Order With the consent of the parties the matter has been taken up for disposal at the stage of admission itself. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 21.12.2009 passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Bihar, Patna in M.A. No. 5 of 2006 whereby the petition filed on behalf of the petitioner under Section 26(2) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), for withdrawal and/or cancellation of the certificate issued by the Tribunal together with petition filed under the provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’) for recall of the ex parte judgment and decree dated 16.02.1989 passed in Money Suit No. 192 of 1986, have been rejected. The petitioner has also questioned the very initiation of proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal giving rise to O.A. No. 2 of 2001 and has questioned its jurisdiction for issuance of certificate dated 22.08.2001 under Section 19(22) of the Act. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing the order dated 31.07.2004 whereby the learned Sub-Judge-8, Patna was pleased to transfer the application bearing Misc. Case No. 9 of 1994 filed on behalf of the petitioner under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree dated 16.02.1989 which upon transfer to the Debt Recovery Tribunal was numbered as Misc. Case No. 5 of 2006. 3. The brief facts of the matter essential for disposal of the writ petition is that a Firm by the name M/s Kitchen King obtained a cash Credit Loan of Rs. 40,000/- from the respondent-Bank and executed a promissory note together with letter of hypothecation on 31.05.1979. Copy of the letter of hypothecation dated 31.05.1979 and the promissory note dated 31.05.1979 are placed at Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition. The petitioner stood as one of the security together with one Som Nath Bhattacharya to the Bank loan amount of Rs. 40,000/- extended to M/s Kitchen King. It is contended that the said cash credit loan was extended to Rs. 86,000/- on 29.01.1980 without seeking any fresh guarantee from the guarantors nor any such information being provided to the petitioner regarding enhancement of the cash credit loan. 40,000/- extended to M/s Kitchen King. It is contended that the said cash credit loan was extended to Rs. 86,000/- on 29.01.1980 without seeking any fresh guarantee from the guarantors nor any such information being provided to the petitioner regarding enhancement of the cash credit loan. A fresh hypothecation was executed on 15.05.1983 by M/s Kitchen King who also executed a D.P. Note in respect thereof on 25.05.1983 undertaking to pay interest at the rate of 16% per annum. As M/s Kitchen King the borrower started defaulting in making repayment of the loan amount, a request was made to the Bank to allow them for disposal of the stocks held by them for repayment of the loan. 4. It is contended that even where the borrower M/s Kitchen King authorized the respondent-Bank to dispose of the hypothecated goods on 28.02.1984 and also gave a letter for liquidation of loan and pursuant to a letter dated 13.03.1984 of the borrowers the stock was evaluated by the Bank at Rs. 1,57,386.41 enough to cover the loan outstanding as on the said date, but the respondent-Bank even after preparing an inventory and placing the hypothecated goods under their lock and key instead of disposing of the same and liquidating the loan chose to file a money suit giving rise to money suit No. 192 of 1986 in the Court of Sub-Judge- 1, Patna for recovery of an amount of Rs. 1,48,667.89 which included the principal amount together with interest amount. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that he appeared in the money suit on 16.08.1987 and took adjournment to file a written statement but in the mean time the case was transferred from the Court of Sub- Judge-1 to the Sub-Judge-8, Patna and whereafter it was fixed for hearing on 22.09.1988. It is further the case of the petitioner that the records were never placed before the Court, on 22.09.1988 and whereafter there was a strike of the non-gazetted employees for a period of almost two months and no particular date was fixed in the proceedings. It is the case of the petitioner that after the strike was called of the matter proceeded ex parte without notice of hearing to the petitioner and other defendants and ultimately by a judgment and decree dated 16.02.1989, the claim of the Bank was allowed. It is the case of the petitioner that after the strike was called of the matter proceeded ex parte without notice of hearing to the petitioner and other defendants and ultimately by a judgment and decree dated 16.02.1989, the claim of the Bank was allowed. It is further the case of the petitioner that in terms of the judgment and decree the trial Court had allowed the Bank to charge interest at the rate of 14% per annum with quarterly rest from the date of disbursement of the loan until the presentation of the suit on 22.05.1986 and @ 14% per annum from the date of presentation of the suit until the date of actual payment. The post litigation interest was thus awarded at simple rate of interest with no capitalization thereof. 