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2011 DIGILAW 229 (GAU)

Alifuddin v. State of Assam

2011-03-17

A.K.GOSWAMI, MADAN B.LOKUR

body2011
JUDGMENT A.K. Goswami, J. 1. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated 11.7.05 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup in Sessions Case No. 26(K)/03 convicting the accused Appellant under Section 302IPC and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/-, in default, further rigorous imprisonment for one year. 2. One Md. Asad Ali had lodged an Ejahar on 12.10.2000 stating that his son, Md. Alifuddin had killed his wife by stabbing her with a dagger while he was sleeping with her in the bed. The ejahar was received by the police at the place of occurrence at 1.10 P.M. and consequently, same was forwarded to the Officer-in-Charge, Hajo Police Station, for registering a case under Section 302IPC and accordingly, Hajo PS Case No. 176/2000 under Section 302 IPC was registered. 3. After completion of the investigation, the police submitted charge sheet under Section 302 IPC against the accused and the case being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions Judge, Kamrup by the learned Magistrate. Accordingly, Sessions Case No. 26(K)/03 was registered. Charge under Section 302 IPC was framed against the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution, in all, had examined 11 witnesses during the course of trial. The defense had also examined two witnesses. 5. We have heard Mr. NJ Das, learned Counsel for the Appellant and Mr. Z. Kamar, learned PP for the State of Assam. 6. PW 1, Siraj Ali, is a neighbor of the accused. According to him, after hearing hue and cry in the house of the accused, he went there. Some people had already gathered there and he had found Salima, the wife of the accused, dead. He also said that on being asked by his father, the accused had said that he had killed his wife. He deposed that he along with some other persons, had informed the police at the Hajo Police Station about the occurrence and accordingly, the police had come to the place of occurrence. He is also a signatory to the inquest report (Ext- 1). He also stated that on being shown by the accused, the police had seized a dagger and he was a witness to the seizure list, Ext-2. He is also a signatory to the inquest report (Ext- 1). He also stated that on being shown by the accused, the police had seized a dagger and he was a witness to the seizure list, Ext-2. He had stated that the accused had produced the dagger from inside his house and the size of the dagger would be about 1½ ft. long. In his cross-examination, he had deposed that the couple had quarreled frequently as the deceased had preferred not to stay in the village as she hailed from Guwahati. He had also clarified that he had not seen where from the accused had brought out the dagger and, in fact, he had signed the seizure list on being told by the police that they had seized the dagger. 7. P.W. 2, Md Painar Ali, also deposed that after hearing hue and cry at around 3/4 a.m. in the house of the accused, he had gone there where he found that many people including PW 1 had already assembled there. He had deposed that the accused had told that he would go to jail because he had killed his wife and that he confessed voluntarily. In cross-examination, he had stated that he had seen the dead body after it was taken out from the house. He had also gone to the police station along with PW 1. He also deposed to the effect that the police had taken the dagger from inside the house. It also came out in his evidence that the deceased used to beat up the accused sometime. In cross-examination, he reaffirmed that he heard the accused telling his father that he had killed his wife. 8. PW 3, Msstt. Gulsan Bibi, is the mother of the accused who deposed that the deceased also lived in their house and there was frequent quarrels between her son and daughter-in-law. She also stated that she had found Salima lying in the bed and the accused unconscious on the courtyard. 9. PW 4, Md. Atab Ali, who is a neighbor of the accused, had deposed that there was a hue and cry in the house of the accused and the accused had come out of the room and said that he would go to jail as he had cut a man. 9. PW 4, Md. Atab Ali, who is a neighbor of the accused, had deposed that there was a hue and cry in the house of the accused and the accused had come out of the room and said that he would go to jail as he had cut a man. He was informed by the police that the police had found a dagger in the house of the accused. 10. PW 5, Md. Latifur Raman, does not contribute much to the prosecution case and he had merely stated that he had heard that the accused had killed his wife by stabbing her with a knife. 11. PW 6, Md. Asad Ali, is the father of the accused. It is in his evidence that he had come out of the house after hearing commotion in the morning and he saw that his daughter-in-law was lying dead in the bed in the house. He stated that he also found the accused lying unconscious on the courtyard. He stated that he did not lodge any ejahar and he had merely put a signature as guardian. He stated that the accused had told him that Salima had killed herself by stabbing with a dagger. In cross-examination, he stated that he was not aware as to who had written the ejahar. 