ORDER This first appeal was taken up for hearing. During the course of hearing the appellants filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure being I.A. No. 6192 of 2011 on 8.9.2011 praying therein to allow the appellants to produce the additional evidence. A counter affidavit to the said application was filed by the respondents on 19.9.2011. Thereafter both the parties were heard at length on this interlocutory application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. Both the parties submitted that although substantially the appeal itself has been heard but because during the hearing of this appeal this interlocutory application has been filed the same may be disposed of prior to the passing judgment in the first appeal on merit. 2. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that in the interest of justice and for doing substantial justice the documents which are sought to be adduced as additional evidence should be allowed. According to the learned counsel the appellant is a waqf board and some of the documents which are sought to be produced were not in possession of the waqf board and, therefore, it is essential that the application may be allowed. The learned counsel further submitted that no doubt there is lacuna in the evidence of the appellants but for pronouncing meaningful judgment the documents are necessary to be considered. The learned trial court dismissed the suit mainly finding that no documentary evidences have been produced by the plaintiffs-appellants and the question which requires to be considered in this case is only as to whether the suit property is waqf property or the ancestral property of the respondents. So far this question is concerned, on the basis of oral evidence no satisfactory judgment can be passed. In view of the above facts the application filed by the appellants seeking to produce documentary evidences some of which are public documents and some requires proof by examining witnesses may be taken into consideration as additional evidence. The learned counsel relied upon various decisions of the Apex Court on the question of Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. 3. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel Mr. S.S. Dvivedi vehemently opposed this interlocutory application and submitted that at this stage after 8 years of filing of this appeal this interlocutory application has been filed by the appellants which cannot be allowed. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel Mr. S.S. Dvivedi vehemently opposed this interlocutory application and submitted that at this stage after 8 years of filing of this appeal this interlocutory application has been filed by the appellants which cannot be allowed. The learned counsel further submitted that on 25.7.2000 a similar application was filed in the suit praying therein to call various documents mentioned in the said application from the concerned courts and authorities. The plaintiff appellant never pressed the said application which has been recorded in the order sheet dated 23.2.2001. Now therefore, the appellant cannot be allowed to agitate the same matter before the appellate court that too after expiry of such a long period. The appeal has been filed in the year 2002 and this application has been filed during the course of hearing. Moreover, according to the provision as contained in Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure the additional evidence cannot be permitted to be adduced unless the three exceptions mentioned in the said provision is fulfilled strictly. The learned counsel submitted that the additional evidence can only be permitted to be adduced if the court requires the same for pronouncing judgment and the parties have no right to adduce additional evidence at the appellate stage. Here it is not the requirement of the court but the application has been filed by the plaintiff for permission to adduce additional evidence which cannot be allowed as a routine manner. The learned counsel submitted that in the list of documents filed by the appellants the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta has also been added as document. So far this judgment is concerned, according to the learned counsel it is not a document rather it is a ruling and, therefore, it can be referred at any time without marking the same as an exhibit. The learned counsel further submitted that some of the documents were in possession of the plaintiff but intentionally they did not produce in the court below and, therefore, at such a belated state the appellants cannot be permitted to produce additional evidence because they themselves are guilty of laches and inaction. The learned counsel also relied upon various decisions in support of his contentions. 4. The learned counsel also relied upon various decisions in support of his contentions. 