6. The Bank put the decree for execution giving rise to Execution Case No. 3 of 1990 which was filed on 17.07.1990 before the Sub-Judge-8, Patna. While the execution case was pending consideration the petitioner filed a Misc. Case under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code giving rise to Misc. Case No. 9 of 1994 for recall of the ex parte judgment and decree passed in Money Suit No. 192 of 1986. While the proceedings aforementioned were pending consideration before the Court below, the Act came into force and pursuant whereto a Tribunal was constituted at Patna. In view of the statutory provisions of the Act the Bank chose to withdraw the Execution Case No. 3 of 1990 from the Court of Sub-Judge-8 and which was permitted vide order dated 12.01.2001. Copy of the withdrawal application dated 02.12.2000 filed in Execution Case No. 3 of 1990 is placed at Annexure-A to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank and the order dated 12.01.2001 passed thereon is present in the ordersheet in the Execution Case appended at Annexure-15 of the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner. After withdrawing the execution case the respondent-Bank filed an original application under Section 19 of the Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Patna on 15.02.2001 which was registered as O.A. No. 2 of 2001 praying for grant of certificate of recovery of Rs. 10,99,004.60 and which was granted on 22.08.2001. After withdrawing the execution case the respondent-Bank filed an original application under Section 19 of the Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Patna on 15.02.2001 which was registered as O.A. No. 2 of 2001 praying for grant of certificate of recovery of Rs. 10,99,004.60 and which was granted on 22.08.2001. Consequent upon the issuance of certificate by the Tribunal, a recovery proceedings was initiated against the certificate debtors including the petitioner which was numbered as R.P. Case No. 175 of 2001. Although the execution case stood withdrawn on the application filed on behalf of the respondent-Bank from the Court of Sub-Judge-8 but the Misc. Case No. 9 of 1994 filed by the petitioner under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code remained pending without any order being passed thereon. On an application made by the respondent-Bank the said Misc. Case No. 9 of 1994 was also transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Patna from the Court of Sub-Judge 8 Patna vide order passed on 31.07.2004. 7. Even while the application of the petitioner under Order 9 r 13 remained pending for consideration before the Tribunal, the Recovery Officer ordered for attachment of the property situated at Hira Palace by order dated 22.03.2002. Copy of the order is placed at Annexure-8 to the writ petition. As the order dated 22.3.2002 was not served upon the certificate debtors hence, the Recovery Officer passed a fresh order of attachment attaching the property at Hira Palace and against which order the petitioner filed an objection on 15.02.2007 which was disposed of by order dated 07.07.2008 whereby the recovery officer while holding that 1/4th of the property situated at Hira Palace belonged to the petitioner, was pleased to release 3/4th portion of the property from the attachment. The order dated 07.07.2008 placed at Annexure-10 was challenged by the co-sharers before this Court through C.W.J.C.No.12853 of 2008 and which was disposed of by order dated 10.12.2008 (Annexure-11) requiring the Debt Recovery Tribunal to dispose of the two applications filed on behalf of the petitioner and pending before the Tribunal. The order dated 07.07.2008 placed at Annexure-10 was challenged by the co-sharers before this Court through C.W.J.C.No.12853 of 2008 and which was disposed of by order dated 10.12.2008 (Annexure-11) requiring the Debt Recovery Tribunal to dispose of the two applications filed on behalf of the petitioner and pending before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by the impugned order dated 21.12.2009 as contained in Annexure-13 has been pleased to reject the two applications filed on behalf of the petitioner namely the application filed under Section 26(2) of the Act for withdrawal/cancellation of the certificate and the application filed for under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code which upon transfer to the Tribunal was numbered as Misc. Case No. 5 of 2006. It is in these circumstances the present writ petition came to be filed questioning the very jurisdiction of the Tribunal in entertaining the application filed on behalf of the Bank. 8. Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner with reference to the provisions of Section 1(4) of the Act submitted that it is only in circumstances where the amount of debt due to any Bank or financial institutions exceeds Rs. 10 lacs that the recovery thereof falls within the jurisdiction of the Debt Recovery Tribunal and not otherwise. Learned counsel with reference to the judgment passed in Money Suit No. 192 of 1986 placed at Annexure-6 submitted that the judgment was in two parts and the learned trial Court while allowing the Bank to recover interest at the rate of 14% per annum with quarterly rest from the date of disbursement of the loan amount until the presentation of the suit had modified the said rate of interest to simple interest at the rate of 14 % per annum to be calculated with effect from the date of filing of the suit on 22.05.1986 until its recovery. Learned counsel with reference to the decree which is a part of Annexure-6 submits that the same in no uncertain terms provides interest at the rate of 14% per annum from 22.05.1986 to 16.02.1989 and until the date of realization together with the cost of Rs. 4924.90. Learned counsel thus submits that the distinction in the nature of interest awarded by the Trial Court is manifest from the judgment and decree itself and requires no interpretation. 9. 4924.90. Learned counsel thus submits that the distinction in the nature of interest awarded by the Trial Court is manifest from the judgment and decree itself and requires no interpretation. 9. Learned counsel referring to a calculation chart placed at Annexure-14 to the writ petition submits that the interest in terms of the decree has been calculated by the petitioner with effect from the date of the filing of the suit until the withdrawal of the execution case on 15.02.2001 and which comes to not more than Rs. 6,49,237.46. He thus submits that the debt amount being less than Rs. 10 lacs, the Debt Recovery Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed on behalf of the Bank. It was contended that even before the executing Court could quantify the decretal amount as on the date of withdrawal of the case on 12.1.2001, the Bank chose to withdraw the same. Learned counsel with reference to the judgment passed in the money suit submitted that had the trial Court intended to award compound interest throughout the pendency of the proceedings and until the realization of the suit amount there was no occasion to bifurcate the order in two parts for the purpose of calculation of interest i.e., one with effect from the date of disbursement until the date of filing of the suit to be calculated at the rate of 14 % per annum with quarterly rest and thereafter to be calculated at the rate of 14 % per annum only. It was contended that the very distinction between two sets of interest by itself demonstrates that whereas the first part was to be calculated at a compound rate by capitalization of the interest amount but the rate of interest for the period subsequent to the institution of the money suit on 22.05.1986 was to be calculated at flat rate of 14% per annum of the debt claim amount of Rs. 1,48,767.89. It was thus contended that any interpretation to the award of interest by the trial Court could only be done by the Court itself and neither the Bank nor the Debt Recovery Tribunal could assume jurisdiction to interpret judgment and decree passed the learned Sub-Judge-8, Patna while allowing the Money Suit and awarding interest. 10. 1,48,767.89. It was thus contended that any interpretation to the award of interest by the trial Court could only be done by the Court itself and neither the Bank nor the Debt Recovery Tribunal could assume jurisdiction to interpret judgment and decree passed the learned Sub-Judge-8, Patna while allowing the Money Suit and awarding interest. 10. Learned counsel with reference to a case reported in (2002) 1 SCC 367 (Central Bank of India versus Ravindra & Ors.) submits that a similar confusion was sought to be created by the respondent Bank in the said case and the Apex Court upon consideration of the relevant provisions of the Code, the Banking Regulation Act and the R.B.I Circulars on the issue, was pleased to hold that award of interest pendente lite and post decree is discretionary with the Court in seisen of the suit proceedings and is essentially governed by Section 34 of the Code, de hors the contract between the parties. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon paragraphs 36,39,40 and 55(4) & (8) submitted that interpretation as regarding the rate of interest awarded by the trial Court given by the Bank and admitted by the Debt Recovery Tribunal is completely in conflict with the law so settled. 