12. PW.7, Md. Rekibudin Ahmed, is the owner of a pharmacy and he had gone to the place of occurrence seeing a gathering and he found police personnel present there already. The accused was sitting in the police vehicle and the police had shown him a knife wrapped in a paper, which, he was told, was seized by the police and he had signed as a witness in the seizure list, Ext-2. He had also said that the marital life of the couple was not very cordial and they used to quarrel some time. In the cross-examination he had said that sometime before the occurrence, the brothers of the deceased had tortured him and the accused had purchased medicine from his pharmacy for treating the injuries sustained by him. 13. PW 8, Dr. Pratap Ch. In the cross-examination he had said that sometime before the occurrence, the brothers of the deceased had tortured him and the accused had purchased medicine from his pharmacy for treating the injuries sustained by him. 13. PW 8, Dr. Pratap Ch. Sarma is the Doctor who had conducted postmortem examination on the dead body of Salima Begum and he had found the following injuries on her person: 1) Defense cuts-present on palmar surface of 2nd finger of left hand on middle phalanx, size being 2 cms x 0.5 cm 0.5 cm deep. 2) Defense cut measuring 5 cms x 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm deep present on palmar surface of 3 rd finger of left and on middle phalanx. 3) Stab wound wedge shaped measuring 3 cms x 1.5. cms x chest cavity deep present on front of chest at 24 cms below suprasternal Notch and 2 cms left to midline the lower and pointed end of the wound being at 12 cms above and left to umbilicus. Weapon entered the left side of chest cavity cutting the chest wall and left side of the Xiphoid process and pierced the lower lobe of left lung chest cavity contains 1000 ml blood. Direction of the stab wound - from front to back, right to left and below upwards. According to him, death was due to shock and hemorrhage resulting from stab injury of chest which was ante-mortem, caused by sharp cutting pointed weapon and homicidal in nature. The defense declined to cross-examine this witness. 14. PW. 9, Sahanur Ali, is a neighbor. He had deposed that he heard a loud cry in the house of the accused and hearing that, he got up from sleep and came to the courtyard of the accused, where he found that the father of the accused and some other neighborhood persons had already gathered. The accused kept on saying that "he finished". The people gathered there took the accused inside his room whereupon he found Salima was lying in a pool of blood. The accused tried to flee away but he was over powered and was handed over to the police. Police seized one dagger from the house of the accused on being led and shown by the accused. In cross-examination, he had said that the dagger which was seized, was not shown to him by the prosecution. The accused tried to flee away but he was over powered and was handed over to the police. Police seized one dagger from the house of the accused on being led and shown by the accused. In cross-examination, he had said that the dagger which was seized, was not shown to him by the prosecution. He also stated that there have been frequent quarrels between the couple and a case was instituted by the wife against her husband. In cross-examination, he had said that the accused was arrested and had re-iterated that a dagger was recovered on being led by the accused. 15. PW.10, Mustt. Diljan Bibi, did not state anything about the occurrence and she is only a witness to the Ext-1. 16. PW 11, Ajmal Ali, was the Investigating Officer. He deposed that he had received verbal information from the PW 1 who had stated to him that one Alimuddin Ahmed had killed his wife and he had made one G.D. Entry No. 245 dated 12.10.2000. He had asked for lodging of a formal ejahar, but nevertheless went to the place of occurrence and took up investigation. He had found the accused person at the place of occurrence and had arrested him. He also deposed that the accused had confessed his guilt before him and other persons present and the accused had also led him to show the dagger that was concealed by him in the house and the same was seized in the presence of the witnesses. The dagger was exhibited as Material Ext-1. It is also in his evidence that he had received the ejahar at the place of occurrence. In cross-examination, he had stated that the statement of the accused was not recorded before recovery of the dagger was effected and there is also no mention in his notes before whom the recovery was made. The dagger was also not sent for Forensic Science Laboratory for examination. 17. The defense had also examined two witnesses as indicated earlier. DW 1, Musstt. Sayera Begum, had said that the cause of quarrel between the couple was the refusal of the accused to stay in the house of the father of the deceased. She does not say anything with regard to the incident. 