4. This first appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs appellants against the judgment and decree dated 31.7.2001 passed by Sub Judge 8th Ara in Title Suit No. 269 of 1996 dismissing the plaintiff appellants’ suit. The plaintiff appellant No.1 is Bihar State Sunni Waqf Board. The plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit for declaration of right, title and interest of Waqf Estate Badi Karbala Maula Bagh, Ara waqf No. 123 and also for confirmation of possession over the suit land described in Schedule 1 of the plaint and also for declaration that the suit land is not the ancestral property of defendant Nos.1 to 10 and defendant 1 to 12 had no authority to alienate it. 5. The plaintiffs appellants claimed the aforesaid relief alleging that the suit land measures 9.08 acre pertaining to cadastral survey plot No. 310 khata No. 191 in Mauja Maula Bagh, Ara is the property of the Public Waqf Estate known as Badi Karbala registered as waqf No.123. The suit lands originally belonged to Bibi Mahboob Baksh and Bibi Saheb Jen who had purchased from East India company through a registered sale deed dated 21.5.1918. They by registered deed of waqf dated 29.10.1833 dedicated the suit land for Mosque, Imambara. Sah Kamaruddin was appointed its Mutwalli. Earlier some dispute arose regarding the nature of the properties which resulted in filing Title Suit No.1 of 1880 which was decided by the District Judge, Sahabad by judgment dated 8.6.1891. On appeal Calcutta High Court passed judgment dated 3.3.1893. It may be mentioned here that for the purpose of deciding this interlocutory application it is not necessary to go into detail the pleadings of the parties. The aforesaid facts stated will suffice the matter. 6. The defendants’ case is that the suit lands are the ancestral properties of the defendant Nos. 1 to 10 and they are coming in possession of the same since the time of their ancestors. 7. By the impugned judgment and decree, the learned court below dismissed the plaintiff’s suit. The aforesaid facts stated will suffice the matter. 6. The defendants’ case is that the suit lands are the ancestral properties of the defendant Nos. 1 to 10 and they are coming in possession of the same since the time of their ancestors. 7. By the impugned judgment and decree, the learned court below dismissed the plaintiff’s suit. At the time of hearing the learned counsel for the appellant placed paragraph 8 of the judgment wherein it has been observed by the courts below that plaintiff in paragraph 5 of the plaint stated that suit land belonged to Mahboob Baksh and Bibi Saheb Jan who has purchased from East India Company on 21.5.1816 and by registered deed of public waqf dated 29.10.1833 dedicated the suit land for Mosque, Imambara etc. but no chit of paper relating to waqf deed executed by them in respect of the suit land has been produced by the plaintiffs. The trial court also observed that further no paper has been produced on behalf of the plaintiffs which will show that the disputed land has been registered under the Bihar State Sunni Waqf Board under Section 36 of the Waqf Act. According to the learned counsel for the appellants if the documentary evidences are not allowed to be produced as additional evidence in this case no judgment can be pronounced by the appellate court because on the basis of oral evidence only this question cannot be decided. Therefore, for better appreciation and for doing justice the application may be allowed. The learned counsel further submitted that it will be easier to confirm the judgment holding that since there is no documentary evidence in support of the plaintiffs’ case the appeal is dismissed but that cannot be turned as judgment within the meaning of said expression. Therefore, this is a fit case where the application may be allowed. 8. According to the learned counsel for the respondents the additional evidence cannot be allowed to be adduced by the appellate court for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way and if the application is allowed there will be de novo trial. 9. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon AIR 1965 SC 1008 , Municipal Corporation For Greater Bombay Vs. Lala Pancham of Bombay and others. 9. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon AIR 1965 SC 1008 , Municipal Corporation For Greater Bombay Vs. Lala Pancham of Bombay and others. Five judges of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said decision held that no doubt under Rule 27 the High Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined, Nut the requirement of the High Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the High Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. The learned counsel for the respondent gave much emphasis on this portion of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 10. From perusal of the aforesaid decision it appears in that case the trial court dismissed the suit. The first appellate court also dismissed the appeal. A Letter Patent Appeal was filed before Division Bench. The L.P.A. Court permitted the plaintiff to amend the plaint and observed that it is not possible to dispose of the case on the material on record as there are certain documents on record which, if unexplained, support in a large measure the contention of the plaintiffs and that defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 obtained an order by fraud and also that the order was mala fide and then further observed that “we particularly want the Commissioner and the City Engineer and the defendants to be examined on this question” and thereafter remanded the case to the court below allowing the parties to adduce fresh evidence in the matter. Considering these facts and observations of the High Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the appellate court has no jurisdiction to direct for examination of particular witness. The Apex Court held that the High Court does not say that “there is any such lacuna in this case. On