JUDGMENT Kuldip Singh, Judge. 1. The appellants are plaintiffs and aggrieved by judgement, decree dated 1.9.2000 passed by learned District Judge, Shimla in Civil Appeal No. 22-S/13 of 99/2000 affirming the judgement, decree dated 27.2.1999 passed by learned Sub Judge Ist Class (I), Shimla in Case No. 286-1 of 95/92. 2. The facts in brief are that Satish Chand predecessor-in-interest of appellants had filed suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondent restraining latter from deleting his name from the column of owner in possession in respect of property known as Station View Estate, Kareru, House No. 36, Shimla (for short, suit property). It has been alleged that after purchase of the suit property, late Satish Chand had received notice from Assistant Secretary (Tax), Municipal Corporation, Shimla for entering his name in municipal record and thereafter entry was made. Thus Satish Chand was made liable to pay municipal taxes, which he paid. 3. It has been alleged that thereafter Satish Chand had received letter from Assistant Secretary (Tax) for deleting his name from municipal record. The respondent had no power to delete the name once incorporated in the record or direct late Satish Chand to produce record regarding his title. The further case of late Satish Chand was that K.L.Bhatia, Naib Tehsildar (Settlement) had earlier passed illegal orders which were challenged before the High Court in writ petition and the High Court quashed those orders and directed Settlement Officer to dispose of the case himself. 4. The respondent contested the suit by filing written statement, in which preliminary objections of maintainability, cause of action were taken. On merits, respondent took the stand that late Satish Chand had failed to disclose how and when he acquired ownership over the property. Late Satish Chand was not eligible to acquire immovable property in the State of Himachal Pradesh being non-agriculturist. Late Satish Chand managed to get his name included in the record of Municipal Corporation, Shimla. He tried to take advantage of his own wrong. The entries in the municipal record based upon wrong revenue record were not legal and valid. On inquiry from revenue department, it was revealed that sale deed was cancelled by District Collector/ Registrar, Shimla. It was admitted that late Satish Chand had paid municipal taxes from the year 1989 to 1992. The proposed action was done in view of cancellation of sale deed by the competent authority. On inquiry from revenue department, it was revealed that sale deed was cancelled by District Collector/ Registrar, Shimla. It was admitted that late Satish Chand had paid municipal taxes from the year 1989 to 1992. The proposed action was done in view of cancellation of sale deed by the competent authority. The respondent was not a party in the writ petition filed in the High Court. The respondent is required to maintain record according to correct, factual and legal position. The respondent has prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned trial court:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction? OPP. 2. Whether suit is not maintainable? OPD. 3. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action? OPD. 4. Relief. The issues No. 1 and 2 were answered in negative and issue No. 3 in affirmative and the suit was dismissed by the learned Sub Judge on 27.2.1999 and the first appeal filed by the appellants was dismissed on 1.9.2000, hence second appeal, which has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the courts below have erred in law in ignoring the settled position that once a sale deed had been registered in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the applicants, the Municipal Corporation was neither competent or authorized in law to question the validity of the transfer? 2. Whether the courts below have misinterpreted the provisions of Section 392(3) of the Municipal Corporation Act, if so its effect? 3. Whether the Municipal Corporation was estopped by its acts, deeds and conduct from deleting the name of the original owner i.e. the predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants since it had entered his name in the ownership column in the Tax records and had been demanding and accepting municipal taxes from him and after his death from the present appellants even during the pendency of the suit? 4. Whether the courts below have erred in holding that the Assistant Secretary Tax appears to (sic) authorized to issue notice on behalf of the Commissioner? 5. 4. Whether the courts below have erred in holding that the Assistant Secretary Tax appears to (sic) authorized to issue notice on behalf of the Commissioner? 5. Whether the learned court below had no jurisdiction whatsoever to return any findings on the question of the entitlement of the original owner to purchase the property in H.P., more particularly as it is only the authority under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act who is competent to go into this question? 