18. DW. 2, Md. 17. The defense had also examined two witnesses as indicated earlier. DW 1, Musstt. Sayera Begum, had said that the cause of quarrel between the couple was the refusal of the accused to stay in the house of the father of the deceased. She does not say anything with regard to the incident. 18. DW. 2, Md. Kalam Ali, stated that he was present when the police had come to the place of occurrence and according to him police had not seized anything. 19. In his 313 Code of Criminal Procedure statement, the accused asserted that he had not confessed his guilt and professed his innocence. He also denounced the recovery of the dagger made at his instance and his categorical assertion was that his wife had killed herself by stabbing herself with a dagger. He also admitted that the police had taken out the dead body from inside the house. 20. Above is the broad contours of the case unfolded by the prosecution and the defense. 21. The learned trial court had based the conviction of the accused on the basis of the extra-judicial confession and the recovery of the weapon of assault at the instance of the accused person. 22. Mr. Das, learned Counsel for the Appellant, has submitted that conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial court is not sustainable and the accused Appellant is entitled to be acquitted of the charges under Section 302 IPC. According to him, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the seizure of the dagger. He further submits that the parents of the accused did not state about the so called extra-judicial confession made by the accused. He has also contended that the prosecution has suppressed the G.D. Entry and the ejahar, Ext.-1 is hit by the provision of Section162 Code of Criminal Procedure According to him, the deceased had inflicted injuries on herself as a result of which she had died. He submits that in absence of any statement recorded prior to the recovery of the dagger at the instance of the accused, no reliance can be placed on the said recovery, more so, in view of the fact that that there was conflicting versions of the prosecution witnesses. 23. Mr. Z. Kamar, learned PP, on the other hand, submits that there is nothing to disbelieve P Ws 1 and 2. 23. Mr. Z. Kamar, learned PP, on the other hand, submits that there is nothing to disbelieve P Ws 1 and 2. He also submits that in the facts and circumstances of the case, recovery of the weapon of assault and the statement of the accused has been proved. Arguing further, he submits that even if recovery part is held to be doubtful, than also, conviction can be sustained on the basis of the extra-judicial confession made by the accused. 24. We will deal with the weapon of offence first. PW 1, though had been shown as a witness to the seizure list, it would be evident from his deposition that the dagger was not seized in his presence and he did not know actually from where the police had brought out a dagger. PW 2, though was shown to be a witness to the seizure, he is conspicuously silent on the subject of seizure so made. PW 9, though had stated that the dagger was seized on being led and shown by the accused, does not depose exactly wherefrom the dagger was recovered. He does not even say whether it was blood stained. PW 11 was also not categorical as to whether the accused had supposedly kept the dagger concealed. At the cost of repetition, we have already noticed in the evidence of PW 11 that the statement of the accused was not recorded before the recovery was made at the instance of the accused. It is also to be noticed that though PW 11 refers to the dagger seized by him as a material exhibit, evidence of PW 9, who otherwise had deposed that there was a recovery made on being led and shown by the accused, stated in his evidence that the dagger which has been seized by the police had not been shown by the prosecution. The inference is that the dagger was not produced at the trial. 25. In the case of Niranjan Panja v. State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 6 SCC 525 , the High Court had relied upon the discovery made in the absence of the weapon of offence and recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and the theory of last seen together. On the basis thereof, the High Court had proceeded to hold that the chain of circumstances was complete against the accused. On the basis thereof, the High Court had proceeded to hold that the chain of circumstances was complete against the accused. The Apex Court had made the following observation in this regard: The High Court has accepted the evidence on the recovery of the so-called weapon. We fail to follow as to how the said discovery could at all be relied upon in the absence of the weapon being produced before the court.... Further, in paragraph 20, the Apex Court said thus: For effecting a discovery, a statement has to be recorded on the part of the accused showing his readiness to produce the material object and it is only the part of the statement which is not incriminating and leads to discovery which becomes admissible. The evidence of this witness does not inspire confidence and it is of no use, more particularly, because the so-called hansua allegedly produced by the accused never saw the light of the day nor had the witness identified the same and the prosecution had also not given any explanation whatsoever about the disappearance of this weapon. 