12. It was thus contended that the withdrawal of the execution case by the respondent-Bank even before the amount of debt as existing on the said date could be quantified by the trial Court has proved fatal for the Bank and cannot be cured. It was further contended that the provisions of Section 31 of the Act by itself conceives of transfer of proceedings pending on the date of enforcement of the Act to the Debt Recovery Tribunal and thus the transfer is by operation law. It is contended that the respondent Bank by preempting the law to take its course and having withdrawn the execution case is to blame themselves for the lapse. Learned counsel contended that the filing of an original application under Section 19 of the Act was hopelessly barred by limitation and thus not maintainable. 13. It is contended that the respondent Bank by preempting the law to take its course and having withdrawn the execution case is to blame themselves for the lapse. Learned counsel contended that the filing of an original application under Section 19 of the Act was hopelessly barred by limitation and thus not maintainable. 13. Learned counsel in the aforesaid circumstances submitted that the entire proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal right from the stage of filing of the original application bearing O.A.No.2 of 2001, the issuance of certificate thereon giving rise to recovery proceedings in R.P. No. 175 of 2001, the orders of attachment passed thereunder together with the impugned order dated 21.12.2009 placed at Annexure-13 are per se illegal without sanction of law and dehors the provisions of the Act. 14. Mr. Ajay Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the Bank responding to the contentions and with reference to the provisions of Section 1(4) of the Act submits that no sooner the decretal amount reaches, a quantum of Rs. 10 lacs, it goes beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and stands transferred to the jurisdiction of the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Learned counsel with reference to the withdrawal application present at Annexure-A to the counter affidavit submitted that it was in the circumstances where the debt amount together with interest had exceeded an amount of Rs. 10 lacs rendering the proceedings triable by the Debt Recovery Tribunal that the Bank sought permission from the Executing Court of Sub-Judge-8, Patna to withdraw the execution case with permission to file an execution case before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. It is stated that following the permission granted by the Executing Court, an appropriate application was filed under the provisions of the Act before the Tribunal at Patna giving rise to O.A. No. 2 of 2001 instituted for execution of the decree passed in Money Suit No. 192 of 1986/ 299 of 1987. Learned counsel with reference to the provisions of Section 31A submits that a plain reading of the provisions in no uncertain terms enables the Bank to file an appropriate application for recovery of the amount in circumstances where a decree passed by any Court prior to commencement of the Recovery of Debt Due to Bank and Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act, 2000 had not yet been executed. 15. 15. Learned counsel in support of his submissions has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (2000)6 SCC 655 (Punjab National Bank versus Chajju Ram). It was contended that notwithstanding the pendency of the execution case before the Civil Court the Bank was fully entitled to file an independent application before the Tribunal by virtue of the right conferred under the provisions of Section 31A of the Act because the decree had not yet been executed. It was contended that the petitioner neither having questioned the withdrawal of the execution proceedings nor questioned the transfer of his application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code cannot for the first time question the same before this Court after the order has been passed. It was contended that the execution case was withdrawn from the court of Sub Judge-8, Patna and again filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 before the Tribunal. It was submitted that even if this Court ultimately holds that the Bank was before a wrong forum yet as the application was filed by the respondent-Bank before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Patna within the limitation period of 12 years from the passing of the judgment and decree on 16.02.1989, the Bank can yet revert back to the Civil Court for execution thereof and the claim of the Bank cannot be held irrecoverable on grounds of limitation or res judicata. It was further contended that the petitioner never questioned the issuance of certificate by the Debt Recovery Tribunal and which has now become binding on him. With reference to Section 25 of the Act it was submitted that the Recovery Officer has been empowered to recover the amount of debt specified in the certificate by one or more modes as provided under Clause (A), (B) and (C) thereof. It was further contended that the application filed under Section 26(2) of the Act for withdrawal/cancellation of the Certificate did not raise issue of jurisdiction as is manifest from the written arguments placed