the other hand, what it says is that certain documentary evidence on record purported “in a large measure” the plaintiffs’ contention about fraud and mala fide”. The Apex Court held that the High Court does not say that “there is any such lacuna in this case. On the other hand, what it says is that certain documentary evidence on record purported “in a large measure” the plaintiffs’ contention about fraud and mala fide”. Therefore, the Hon’ble Apex Court found that the High Court had in substance order a fresh trial and such course is not permissible under order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. The Apex Court also found that the High Court had not proceeded under Order 41 Rule 25. In view of the above facts of that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. The fact of the present case at our hand is entirely different. In the said judgment also the Apex Court held that the High Court has power to allow the document to be produced and a witness to be examined but the requirement of the High Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. Therefore, this is the acid test. 11. The learned counsel for the respondents next relied upon AIR 1980 SC 446 , Smt. Pramod Kumari Bhatiya Vs. Om Prakash Bhatiya and others. From perusal of the said decision it appears that the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. was rejected by the High Court considering the fact that the application to the High Court was made, many years after the suit has been filed and also quite some years after the appeal had been filed before the High Court and, therefore, the Apex Court refused to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing to receive additional evidence. Therefore, in that case the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the High Court was not interfered with by the Apex Court. It does not help in any way to the respondents. 12. The learned counsel next relied upon AIR 2001 SC 2802 , N. Kamalam (dead) and another Vs. Ayyaswamy and another. It appears that in this decision the Apex court followed the above two decisions i.e. AIR 1965 SC and AIR 1980 SC relied upon by the respondent. From the facts of the said decision it appears that in that case the validity of will was challenged. Ayyaswamy and another. It appears that in this decision the Apex court followed the above two decisions i.e. AIR 1965 SC and AIR 1980 SC relied upon by the respondent. From the facts of the said decision it appears that in that case the validity of will was challenged. Application was filed for production of attesting witness for examination to prove validity, execution of will after ten years which was rejected by the High Court. Considering all facts of that case the Apex Court refused to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court. The Apex Court quoted the aforesaid two decisions. Therefore, the decision of five judges bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1965 SC has been followed subsequently. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the next decision reported in (2006) 9 SCC 772 , State of Gujrat Vs. Mahendra Kumar Parsottam Bhai. It appears that in this decision also the Apex Court followed AIR 1965 SC 1008 , Municipal Corporation case (supra) and held that provision to Order 41 Rule 27 (1) (b) C.P.C. can be invoked only if the court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronouncing judgment and or for any other substantial cause. It appears that in that case before the first appellate court i.e. the High Court an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. was filed which was rejected by the High Court by Order dated 22.6.2000. A special leave petition filed before the Supreme Court was withdrawn on 19.7.2001. Subsequently, two applications were filed before the High Court again which were rejected. The High Court observed that Rule 27 (1) (b) or Order 41 can be invoked only if the court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. In that case it was not the fact that the court required the additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. 14. The learned counsel next relied upon (2008) 3 SCC 120 , Basayya I. Mathad Vs. Rudraya S. Mathad. It appears that in that case the additional evidence was allowed to be adduced at the stage of second appeal. The Apex Court held that the parties are not entitled to produce additional evidence as a matter of right. 14. The learned counsel next relied upon (2008) 3 SCC 120 , Basayya I. Mathad Vs. Rudraya S. Mathad. It appears that in that case the additional evidence was allowed to be adduced at the stage of second appeal. The Apex Court held that the parties are not entitled to produce additional evidence as a matter of right. It was found that the conditions under Order 41 Rule 27 were not satisfied by the parties concerned and the High Court received the additional evidence without recording any reason. 