrogation is required in cases to unearth basic facts constituting the offence and cannot be thwarted on the plea of personal liberty having precedence over larger interest of the Society. 31. The learned trial Court should have been alive to the situation that the case involved serious erosion of the credibility of the judicial system and the manner in which it was manipulated. The impact on public interest was plain and evident without launching into a detailed inquiry. 32. Having considered these principles, I advert to the facts of the present case. The learned trial Court has given a complete go bye to the magnitude and gravity of the offence. The illegality in the order is writ large. Offences against justice could not be treated as routine offences of forgery and cheating and the lackadaisical manner in which the judgment proceeds to dispose of the bail application by pontificating on personal liberty. 33. In the case of Kuldip Rao, his medical record has been placed on record showing his treatment at the Indira Gandhi Medical College and Hospital, Shimla as .also the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh (copies of which have been placed on the record in these proceedings and handed over to the State). I do not find this record on the trial Court file. I wonder if the learned Magistrate has turned to this record to ascertain the factual ground realities. 34. Simply saying that the respondents herein would not abscond and were, therefore, entitled to be released on bail, is a perversion of the principle as enunciated by the Supreme Court. I do not find this record on the trial Court file. I wonder if the learned Magistrate has turned to this record to ascertain the factual ground realities. 34. Simply saying that the respondents herein would not abscond and were, therefore, entitled to be released on bail, is a perversion of the principle as enunciated by the Supreme Court. The order directing the release of the respondents herein, is perverse, against all settled principles of law and cannot stand judicial scrutiny for a moment. It ignores the enormity and magnitude of an offence and the erosion of the public interest and the credibility of the judiciary by those who were supposed to protect the same. The order, therefore, deserves to be quashed and set aside as being perverse and illegal displaying if anything a total non-application of mind. In the facts and circumstances, it is directed:- .(a) That both the respondents herein will be taken into custody by the police forthwith. Keeping in view the directions issued in D.K. Basu’s case, the respondents shall be subjected to a thorough medical examination before .being detained and thereafter in accordance with law. .(b) In case of Shri Kuleep Rao, a further direction is issued that since he is a patient of unstable angina and has suffered a bleeding ulcer, he will be examined regularly at Indira Gandhi Medical College and Hospital, Shimla or such other Institution as advised by the doctors to ensure his health. In case of his hospitalization, the remand initially granted shall extend, as previously also it has been found that because of his stay in the hospital, interrogation has not been possible. .(c) The respondents shall not be subjected to any physical or mental torture. .(d) In the first instance the respondents shall be in custody of the police for five days, whereafter they shall be produced before the Magistrate for further remand in accordance with settled principles of law and taking into consideration the enormity and gravity of the offence and the .involvement of the respondents in commission of the offence. The assistance of the lawyer, as ordered, will be in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Nandini Satpathy’s and D.K. Basu’s case. The assistance of the lawyer, as ordered, will be in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Nandini Satpathy’s and D.K. Basu’s case. .(e) In case it is found or complaint is made that the advocate is interfering in the interrogation, the matter shall be reported straightway to the Magistrate in which event the presence/assistance of the advocate will not be allowed. .(f) The detention/custody of the respondents herein shall be determined in accordance with the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court and as detailed by me above. The Court shall ensure that law is implemented in letter and spirit. 35. Before parting with the case I must express my surprise and amazement in the manner in which the established principles of law have been given a go bye in dealing with the case. 36. Both these petitions have been disposed of by a separate detailed judgment of the day. The revision petitions filed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Shimla, shall abide by the decision of this Court. Let a copy of this order be placed on the files of revision petitions. Records of the Courts below be sent back immediately. June 29, 2011. (Dev Darshan Sud) (aks) Judge.