at Annexure 12 of the writ petition and the same is an afterthought. It was submitted that the issue of jurisdiction was for the first time raised before this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 12853 of 2008. It was submitted that the issue of jurisdiction was for the first time raised before this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 12853 of 2008. With reference to the judgment and decree passed by the Court below it was contended that as the judgment required the payment of the decretal amount to be made within two months of the passing of the judgment hence even if the submission of the counsel for the petitioner is accepted for the sake of argument yet the simple rate of interest at the rate of 14% per annum could only be for the period from the date of filing of the suit on 22.05.1986 until two months of the passing of the judgment on 16.02.1989 and whereafter the petitioner would be bound to pay interest at the contractual rate. 16. Mr. Sinha, concluding his arguments submitted that there was no infirmity on the part of the Bank in having withdrawn the execution case from the Court below for filing of an independent case under the provisions of Section 31A of the Act and which had to proceed as an original application filed under Section 19 of the Act and adjudicated upon by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Learned counsel thus submits that the order passed by the Tribunal impugned in the present proceedings is in accordance with law and required no interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17. Mr. Jitendra Singh, learned Senior counsel with reference to the order passed in the previous round of litigation between the parties and present at Annexure-11 submits that not only the issue raised by the petitioner under Section 26(2) of the Act had to be determined by the Debt Recovery Tribunal in the backdrop of the observations made by this Court in its order dated 10.12.2008 placed at Annexure-11 but also after taking into consideration the calculation chart appended to the said application and which has also been placed at Annexure-14 to the present proceedings. Learned counsel with reference to the findings of the Tribunal present at paragraph 13 of the impugned order submits that the same is in the teeth of the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Central Bank of India versus Ravindra (supra). 18. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials available on record of the proceedings. 18. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials available on record of the proceedings. 19. The petitioner has questioned the very jurisdiction of the Debt Recovery Tribunal in entertaining the application filed on behalf of the respondent- Bank under Section 19 of the Act purporting to be an application under Section 31A of the Act, for execution of the decree passed by the learned Sub-Judge-8, Patna in Title Suit No. 192 of 1986, primarily in the light of the statutory provisions present at Section 1(4) of the Act. 20. According to the petitioner the decretal amount even today is less than Rs. 10 lacs and thus in view of the provisions of Section 1(4) of the Act, the Tribunal while entertaining the proceedings is acting wholly without jurisdiction. In support of the contentions that the decretal amount either on the date of withdrawal of the execution proceedings on 12.01.2001 or even today continues to remain below Rs. 10 lacs, the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India versus Ravindra (supra) and the calculation chart present at Annexure-14 to the writ petition. 21. Opposing the contentions of the petitioner the stand of the Bank is that the rate of interest awarded by the trial Court was to be calculated at a compound rate and following which calculation, as the decretal amount as on the date of withdrawal of the execution proceedings had exceeded Rs. 10 lacs, hence the proceedings travelled out of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and stood vested in the Debt Recovery Tribunal under the provisions of the Act. 22. Considering the rival submissions, the only issue which falls for determination before this Court is whether or not the interest awarded by the trial Court was to be calculated at a simple rate of interest or compounded annually. 