15. The learned counsel next relied upon 2007 (1) PLJR 489 , Arvind Sharma @ Pappu Vs. Ram Chander Sharma. It appears that in the said decision this court found that Order 41 Rule 27 (b) is also not applicable because it cannot be said that in absence of the additional evidence the appellate court is unable to pronounce the judgment. It appears that in that case the plaintiffs’ suit was decreed. The plaintiffs’ case was that Itwari Kuer died in the night on 14 – 15 December 1989 at about 10.40 a.m. On 15.12.1989 she was cremated in presence of plaintiff and defendant. The plaintiff on her death succeeded the property. The plaintiff then learnt that a forge and fabricated deed dated 15.12.1989 was purported to be executed by her in favour of defendant opposite party. During the trial the plaintiff produced Ext.1 and 2 which was certified copies of entries in the register of death and also the receipt of cremation chart of Varanasi. The defendant also adduced evidence on that point and that was the only question to be decided in that suit. At the belated stage the defendant filed application praying for permitting the defendant to produce the death certificate issued by Gram Panchayat dated 8.9.1993 wherein it was stated that Itwari Kuer died on 15/16.12.1989. This court considering various decisions cited by both the parties held that application has been filed after 14 years from the date of filing of the suit and three years from the date of filing of the appeal that too by a document which had come into existence more than three years after the filing of the suit. 16. This court considering various decisions cited by both the parties held that application has been filed after 14 years from the date of filing of the suit and three years from the date of filing of the appeal that too by a document which had come into existence more than three years after the filing of the suit. 16. From the above decision relied upon by the respondent it is evident and clear that all the decisions of the Apex Court and the decisions of this Court states that no doubt the appellate court has the power to allow the parties to adduce additional evidence but the requirement of the appellate court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. The application filed by a party under Order 41 Rule 27 of the C.P.C. should not be allowed as a routine manner. The court is required to consider the facts of the case. There is no such straight jacket formula that because there is delay the application should be rejected, on that ground alone if it is found that it is necessary for the purpose of enabling the court to pronounce judgment and for any other substantial cause. Therefore, this provision has to be construed considering the facts of each case. In the present case at our hand as stated above the learned court below dismissed the plaintiffs’ case holding that no chit of papers has been produced by the appellants. The question involved in the case is as to whether the suit property was dedicated to the waqf and whether it is registered in the waqf board or not. So far this question is concerned, it cannot be decided on the basis of oral evidence. It requires documentary evidence. If the application filed by the appellants is rejected then automatically this Court has to dismiss the appeal stating the facts of the case of the parties and then stating that there is no documentary evidence and, therefore, the appeal is dismissed. Whether this judgment will be called the judgment within the meaning of Section 2 sub Section 9 C.P.C. Further this Court will be doing justice to the parties by writing that the plaintiff failed to prove the case as no documentary evidence has been produced as has been done by the trial court. 17. Whether this judgment will be called the judgment within the meaning of Section 2 sub Section 9 C.P.C. Further this Court will be doing justice to the parties by writing that the plaintiff failed to prove the case as no documentary evidence has been produced as has been done by the trial court. 17. In AIR (38) 1951 SC 193, Arjan Singh Vs Kartar Singh the Apex Court has held that the discretion to receive and admit additional evidence is not an arbitrary one, but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitation specified under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In AIR 1963 SC 1526 , K. Venkataramiah Vs. A. Seetharama Reddy and others the five judges bench of the Apex Court at paragraph 10 and 13 has held as follows : “(10) Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the appellate court “to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken,” “subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed.” Rule 27 of O. 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes the conditions and limitations in the matter. The rule first lays down that the parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate court. It then proceeds to lay down two classes of cases where the appellate court may allow additional evidence to be produced. One class is where the Court appealed from has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted. The other class is whether the appellate court requires such additional evidence for itself either to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The second class of the rule requires that when additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate Court the Court shall record the reason for its admission. (13) It is very much to be desired that the courts of appeal should not overlook the provisions of cl. (2) of the Rule and should record their reasons for admitting additional evidence. We are not prepared, however, to accept the contention of the appellant that the omission to record the reason vitiates the admission of the evidence. (13) It is very much to be desired that the courts of appeal should not overlook the provisions of cl. (2) of the Rule and should record