26. The question as to whether a statement, which, in legal parlance is commonly referred to as "disclosure statement", need to be reduced into writing or not in order to make such a statement admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rajiv Phukan and Anr. v. State of Assam, reported in 2009 (2) GLT 414. This Court, on consideration of the authorities and relying on the provisions contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, pointed out as follows: Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we conclude that a "disclosure statement?, to be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, is not statutorily required to be reduced into writing, though prudence demands that such an information should be reduced into writing in order to enable the Court to know exactly as to what the accused is allegedly to have stated and the extent to which the information given by him is admissible. The reference shall stand answered accordingly. 27. The reference shall stand answered accordingly. 27. On the basis of the materials on record, we are reluctant to hold that the case sought to be projected by the prosecution with regard to the discovery of the weapon on being led and shown by the accused has been proved. 28. With regard to the next submission of Mr. Das that the ejahar is hit by the principle of Section162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is to be noted that the information was received at 12.00 noon regarding the alleged occurrence and the police had set out to investigate the matter and the ejahar was received at the place of occurrence at 1.10 p.m. The distance between the place of occurrence and the police station is 12 Kms. P.W. 11 had stated that he had received verbal information from PW 1 stating that the accused had killed his wife. There was no cross-examination of PW 11 with regard to the G.D. Entry recorded. The learned Counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Mukul Mandal v. The State of Assam, reported in 1997 (3) GLT 256, to contend that the ejahar has been wrongly treated as an ejahar within the meaning of Section 154 Code of Criminal Procedure The object of FIR being to obtain early information of alleged criminal activities and to record the circumstances before there is time for them to be effaced and embellished, according to learned Counsel, having regard to the GD entry already recorded, Ext-1 can at best be treated as previous statement which can be used only for the purpose of contradicting the witness. 29. It is to be noticed that there is no appreciable time difference between G.D. entry recorded and the FIR. Further more, the substance of the G.D. entry was also deposed to by the PW 11 when he made it explicitly clear that PW 1 had informed him that the accused had killed his wife. We have also noted that there is no cross-examination of the PW 11 on this point. Further more, the substance of the G.D. entry was also deposed to by the PW 11 when he made it explicitly clear that PW 1 had informed him that the accused had killed his wife. We have also noted that there is no cross-examination of the PW 11 on this point. The factual matrix in Mukul Mandal (Supra) was to the effect that after receipt of the information about the occurrence that had taken place around 8.40 p.m. on 28.8.91, police started investigation and after much of the investigation was over, and at a belated stage, the ejahar was lodged on the intervening night of 28.8.91/29.8.91 at 1.00 a.m., after 3/4 hours of having set in motion the investigation. The facts of Mukul Mandal (Supra) is clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case. We are not inclined to take a view that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis of the occurrence. 30. It would appear that while PW 1 and PW 2 are categorical to the effect that accused had voluntarily confessed that he had killed his wife, P Ws 3 and 6 gave a different picture altogether, inasmuch as, according to them, the accused was found unconscious on the courtyard. Though they were present, they did not say anything about the accused making any extra judicial confession. PW 9 had also said the accused was saying something like "he finished". PW 4 had also deposed that the accused had said that he would go to jail as he had cut a man. We will not hazard a guess as to whether these two witnesses were referring to an extra-judicial confession when the language itself is not very clear. The Investigating Officer had also deposed with regard to the extra-judicial confession made by the accused in the presence of different persons. It would appear that there is one set of evidence led by P Ws 1 and 2, who are undisputedly disinterested persons affirming the extra-judicial confession, made by the accused. Side by side, we have the evidence of P Ws 3 and 6, who are, most interested witnesses being the parents of the accused. It would appear that there is one set of evidence led by P Ws 1 and 2, who are undisputedly disinterested persons affirming the extra-judicial confession, made by the accused. Side by side, we have the evidence of P Ws 3 and 6, who are, most interested witnesses being the parents of the accused. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that when there are two sets of evidence clearly depicting two different pictures then, that set of evidence, which goes in favor of the accused, should be adopted by the court, and viewed from that angle, the accused Appellant is entitled to have the benefit of statements made by the P Ws 3 and 6. In order to bolster his submission, he has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Budhua Mura v. State of Assam, reported in 2002(2) GLT 103. 31. This Court, in the aforesaid case, making a reference to the reported case of Harchand Singh and Anr. v. State of Haryana AIR 1974 SC 344 , stated thus: 24. Coupled with the above, we have to also bear in mind that when prosecution adduces two sets of witnesses, one contradicting the other, and the Court is not a position to hold confidently as to which set of witnesses has told the truth, then, both sets of witnesses have to be discarded or, at least, the set of evidence, which goes in favour of the accused shall be adopted by the Court. Reference may be made to Harchand Singh and Anr. v. State of Haryana AIR 1974 SC 344 . Keeping in mind this salutary principle of criminal law in mind, when we revert to the case before us, we find that the evidence given by PW-2 not only projects Mangra Mura alone as assailant of the deceased Ashok but it rules out the possibility of the present Appellant having shot the deceased with arrow or having helped Mangra in killing the deceased by shooting the latter with arrow. Viewed from this angle too we have no option but to discard the evidence of PW-1, PW-4 and PW-5 as unsafe to place reliance upon. 32. Mr. Das has suggested that the projection of extra-judicial confession by the prosecution is after thought. Viewed from this angle too we have no option but to discard the evidence of PW-1, PW-4 and PW-5 as unsafe to place reliance upon. 32. Mr. Das has suggested that the projection of extra-judicial confession by the prosecution is after thought. His reasoning is this - there is no whisper whatsoever, either in the ejahar or in the deposition of PW 11, in connection with recording of G.D. entry about the so called extra-judicial confession made by the accused. We find that the submission does not have much substance. The accused was directly implicated in the ejahar. PW 11 also deposed that he went to the place of occurrence after being informed that the accused Appellant had killed his wife. In such circumstances, we do not consider it necessary to indicate in detail in the ejahar as to the source of information or how the informant came to know about it or the manner and method of committing the crime and, therefore, the submission of Mr. Das fails. 33. There is no dispute with regard the above proposition of law enunciated in Harchand Singh (Supra). The question is how it is relatable to the facts of a case. In the instant case, we have two sets of evidence as indicated earlier - one of uninterested witnesses and the other of vitally interested witnesses. P.W. 1 had informed the police along with others based on which G.D. entry was recorded wherein also, according to P.W 11, the accused was implicated in the death of his wife. PW 1 was also very candid and truthful while he had deposed in connection with the recovery of the dagger. P.W. 6 was ambivalent with regard to filing of ejahar, Ext-1. At one point of time, he had stated that he had signed as a guardian, only to state a little later, that he did not know who wrote the ejahar. None other than P Ws 3 and 6 has deposed to the effect that the accused had been found unconscious in the courtyard of the place of occurrence. Nothing has been brought on record by the defense to arouse any doubt in our mind as to why it would be unsafe to rely on the testimony of P Ws 1 and 2. We are satisfied that their evidence is reliable and trustworthy. 34. Mr. Nothing has been brought on record by the defense to arouse any doubt in our mind as to why it would be unsafe to rely on the testimony of P Ws 1 and 2. We are satisfied that their evidence is reliable and trustworthy. 34. Mr. Das places reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. E. Satyanarayana, reported in (2009) 14 SCC 400 and more particularly, paragraph 7, which reads as follows: The evidence of PW 2 shows that police was in the house of the accused around 8.00 a.m. If that be so, the first thing PW 1 would have done was to report to the police about the extra-judicial confession. That apparently has not been done. PW 1 stated that after the extra-judicial confession was made, he asked two persons to keep a watch over the accused and then the police came and the accused was handed over to the police officials. This runs contrary to the evidence of PW 14 who has clearly admitted that the position was no so. 35. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has also relied on a judgment reported in AIR 1994 SC 1594 in the case of Sakharam Shankar Bansode v. State of Maharashtra, to contend that extra-judicial confession, though a piece of evidence, has to be corroborated by independent evidence. In the said case, the trial court as well as High Court had convicted the Appellant on the basis of recovery of dagger, bloodstained clothes, motive and extra-judicial confession. PW11, to whom the alleged extra-judicial confession was made, was found to be unreliable by the Apex Court and there being no other circumstances to connect the accused with the crime, the Apex Court had set aside the conviction. 36. Learned Counsel also places reliance in the case of Kishore Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in AIR 1990 SC 2140 , to bring home the point that the extra-judicial confession, if found to be voluntary, can be relied upon by the court along with other evidence on record. 37. The facts of Satyanarayana (Supra) is clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case. Though, extra-judicial confession is regarded as a weak piece of evidence, yet there is neither any rule of law nor prudence that it cannot be acted upon unless corroborated. 37. The facts of Satyanarayana (Supra) is clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case. Though, extra-judicial confession is regarded as a weak piece of evidence, yet there is neither any rule of law nor prudence that it cannot be acted upon unless corroborated. If the evidence about the extra-judicial confession comes from witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may admit to suggest that he may have a motive for attributing a false statement to the accused coupled with the fact that the witnesses have unmistakably and unambiguously convey that the accused is a perpetrator of crime, the same may form the basis of conviction. Of course, the evidence of the witnesses have to be subjected to rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility before such extra-judicial confession can be accepted. Seeking assurance of corroboration of such extra-judicial confession before it can form the basis of conviction would tend to cast a shadow of doubt over such evidence. 38. The Apex Court, in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. M.K. Anthony reported in AIR 1985 SC 48 , had laid down as follows: 15. There is neither any rule of law nor of prudence that evidence furnished by extra-judicial confession cannot be relied upon unless corroborated by some other credible evidence. The courts have considered the evidence of extra-judicial confession as a weak piece of evidence. See Jagta v. State of Haryana 1974 CriLJ 1010 and State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh and Ors. 1975 CriLJ 282 In Sahoo v. State of U.P. 1966 CriLJ 68, it was held that 'an extra-judicial confession may be an expression of conflict of emotion, a conscious effort to stifle the pricked conscience ; an argument to find excuse or justification for his act; or a penitent or remorseful act of exaggeration of his part in the crime." Before evidence in this behalf is accepted, it must be established by cogent evidence what were the exact words used by the accused. The Court proceeded to state that even if so much was established, prudence and justice demand that such evidence cannot be made the sole ground of conviction. It may be used only as a corroborative piece of evidence. The Court proceeded to state that even if so much was established, prudence and justice demand that such evidence cannot be made the sole ground of conviction. It may be used only as a corroborative piece of evidence. In that case, the evidence was that after the commission of murder the accused was heard muttering to himself that he has finished the deceased. The High Court did not interfere with the conviction observing that the evidence of extra-judicial confession is corroborated by circumstantial evidence. However, in Pyara Singh v. State of Punjab (1978) 1 SCR 661, this Court observed that the law does not require that evidence of an extra-judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated. It thus appears that extra-judicial confession appears to have been treated as a weak piece of evidence but there is no rule of law nor rule of prudence that it cannot be acted upon unless corroborated. If the evidence about extra-judicial confession comes from the mouth of witness/witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused; the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it, then after subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, if it passes the test, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction. In such a situation to go in search of corroboration itself tends to cast a shadow of doubt over the evidence. If the evidence of extra-judicial confession is reliable, trust-worthy and beyond reproach the same can be relied upon and a conviction can be founded thereon. 39. In the Case of Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 2001 SC 330 , the Apex Court, in paragraph 6, stated thus: It is settled position of law that extra-judicial confession, if true and voluntary, it can be relied upon by the court to convict the accused for the commission of the crime alleged. 