23. The statutory provisions of the Act as present at Section 1(4) has been engrafted in a negative form and excludes the applicability of the Act where the debt amount due to any Bank or financial institution or a consortium of Bank or financial institution is less than Rs. 10 lacs. Thus unless the debt amount due to any Bank surpasses the pecuniary limit of Rs. 10 lacs, the Banks or financial institutions cannot take recourse to the remedy available under the Act. 10 lacs. Thus unless the debt amount due to any Bank surpasses the pecuniary limit of Rs. 10 lacs, the Banks or financial institutions cannot take recourse to the remedy available under the Act. In fact, the moment the debt due amount reaches Rs. 10 lacs, by operation of Section 31, the proceeding stands transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal constituted under the provisions of Section 3 of the Act for recovery of the amount due. By now it is well settled that the word “proceeding” as referred to in Section 31 of the Act also includes execution proceedings. Reference in this regard is made to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (2000) 4 SCC 406 (Allahabad Bank versus Canara Bank) followed in (2000) 6 SCC 655 (Punjab National Bank versus Chajju Ram). 24. By an Amendment Act of 2000 the provisions of Section 31A was incorporated in the Act conferring powers on the Tribunal to issue certificate in such of the cases where any decree or order passed by a Court before the commencement of the Amendment Act, 2000, had not yet been executed. The provisions of Section 31A enabled the Bank or the aggrieved party in circumstances where the decree had not been executed, to file an application before the Tribunal for issuance of a certificate of recovery. 25. In so far as the present case is concerned, undisbutably the money suit was decreed on 16.02.1989 and the proceeding for execution of the decree was instituted in the year 1990 i.e. prior to the enforcement of the Act in 1993. The execution proceedings pending before the learned Sub-Judge-8, Patna could either be transferred to the Tribunal under Section 31 of the Act or as the decree had not been executed until the enforcement of the Amendment Act in the year 2000, the respondent Bank had an alternative in filing an independent application before the Tribunal for issuance of a certificate of recovery. However, in either of the situations the core issue would remain whether the decretal amount satisfied the provisions of Section 1(4) of the Act and had reached Rs. 10 lacs so as to bring the matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Undisputably, the Bank did not allow the Executing Court of Sub-Judge-8, Patna to quantify the decretal amount before choosing to withdraw the Execution Case No. 3 of 1990 on 12.01.2001. 26. 10 lacs so as to bring the matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Undisputably, the Bank did not allow the Executing Court of Sub-Judge-8, Patna to quantify the decretal amount before choosing to withdraw the Execution Case No. 3 of 1990 on 12.01.2001. 26. A perusal of the withdrawal application placed at Annexure-A to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Bank, manifests that the application was not accompanied with any calculation chart rather the Bank by merely declaring that the debt amount had exceeded Rs. 10 lacs and hence triable by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Patna, chose to withdraw the Execution proceedings. The permission granted by the learned Sub-Judge-8, Patna allowing the Bank to withdraw the execution proceedings in no manner can be construed to be an acceptance of the debt position. Having withdrawn the execution proceedings, the Bank instead of filing an appropriate application under Section 31A of the Act, went on to file an original application under section 19 of the Act. Without entering into the issue as to whether or not the application filed on behalf of the Bank under Section 19 of the Act for execution of the decree passed by the trial Court was maintainable, even assuming that the said application was an application filed under Section 31A of the Act, the Tribunal certainly could not exercise jurisdiction on a mere declaration on the part of the respondent Bank that the debt due amount in terms of the decree of the trial Court had exceeded Rs. 10 lacs and hence the proceedings lay before the Tribunal. 27. It is not a circumstance where the executing Court had given any finding regarding the debt due amount payable to the Bank before allowing the Bank to withdraw the execution proceedings or any such application had been filed on behalf of the Bank requiring the Executing Court to quantify the debt due amount rather the respondent Bank by unilaterally declaring that the debt due amount had exceeded Rs. 10 lacs, sought permission of the Executing Court to withdraw the execution proceedings and which was allowed. 28. 10 lacs, sought permission of the Executing Court to withdraw the execution proceedings and which was allowed. 28. It is not in dispute that the respondent-Bank had twin options open in respect of the execution proceedings that is either to pray for its transfer to the Tribunal by invoking the provisions of Section 31 of the Act or notwithstanding the pendency of the execution proceedings, file an appropriate application before the Tribunal under Section 31A of the Act for issuance of certificate of recovery of the debt. The Bank instead chose to withdraw the execution proceeding itself. 