their reasons for admitting additional evidence. We are not prepared, however, to accept the contention of the appellant that the omission to record the reason vitiates the admission of the evidence. Clearly, the object of the provision is to keep a clear record of what weighed with the appellate court in allowing the additional evidence to be produced- whether this was done on the ground (i) that the court appealed from had refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (ii) it allowed it because it required it to enable it to pronounce judgment in the appeal or (iii) it allowed this for any other substantial cause. Where a further appeal lies from the decision of the appellate court such recording of the reasons is necessary and useful also to the court of further appeal for deciding whether the discretion under the rule has been judicially exercised by the court below. The omission to record the reason must therefore be treated as a serious defect. Even so, we are unable to persuade ourselves that this provision is mandatory. For, it does not seem reasonable to think that the legislature intended that even though in the circumstances of a particular case it could be definitely ascertained from the record why the appellate court allowed additional evidence and it is clear that the power was properly exercised within the limitation imposed by the first clause of the Rule all that should be set at naught merely because the provision in the second clause was not complied with. It may be mentioned that as early as 1885, when considering a similar provision in the corresponding section of the Code of 1882, viz., S. 586, the High Court of Calcutta held that this provision for recording reasons is merely directory and not imperative, Gopal Singh Vs. Jhakri Rai, ILR 12 Cal 37. We are aware of no case in which the correctness of this view has been doubted. Jhakri Rai, ILR 12 Cal 37. We are aware of no case in which the correctness of this view has been doubted. It is worth noticing that when the 1908 Code was framed and O. 41 R. 27 took the place of the old S. 568, the legislature was content to leave the provision as it was and did not think it necessary to say anything to make the requirement of recording reasons imperative. It is true that the word “shall” is used in R. 27(2), but that by itself does not make it mandatory. We are therefore of opinion that the omission of the High Court to record reasons for allowing additional evidence does not vitiate such admission.” 18. In the said decision at paragraph 16 it has been held by the Apex Court that “Apart from this, it is well to remember that the appellate court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence “to enable it to pronounce judgment” but also for “any other substantial cause”. There may well be cases where even though the court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence “to enable it to pronounce judgment”, it still considers that in the interest of justice something remain obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner”. 19. In the said decision at paragraph 17 and 18 the Apex Court has held as follows : “(17) It is easy to see that such requirement of the Court to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause is not likely to arise ordinarily unless some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent on an examination of the evidence. That is why in Parsotim Thakur Vs. Lal Mohar Thakur, 53 Ind App 254: (AIR 1931 PC 143) the Privy Council while discussing whether additional evidence can be admitted observed: “It may be required to enable the Court to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, but in either case it must be the Court that requires it. This is the plain grammatical reading of the sub-clause. This is the plain grammatical reading of the sub-clause. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but “when on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent.” (18) As the Privy Council proceeded to point out: “It may well be that the defect may be pointed out by a party, or that a party may move the Court to supply the defect, but the requirement must be the requirement of the Court upon its appreciation of the evidence as it stands.” 20. In 2008 (8) SCC 511 , North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur Vs. Bhagwan Das (dead) By LRs. the Apex Court at paragraph 14 and 15 has held as follows : “14. It is plain that under Clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 Order 41 CPC, with which we are concerned in the instant case, evidence may be admitted by an appellate authority if it “requires” to enable it to pronounce judgment “or for any other substantial cause”. The scope of the Rule, in particular of clause (b) was examined way back in 1931 by the Privy Council in Parsotim Thakur v. Lal Mohar Thakur. While observing that the provisions of Section 107 as elucidated by Order 41 Rule 27 are clearly not intended to allow litigant, who has been unsuccessful in the lower court, to patch up the weak parts of his case and fill up omissions in the court of appeal, it was observed as follows: (AIR p.148). “… Under clause (1)(b) it is only where the appellate court „requires? it (i.e. finds it needful) that additional evidence can be admitted. It may be required to enable the court to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, but in either case it must be the court that requires it. This is the plain grammatical reading of the sub-clause. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but ‘When on examining the evidence as it stands some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent?.” 15. Again in K. Venkataramiah Vs. This is the plain grammatical reading of the sub-clause. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but ‘When on examining the evidence as it stands some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent?.” 15. Again in K. Venkataramiah Vs. A Seetharama Reddy a Constitution Bench of this Court while reiterating the aforenoted observations in Parsotim case pointed out that the appellate court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence “to enable it to pronounce judgment” but also for “any other substantial cause”. There may well be cases where even though the court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence “to enable it to pronounce judgment”, it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Thus, the question whether looking into the documents, sought to be filed as additional evidence, would be necessary to pronounce judgment in a more satisfactory manner, has to be considered by the Court at the time of hearing of the appeal on merits.” 21. In view of the above settled principles of law laid down by the Apex Court as well by this Court if the documents are necessary for pouncing the judgment in more satisfactory manner the case will be one for allowing additional evidence for any other substantial cause under Order 41 Rule 27 (1) (b) C.P.C. Here as stated above since there is no documentary evidence the judgment cannot be pronounced in a more satisfactory manner. Further the interest of public at large is involved in this case. So far the submission of the learned counsel that the documents produced by the appellants are forged and fabricated documents is concerned that is the matter to be considered finally. At this stage no finding can be recorded without therebeing any evidence to the effect that the documents which are sought to be produced are either not relevant or are forged documents. At this stage no finding can be recorded without therebeing any evidence to the effect that the documents which are sought to be produced are either not relevant or are forged documents. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and in view of the decisions referred to above relied upon by the appellants as well as by the respondents it is settled now that in the interest of justice the appellate court has the power to allow a party to adduce additional evidence at appellate stage if the appellate court finds that the additional evidence is required to enable it to pronounce judgment more satisfactorily. Here in the present case, if the application is not allowed there is no question of passing any judgment what to speak of passing judgment in more satisfactory manner. The appellant has only filed the application and informed this Court about the inherent lacuna and defect which is apparent from the judgment and, therefore, has filed this application for permission to supply the defect. Therefore, in my opinion, in this case unless the documentary evidences are allowed to be brought on record as additional evidence this court will not be able to pronounce judgment in more satisfactory manner. This requirement cannot be said that the documents are required to pronouncing judgment in particular manner. 22. From perusal of the list of document filed by the appellants it appears that the judgment of Calcutta High Court has also been mentioned. In my opinion, this is a ruling of the High Court and, therefore, it is not necessary for marking the ruling as exhibit. So far the rest of the documents which are sought to be adduced as additional evidence is concerned, those are required to be marked as exhibit. Out of the said documents some are public document and some are private documents. Therefore, for proving the said documents it is necessary to examine the witnesses. 23. In the result, I allow the Interlocutory Application No. 6192 of 2011 filed by the appellants. The lower court record may be sent back to the trial court from which decree this appeal has been filed and the trial court is directed to receive evidence in support of the documentary evidence sought to be produced as additional evidence. The respondent is also at liberty to adduce evidence in rebuttal. 24. The lower court record may be sent back to the trial court from which decree this appeal has been filed and the trial court is directed to receive evidence in support of the documentary evidence sought to be produced as additional evidence. The respondent is also at liberty to adduce evidence in rebuttal. 24. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the photo copies of the documents have been filed with the interlocutory applications. He will be proving the certified copy of the documents while adducing evidence. 25. The trial court is directed to record the evidence of the parties as early as possible and send the recorded evidence of both the parties to this court as far as practicable just after recording evidence so that the appeal may be heard at an early date. Both the parties are directed to cooperate before the trial court so that the evidences may be recorded and documents may be marked within a reasonable period by the trial court without adjourning the case unnecessarily.