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that once the sale deed had been registered in favour of late Satish Chand, the respondent has no jurisdiction to question the validity of the sale deed. The courts below have misinterpreted Section 392(3) of Municipal Corporation Act, 1994. The respondent is estopped from deleting the name of late Satish Chand predecessor-in-interest of the appellants from the tax record inasmuch as respondent had been demanding and accepting the municipal taxes from late Satish Chand and after his death from the appellants. The Assistant Secretary (Tax) has no jurisdiction to issue notice on behalf of the Commissioner. The courts below have no jurisdiction to return findings on the question of entitlement of late Satish Chand to purchase the property in Himachal Pradesh. The authority under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (for short, 1972 Act) is the competent authority to go into the question of validity of sale deed, vide which late Satish Chand had purchased the suit property. The learned counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned judgement and decree. 7. The substantial question of law No. 2 is taken first for determination. The suit was filed on or about 15.1.1992 by Satish Chand predecessor-in-interest of appellants on receipt of notice Ex. D-1 dated 28.10.1991. On the date of filing of the suit, the H.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1979 (for short, 1979 Act) was in force, which was replaced by the H.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (for short, 1994 Act). However, in both the Acts, Section 392 provides notice to be given of suits. D-1 dated 28.10.1991. On the date of filing of the suit, the H.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1979 (for short, 1979 Act) was in force, which was replaced by the H.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (for short, 1994 Act). However, in both the Acts, Section 392 provides notice to be given of suits. The sub-section (3) of Section 392 provides that nothing in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to apply to a suit in which only relief claimed is an injunction of which the object would be defeated by giving of the notice or postponement of the institution of the suit. The suit has not been dismissed on the ground that notice was not issued under section 392 before filing the suit. The section 392(3) of both the Acts does not apply remotely in the present case. Hence, substantial question of law No. 2 is decided against the appellant. 8. The substantial questions of law No. 1, 3, 4 and 5 are interconnected, therefore, all of them are taken for determination collectively. The section 89 of 1979 Act provides taxes to be imposed by the respondent, which includes tax on lands and buildings. The incidence of taxes on lands and buildings, as per Section 96, of lands or buildings let is upon the lessor, land or building sublet is upon the superior lessor and a building un-let is upon the person in whom the right to let vests. If tenant has built upon the land then on tenant whether the land and buildings are in occupation of such tenant or sub-tenant of such tenant. The liability of several owners is joint and several. Section 100 provides assessment list to be prepared by the respondent, Commissioner has power to amend the assessment list under Section 102, sub-section (2) of Section 102 provides that amendment under sub-section (1) can be made after giving notice of one month by the Commissioner to the affected person and after considering objections of such person. Similar provisions are in 1994 Act. 9. The grievance of the appellants is that name of their predecessor was recorded in the assessment list. The Assistant Secretary had no jurisdiction to issue notice dated 28.10.1991 Ex. D-1, only Commissioner was competent to issue notice for amendment of the assessment list. Similar provisions are in 1994 Act. 9. The grievance of the appellants is that name of their predecessor was recorded in the assessment list. The Assistant Secretary had no jurisdiction to issue notice dated 28.10.1991 Ex. D-1, only Commissioner was competent to issue notice for amendment of the assessment list. The respondent has taken the stand that sale deeds have been cancelled by the District Collector/ Registrar and, therefore, the respondent had issued notice Ex. D-1, but according to appellants sale deeds vide which Satish Chand predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had purchased the suit property had not been cancelled. It has been argued that rejection of mutations cannot be made basis for deleting the name of Satish Chand or appellants from the municipal record when respondent itself has not taken such stand in the written statement that amendment of assessment list is based upon rejection of mutations. The civil court has no jurisdiction to decide whether a person is an agriculturist under the 1972 Act. The competent authority under the 1972 Act has not decided that Satish Chand or appellants are not agriculturists. 10. The orders dated 5.5.1990 and 4.9.1990 in file No. 6/99 had been quashed by High Court in CWP No. 535 of 1990 on 9.12.1991 vide Ex. PX and Settlement Officer, Shimla was directed to decide the applications of Shounku Ram and Jai Ram for entering their names in revenue record as tenants after affording adequate opportunity of being heard to the interested persons including Satish Chand. 