JUDGMENT As common questions of facts and law arise in all these four petitions, they are disposed of by this common judgment. In all these four petitions preferred by the Bhuj Municipality through its Chief Officer, the challenge is to the orders passed by the Labour Court, Kutch at Bhuj in Recovery Application Nos.27/1997, 21/1997, 18/1997 and 28/1997 respectively filed by the respondent-workmen in all four respective petitions. The issue involved in all these four petitions is common and is in a very compass. It is with regard to applicability of Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act'). The respective workman preferred Recovery Application before the Labour Court praying for recovery of difference of pay between the post of Driver and Labourer as, according to them, they were appointed as Driver and were performing duties as Driver even though they were paid salary of Labourer. They, therefore, claimed difference of pay along with other benefits of the post of Driver from the date of their appointment with effect from 1st July 1986, 6th August 1995, 14th September 1985 and 1st February 1982, along with 18% interest per annum, till they are paid the pay of the post of Driver under Section 33C(2) of the Act. It appears that the petitioner – Nagarpalika was served with notice issued by the Labour Court and in response to the notice, the petitioner appeared through its advocate and filed reply stating that the applications are not maintainable, they are false, fabricated and contrary to the provisions of law. It also appears from the impugned orders passed by the Labour Court that after filing of the reply to each of the Recovery Applications, learned advocate for the petitioner – Nagarpalika did not remain present thereafter at any point of time and, therefore, the Labour Court was left with no other option but to proceed further with the hearing of the Applications. It also appears from the impugned orders that each of the workman examined themselves by leading oral evidence but they were not cross-examined by the petitioner – Nagarpalika. They also adduced documentary evidence in support of their claim. The Labour Court, having considered the oral evidence led by each of the workman, the documentary evidence adduced and submissions made, ultimately allowed the Applications and directed the petitioner – Nagarpalika to pay the amount of difference of pay, D.A., etc. They also adduced documentary evidence in support of their claim. The Labour Court, having considered the oral evidence led by each of the workman, the documentary evidence adduced and submissions made, ultimately allowed the Applications and directed the petitioner – Nagarpalika to pay the amount of difference of pay, D.A., etc. with effect from different dates as applicable in the cases of each of the workman till the workman is given regular pay of Driver along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. The Labour Court also directed to fix the pay of the workmen in the pay-scale of permanent post of Driver along with all other admissible benefits as per rules. The Labour Court directed the petitioner – Nagarpalika to deposit the requisite amounts within 60 days from the date of the order along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum with the Court for payment to the workmen, failing which recovery warrant would be issued under the Land Revenue Code after expiry of the stipulated period of 60 days. The recovery certificates were ordered to be sent to the concerned authority under Section 33C(1) of the Act. It is against these orders passed by the Labour Court in the case of four workmen, the petitioner – Nagarpalika has preferred the present four petitions. I have heard learned advocates Mr.B.Y.Mankad appearing for the petitioner – Nagarpalika, Mr.A.J.Vyas and Mr.Mehul S.Shah for the respondent-workman in the respective petition. Contentions put forward by learned advocate Mr.Mankad appearing for the petitioner – Nagarpalika are summarised as under:- 1. The main bone of contention is that the Labour Court has exceeded its jurisdiction while exercising powers under Section 33C(1) and (2) of the Act, because the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act are in the nature of execution proceedings and the Labour Court can only interpret the award or the settlement on which the claim is based. According to him, in the present case, there is no award or settlement of any nature which the Labour Court could have interpreted and, therefore, the Labour Court ought not to have straightway passed the order of recovery in exercise of power under Section 33C (2) of the Act. 2. The second contention is that the order made is an ex-parte order. 2. The second contention is that the order made is an ex-parte order. The Labour Court has not given opportunity to the petitioner – Nagarpalika to oppose the applications filed by the respective workman and to lead evidence; oral as well as documentary. His contention is that the Labour Court has passed the orders in haste. He has relied upon the decisions rendered by this Court in the matters of Executive Engineer, G.E.B., Surat and another v/s. J.B.Soni, reported in 2000(2) GLH 282; GMDC Employees Union v/s. Gujarat Minerals Development Corporation, reported in 2000(2) GLH 523 ; and State of U.P. and another v/s. Brijpal Singh, reported in (2005)8 SCC 58 ]. Per contra, contentions raised on behalf of the respective respondent-workman are as under:- 1. It is submitted that the petitioner – Nagarpalika hadalready taken a decision way back in the year 1999 to pay minimum wages to the workmen working as Drivers. Counsel for the respondents-workmen have relied upon one Office Order which goes to show that the Nagarpalika has taken decision to pay minimum wages from 18th January 1989 to the Drivers. The substance of the submission is that as the Nagarpalika had already taken a decision and there was already an office order in this regard, it was a matter of implementing the same and since they did not implement, they were left with no other option but to approach the authority under Section 33C(1) of the Act. 2. It is further contended that the orders passed by the Labour Court are just and proper and they are in accordance with law, more particularly, Section 33C(1)of the Act. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the rival contentions of the respective counsels appearing for the parties, I am of the view that all these four petitions can be disposed of on a very short count without going into the merits of the legal contentions which have been raised by the respective counsel. It is very clear from the orders passed by the Labour Court that the petitioner – Nagarpalika, after filing the reply to each of the applications preferred by the respondents-workmen, failed thereafter to appear and contest the applications. The petitioner – Nagarpalika, for the reasons best known to it, did not bother to lead any oral evidence or even cross-examine the workmen. The petitioner – Nagarpalika, for the reasons best known to it, did not bother to lead any oral evidence or even cross-examine the workmen. No steps were taken to controvert the documentary evidence adduced by the workmen. In short, the entire proceedings after the stage of filing of the reply went ex-parte. This has been one of the contentions of the petitioner – Nagarpalika. I am of the view that the petitioner – Nagarpalika ought not to have preferred these petitions challenging the orders passed by the Labour Court without availing of the alternative remedy available under the Industrial Disputes (Gujarat) Rules, 1966. In my opinion, there is an efficacious alternative remedy in the form of Rules 26A and 26B of the Rules of 1966 (for short, 'the Rules of 1966'). They are reproduced herein below: “26A. Setting aside ex-parte orders, awards and reports. 1. On an application made within thirty days from the date of knowledge of an ex-parte order, award or report by the party concerned, the board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, for sufficient cause; set aside after notice to the opposite party such order, award, or report as the case may be. (2) The Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, or Arbitrator may on sufficient cause being shown, extend the period referred to in sub-rule(1). (3) An application under sub-rule (1) shall be supported by an affidavit. 26B. Stay of operation of awards. The Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator shall have the power to stay the operation of an award conditionally or otherwise in appropriate cases, until the application for setting aside ex-parte orders is disposed off finally.” I am of the view that the petitioner – Nagarpalika ought to have preferred applications before the Labour Court praying for setting aside the ex-parte orders after assigning sufficient cause for not appearing before the Labour Court. Bare reading of rule 26A(2) of the Rules of 1966 would also suggest that the Labour Court has got powers to extend the period referred to in sub-rule (1) on sufficient cause being shown. Rule 26B of the Rules of 1966 also empowers the Labour Court to stay the operation of any order passed by the Labour Court ex-parte, until the application for setting aside ex-parte orders is disposed of finally. The position of law in this regard is also well-settled. Rule 26B of the Rules of 1966 also empowers the Labour Court to stay the operation of any order passed by the Labour Court ex-parte, until the application for setting aside ex-parte orders is disposed of finally. The position of law in this regard is also well-settled. The Supreme Court has, in a recent pronouncement in the matter of Transport and Dock Workers Union and others v/s. Mumbai Port Trust and another, reported in 2011(2) SCC 575 , come down very heavily on the High Courts entertaining writ petitions where alternative remedies are available. In paragraph 14 of the judgment, the Apex Court has observed as under: “In our opinion the writ petition filed by the appellants should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction, and the discretion should not ordinarily be exercised if there is an alternative remedy available to the appellant. In this case there was a clear alternative remedy available to the appellant by raising an industrial dispute and hence we fail to understand why the High Court entertained the writ petition. It seems to us that some High Courts by adopting an over liberal approach are unnecessarily adding to their load of arrears instead of observing judicial discipline in following settled legal principles. However, we may also consider the case on merits.” In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that interest of justice would be served if the petitioner – Nagarpalika is relegated to avail of the alternative remedy under the Rules as stated above. All the four petitions are disposed of with the following directions:- (1) The petitioner – Nagarpalika may file appropriate applications under Rule 26A of the Rules of 1966 before the Labour Court praying for setting aside the ex-parte order, within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of this order. It will also open for the petitioner – Nagarpalika to prefer appropriate applications under Rule 26B of the Rules of 1966praying for stay of the operation of the ex-parte orders till the applications under Rule 26A of the Rules of 1966 are finally disposed of. It will also open for the petitioner – Nagarpalika to prefer appropriate applications under Rule 26B of the Rules of 1966praying for stay of the operation of the ex-parte orders till the applications under Rule 26A of the Rules of 1966 are finally disposed of. (2) The Labour Court, on filing of such applications, shall decide the same in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the respondents-workmen, within a period of six weeks thereafter. (3) The Labour Court shall decide such applications which may be preferred by the petitioner – Nagarpalika without being influenced by the present order as this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival claims and contentions. All the four petitions stand disposed of. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent only. No order as to cost.