29. As the Executing Court was not allowed by the Bank to quantify the debt due amount as on the date of withdrawal of the execution proceedings and the Debt Recovery Tribunal proceeded to issue the certificate of recovery of Rs. 10,99,004.60 on 22.08.2001 giving rise to recovery proceedings bearing R.P. Case No. 175 of 2001 on mere asking by the bank without bothering to examine the correctness of the claim and which has been given a post facto approval by the impugned order, this Court is called upon to decide as to whether at all the Tribunal had any jurisdiction to entertain the application filed on behalf of the Bank for execution of the decree passed by the learned Sub-Judge-8, Patna and whether orders passed pursuant thereto have sanction of law. 30. The entire issue centers around the interpretation of the judgment passed by the trial Court in Money Suit No. 192 of 1986. This exercise could have been avoided, had the Bank allowed the Executing Court of Sub-Judge-8, Patna to quantify the debt due amount as per the decree. The issue however, having been deliberated upon the Tribunal under the impugned order, it is to be seen whether it is the correct interpretation of the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 31. A plain reading of the judgment passed by the trial Court in Money Suit No. 192 of 1986 placed at Annexure-6 in no uncertain terms manifest that interest has been awarded in two forms. 31. A plain reading of the judgment passed by the trial Court in Money Suit No. 192 of 1986 placed at Annexure-6 in no uncertain terms manifest that interest has been awarded in two forms. Whereas the rate of interest from the date of disbursement of the loan amount until the filing of the suit on 22.05.1986 has been awarded @ 14% per annum with quarterly rest, the rate of interest awarded from the date of filing of the suit until the date of judgment and decree passed on 16.02.1989 and until realization was passed @ 14% per annum only with no rests either quarterly, six monthly or annually. Thus the trial Court by itself had carved out a distinction in the matter of award of interest on the debt amount for the pre litigation period and for the post litigation period until realization and whereas it had chosen to award interest with quarterly rest for the pre litigation period no such stipulation is found in the judgment of the trial Court as present at Annexure-6 for the period since after the institution of the suit on 22.05.1986 until the judgment and decree and/or its realization. If the trial Court intended to maintain the same rate of interest for the entire period beginning from the disbursement of the loan until its realization, there was no occasion to create a distinction in the judgment which is self eloquent. While allowing compound interest for the pre litigation period i.e. until the filing of the money suit on 22.05.1986, the trial Court did not put any stipulation for the post litigation period and the same was allowed at a flat rate of 14% per annum only meaning thereby that a simple rate of interest @ 14 % was awarded for the post litigation period until its realization. It is rather surprising that even while the said distinction has been taken note of by the Tribunal in paragraph 7 of the impugned order yet while interpreting the same in paragraph 13 a serious illegality has been committed by the Tribunal in holding that in absence of stipulation, the interest awarded would always mean compound interest. 32. It is rather surprising that even while the said distinction has been taken note of by the Tribunal in paragraph 7 of the impugned order yet while interpreting the same in paragraph 13 a serious illegality has been committed by the Tribunal in holding that in absence of stipulation, the interest awarded would always mean compound interest. 32. The finding of the Debt Recovery Tribunal is converse to the legal position and the correct position is that in absence of any stipulation in the award of interest it shall always mean a simple rate of interest until it is qualified to mean compound interest. The award of interest pendente lite i.e. after the institution of the suit is essentially governed by Section 34 of the Code as held by the Supreme Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Central Bank of India versus Ravindra (supra) and this Court would do no better but to reproduce paragraph 55 (8) of the said judgment :- “(8) Award of interest pendente lite and post-decree is discretionary with the court as it is essentially governed by Section 34 CPC dehors the contract between the parties. In a given case if the court finds that in the principal sum adjudged on the date of the suit the component of interest is disproportionate with the component of the principal sum actually advanced the court may exercise its discretion in awarding interest pendente lite and post-decree interest at a lower rate or may even decline awarding such interest. The discretion shall be exercised fairly, judiciously and for reasons and not in an arbitrary or fanciful manner.” 