11. The certified copy of order dated 30.6.1995 in case No. 14/1/92 decided by Settlement Collector is on record of the trial court. In that case the facts were that Shounku Ram and Jai Ram had filed an application for correction of revenue record on 30.1.1989 on the ground that they were inducted as tenants by one Narain Dass on land and house situated in khasra Nos. 139 measuring 8-2 bighas and 140/1 measuring 1-1 bigha, village Kareru. The application was contested by Dr. Kusum S. Chand successor of Satish Chand deceased. This application was partly allowed on 7.9.1990 by Assistant Collector, 2nd Grade (Settlement Naib Tehsildar). Satish Chand filed CWP No. 535/90 in the High Court for quashing order dated 7.9.1990. The High Court quashed orders dated 5.5.1990 and 7.9.1990 of Assistant Collector, 2nd Grade. The Settlement Collector conducted inquiry as per the directions of the High Court. This application was partly allowed on 7.9.1990 by Assistant Collector, 2nd Grade (Settlement Naib Tehsildar). Satish Chand filed CWP No. 535/90 in the High Court for quashing order dated 7.9.1990. The High Court quashed orders dated 5.5.1990 and 7.9.1990 of Assistant Collector, 2nd Grade. The Settlement Collector conducted inquiry as per the directions of the High Court. The application filed by Shounku Ram and Jai Ram was dismissed. The Settlement Collector sent copy of order to District Collector for taking action in accordance with law against respondent Satish Chand (deceased) as he acquired the property in violation of Section 118 of 1972 Act as was held by the Assistant Collector, 2nd Grade while rejecting mutation Nos. 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294 and 295. 12. It appears from the order dated 30.6.1995 that Satish Chand had purchased the suit property vide seven sale deeds Nos. 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630 and 631 but Assistant Collector, 2nd Grade rejected mutation No. 289 Ex. DW 1/A, mutation No. 290 Ex. DW 2/B (sic DW 1/B), mutation No. 291 Ex. DW 1/C, mutation No. 292 Ex. DW 1/D, mutation No. 293 Ex. DW 1/E, mutation No. 294 Ex. DW 1/F and mutation No. 295 Ex. DW 1/G. 13. DW 2 Jagdish Chand,Tax Inspector has proved notice Ex. D-1. He has stated that respondent had received copies Ex.DW 1/A to Ex. DW 1/G. He has stated that house No. 35-36, Station View Chakkar was entered in the record of corporation in the name of Satish Chand on 1.10.1990 on the basis of sale deeds. The Revenue Department has not given any information that sale deeds in favour of Satish Chand had been cancelled. The learned counsel for the appellants has stressed that since sale deeds in favour of Satish Chand of the suit property had not been cancelled, therefore, notice Ex. D-1 is illegal. Sub-section (1) of Section 96 of 1979 Act nowhere refers to owner. Clause (c) of sub-section 1 of Section 96 provides that incidence of taxes on unlet lands and buildings is upon the person in whom the right to let the same vests. The sub-section (3) of Section 96 provides that liability of several owners of any building which is owned in parts is joint and several. This gives an indication that incidence of taxes on un-let lands and buildings is on the owner(s). 14. The sub-section (3) of Section 96 provides that liability of several owners of any building which is owned in parts is joint and several. This gives an indication that incidence of taxes on un-let lands and buildings is on the owner(s). 14. The section 100 and section 102 of 1979 Act provides for preparation of assessment list and amendment thereof. The assessment list and its amendment is to be done in summary manner. It nowhere provides detailed inquiry like a court. The sale deeds of the property in question have not been placed on record. In the order dated 30.6.1995 it has been observed that Satish Chand has acquired the property in violation of Section 118 of 1972 Act as held by Assistant Collector, 2nd Grade while rejecting mutation Nos. 289 to 295 Ex. DW 1/A to Ex. DW 1/G of sales. The name of Satish Chand was entered in the Municipal record on the basis of sale deeds but when mutations of sales were rejected then it cannot be said that respondent was deprived to take notice of rejection of mutations Ex. DW 1/A to Ex. DW 1/G for amending the assessment list. In any case, only notice Ex.D-1 was issued to Satish Chand, he and his successors could project their case before Commissioner that no amendment of assessment list was required. Satish Chand instead of taking that course rushed to the court and filed the suit on the basis of notice Ex. D-1. 