39. In the Case of Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 2001 SC 330 , the Apex Court, in paragraph 6, stated thus: It is settled position of law that extra-judicial confession, if true and voluntary, it can be relied upon by the court to convict the accused for the commission of the crime alleged. Despite inherent weakness of extra-judicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored when shown that such confession was made before a person who has no reason to state falsely and to whom it is made in the circumstances which tend to support the statement. Relying upon an earlier judgment in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh 1954 SCR 1098 , this Court again in Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1975SC 1320 held that the evidence in the form of extra-judicial confession made by the accused to witnesses cannot be always termed to be a tainted evidence. Corroboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution. If the court believes the witness before whom the confession is made and is satisfied that the confession was true and voluntarily made, then the conviction can be founded on such evidence alone. In Narayan Singh v. State of M.P. 1985 Cri LJ 1862 this Court cautioned that it is not open to the court trying the criminal case to start with presumption that extra judicial confession is always a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession. The retraction of extra-judicial confession which is a usual phenomenon in criminal cases would by itself not weaken the case of the prosecution based upon such a confession. In Kishore Chand v. State of H.P. 1990 CriLJ 2289 this Court held that an unambiguous extra judicial confession possesses high probative value force as it emanates from the person who committed the crime and is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and suggestion of any falsity. In Kishore Chand v. State of H.P. 1990 CriLJ 2289 this Court held that an unambiguous extra judicial confession possesses high probative value force as it emanates from the person who committed the crime and is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and suggestion of any falsity. However, before relying on the alleged confession the court has to be satisfied that it is voluntary and is not the result of inducement, threat or promise envisaged under Section 24 of the Evidence Act or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections25 and 26. The Court is required to look into the surrounding circumstances to find out as to whether such confession is not inspired by any improper or collateral consideration or circumvention of law suggesting that it may not be true. All relevant circumstances such as the person to whom the confession is made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made have to be scrutinized To the same effect is the judgment in Baldev Raj v. State of Haryana 1990 CrLJ 2643 . After referring to the judgment in Pyara Singh v. State of Punjab 1977 CriLJ 1941 this Court in Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey and Anr. (1992) 2 SCR 921 held that the extra judicial confession which is not obtained by coercion, promise of favour or false hope and is plenary in character and voluntary in nature can be made the basis for conviction even without corroboration. 40. We come to the conclusion that the evidence of PW 1 and PW 2, relating to the extra-judicial confession, is reliable and trustworthy. We have considered the relevant facts such as the persons to whom the confession is made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made and the words used by the accused. We have also no hesitation to hold that the extra-judicial confession made by the accused was voluntary and not a result of undue influence, pressure or inducement. In view of above, we are satisfied that the conviction can be based on the basis of extra-judicial confession made by the accused. 41. There is another aspect of the matter which is also of immense importance. There is no doubt whatsoever that dead body was lying in the bed and subsequently, the dead body was brought out. In view of above, we are satisfied that the conviction can be based on the basis of extra-judicial confession made by the accused. 41. There is another aspect of the matter which is also of immense importance. There is no doubt whatsoever that dead body was lying in the bed and subsequently, the dead body was brought out. PW 6 made it very clear that the accused and the deceased lived with their baby daughter. The evidence on record does not even remotely suggest presence of any other person or a third party. The plea taken by the accused under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure that the deceased had stabbed herself finds no corroboration in the medical report. PW 8 was clear in his mind that the death was homicidal in nature. While we can base the conviction on the basis of the extra-judicial conviction as deposed by P Ws 1 and 2, these are also materials which lead to inference of the guilt of the accused. 42. For the reasons aforesaid, we are satisfied that the Appellant is liable to be convicted under Section 302 IPC and, therefore, we dismiss this appeal. 43. Send down the LCRs forthwith. Appeal dismissed.