33. Thus pendente lite interest or future interest i.e. from the date of decree until realization has to be lower than the pre litigation interest or the contractual rate of interest. The decree passed in the money suit also merely awards interest on the debt due amount of Rs. 1,48,667.89 @ 14 % per annum with effect from 22.05.1986 to 16.02.1989 and until the realization of the dues. Conspicuously the interest so awarded is not accompanied with the words quarterly rests or six monthly rests or annual rests or the like as can be found in the judgment in context with the pre litigation interest i.e. until filing of the suit on 22.05.1986. Conspicuously the interest so awarded is not accompanied with the words quarterly rests or six monthly rests or annual rests or the like as can be found in the judgment in context with the pre litigation interest i.e. until filing of the suit on 22.05.1986. The Interest Act, 1978 while conferring powers on the Court to allow interest independently provides for award of interest upon interest. Thus in absence of any stipulation in the order of a Court awarding interest by specifying it to be at a compound rate, it would always mean that the interest has been awarded at a simple rate. 34. A similar issue had come up for consideration before the Jharkhand High Court in a matter concerning the State of Bihar and a Bench of Jharkhand High Court upon consideration of the statutory provisions was pleased to hold that where the decree was silent regarding the payment of compound interest, it would be deemed that the Court had refused compound interest. The judgment of the Jharkhand High Court is since reported in AIR 2004 Jharkhand 29 (State of Bihar versus Mijaz International). The very judgment relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Bank rendered in the case of Punjab National Bank versus Chajju Ram (supra) also fortifies this position. In the said case also the trial Court had decreed the suit with interest @ 16 ½ % per annum from the date of filing of the suit till the date of recovery as in the present case. The suit was filed on 26.08.1988, the judgment was passed on 16.02.1994 and an execution application was filed on 21.12.1994 for recovery of the amount of Rs. 12,91,398/- i.e. the principal amount of Rs. 6,16,250/- plus interest there thereon @ 16 ½ % p.a as per the decree. It is but obvious that the recovery amount was calculated by applying simple rate of interest otherwise the amount would have been much higher. 35. The finding of the Tribunal at paragraph 13 of the impugned order disallowing the contentions of the petitioner by holding that where the Court intends to award simple rate it has to be specifically mentioned as such failing which it would mean that the interest would compound each year and would become principal thereafter for further calculation of interest, is upon complete misappreciation of the legal position and difficult to be upheld. The Tribunal while holding as such has completely misdirected itself. 36. The legal position is otherwise and the reason is simple. A compound rate of interest leads to capitalization of an interest amount and casts extra burden on the borrower and thus requires to be spelt out in such manner by the Court concerned while awarding interest. Where the Court concerned is silent and awards interest at a particular rate per annum without making any further specifications as to its calculation, it shall be deemed that the Court has awarded interest at a simple rate. 37. The chart appended at Annexure-14 of the writ petition manifests that calculating the due amount in terms of the decree passed by the trial Court in Money Suit No. 192 of 1986 by applying interest @ 14 % per annum, even today the Debt Recovery Tribunal lacks jurisdiction, for the amount of debt continues to remain below Rs. 10 lacs. The withdrawal of the execution proceedings by the respondent Bank from the Court of Sub Judge 8, Patna without allowing the Court to quantify the amount in terms of its judgment and decree, has proved fatal to its interests and only they can be blamed for the serious lapse. 38. For the reasons aforesaid the impugned order dated 22.12.2009 as contained in Annexure-13 together with the entire proceedings pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Patna right from the stage of initiation of proceedings under O.A.No.2 of 2001, the issuance of certificate thereon dated 22.08.2001, the recovery proceedings in R.P. No. 175 of 2001 are without jurisdiction, having no sanction of law and thus quashed and set aside. 39. For the same reasons even the order dated 31.07.2004 of the learned Sub Judge-8, Patna transferring Misc. Case No. 9 of 1994 filed on behalf of the petitioner under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code, also cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed and set aside. 40. The writ petition is allowed.