15. The Ex. D-1 is only notice, the ultimate amendment of the assessment list, if any, was to be made by the Commissioner. It cannot be presumed that Commissioner would not have considered the mandatory procedural aspect of the case before passing order for amendment of assessment list of house No. 35-36, Station View Chakkar. Satish Chand without waiting for order to be passed by the Commissioner for amendment of assessment list filed the suit. Ex. D-1 is simply a notice and not the order amending the assessment list of property i.e. house No. 35-36, Station View Chakkar 16. The respondent-corporation had power to amend the assessment list under section 102 of 1979 Act. Satish Chand without waiting for order to be passed by the Commissioner for amendment of assessment list filed the suit. Ex. D-1 is simply a notice and not the order amending the assessment list of property i.e. house No. 35-36, Station View Chakkar 16. The respondent-corporation had power to amend the assessment list under section 102 of 1979 Act. Simply because, at one point of time name of Satish Chand was recorded in the municipal record for the purposes of taxes of property No. 35-36, Station View Chakkar, it cannot be said that respondent- corporation had no power to amend the assessment list. The respondent-corporation had statutory power to amend the assessment list, therefore, there is no question of estoppel against respondent – corporation for amending the assessment list of property No. 35-36, Station View Chakkar. 17. Sub-section (2) of section 102 of 1979 Act authorizes the Commissioner to amend the assessment list after giving notice of not less than one month and after considering objections, if any. The notice Ex. D-1 was issued by the Assistant Secretary (Tax), Municipal Corporation, Shimla. Satish Chand through notice Ex. D-1 was asked to produce certain documents mentioned in the notice in view of rejection of mutations. In fact, Ex. D-1 is in the form of letter. In Ex. D-1, it has not been stated that Assistant Secretary (Tax) would himself amend the assessment list. It is not the case of the appellants that on the basis of Ex. D-1 assessment list has been amended. The suit is based upon Ex. D-1 dated 28.10.1991. Section 41 (h) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that an injunction cannot be granted when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust. The authority to amend the assessment list under 1979 Act was the Commissioner, therefore, appellants or their predecessor could approach the Commissioner and bring to his notice their grievance, which in the facts and circumstances of the case would have been alternative efficacious remedy. The appellants have not explained why they have not approached the Commissioner for their grievance instead of approaching the court directly. The notice Ex. D-1 in itself without positive order amending assessment list has neither created any right nor caused any prejudice to the appellants, even if it is assumed that notice Ex. The appellants have not explained why they have not approached the Commissioner for their grievance instead of approaching the court directly. The notice Ex. D-1 in itself without positive order amending assessment list has neither created any right nor caused any prejudice to the appellants, even if it is assumed that notice Ex. D-1 is not strictly in accordance with subsection (2) of Section 102 of 1979 Act. 18. It has been lastly contended on behalf of the appellants that court below has no jurisdiction to return the findings on the question of entitlement of original owner to purchase the property in Himachal Pradesh. The authority under 1972 Act is competent to go into this question. The learned District Judge, in the impugned judgement, has referred to Section 118 of 1972 Act. The stand of the respondent- corporation is that sale deeds are illegal and wrong and, therefore, respondent –corporation was not bound by the same. The mutations Ex. DW 1/A to Ex. DW 1/G indicate that those were rejected as agriculturist certificate was not produced by the vendee. Thus there is a dispute between the parties regarding the validity of the sale deeds, therefore, civil court is competent to decide the dispute. The learned District Judge has observed that suit is a clever device by the appellants and their predecessor to get a seal of approval as owner of the suit property and to avoid real issue that Satish Chand had purchased the suit property in violation of Section 118 of 1972 Act, as he was not an agriculturist in Himachal Pradesh. 19. There is nothing on record that registering authority before whom the sale deeds were registered had complied sub-rule (2) of Rule 38 of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Rules, 1975 and recorded a satisfaction that Satish Chand was competent to purchase the land vide sale deeds Nos. 625 to 631. It has not been pointed out by the appellants from 1972 Act or Rules that even in a case where the registering authority has registered the sale deed after recording satisfaction in terms of sub- rule (2) of Rule 38 then finality is attached to such satisfaction and civil court cannot go into the question of such satisfaction or legality of the sale deed so registered. No statutory bar has been pointed out so as to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court to consider the legality of the sale deed in terms of Section 118 of 1972 Act. 20. The two courts below have considered the material on record properly. In the light of above discussion, the above substantial questions of law No. 1, 3 4 and 5 are decided against the no order as to costs. The interim orders passed from time to time shall stand vacated. 21. In view of above discussion, the appeal is dismissed with appellants. There is no merit in the appeal, which is liable to be dismissed.